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ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades the corporatist-continental welfare states o f France and 
Germany have come under strong budgetary stress. As social expenditure accounts for 
around half o f public spending in both countries, its retrenchment has been prominent 
on the political agenda. However, governments seeking to contain social spending face 
the problem that due to the institutional characteristics o f the countries’ social insurance 
programmes, a large share of the social budget is pre-committed and largely outside 
their control.
This study analyses how France and Germany have dealt with the strong pressures for 
retrenchment on the one hand, and high barriers for reform on the other between 1990 
and 2005. By identifying systematic links between specific institutional commitment 
devices, cost-containment strategies and outcomes, it sheds light on the causal 
mechanisms behind the concept of path-dependency. It demonstrates that contrary to 
common perceptions, the de-facto degree o f fiscal commitment in the French and 
German welfare states differs quite considerably between insurance sectors and 
individual schemes. These differences have a systematic effect on the degree to which 
the governments in both countries have regained influence over the determination of 
spending in these schemes and therefore over their social budgets.
According to the ‘old politics’ of the welfare state tradition and fiscal institutionalism 
literature, the nationally distinct actor constellations with regard to corporatist relations 
and budgetary allocation processes in the two countries should lead to different reform 
developments. This study challenges these arguments and shows that the motives and 
influence of the identified actors are strongly mediated by sectoral institutions. This 
strengthens arguments for a closer combination of both ‘new’ and ‘old’ arguments in 
welfare reform research, as well as for a more differentiated, scheme-specific 
perspective in analysing path-dependent reform processes and institutional lock-in.
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1 Introduction
Focus of the Study
In April 1986, Germany was plastered by its Christian-Democratic and Liberal 
government with 15,000 campaign posters exclaiming “For one thing is certain: your 
pension!”.1 But during the following two decades, the average pension level for future 
generations of German pensioners was reduced from 70 to 43 percent o f former wages.2 
This is only one example of the widespread political practice to break former spending 
promises in the social sector -  often justified by the pressures resulting from 
‘unexpected’ external circumstances. In the eyes o f many commentators this 
development has contributed to the growing disenchantment with politics visible in 
many European countries.
Since the 1980s, the mature European welfare states have in fact come under strong 
budgetary and political stress (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Kuhnle 2000; Leibfried 2001; 
Pierson 2001a; Schmidt 2001). State revenues declined as a consequence o f staggering 
economic growth and rising unemployment since the 1990s. At the same time, spending 
demands increased due to a growing number of people being dependent on state 
benefits - the consequences o f both high unemployment as well as socio-demographic 
changes. These increasing demands for social provisions on the one hand, and the 
declining ability to finance them on the other, have created increasing difficulties for 
policymakers to ‘square the welfare circle’ (Bonoli et al. 2000). Consequently, social 
budget balances -  that is, the accounts of all social policy programmes - have 
increasingly turned negative. As social expenditure accounts for around half o f public 
spending in the EU-15 countries, these negative balances have contributed strongly to 
the increase o f state debt during the same period. Facing this ‘context of permanent 
austerity’ (Pierson 2001b: 417), welfare state retrenchment in the sense of cost 
containment has become an inevitable task for all countries.
At the same time, policymakers face strong barriers for change and their scope to act is 
often considerably restricted by existing commitments. Public spending in the welfare 
state is to a large degree pre-committed through laws, contracts and other legal 
obligations, which drastically limit the scope for policymakers to redistribute or restrain
1 “Denn eins ist sicher: die Rente!” (Norbert Blum, Minister for Employment and Social Affairs 1982- 
1998)
2 Pensions in the predominant Statutory Insurance Scheme (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung, GRV)
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spending (Ross 1997; Pierson 2001c). In fact, budgets in OECD countries only vary by 
less than 1 percent o f their macro structures annually (see Tsebelis and Chang 2004: 
459). In many respects, policymakers are therefore ‘heirs before they are choosers’ 
(Rose and Davies 1994: 1) and in a permanent conflict between pressures for change 
and obligations to fulfil the fiscal commitments o f their predecessors. This is 
particularly true for the social budget, where previous spending commitments play an 
extremely important role.
This study deals with mature welfare states’ dilemma of facing both increasing financial 
pressures for and strong barriers against reform. While Paul Pierson (1994; 1996) and 
others working in the ‘new politics’ tradition have analysed the path-dependent effect of 
existing institutions and policies, this study investigates not whether, but what forms of 
commitment determine institutional and policy ‘stickiness’. It then asks what the 
implications of different degrees of pre-commitment in insurance schemes are for the 
way policymakers deal with pressures for cost containment in these programmes. 
Secondly, the study examines what role domestic political factors, political ideologies 
and processes -  the focus o f the so-called ‘old’ school o f welfare state research as well 
as of the fiscal institutionalism literature - play for the direction and form of policy 
changes. Who are the supporters of cost containment and who are the opponents, and 
does their respective influence in the policymaking process have an impact on reform 
outcomes?
The main social insurance programmes in two corporatist-continental welfare states, 
France and Germany, form the basis for this research. Given their institutional 
characteristics, these programmes should according to the ‘new politics’ literature be 
particularly resistant to change. Contrary to this expectation, this study demonstrates 
that the de facto degree of fiscal commitment in the two countries differs quite 
considerably between sectors and individual insurance schemes, and that certain 
institutional elements are often not as committing as commonly perceived. It 
furthermore shows that overall in both France and Germany the degree o f fiscal 
commitment has been reduced between 1990 and 2005, which has increased the 
leverage of the central governments over social spending. But the study also identifies a 
systematic reform-blocking effect of high degrees o f fiscal commitment in both 
countries: policy sectors with an initially higher degree o f fiscal commitment see a 
smaller degree o f institutional and programmatic change. By identifying systematic
14
links between specific commitment devices, cost containment strategies and outcomes, 
the study illuminates the causal mechanisms behind these path-dependent 
developments.
According to the ‘old politics’ of the welfare state tradition and the budget literature, 
France and Germany differ considerably with respect to the motives and the influence 
of various political actors in social and fiscal policy reform processes. Accordingly, this 
should lead to nationally or temporarily distinct reform processes in the two countries. 
This study challenges these arguments and shows that the motives and influence o f the 
identified actors are strongly mediated by sectoral institutions. Depending on the 
respective institutionalisation of fiscal commitment, even a worsening o f the financial 
situation in insurance schemes can be in the interest of retrenchment advocates; 
moreover, the relative position of actors in insurance schemes can lead to unexpected 
coalitions between generally opposing interest groups. The study furthermore finds 
strong evidence that despite nationally distinct actor constellations, similar institutional 
constraints in individual social insurance sectors lead to similar reform processes in 
both countries. This strengthens arguments for a closer combination o f both ‘new’ and 
‘old’ arguments in welfare reform research, as well as for a more differentiated, 
scheme-specific perspective in analysing path-dependent reform processes and 
institutional lock-in.
Research Background
The question of how mature welfare states that belong to ‘corporatist-continental’ and 
‘social-democratic’ welfare families (see Esping-Andersen 1990) deal with increasing 
financial pressures has been the subject of an extensive series of research. In line with 
the literature about the convergence effects o f globalisation on state spending and 
taxation (Rodrik 1997; Garrett 2001; Genschel 2002), many scholars anticipated a 
convergence in fiscal policies and a ‘social dumping’ o f taxes and social security 
contributions as a consequence of the increased market integration and common 
monetary policy in EMU (e.g. Steinmo 1994; George and Taylor-Gooby 1996; Standing 
1997; Scharpf 1997; Ferrera et al. 2001). As a result they predicted a massive scaling 
back o f welfare provision in those countries with above average social expenditure. In 
contrast, the ‘models of capitalism’ literature argues that increasing internationalisation 
does not necessarily undermine the possibilities for distinct national economic and 
social policies because of mutual interdependencies between production and welfare
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regimes (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2001; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). What we 
know today is that there is no general downward trend in social expenditure (see Castles 
2004), and that countries have found very distinct ways of dealing with the financial 
pressures. How these divergent developments can be explained, however, is still very 
much subject of debate.
The most challenging theoretical argument against undifferentiated ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
arguments has been made in the ‘new politics o f the welfare state’ literature based on 
the work o f Paul Pierson (1994; 2001b). This literature explains the persistence o f 
welfare state spending even in times of austerity with the strong countervailing factors 
that push for the maintenance of social spending in mature welfare states. Pierson 
identified two main sources of the welfare state’s political resilience, of which the first 
one is ‘institutional stickiness’. The first aspect o f this stickiness is that welfare 
programmes are characterised by ‘increasing returns’, which means that the exit costs -  
i.e., the cost o f switching from one policy to some previously plausible alternative -  rise 
with time (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000a). Policies create political constituencies that 
benefit from the continuation of these policies and these groups strongly resist potential 
cutbacks. Since they are likely to be better organised and informed than the general tax 
payer who would benefit from lower taxes (Bonoli et al. 2000), these tend to be highly 
influential in their opposition to change. Therefore, institutional change is typically 
incremental and path-dependent as incumbent decisionmakers are constrained by the 
actions o f their predecessors, even though they may have the formal authority to enact 
change (North 1990; Rose and Davies 1994). A second aspect o f institutional stickiness 
concerns formal and informal ‘veto points’ in a political system in the form of 
institutional arrangements such as federalism, bicameralism or coalition governments. 
Since veto points increase the number of players whose agreement is necessary for 
reform, they limit the potential for institutional change (Tsebelis 2002). In addition to 
these arguments o f institutional stickiness, the new politics of the welfare state literature 
has also paid strong attention to the electoral incentives of politicians (Pierson 1994; 
Ross 1997; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Assuming that policymakers are seeking to 
avoid blame, the success of retrenchment advocates will vary with the chances for 
lowering the visibility o f reforms -  which, again, depends mainly on the design of 
political institutions and the resulting concentration o f political power.
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Identifying the importance of both structural and actor-centred factors for welfare state 
reforms, the ‘new politics’ literature has made an important contribution to the analysis 
of divergent retrenchment patterns. It provides a theoretical framework for explaining 
why mature welfare states under strong and similar pressure for welfare state reform 
respond differently to these challenges depending on their institutional settings and the 
extent of past commitments. Institutional stickiness and blame avoidance impede a race- 
to-the-bottom as a response to pressure. Consequently, ‘what we can observe are efforts 
to renegotiate and restructure the welfare state but not to dismantle it’ (Pierson 2001b: 
14). But while the existing retrenchment literature offers an encompassing framework 
for explaining institutional resistance and the incentive for politicians not to pursue 
retrenchment, it has difficulties to explain the successful cutback initiatives and policy 
change which are arguably underway also in countries with apparently high barriers for 
reform. In most West European welfare states, the reform o f  social programmes has 
been on top of the political agenda for the last two decades and has lead to considerable 
changes in welfare provisions. These reform and retrenchment patterns cannot be 
explained by the strong abilities o f welfare constituencies and institutional impediments 
alone. A number o f welfare reform scholars have therefore criticised the ‘new politics’ 
approach for lacking the explanatory power to analyse the ongoing reform processes 
(e.g., von Kersbergen 2000; Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002; Natali and Rhodes 
2004a).
This thesis addresses two aspects of the ‘new politics’ approach’s shortcomings: first, 
there is some lack o f understanding in the literature about the exact character o f the 
institutional and political elements that create the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and 
spending for certain policies. What exactly are the institutional and policy 
characteristics that lead to reform processes developing in path-dependent ways? What 
are the factors that enable cost containment measures even in highly pre-committed 
environments? The explanation for retrenchment processes offered by the ‘new politics’ 
literature is that politicians avoid visible and radical cuts in order to avoid blame. But 
this account does not explain the far-reaching and highly visible reform processes which 
have taken place in most developed welfare states during the last two decades. 
Furthermore, it contains various argumentative contradictions: according to Pierson 
(1994), the concentration of political authority and a low degree of institutional 
fragmentation should facilitate the development of retrenchment strategies. This 
positive relationship between concentrated authority and fiscal discipline has also been
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stressed by the budget literature (Strauch and von Hagen 1999; Buti and Sapir 2002). At 
the same time the ‘blame avoidance’ logic (Weaver 1986) posits that politicians have 
strong incentives to avoid cutbacks especially in areas in which they have concentrated 
power, as this in turn concentrates responsibility such that cutbacks might lead to 
electoral backlashes. This means that policymakers should refrain from retrenching in 
areas in which they have the power to act, while they cannot act in those areas in which 
they seek to cut back. But if this is true, how can we explain ongoing welfare state 
reforms and cost containment measures? Attempts to closer examine the effect o f  
organisational structures and authority to act on changes in welfare policy have so far 
been rather limited. Bonoli, George and Taylor-Gooby raise this question, but arrive at 
the same contradiction of effects as outlined above: if governments control finances 
directly, they are in a strong position to retrench -  but as conversely concentrated power 
also concentrates accountability, they tend to refrain from attacking exactly those 
schemes (see Bonoli et al. 2000: 140ff.). Kittel and Obinger (2003), focusing 
specifically on the effects of contribution-financed social insurance programmes, also 
point to this unresolved question:
“If the organisation o f welfare programmes is delegated to external institutions such as social 
insurance funds, financial problems are likely to be visible at a fairly early stage because 
demands for additional funding from the government budget must be made publicly. Hence 
cost pressures might be more likely to be tackled in a technical and problem-oriented way. In 
contrast, if  social expenditures are hidden in the government budget, vested interests may 
have much more leeway to block reform because they can more easily embark on policies o f  
blame avoidance. However, this conflicts with the argument that tax-financed systems are 
easier to change because they are more open to government discretion” (Kittel and Obinger 
2003: 42).
These contradictions show the limitations of existing theories in explaining 
contemporary retrenchment developments. The concept of institutional change and 
lock-in as outlined in the new politics literature consequently needs further 
specification.
This study contributes to the existing historical-institutionalist literature by providing 
such a specification. In its analysis of welfare reform processes, it identifies the 
elements o f social insurance schemes that create institutional and political stickiness, 
and demonstrates their effect on fiscal welfare reforms. In contrast to former studies on
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the effect o f political macro-structures (e.g., the number of veto players on the central 
state level, coalition governments, federalism, or electoral institutions, see Huber et al. 
1993; Swank 2001; Siegel 2002) on the development of welfare spending and the 
likelihood o f reform, its focus lies on identifying micro-level causal mechanisms 
between alternative institutional designs and reform developments (see Hacker 2005; 
Starke 2006). For this purpose it analyses the degree to which social insurance 
institution and policies are in fact affected by pre-commitment on four dimensions, 
which are the administrative and budgetary regulations o f the insurance schemes as well 
their respective revenue structures and benefit regulations.
The results show that the assumption o f general high degrees o f fiscal pre-commitment 
in the French and German social insurance schemes is not correct. Instead, the degree of 
de facto commitment in both countries differs considerably between sectors and 
individual insurance schemes. Contrasting measurements of pre-commitment in 1990 
with those in 2005 shows that in both countries the central governments have reduced 
fiscal pre-commitments during this period and have therefore regained control over their 
social insurance budgets. In this context, the study identifies systematic links between 
degrees o f commitment on the individual four dimensions in 1990 and the extent and 
form of cost containment strategies in the subsequent 15 years: high degrees o f pre­
commitment on the administrative and spending dimension are rarely affected by 
successive reforms, whereas commitment on the budgetary and revenue dimensions has 
been reduced more strongly. These results demonstrate that specific institutional and 
policy elements create more effective fiscal commitment and institutional ‘lock-in’ as 
others, which helps to shed light on the causal mechanisms behind path-dependence.
The second criticism on which this study focuses is the apparent failing o f the 
retrenchment literature to take into account the so-called ‘old’ arguments o f welfare 
reform analyses. Pierson and other ’new politics’ scholars have argued that class-based 
power resources approaches (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1979; 1983) and partisan arguments 
(Iversen and Cusack 1998; Hicks and Kenworthy 1998; Garrett 2001) have contributed 
to the explanation of divergent welfare state growth, but fail to explain welfare state 
retrenchment. But an increasing number of scholars have argued that these explanatory 
factors, particularly the role o f trade-unions and corporatist relationships, are still 
important elements in reform processes and should not be ignored (e.g., Scarbrough
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2000; Reynoud 2000; Beland 2001; Jochem and Siegel 2003). In some countries, the 
social partners have played an important role in negotiated reforms, so-called ‘social 
pacts’, which, in some cases, have contained cutbacks in welfare benefits (Ebbinghaus 
and Hassel 2000; see Siegel 2005 for a sceptical view). The proponents of the ‘old’ 
arguments argue that in order to explain welfare reforms it is important to identify who 
the advocates of retrenchment are, and how these actors pursue their motives.
The aim of this study is to assess the explanatory power o f the different arguments put 
forth in the debate on welfare state reform. For this purpose, it contrasts the ‘old 
politics’ arguments on the importance of interest group strength and party ideology and 
arguments from the budget literature with the institutional arguments o f the ‘new 
politics’ literature. The first argument emphasises the role o f corporatist actors and 
corporatist institutions in welfare reform processes. There has been a revival o f power- 
resource arguments in the ‘neo-corporatism’ and ‘social pacts’ literatures, which 
underlines the importance of social partner positions and involvement for the 
explanation for the success or failure o f social policy reforms (e.g., Crouch and Streeck 
1997; Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000; Rhodes 2001; Jochem and Siegel 2003). The social 
partners play an important role in the management of the insurance schemes in both 
France and Germany, but the detailed effects of corporatist institutions on expenditure 
developments and the extent of retrenchment measures are still not adequately 
understood. As the two countries differ considerably with regard to the mode of  
interactions between the social partners and the degree to which they are consulted in 
social policymaking processes, we should expect nationally distinct effects on reform 
processes. But the study shows that that the effect o f corporatist relationships on 
insurance reforms is strongly mediated by the existing institutions and very distinctive 
for the individual schemes. Despite nationally distinct actor constellations, similar 
institutional constraints in social insurance sectors lead to similar reform processes in 
both countries: the specific position o f the social partners in individual insurance 
schemes strongly affects their policy positions and can lead to them finding common 
ground despite strong conflicts on the national level.
The second argument with which the ‘new’ and ‘old’ politics hypotheses will be 
contrasted derives from the literature on the effects o f budgetary institutions and 
processes on fiscal policy (e.g., von Hagen and Harden 1996; Poterba and von Hagen
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1999; Buti and Sapir 2002). This literature analyses the relative position and strength of 
retrenchment advocates in governments and its implications for expenditure 
developments. Although highly relevant, the hypotheses and results o f the budget 
literature have so far been rarely connected to the analysis of social expenditure 
developments and welfare reforms. Also with respect to this literature, we should expect 
nationally distinct reform processes in France and Germany as the position o f the 
French finance minister in the policymaking process is said to be much stronger than is 
the case for its German counterpart (see von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden 1996). 
But similar to the effect o f corporatist relations, the study finds strong evidence that 
both the motivations o f the retrenchment advocates in government and their influence 
on reform processes depend strongly on the specific institutional and programmatic 
characteristics o f individual insurance schemes: the higher the financial stake o f the 
central government in insurance schemes, the stronger is its interest for self-motivated 
intervention in the schemes.
The third argument discussed in this study stresses the effect o f different party 
ideologies on welfare reform outcomes and on overall social expenditure cutbacks (e.g., 
Schmidt 1996 and Cusack 1999). The traditional hypothesis has been that leftist parties 
have more expansionary tendencies with regard to fiscal policies because o f their strong 
links with unions and other labour institutions who favour social spending. In contrast, 
conservative parties are expected to be more capable o f restricting public spending and 
to resist pressures to expand social protection. Whether such arguments matter when 
strong external economical and financial pressures restrict the scope of policymakers, is 
a matter o f debate. The study finds no evidence in the French and German reform 
processes which would support such a causal connection, but instead can only detect a 
procrastinatory effect of left-wing governments on the timing o f retrenchment measures.
In addition to the question which factors influence welfare state reform, there has been 
much debate about what ‘welfare retrenchment’ exactly means and how it can be 
measured. Welfare retrenchment is not synonymous with the mere cutting back of social 
expenditure, but also encompasses reforms that according to Pierson (1994: 17) 
“restructure welfare state programmes to conform more closely to the residual welfare 
state model, or alter the political environment in ways that enhance the probability of 
such outcomes in the future”. Different from previous studies, this analysis employs a
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definition o f ‘institutional change’ that encompasses both these direct and future 
implications of policy measures as well as their effect on the future likelihood of 
change.
By measuring the extent of retrenchment through the implications o f political decisions 
for the degree of pre-commitment of policies, it is not only possible to assess both 
immediate and future implications of these decisions, but also to incorporate 
manifestations of less visible changes. These are an important element often overlooked 
by studies that focus on expenditure developments or institutional and programmatic 
changes. As publications about institutional analysis underscore, the common 
perception o f institutional change is often too narrow to capture all retrenchment 
processes in welfare states (Hacker 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005). One example is the 
cutback o f social programmes by not adapting them to changing economic and social 
circumstances, a policy of so-called ‘political non-decisions’ (see Alber 1982: 204). 
Similarly, Hacker (2004; 2005) as well as Streeck and Thelen (2005) point to the fact 
that crucial policy changes can derive not only from large-scale legislative reform, but 
also from a series of incremental, semi-autonomous processes. Instead o f directly 
attacking the formal operations and structures o f institutions, policymakers “may seek 
to shift those institutions’ ground-level operation, prevent their adaptation to shifting 
external circumstances, or build new institutions on top o f them. These are strategies for 
change that are little studies and even less well understood” (Hacker 2004: 3). By 
employing a more encompassing definition of welfare state reform, this study sheds 
light on some o f these issues.
Methodology
To study the effects o f fiscal pre-commitment on welfare reform, this analysis draws on 
two comparative case studies of the main social insurance schemes in France and 
Germany. Because social insurance schemes represent the strongest form of budgetary 
and political commitment in welfare states, it concentrates on the main social insurance 
schemes in the three sectors pensions, health and unemployment. Together, they 
account by far for the largest share of total social expenditure in the two countries and 
are also their fastest growing component. The ability to control spending in these 
schemes is therefore of central importance for policymakers seeking to regain control 
over their social budgets.
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The analysis of two cases suggests possible problems of over-determination, as a 
number o f independent variables are tested on only a very limited number of cases. The 
study avoids this problem by separately analysing the main schemes in the three 
insurance sectors: all o f these schemes have different characteristics with regard to 
fiscal commitment, and for each of the schemes the effect o f these commitments in 
times o f fiscal austerity is analysed individually. This means that effectively seven 
different cases are analysed (the main insurance schemes in each o f the three sectors, 
plus additionally the supplementary pension insurance schemes in France). In order to 
show that the fiscal commitment framework is also useful to explain developments in 
welfare states with very different institutional characteristics, the results of the study are 
furthermore contrasted with a short analysis of reform developments in the UK during 
the same time period (see Chapter 8).
In order to assess the degree of policy pre-commitment in the individual insurance 
schemes, the analysis uses an index which measures fiscal commitment on four 
different dimensions o f these schemes: the administrative structure o f insurance 
schemes and their degree of managerial independence, the extent o f their budgetary 
independence and extent o f fiscal constraints imposed on them, their revenue structure, 
and finally, their spending structure in terms o f contribution-based eligibility and 
reciprocity. Some aspects o f this index have been comparatively analysed or measured 
before in the context of welfare state analysis, as for example the representation of 
social partners in social insurance administration (e.g., Mosley et al. 1998) or the share 
of contribution financing in financing welfare provision (e.g., Kittel and Obinger 2003). 
In contrast, other aspects -  particularly those on the budgetary dimension -  have not 
been subject to a comprehensive comparative analysis before. Data had therefore to be 
collected from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources (see below). The 
measurement of the respective degrees of fiscal commitment in the schemes is carried 
out by assigning ordinal values for each dimension. The values on the four dimensions 
are successively aggregated, which provides a measurement o f the overall degree of 
fiscal commitment in insurance schemes.
Similar methodological approaches have been applied in regulatory analysis or the 
fiscal institutionalism literature (see Cukierman et al. 1992; von Hagen 1992; Gilardi 
2002), but the attempt to empirically assess the institutional stickiness o f welfare 
programmes by taking into account not only procedural barriers, but also factors which
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generate political transaction costs, is unique. It is however important to stress that a 
truly objective measurement of fiscal commitment is difficult to achieve, as institutional 
characteristics are ‘always only constraints but no determinants of actions’ (see Pierson 
2000b: 810). The applied measurement approach is useful in this respect as it makes it 
possible to assess the extent to which actions are constrained, to compare degrees of 
commitment between insurance schemes and also to measure change over time. The 
analysis o f reform processes in the French and German insurance schemes furthermore 
provides strong evidence that the index is indeed an effective indicator for institutional 
stickiness.
The empirical evidence for the study is drawn from various sources: the information 
about the specific institutional, administrative and budgetary regulations stems from 
statutes and other publications of the specific insurance schemes, the Social Security 
Codes and government as well as academic publications. Data published either directly 
by insurance institutions, by the statistical or audit bodies of the national governments 
as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is 
used to analyse changes in revenue structures as well as the impact of policy changes on 
spending. Changes in benefit regulations are analysed by using mainly legal information 
from the Social Security Codes but also from comparative sources such as ILO or 
MISSOC as well as secondary literature. Press statements, parliamentary minutes and 
newspaper articles form the basis for the analysis o f the positions of interest groups and 
political parties as well the political debates accompanying reform processes.
Case Selection:
The case-study based research design applied in this study is best suited to analyse the 
causal mechanisms behind the social insurance reform processes, as it is necessary to 
capture the complexity o f the institutional and programmatic structures as well as 
reform measures which are focus of this research project. A case-study design 
furthermore allows for the necessary in-depth comparisons of the political forces as well 
as reform debates behind these measures. The two cases selected are France and 
Germany, two countries whose welfare states belong to the group of corporatist- 
continental schemes as classified by Esping-Andersen (1990). The new politics 
literature predicts that this group o f welfare states should be particularly affected by the 
counter-pressures for change: while tax-based universal and liberal welfare systems 
usually centralise policy formation and implementation within governmental
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institutions, corporatist-continental welfare systems, which are mainly contribution- 
financed, decentralise authority over their social insurance schemes to networks of 
quasi-public administrative bodies comprised o f labour, business and the government. 
Those administrative bodies often also dispose o f independent budgetary authority and 
an off-budget status. The emphasis of the spending structure is on maintaining class 
differentials, closely linked to occupational status and with a high degree of 
contribution-based reciprocity. Through these institutional features, policymakers have 
purposefully committed budgetary resources as well as themselves to certain policies in 
order to achieve higher credibility and to limit their successors’ scope for policy change. 
It should consequently be difficult for retrenchment advocates to access these funds.
Both Germany and France share these institutional features of their social insurance 
schemes. At the same time, however, the two countries differ with regard to their 
framework o f corporatist relationships as well as the respective institutional strength of 
retrenchment advocates in their budgetary processes, factors that have been particularly 
stressed by the ‘old politics’ and the budget literature. With regard to party politics, the 
ruling party changed twice in both countries from right-wing to left-wing ones and back 
during the analysed period from 1990-2005. This makes them also suited for the 
analysis o f partisanship arguments and we should expect time-specific effects if  the 
hypotheses about the influence of party ideology are correct.
France and Germany faced similar external as well as internal financial pressures during 
the period under study. After 1990, strong financial pressures developed in France and 
Germany as both countries struggled with economic adaptation processes and domestic 
financial challenges. Besides these domestic pressures, both countries also faced 
external constraints as they needed to comply with restrictive deficit and debt criteria if  
they wanted to join the European Monetary Union by 1999.3 Initially, France had been 
hit harder by economic difficulties and increasing unemployment, which had a negative 
effect on tax revenues while simultaneously increasing state expenditure. Those 
developments peaked in 1993 when the central government deficit reached a record 
level o f 6 percent o f GDP. The situation subsequently improved and the general 
goverritnent deficit was cut by an average o f 0.9 points o f GDP in the following four 
years, and in 1997 the important Maastricht-limit o f 3.0 percent was achieved. But the
3 Besides price and currency stability and moderate interest rates, the 1991 Maastricht Treaty required 
from countries to avoid excessive deficit positions (defined against a reference value for deficits o f 3 
percent and for gross public debt o f 60 percent o f GDP).
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weak economic recovery in the mid-1990s was only short-lived (see OECD 2000). In 
the wake of a new economic slowdown, fiscal policy was relaxed again after 2001 and 
the Maastricht deficit criteria were repeatedly missed. In 2004 the government started 
new consolidation efforts, but the fiscal improvement remained moderate and deficits 
were again high with 3.6 percent of GDP in 2004 and 3 percent in 2005 (see OECD 
2005a: 44). Overall, the indebtedness of the French state increased from 28 percent of 
GDP in 1991 to a staggering 54 percent in 2005 (see Graph 1-1).
Graph 1-1 Central Government Balance and Overall Debt in France and Germany
as Percentage of GDP 1991-2005
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While the situation had been more positive for Germany at the end of the 1980s, 
reunification in 1990 and a subsequent economic slowdown also led to a quick 
deterioration of public finances. Massive transfers to the new Eastern Lander took their 
toll on government finances, a development which was augmented by a strong increase 
in unemployment as economic growth staggered from 1993 onwards. In an effort to 
meet the Maastricht criteria, budget deficits were reduced. In 2000 the overall balance 
even turned positive, although this was due to unusually high economic growth and 
high but nonrecurring state revenues from the sale of UMTS licenses. But the financial 
recovery was short-lived and deficit targets were repeatedly missed again. This was also 
due to the fact that income tax reductions, intended to boost investment and spending, 
were not sufficiently offset on the spending side (see OECD 2006a: 27). The effect on
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public finances was dramatic: central government debt doubled from 20 to 40 percent o f 
GDP between 1991 and 2005 (see Graph 1-1). According to the Maastricht definition, 
which also takes sub-national government debt into account, the debt o f the German 
state even increased by 28 percentage points to 68 percent o f GDP during this period.
The Financial Situation of the Social Budgets
A major cause o f this severe deterioration in the French and German public finances 
was increasing deficits in the countries’ public social insurance schemes, which 
constitute by far the largest share of the social budget. In 1991, social expenditure 
accounted for nearly 40 percent of total government spending in both countries.4 This 
illustrates how significant the financial situation of the welfare state is in determining 
the situation of overall public finances. In both countries, the financial situation in the 
social insurance schemes deteriorated strongly after 1990, and besides a short-lived 
recovery at the end o f the 1990s, the balances have been continuously negative since 
(see Graphs 1-2 and 1-3). Cost containment in these schemes has therefore been on top 
of the political agenda since the beginning o f the 1990s.
In France, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur’s (1993-95) efforts to balance the budget 
had focused on reducing social spending, and included a major pension reform in 1993 
and various austerity measures in the healthcare system. But while the financial 
situation in the unemployment insurance scheme improved strongly in 1994, other 
social budget deficits, particularly in the health sector, continued to grow, and Balladur 
had to resign as a result of public pressure in 1995. When President Chirac appointed 
his successor, Alain Juppe (1995-97), he announced that, in line with the aim to reduce 
budget deficits below the Maastricht threshold, a major focus o f the new government 
would again be the reduction of social spending (see Levy 2000: 340). But attempts to 
continue and intensify the first reform steps undertaken by Balladur resulted in massive 
strikes and the government was forced to back down. Early elections in 1997 brought a 
new left-wing government under Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (1997-2002). Benefiting 
from the improvement o f the economic situation, his government was initially more 
successful in balancing the social insurance accounts, and even achieved overall 
positive results in 1999 and 2000. But the success was short-lived and with slowing 
economic growth the deficits returned on a bigger scale than ever before. With the new 
conservative government in 2002, headed by Prime Minister Raffarin (2002-2005),
4 Data from OECD 2006b.
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further attempts to deal with the structural deficits were undertaken and wide-reaching 
pension and health reforms were enacted in 2003 and 2004. Expectations regarding the 
mid-term effects of these reforms had been high, but despite a slight improvement of the 
situation in 2005, insurance spending remained a major concern for the government -  
particularly as demographic developments were predicted to further worsen the situation 
in the medium and long term.
Graph 1-2 Balance Main Insurance Schemes France 1990-2005
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In Germany, increasing deficits in the social budget also became a pressing political 
issue after 1991. Not only did these deficits contribute to overall debt levels and thus 
posed a threat to the goal of meeting the Maastricht criteria, but the government often 
had to cover social insurance deficits with subsidies. At the beginning of the 1990s the 
public insurance schemes had been burdened with massive extra spending as schemes 
were expanded to East Germany after unification. After 1992, however, the focus 
shifted towards curbing expenditures. A first attempt to address the spiraling costs was 
the 1993 ‘Consolidation Programme’ which was intended to save up to €13 bn 
annually.5 But the reduction of deficits was only short-lived and the three main social
5 Spar-, Konsolidierungs- und Wachstumsprogramm (SKWP).
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insurance sectors reported record deficits of €14 bn in 1996. With its ‘Programme for 
Growth and Employment’ announced in April 1996, the Kohl government (1982-98) 
wanted to reduce spending by the unprecedented amount of €38 bn, one third of which 
was to be achieved by cuts in social insurance programmes. The hope was that this 
would allow the combined social insurance contribution level, which had risen from 35 
per cent of gross wages in 1989 to 41 per cent in 1996, to be pushed below 40 percent 
(BMAS 1996; Clasen 1997b: 73). This reform programme, combined with a coinciding 
short-term economic upturn, resulted in an overall positive balance for the three 
insurance sectors in 1999. But this overall positive result was only achieved as surpluses 
in the health insurance counterbalanced the high deficits of the Federal Employment 
Agency. This fiscal recovery was again short-lived and deficits in 2002 nearly reached 
the record levels of 1996, increasing pressures on the Red-Green government under 
Chancellor Schroder (1998-2005) to contain spending. Although the fiscal situation 
improved in 2004 due to positive balance of the health insurance schemes, it remained 
difficult overall when Schroder’s government was replaced by the Grand Coalition 
between CDU/CSU and SPD under Chancellor Merkel in 2005.
Graph 1-3 Balance Main Social Insurance Schemes Germany 1991-2005
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In sum, France and Germany are two countries with very high pressures for cost 
containment in their social insurance schemes. This makes it possible to control for this 
factor as a possible alternative explanation for differences in reform developments. 
According to ‘new’ politics arguments, the institutional characteristics of the public 
insurance schemes in both countries should create very high barriers for change. This 
should therefore result in only very limited retrenchment measures in both countries 
despite the strong financial pressures. But this assumption is challenged by arguments 
from the ‘old’ politics of welfare state research and the literature on budget processes, 
which highlight differences between the two countries: France and Germany differ with 
respect to the involvement of social partners in social policymaking and interaction 
patterns between employers and unions. While in Germany consensual decisionmaking 
between the social partners and the government has a long-standing tradition, the 
French corporatist relations are usually highly conflictual and the social partners are not 
always consulted in policymaking processes. Besides their differences in corporatist 
relations, the two countries differ furthermore with respect to the strength of 
retrenchment advocates in their governments. As identified by the budget literature, the 
position o f the French finance minister in policy decisions is much stronger than in 
Germany. Due to those differences, we should see stronger cost containment in France 
than in Germany and not a similar degree o f ‘lock-in’ as the ‘new politics’ 
argumentation states. These contrasting arguments leave many open questions with 
regard to how to explain social policy reforms in the times of fiscal austerity prevalent 
between 1990 and 2005.
Outline
Chapter two outlines the different competing theories o f welfare state retrenchment in 
more detail. It firstly discusses how institutional and policy design can cause the 
development o f intentional and unintentional commitment to spend for particular 
purposes, and identifies the various elements in welfare states which create fiscal pre­
commitment. Based on this discussion, it develops hypotheses about the likely 
development o f social insurance reforms in both France and Germany during the period 
of fiscal austerity prevalent after 1990. Those hypotheses are then contrasted with ‘old 
politics o f the welfare state’ theories as well as with those o f the fiscal institutionalism 
literature, according to which we should expect nationally and temporarily distinct 
reform developments in the two countries. All these hypotheses are successively 
confronted with social expenditure developments in the two countries between 1990 and
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2005, which seem to indicate that the French and German welfare states are indeed 
‘frozen* due to their high degrees of fiscal pre-commitment.
Chapter three presents a four-dimensional approach to measure the degrees o f fiscal 
commitment in social insurance schemes. This is applied in Chapter four to the main 
healthcare, pension and unemployment insurance schemes in France and Germany in 
1990 -  the point in time after which financial pressures in both countries started to 
increase considerably. The analysis shows that the de facto degree o f fiscal commitment 
in the two countries differs quite considerably between sectors and individual insurance 
schemes. These outcomes are then contrasted with the commitment scores of the 
schemes in 2005, which provides first evidence about the reform developments: while 
in both countries governments seem to have regained influence over the determination 
of social insurance spending, there are considerable differences between insurance 
schemes which indicate a systematic effect o f institutional lock-in. These results 
illustrate the necessity of a further in-depth, sector-specific analysis o f the reform 
developments in the two countries.
Chapters five, six and seven investigate the developments in the French and German 
pension, health and unemployment insurance sectors from 1990 to 2005. The chapters 
assess to what extent the differences in the overall commitment scores between the 
schemes, but also the differences on the individual programme-specific dimensions of 
this commitment, mattered for reform processes and outcomes in the respective sectors. 
Furthermore, they analyse the predominant modes o f change and the implications of 
reforms for the degrees o f fiscal commitment. Finally, they assess the role of corporatist 
relationships, the institutional strength o f retrenchment advocates in government and 
party politics in the reform developments.
Chapter eight draws the results of the sectoral analyses together and provides a 
comparative assessment to what degree ‘new’ and ‘old’ arguments as well as those of 
the budget literature are suited to explain the observed reform patterns. It then contrasts 
these results with a short analysis of reform developments during the same period in the 
UK, which has a welfare state with very different institutional characteristics compared 
to the two corporatist cases France and Germany.
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Chapter nine summaries the results of the thesis and outlines their implications for 
welfare state and fiscal policy research. It furthermore discusses the future implications 
of the identified social insurance reform patterns for social risk protection and public 
spending control.
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Part I
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2 Explaining Social Policy Reforms in Times of Fiscal 
Austerity
There is no lack of variety regarding theories trying to explain differing developments 
of welfare states in times of fiscal pressures. They have been tested on an array of 
different cases in a large number o f studies, applying varying methods from 
comparative case study designs to large-n statistical analyses. But as outlined in Chapter 
1, there still exist many contradictions about the influence o f institutional and actor- 
centred factors on welfare reforms, particularly when it comes to the explanation of  
divergent developments between countries of the same ‘welfare family’.
The following chapter will present some of the most prominent welfare reform theories, 
and will specify the respective hypotheses regarding the likely development of social 
insurance reforms in France and Germany between 1990 and 2005. The first part o f the 
chapter deals with what has become known as the ‘new politics o f the welfare state’ 
theories. The chronological reversal of starting with ‘new’ theories before the ‘old’ ones 
is deliberate, as firstly the pioneering ‘new politics’ literature is not as new anymore as 
the term suggests (see e.g. Pierson 1996), and as secondly this approach has become the 
most widely accepted one for explaining reforms during periods of fiscal austerity. This 
chapter specifies the concept behind the institutional lock-in arguments of this literature, 
and identifies commitment devices in policymaking. Subsequently, it describes what 
role such commitment devices play in welfare states and formulates hypotheses 
regarding the likely reform development in social policy programmes with a high 
degree o f commitment. As both the French and German social insurance schemes are 
generally characterised as particularly strongly affected by pre-commitment and 
resulting institutional lock, we should accordingly expect similar developments in the 
two countries’ social insurance schemes.
The second part of the chapter presents theories which, instead of focusing on 
institutional factors which hinder reforms, explain divergent welfare reform processes 
by stressing the motivations and influence o f political actors in decisionmaking 
processes. The first of these theories is one of the most prominent representatives of the 
‘old’ theories o f welfare state research, and is based on the so-called ‘power-resources 
approach’. It stresses the involvement and positions o f the social partners in social 
policymaking as factors explaining divergent welfare developments. This seemingly
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‘old’ theory is of interest for this study as in the last few years a series of new literature 
has been published stressing the revival o f ‘social pacts’ and ‘neo-corporatism’ and their 
importance for explaining the success or failure o f social policy reforms. This chapter 
specifies the hypotheses resulting from this literature for the French and German cases. 
In contrast to the hypotheses derived from the ‘new politics’ arguments, those based on 
the involvement and policy positions of corporatist actors should lead us to expect 
different outcomes in France and Germany as the two countries differ considerably in 
this respect.
The second theory outlined is derived from the ‘fiscal institutionalism’ literature, which 
stresses the relative strength of cost containment advocates in the governmental budget 
allocation process as an explanatory factor for fiscal policy outcomes. Although highly 
relevant to the analysis o f social spending developments, this literature has been widely 
ignored by the existing welfare reform research. The following chapter applies the 
arguments o f the fiscal institutionalisms to the French and German cases, and outlines 
the resulting hypotheses regarding the development o f social insurance reforms. Also 
according to this approach we should expect divergent developments in the two 
countries, as France and Germany differ with regard to their respective budget 
allocation processes.
The third theory outlined, the so-called ‘partisanship theory’, is another prominent 
representative of the ‘old’ politics of the welfare state research. This theory stresses the 
effect o f different ideologies o f the ruling party (usually distinguished on a continuum 
between left and right-wing policy positions) on fiscal and social policies. The 
hypotheses which can be derived from the partisanship arguments predict a varying 
extent o f cost containment measures in each country coinciding with changes o f  
government. In contrast, this study argues that such effects over time should not be 
visible as the extent of pre-commitments and fiscal pressures has limited the extent of 
political scope to such a degree that governments regardless o f their political ideology 
are forced to follow the same reform paths.
The third part o f this chapter contrasts these divergent reform predictions with social 
expenditure developments in France and Germany over the analysed period. This 
indicator of social insurance developments in the two countries between 1990 and 2005
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seems to strengthen the ‘new politics’ arguments, but also opens up a series of further 
analytical questions.
2.1 Institutional Design and the Creation o f Commitment
The creation of credible commitment is said to play an important role for winning 
sufficient political and public support in policymaking and policy implementation and 
to therefore be important for the understanding of institutional design (Shepsle 1991; 
Horn 1995). The various forms and degrees o f institutionalised commitment and its 
effect on subsequent policy reforms are also the underlying aspects o f the ‘new politics 
of the welfare state’ literature (Pierson 1996; 2001a). This literature argues that welfare 
reforms are typically incremental and path-dependent as decisionmakers are constrained 
in their actions by previous commitments made by their predecessors: although having 
the formal authority to act, policymakers face institutional as well as political barriers 
for change as social policies are characterised by increasing returns (see below). In 
order to better understand the underlying mechanisms of these ‘lock-in’ effects and the 
resulting path-dependent reform processes, the following section of this chapter 
identifies the various forms in which policy commitment can be institutionalised and 
subsequently what role such commitment devices play in welfare states in particular.
Although the creation of credible commitment is often important in policymaking, it is 
also well known that it is difficult for governments to acquire such credibility and to 
establish lasting commitments. The greatest difficulty in creating commitment is to 
overcome the so-called problem of ‘time inconsistency’, which arises if politicians 
announcing a certain policy today feel it necessary to deviate from the policy at some 
point in the future or if these policies can be easily overruled by successive 
governments. In order to create credible commitment, it thus has to be ensured that (a) 
the government or it successors will not easily deviate from policy paths, and (b) 
institutions will stick to the purpose and the policies they have been built for. As will be 
further outlined below, there are two main ways o f creating a commitment device in 
politics: first, commitment can be created through legal or institutional barriers which 
make changes to the status quo difficult. Second, commitment can result from the 
creation o f transaction costs which make the deviation from a chosen policy path costly 
-  not only for people affected by those policies, but also for the decisionmakers.
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Creating Commitment via Legal and Institutional Barriers
If a majority government can easily overrule decisions by the former government it is 
hard to make credible commitments. The most direct way to solve this problem of 
credibility for the current legislators is to arrange political institutions in a way that 
makes it impossible or at least very costly to exercise discretionary authority, on both 
the legislative as well as the administrative level (Shepsle 1991; Horn 1995). Although 
it is difficult to make policies completely resistant to future changes, there two ways in 
which the continuation of a certain policy -  in most o f the cases equivalent to the 
continuation o f spending for a certain policy -  can be made more likely: either via 
institutional structures, or via specific decisionmaking procedures.
(1) Creating Commitment via Independent Agencies
A structural way of enhancing the credibility and commitment o f public policies is the 
institutionalisation of an independent authority which regulates and administers a 
certain policy, guaranteeing independence from momentary majorities and political 
stability (see Moe 1989; Shepsle 1991; Dixit 1996; Majone 1997). There are two main 
arguments why delegation can be a means o f making policies more credible. Firstly, it 
is said that specialised administrative agencies can implement policies more efficiently 
and effectively than general government administrations as they develop more detailed 
rules and expertise, which reduces complexity and uncertainty (North 1990; Ferejohn 
2002).
The second argument, more important with respect to the time inconsistency problem, is 
that independent agencies are more credible due to the different incentive structures of 
their personnel. Since independent agencies do not suffer - at least not as much as 
government officials - from the short time-horizon imposed by the electoral cycle, their 
capacity to credibly commit themselves to pursue certain policies is much greater than 
that of democratically accountable and elected bodies (Gilardi 2002). The institutional 
delegation of power makes it credible that the legislators do not reverse decisions in the 
following election period and adds to the durability of policies (Weingast 1990; Miller 
2000). Furthermore, the establishment of an independent institution also creates 
commitment in the way that the actors involved will develop an interest in protecting 
this institution. Due to their organisational self-interest, the associated stakeholders will 
defend their institutional autonomy, their authorities and the provision o f sufficient
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organisational resources which will make successive reforms of institutions and the 
policies connected to them more difficult (see North 1990; Macey 1992; Scharpf 2000).
(2) Creating Commitment via Veto Points and Automation
Another way of creating commitment is via the establishment of specific 
decisionmaking procedures which create veto points and therefore make policy change 
harder to achieve (Tsebelis 1995; 2000). This can, for example, be achieved via the 
fragmentation of decisionmaking processes (see Shepsle 1991: 256ff.). In fiscal 
policymaking, the fragmentation of political processes is common and the number of 
veto players (that is, the number of actors which can influence the decisionmaking 
process and their relative position to the finance minister) as well as the number of veto 
points (that is, the sequence o f voting on the budget) are decisive factors for the 
outcome of budgetary bargaining processes (von Hagen and Harden 1996; Alesina and 
Perotti 1999; Hallerberg 2000). Many countries follow a ‘bottom-up’ approach in the 
annual budget process, in which the total size o f the budget is determined after 
collecting spending requests from all ministries and following bilateral discussions 
between the finance minister and each of the spending ministries. This creates fiscal 
commitment as each spending minister is able to defend his or her spending portfolio 
and fiscal policy changes are more difficult to achieve. Another way of creating fiscal 
commitment is to set up specific financing funds dedicated for a specific purpose: These 
funds create procedural commitment as decisions regarding such funds are often outside 
regular decisionmaking processes and involve additional veto players (Patashnik 2000).
A different way of creating commitment via decisionmaking procedures is to avoid 
subsequent political decisions about an issue altogether once a decision has been taken. 
This can be achieved via the automation of decisionmaking processes (see Horn 1995), 
which means that policies which were originally subject to a new decisionmaking 
process after a certain period of time (for example, fiscal policies in the annual budget 
process) are excluded from this process by adapting them automatically according to 
certain socio-economic criteria (for example, economic growth, demographic 
development, tax revenues or inflation rates). Such automated adaptation processes 
create fiscal commitment as they avoid political decisions, but also “degrade the budget 
process to a mere forecast of exogenous developments” (von Hagen 2002: 270).
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Creating Commitment via Political Costs
Besides structural and procedural ways of tying the hands o f policymakers, there is 
another dimension to the creation of political commitment: the formalisation of policies 
through legislation not only creates institutional barriers for those seeking to change 
them, but also makes non-compliance more visible and hence more politically costly 
(see Shepsle 1991; Drazen 2000). Political programmes are characterised by increasing 
returns, which means that the costs o f change rise over time as people make 
commitments based on existing policies (Pierson 2000a). Institutions, once established, 
create groups of stakeholders which strongly influence future reform processes -  not 
only due to their say in the decisionmaking process, but also in shaping public opinion. 
The creation of an institution also creates an audience which monitors the performance 
o f this institution and imposes ‘audience costs’ onto those who seek to change the 
institution itself or the related policies (Scharpf 1997; Lohmann 2003). Politicians face 
the danger of losing support if they pursue unpopular changes and therefore face 
political costs when they interfere with the status quo. “In path-dependent processes, 
individual and organisational adaptations to previous arrangements may make a course 
reversal not only difficult but also unattractive” (Pierson 2000b: 810).
Particularly in policy areas which have direct implications on the financial situation of 
its beneficiaries (and in which people have adapted their plans according to existing 
policies), resistance to change will be particularly high and blame-avoiding politicians 
do not have interest in attacking existing policies (Weaver 1986; Pierson 1996; Ross 
2000). These behavioural aspects -  or ‘political costs’ -  o f policy programmes are an 
important source of commitment besides the formal aspects o f institutions and 
processes. But in this context it is important to stress that the creation of commitment is 
not always intentional. Particularly the development o f such political costs is often a by­
product of other political decisions and has originally not been anticipated to the full 
extent (see below).
2.1.1 Fiscal Commitment in the Welfare State
The creation of credible commitment via institutional barriers and political costs as 
outlined above has played a very important role in the development of welfare states. 
This has been particularly the case in policy areas which focus on providing some form 
of income security when no labour market income can be achieved (due to illness, 
disability, unemployment, or old age). In these policy areas, the design of policy
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programmes has in most countries in Western Europe taken the form of the pooling of  
risks in public insurance schemes. Particularly the specific social insurance design 
characteristic o f the so-called corporatist-continental welfare states has -  as will be 
outlined in the following paragraphs -  many features of institutionalised fiscal 
commitment as discussed in the first part of this chapter. Although welfare states are 
always a mixture of various forms of insurance, assistance and universal social 
protection schemes, this study will therefore focus in particular on such insurance 
schemes as the strongest form of budgetary and political commitment. The following 
section of this chapter will outline in more detail why the deliberate creation of  
commitment played an important role in the development o f social insurance schemes 
in Western Europe and in what forms this commitment has been institutionalised. It will 
furthermore discuss to what extent this commitment has been intentional.
2,1.1.1 Political Commitment and the Development of Social Insurance Schemes
Besides the aim of coping with changing social circumstances and (later on) to promote 
solidarity and social cohesion (Clasen 1997a; Pierson 1998), the development of social 
insurance programmes in Western Europe also served a power-political goal. At the end 
of the 19th century, the working class -  an expanding social, economic and political 
power -  became an increasing risk for the ruling conservative and liberal elites in 
developed Western European countries. In order to deal with intensified class conflicts, 
the integration of the working class into the existing social and political order became 
thus a major task for governments. In order to gain control over the groups threatening 
the social order and political system, social conflicts were moderated through the 
introduction of representative institutions for the working class, and by an increasing 
state intervention in the provision of benefits to workers (see Alber 1982; Flora 1986). 
Particularly in Germany, the pioneer in social insurance legislation, benefit provision 
served as means to an authority-stabilising end (Zollner 1982; Oik and Riedmuller 
1994). In creating benefit expectations for the workers, the intention was to generate the 
conservative attitude within the working classes which should make them stakeholders 
and supporters of the existing political system.
"Anybody who has before him the prospect o f a pension, be it ever so small, in old age and 
infirmity is much happier and more contented in his lot, much more tractable and easy to 
manage. Just compare the difference between a private servant...and an imperial servant: 
the latter will put up with much more..., as he can expect a pension" (Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, Statement regarding the Imperial Message 1881).
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But in order to convince the working classes that the state would also live up to its 
benefit promises, the creation of credible commitment was necessary. The following 
paragraphs will outline in what respect the corporatist-continental social insurance 
model characteristic for both France and Germany incorporates more commitment- 
creating elements than other social policy schemes.
2,1,1,2 Credible Commitment through Legal and Institutional Barriers
Differences regarding the institutional design and governance structures o f social 
insurance programmes are important characteristics in the classifications o f different 
‘welfare regimes’ (see Titmuss 1968; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996): the 
‘corporatist-continental’ model is a system o f social protection mainly based on 
compulsory insurance schemes. It is broadly an institutionally fragmented system, with 
separate institutions for different social groups and a focus on status protection. The 
social insurance funds are often self-governed by executive committees which include 
representatives o f employees, employers and the government, and resemble semi-public 
agencies. Contrary to this, other countries rely on a model o f ‘national insurance’ 
usually managed by the central government with little involvement from the social 
partners.6 Both the so-called ‘liberal’ welfare state regimes usually found in the Anglo 
Saxon world as well as the ‘social-democratic’ countries of Scandinavia are 
characterised by such state-centred, uniform and integrated institutions. These two 
welfare families differ mainly in the structure o f their benefit provision.
Through the creation o f semi-independent social insurance organisations administered 
by employers and employees, policymakers in corporatist-continental countries 
intended to give their social policies higher credibility and to reduce resistance by 
socialists and trade union activists. In fact, early opposition by the workers 
representatives against the social insurance plans changed to increasing support as soon 
as it was ensured that administration would be kept separate from the central state and 
would be self-administered by the workers and employers (Hennock 1987; Clasen 
1997a).
6 The expression ‘the social partners’ is in the following used to describe both employee and employer 
representatives, regardless o f their de facto degree o f voluntary co-operation in the area o f social policy.
7 In the ‘liberal’ welfare states public benefit provision is in most cases universal, marginal and means- 
tested. In contrast, the Scandinavian countries adopted an institutional redistributive model which 
provides generous universalistic services. Other scholars have identified a fourth, Southem-European 
group (see Ferrera 1996), which is characterised by a strongly fragmented benefit provision which can be 
very generous, but also highly selective.
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Besides this institutionalist commitment via the administrative structure of the insurance 
organisations, corporatist-continental welfare states are also characterised by a high 
degree o f procedural commitment as the administrative semi-independence often goes 
hand in hand with the separation of spending authority from the central state (see 
Radner 1978). In mainly tax-financed welfare states, questions concerning the social 
budget are dealt with in the general budgetary process and are therefore subject to the 
role played by the finance minister and the other actors involved in the budget process. 
In mainly contribution-based systems on the other hand, authorities regarding social 
expenditure often lie outside the scope o f the finance minister but instead with the 
related social ministries or independent social insurance institutions. A functional 
argument for taking the main share of social security provision out o f the general state 
budget is that benefit rates are mainly determined by law and therefore, at least 
theoretically, represent fixed costs (see Radner 1978). But the assignment o f budgetary 
control to the social partners has also been an important element creating necessary and 
credible political commitment. The budgetary autonomy o f social insurance schemes 
not only increases the number of veto players involved in financial decisions, as the 
social partners become actors in the budgetary decisionmaking process, but also 
strongly reduces interventionist powers by the government. This is supposed to avoid 
the usage o f contribution revenues for any other purpose than the payment o f insurance 
benefits. Social insurance spending becomes therefore, to a certain degree, detached 
from the influence of changing parliamentary majorities and therefore from being 
challenged by conflicting distributional interests, which creates fiscal commitment (von 
Hagen 2002).
2.1.1.3 The Creation of Transaction Costs
While social-democratic as well as liberal welfare states finance their welfare provisions 
mainly via taxes, social insurance revenues in corporatist-continental regimes are 
predominantly acquired in the form of contributions. Nullmeier and Rub (1993: 92) 
identify various intentions behind this form of revenue generation, such as the creation 
of solidarity between the insured through the common raising of funds. From a revenue 
generating perspective, contributions are politically easier to introduce (and 
successively to increase) as taxes, as workers are more willing to accept a lower net 
wage if there is a perceived link between contributions and benefits (Schokkaert and 
Van Parijs 2003). But most importantly, the financing o f social insurance benefits via 
contributions has served the purpose of creating political credibility. Entitlements
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gained from contribution payments often enjoy a high degree o f legal protection which 
creates a high degree o f transaction costs and therefore a high degree o f fiscal 
commitment. Furthermore, earmarked contributions ensure an independent revenue 
basis for the insurance schemes and reduce incentives for policymakers to intervene in 
the financing o f the schemes, as the funds do not compete with other spending purposes.
But also very important is the creation o f political costs as a result of contribution 
financing: the spending structure of social policies determines the creation o f strong 
stakeholder groups that have adapted their behaviour according to expectations linked to 
the benefits provided, and the interference with existing benefit regulations is seen as a 
direct attack on ‘earned’ benefits. The political costs o f change associated with the 
financing and benefit structure have risen with the development of the social insurance 
system from basic protection against poverty to status-securing provision: the strong 
link between contribution payments and benefit entitlements and the marginal role of 
redistributive elements in corporatist-continental welfare regimes creates strong political 
support for the system within the dominating middle classes o f society, as insured 
provide for their own needs rather than those o f others (see Taylor-Gooby 2005: 666). 
As Nullmeier and Rub (1993: 84) put it, the ‘technical form of benefit provision 
becomes a political function’. This creates strong fiscal commitment on the spending 
dimension.
2.1.1.4 The Trade-Off between Commitment and Flexibility
While the previous sections of this chapter have analysed the different elements creating 
the lock-in o f spending in welfare states and the political intentions of doing so, the 
question remains whether the implications this fiscal commitment has for future 
policymaking were really intended or maybe rather an unintended side effect o f making 
social insurance accountable and universal. In other words, is there an inevitable trade­
off between commitment and flexibility when designing policies and institutions?
On the one hand, there is strong evidence that policymakers were indeed aware of the 
distributional consequences of their actions (see Baldwin 1990). As noted, decisions 
regarding the institutional separation and transfer of administrative authority to social 
partners were taken by ruling elites in the hope o f maintaining political control. These 
policymakers laying the foundation stones o f the insurance schemes could however not 
have anticipated the future fiscal implications o f the created commitment due to the
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immense growth of these programmes in the following decades. Overall, spending of 
social security schemes rose dramatically between 1900 and the mid-1970s and 
continued to grow more moderately in the following years (see Alber 1982: 60). In 2001, 
the average public expenditure on social security amounted to 24 percent of GDP in 
EU-15 (see OECD 2004a). In comparison, social insurance spending had accounted for 
3 percent in 1930 and 13 percent in 1974 (see Flora 1986: XXII). Due to the particular 
institutional and financing structure of corporatist-continental welfare states which 
creates high commitment for policymakers with regard to social insurance spending, 
this means that today a relatively large fraction of public expenditures is non-negotiable 
in the short-run as it is bound by legislation (see Molander 2000). The administrative, 
budgetary, revenue and spending structures o f the welfare state therefore have important 
implications for fiscal policy as a whole.
Successful political commitment does not only help to achieve credibility in the first 
place, but as a consequence also locks in spending and restricts policy scope in the 
future. While successful political commitment has been beneficial in the building up of  
a comprehensive social protection, it causes problems if  the economic, social or 
financial circumstances change and the ‘yoke o f prior commitments’ hinders necessary 
adaptations to new conditions (Steuerle and Kawai 1996). It is then that the inherent 
trade-off between commitment on the one hand and flexibility on the other becomes 
visible. This leads to the paradox that politicians are often the victims o f their own 
success: the better they manage to entrench certain policies through institutional 
structures, the harder it becomes to adapt these policies to changing socio-economic 
circumstances. As Shepsle (1991: 256) puts it: governance (the capacity to commit to 
policies) and representation (the capacity to respond to majorities) are sometimes at 
odds (see also Cox and McCubbins 2001). While in the public choice and regulation 
literatures, the inability o f governments to commit themselves to stick to certain policies 
is the main problem, for governments facing the necessity to reform or to adjust their 
budgets it is the opposite: their main problem is the lack o f flexibility and the resulting 
inability to un-commit (see Levy and Spiller 1994).
2.1.2 The Effect of Fiscal Commitment: Frozen French and German 
Welfare States
As outlined above, there are various elements which create barriers for change in policy 
programmes: legal and institutional obstacles can hinder wide-reaching reforms, while
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also the political costs associated with reforms can lead to inertia. The approach behind 
the ‘new politics’ of welfare state research stresses the path-dependent effects of such 
barriers o f change, which only allow for incremental change even in times o f strong 
reform pressures such as continuing financial difficulties.
The view that both the German and French welfare states should be highly resistant to 
change in this respect has during the last decade been dominant in the literature (Esping- 
Andersen 1996; Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Bonoli 2000; Pierson 2001a; Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Schmidt and Scharpf 2001). Although both countries experienced 
severe financial difficulties in their social insurance schemes and pressures to contain 
spending in the last 15 years, they belong to the family of corporatist-continental 
welfare states which should be particularly susceptible for the effects o f Tock-in’. This 
is the case as many of their institutional structures and regulations represent 
commitment devices as outlined above. The German and French public insurance 
schemes in the three sectors pensions, healthcare and unemployment are all 
administered by social partners (in some cases with participation by the government), 
and have the legal status o f public, semi-independent organisations. This creates 
institutional barriers for change, and therefore creates commitment as state interference 
is made more difficult. The sectoral schemes are furthermore occupationally 
fragmented, which creates additional veto points as decisionmaking processes can be 
influenced by a large number of actors. Contribution-based financing gives the 
institutions an independent revenue base which leaves budgetary decisions often outside 
the influence of the legislator or the government. This creates a further legal barrier 
against successive policy changes. Finally, the specific benefit structure o f the schemes 
creates high political costs for those seeking to curtail allowances: people rely on 
spending promises in essential areas such as healthcare, pensions and wage replacement 
in case o f unemployment. Contribution-based financing creates entitlements and those 
entitlements create high legal transaction as well as political costs.
All these elements together create a high degree of pre-commitment which makes 
changes to the status quo difficult. Accordingly, we should in both countries only see a 
very limited reaction to financial pressures in the form of retrenchment measures and 
structural reforms. Instead, we should observe a continuation or even increase of  
spending (financed via higher contribution rates, loans or increasing subsidies from the
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general government budgets) and only very limited structural reforms in both France 
and Germany.
HI: Due to high degrees o f  fiscal pre-commitment and therefore high barriers for  
change in the French and German social insurance schemes, we should see only limited 
cost containment measures in both countries.
2.2 Dealing with Fiscal Commitment under Financial Pressure: 
Why France and Germany Should Differ
As outlined in Chapter 1, the ‘new politics’ approach has been criticised for over­
stressing barriers for change while neglecting the sources of pressures for reform and 
the related question o f whether such factors can explain divergent reform paths. This 
part of the chapter will therefore outline two o f the most prominent theories which 
stress the relative positions and strength o f political actors as explanatory variables for 
the success or failure o f retrenchment initiatives, and will specify the resulting 
hypotheses for the French and German cases. The first one focuses on the specific role 
o f corporatist actors in social policymaking, the second one on the institutional strength 
o f retrenchment advocates in budgetary allocation processes.
2.2.1 Corporatism and Welfare State Restructuring: The Role of the 
Social Partners in Social Policy Reforms
One important explanation for the growth and development of welfare states is the so- 
called ‘power-resource approach’. At its heart is the assumption that the ability of 
organised labour to mobilise its supporters in the fight for more social rights played an 
essential part in the development of welfare states (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1979, 1983; 
Shalev 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985; Baldwin 1990). The class-struggle between the 
unions and their left-wing political allies on the one side, and the employers and their 
right-wing political supporters on the other should, according to these theories, play an 
essential role in explaining the development of welfare states.
2.2.1.1 Diminishing Importance of Class-Struggles or the Revival of Social Pacts? 
The assumptions of the power-resource approach have been challenged by the 
representatives of the ‘new politics’ literature, which argue that new groups o f actors 
have replaced the old class-related forces and now play the dominating role in shaping 
social policy reform outcomes (Pierson 1996, 2001a; Immergut 1998; Bonoli et al.
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2000). They stress that the constituencies o f the welfare state are no longer 
automatically associated with the unions but are deeply rooted within the middle classes 
-  particularly in the corporatist-continental welfare states due to status-maintaining 
benefit provision (Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Baldwin 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
The proponents of the ‘new’ politics o f welfare state research therefore reject the power 
resources approach as ‘old’ as it is in their eyes not longer applicable in times of 
retrenchment.
In recent years however, a number of defenders o f those allegedly ‘old’ arguments have 
emerged which challenge Pierson’s view that the importance of organised labour in 
shaping welfare outcomes has shrunk. In contrast, they argue that the influence o f the 
social partners in welfare reforms does indeed contribute to the explanation o f welfare 
state retrenchment processes (see Scarbrough 2000; Reynoud 2000; Beland 2001). A 
series o f literature has stressed the revival o f ‘social pacts’ and ‘neo-corporatism’ and 
their importance for the explanation of the success or failure o f social policy reforms 
(Schmitter and Grote 1997; Traxler 1997; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hassel 1998; 
Teague 1999; Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000; Fajertag and Pochet 2000; Rhodes 2001; 
Jochem and Siegel 2003). According to this literature, the ability o f both workers and 
employer representatives to agree with the state on substantive welfare state reforms is a 
major factor explaining the failure or success o f cost containment programmes. ‘Neo­
corporatism’ in this context means that in agreeing necessary reforms between each 
other, the social partners can prevent the unilateral intervention o f the state (Crouch 
1996). So if  we are assuming that the relationship between the social partners and the 
state as well as their policy positions does matter, what should we expect to be the effect 
on welfare reforms in France and Germany?
2,2.1.2 At Opposite Ends: Corporatist Relationships in France and Germany 
The role o f the social partners in the political economy of both France and Germany has 
been a well-studied subject, and most o f these studies come to the conclusion that the 
respective positions o f the two countries could not be more different: locating both 
countries within the possible spectrum of consultation as well as co-operation between 
the state and both union as well as employer representatives, France and Germany are 
positioned on opposite ends. In Germany, corporatist consultations are seen as an 
essential element o f policymaking, which gives the social partners an important role in 
economic as well as social policymaking (Miiller-Jentsch 1995; Ruysseveldt and Visser
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1996a; Streeck and Hassel 2004). This element o f power-sharing between the state and 
the social partners, combined with strong elements o f federalism and a strong central 
bank, became so essential after WWII that Katzenstein (1987) developed the expression 
of the ‘semi-sovereign state’ -  a state which, due to its lack o f unilateral enforcement 
powers, was forced to co-operate with the social partners, and often abstained from 
direct intervention in economic and social policy areas. One factor contributing to the 
ability of the social partners to reach stable agreements has been the fact that the 
organisation of both workers’ and employers’ interests are very centralised: on the 
workers side, the different sectoral unions are united on federal level by the top 
association DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), and also the employers are centrally 
organised in the BDA (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande). 
Furthermore, union density in the workforce has been comparatively high (see Visser 
and Ruysseveldt 1996: 387).
In contrast, corporatist relationships in France are characterised as weak, adversarial, 
and ideologically charged (Freyssinet 1993; Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996b; Goetschy 
1998; Crouch 1999). “Industrial relations became [after WWII] as they had been in the 
1920s and 1930s, a nonexistent arena, or one o f uncompromising conflict, with 
codeterminative and tripartite institutions of the immediate postwar years being reduced 
to residual status” (Crouch 1999: 439). Traditionally, the position of French unions has 
been institutionally weak - one reason being the low density of union membership 
particularly in the private sector industries (see Goetschy 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser
2000). At the end of the 1980s, French unions only organised less then 10 percent o f the 
workforce, which was the lowest number in Europe (Levy 2000: 326). Another factor 
reducing the ability o f not only the unions, but also o f the employer representatives to 
build stable industrial relations was the fact that both the employer as well as worker 
representation was extremely fragmented, leading to conflict not only between the 
different interest groups but also within them. In France, the unions were extremely 
divided regarding their policy positions which often created inner-institutional 
opposition -  which was barely the case in Germany (although also here some employer 
associations held more extreme views than others, they usually acted unified via the 
BDA).8 Since 1945, the employers have been represented via the Conseil National du
8 O f the five unions granted representative status by the French state, the CFDT is generally considered 
the more moderate force, while the CGT and FO are more radical left-wing and CFTC, CGC-CFE, FEN 
somewhere in the middle.
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Patronat Franfaise (CNPF; in 1997 changed to MEDEF9), at the same time a business 
and industrial relations association (see Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996b: 90-93). Despite 
the unitary organisation, employers’ interests were also highly fragmented and the 
CNPF rarely advocated its own policy positions, but instead merely represented an 
instrument to jointly confront the unions.
Due to the resulting difficulties of reaching stable bargains, the French government 
regularly intervened in the regulation of employment relations and affiliated areas, such 
as social policies. Often it was also the state that had to force the social partners to enter 
bargains in case social conflicts intensified. The results o f collective agreements were 
therefore in most instances rather ‘end-of-conflict agreements’ (Freyssinet 1993: 268) 
instead o f stable compromises between the two sides. In contrast to Germany, the 
French state never took the role of the neutral referee while delegating regulatory roles 
to the social partners: “Not that the state does not have the authority, self-confidence 
and neutral reputation. On the contrary: the barrier to central social pacts is the 
paternalism of the French state and its traditional distrust o f organised interests” (van 
Waarden 2003: 18). Corporatist relationships have therefore been extremely weak, 
which distinguishes France strongly from Germany.
2.2.1.3 On the Same Page: The Social Partners and Social Insurance Administration
But despite the fact that the nature of industrial relations has traditionally been very 
different between the two countries, paradoxically we find the social partners playing 
similarly important roles in the area ‘where industrial relations systems and welfare 
state regimes come together’ (Crouch 2001: 113): the social insurance schemes. Besides 
co-determination on company level as well as wage bargaining autonomy, self­
administration of the social insurances by the social partners has been an important 
element of German corporatism (see Trampusch 2002). The ‘delegation o f public 
responsibility’ (Streeck 2005: 139) by the state to the social partners in the welfare state 
contributed to a constructive relationship between the representatives o f the employers 
and the workers, particularly as social insurance provision became an essential part of 
wage bargains and allowed for consensus between the two sides (Mares 2001; Wood
2001). In contrast, the presence of the French unions in all main insurance schemes is 
rather surprising given their weak position in industrial relations. But also this has been 
interpreted as a sign o f their weakness -  the continuation o f union involvement in the
9 Mouvement des Enterprises de France.
49
management o f the insurance schemes after WWII serving “as testimony to its lack of 
seriousness” (Crouch 1999: 439). But as will be shown in the following analysis of the 
administrative and budgetary authorities of the social partners in the French insurance 
schemes, their involvement is often not without ‘seriousness’ - particularly in the 
unemployment and supplementary pension insurance schemes (see Chapter 3).
What France and Germany have further in common is a very high degree o f public 
support for the administration of the insurance schemes by the social partners. In both 
countries, the maintenance o f formal self-administration “operates as a proxy for a very 
strong form o f solidarity that tends to define social benefits almost as a ‘property right’“ 
(Clasen and Clegg 2003: 372). Despite low union membership in France, the potential 
of the unions to mobilise the public against planned welfare reforms is very large (see 
Smith 2005). In contrast, unions in Germany dispose o f institutionalised and formalised 
incorporation in policymaking processes, which reduces the necessity and likelihood of 
strikes. Besides the strong public support for the maintenance o f self-administered 
social insurance schemes, the social partners in both countries should also have a strong 
interest in maintaining the existing system. One reason is the safeguarding of the 
commitment vis-a-vis their constituents which have a high financial stake in the 
insurance schemes. But the management role in the insurance schemes not only 
guarantees the involved actors a voice in policy debates, but also provides them with 
resources. In this respect, the French trade unions seem particularly keen to maintain 
their position as administrators of the social insurance schemes as they dispose o f few 
independent resources due to their low membership (see Palier 2001). The role in social 
security administration legitimises their involvement in policy discussions and 
furthermore provides them with a great number o f jobs for their members: to run the 
various national and regional funds of the different social insurance branches, 
employers as well as unions field around 35,000 part-time administrators each (see 
Financial Times, 5 September 1995).10 The French employers also have an interest in 
the maintenance of the self-administered social insurance system, as it provides them 
with the possibility to exert influence on the unions as well as to participate in decisions 
regarding the usage of resources which are provided by them to a large share. But
10 Particularly the Force Ouvri&re, representing mainly public sector workers, has been strongly 
represented in the social insurance administration -  it held the presidency of the National Health 
Insurance Fund (CNAM) from 1967, before losing it for the first time in 1996 to the more moderate 
CFDT. This has been a consequence of re-introduced parity in the social administration funds in 1995, as 
the employers supported the more moderate representative o f the CFDT in the election o f the health funds 
president.
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compared to the unions, their interest in the maintenance of self-administration should 
be more limited.
Shared management of the social insurance programmes by the social partners is also 
deeply rooted within the German welfare system. Despite increasing costs and fiscal 
difficulties, there is continuously high support from both sides -  the unions as well as 
the employers -  for the maintenance of the system (see BDA 1998, 2004; DGB 2004a). 
Both sides strongly value the beneficial side-effects o f a stable and predictable social 
relationship, which “makes an exit [...] a social and wage-political ‘high price option”’ 
(Dohler 1994: 153). Besides the benefits of a symbolic participation o f employers in the 
provision o f social insurance, there are also economical reasons for the employers to 
support the co-managed insurance schemes. As Groser (1994) points out, a shift away 
from the existing contribution-financed schemes towards increasing tax financing would 
have implications for wage bargaining. He argues that contribution financing comes 
cheaper for employers as companies do not finance their contributions out of their 
profits, but pass on the costs to the consumers. The important role that the distinctive 
German social policies play for its ‘co-ordinated market economy’ (Hall and Soskice
2001) therefore creates support also among employers for certain social policies (see 
Mares 2001). Furthermore, social insurance schemes in which the employers are present 
offers them the opportunity to use those for their own economic interests: by 
participating in the administration and regulation of the programmes, it enables them to 
influence the adaptation of policies according to their needs. One major example has 
been the use of the social insurance schemes to enable a comfortable exit from the 
labour market for low productivity groups in order to smooth processes o f economic 
adaptation (Hassel 1998; Crouch 1999). Generally, there should therefore be strong 
resistance by both sides of the social partners in Germany if  there are attempts by the 
government to reduce administrative or budgetary independence.
2.2.1.4 The Effect of Corporatist Relations on Social Insurance Reforms
To sum up, France and Germany are two countries in which the social partners play a 
significant role in the management o f social insurance programmes, and in both 
countries there is strong support for the maintenance o f this form of administration -  
both from the wider public, as from the social partners themselves (in France 
particularly from the union side). But the countries are also extremely different 
regarding the mode of interactions between the social partners and the state, as well as
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the degree of social partner consultation during policymaking processes. Based on these 
very different class-dynamics, what should we expect to be the outcomes in Germany 
and France regarding welfare reforms in times o f fiscal austerity?
Based on the above outlined assumption that the divergent modes of corporatist 
interaction in France and Germany matter for reform processes, we should see more 
commitment-breaking in France on the administrative and budgetary dimension than is 
the case in Germany. Due to the ability o f the German government and social partners 
to reach mutually acceptable reform agreements, there should be a greater likelihood 
that the self-administration powers in both budgetary as well as administrative terms 
would remain untouched. Due to the importance the self-administration plays for all 
actors involved, it can be expected that the majority o f actors has an interest in the 
preservation of the system. Despite increasing pressures on the system o f corporatist 
interactions due to economic difficulties, it is often assumed that the structures of 
institutionalised partnership in the ‘co-ordinated market economies’ should still function 
and might even experience a revival (Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 
2001; Ebbinghaus 2002a).
In France it can, in contrast, be expected that the government would have a strong 
interest in depriving the social partners, and in particular the unions, o f their 
independent decisionmaking powers as mutual agreements are not possible. Due to its 
strong unilateral powers, its scepticism towards the organised private interests and 
reluctance to co-operate with the social partners, the French state should be strong 
enough and willing to overrule the interest group if  it considers this to be in the public 
interest (Merrien 1991; Marier 2002). Due to the absence o f corporatist decisionmaking 
traditions, the employers would not join forces with the unions in defending the 
schemes, which would mean that we should expect a much stronger reduction of fiscal 
commitment in France than in Germany in the sense o f retrenchment measures as well 
as a reduction o f administrative independencies.
H2: Due to the different traditions o f  corporatist interactions between the social 
partners and the state, we should see more commitment-breaking in France on the 
administrative and budgetary commitment dimensions than in Germany.
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2.2.2 The Power of the Treasury: Effects of Finance Minister Strength 
on Social Policy Reforms
Another argument for why we should expect more commitment-breaking in France 
derives from the literature about the effect o f fiscal institutions. A growing body of 
empirical and theoretical literature in this field suggests that as budgetary rules 
distribute strategic influence among the participants in the budget process and regulate 
the flow of information, they have important effects on the outcomes of budgeting 
processes and successively on the likelihood of cost containment (de Haan and Sturm 
1994; von Hagen and Harden 1996; Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Buti and Sapir 2002). 
Assuming that the different actors try to maximise their share o f the budget, the 
budgetary bargaining process will necessarily lead to conflicts about the size and the 
shape o f the individual spending blocks. But while the so-called ‘spending ministers’ 
are said to have an interest in pleasing their constituencies (that is, the beneficiaries of 
their policies in the electorate and influential stakeholders) and demand more funds for 
their portfolios, there is one actor in the process -  the finance minister -  which is 
usually assigned the role of constraining these demands. Governments which follow a 
so-called delegation approach transfer authority to this actor who has an encompassing 
interest in the budget and whose function is to ensure the continuing cooperation of the 
other policymakers throughout the process (Strauch and von Hagen 1999; Hallerberg et 
al. 2001). A dominant assumption is consequently that a stronger position of the finance 
minister vis-a-vis the spending ministers in the annual budgeting process will increase 
the pressures to contain spending and will successively contribute to a more balanced 
budget (von Hagen 1992; Alesina and Perotti 1999; Hallerberg 2000; Strauch and von 
Hagen 2001).
These institutional factors should also have an impact on social budget outcomes: 
whether it is the finance ministry or a social ministry that is in charge o f social 
insurance reforms should have an important impact on the extent to which these reforms 
focus on cost containment and the degree to which they break existing fiscal 
commitment. A predominant position o f the finance ministry in welfare reform 
processes should accordingly lead to more retrenchment measures, while a predominant 
position o f the spending ministries should lead to reforms focusing on the increase of 
revenues and only moderate cutbacks. Assuming that these assumptions are correct, 
what should we expect to be the extent o f cost containment measures in the French and 
German social insurance schemes?
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Also with regard to their respective budgetary allocation processes, France and 
Germany differ strongly. While both countries apply a delegation approach in their 
budgetary allocation procedures and accordingly transfer the role o f constraining 
spending demands to their finance ministers, the French and German finance ministers 
have very different positions and very different degrees o f influence in these processes. 
Von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1996) have constructed indices which 
rank fiscal procedures from the most hierarchical to the most collegial. According to 
von Hagen’s initial index of the strength of finance ministries (see von Hagen 1992), the 
French finance ministry is the strongest o f all countries in the EU-12 while the position 
o f the finance minister in Germany is much weaker. Measurements at later points in 
time confirm these results (see von Hagen and Harden 1996; Hallerberg et al. 2001: 
6 5 f f ) .11 Regarding the involvement of the different ministries in the social policy 
reform process, the two countries differ as well: the French finance ministry is strongly 
involved in decisions affecting the social policy domain (see Quermonne 1991), as it 
enjoys a superior position to the other ministries. It is generally involved in all major 
reform processes which have implications for the state finances: “When asked about the 
importance of the Finance Ministry, the nearly automatic response of civil servants in 
the Social Affairs Ministry is that nothing gets done without its approval” (Marier 2005: 
539). This is again different from Germany, where the involvement o f the finance 
ministry in social policy reform processes is more the exception than the rule. Usually, 
the labour and social affairs ministry or the ministry o f health have been predominant in 
planning and implementing welfare reforms in co-operation with the relevant 
parliamentary groups (Horst 1995; Trampusch 2003). According to the assumption that 
differences in the budgetary allocation process should have an impact on the 
restrictiveness of budgets and the likelihood o f government to follow the goal to contain 
spending, French welfare reforms should therefore have been dominated more by 
budgetary considerations than the German ones.
H3: We should expect more commitment-breaking measures on all four dimensions in 
France than in Germany due to the stronger position o f  the French finance ministry in 
the budgetary allocation process as well as welfare reform process, which should 
increase pressures for cost containment.
11 The combined index value regarding the ‘Structure o f negotiations within government’ is 16 for France 
(the maximum value), and 12 for Germany (particularly due to a very low score for ‘agenda setting role 
o f minister o f finance’), see von Hagen 1992: 69.
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2.3 Variation over Time: Why Party Politics Should Matter
Another ‘old’ theory o f welfare state research is the so-called ‘partisanship theory’ 
which stresses the effect of different ideologies o f the ruling party (usually 
distinguished on a continuum between left and right-wing policy positions) on fiscal 
and social policies. The theory that broader political-ideological differences determine 
different spending levels and therefore also retrenchment processes is often connected 
with the power-resources approach and has been elaborated mainly in the well-known 
distinction between different worlds of welfare capitalism by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
In this tradition, researchers have in the last decade focused on the effect of the political 
orientation o f the ruling party on overall expenditure developments and the likelihood 
of budget deficits (for an overview see Schmidt 1996 and Cusack 1999), but also on 
welfare state spending in particular. They have argued that leftist parties have more 
expansionary tendencies with regard to fiscal policies due to their strong links with 
unions and other labour institutions which are in favour o f social spending, while 
conservative parties are more able to restrict public spending and to resist pressures to 
expand social protection.
In both Germany and France, there have been similar political developments in this 
respect: while at the beginning of the 1990s conservative governments (in Germany led 
by the Christian Democrats, CDUt and in France by the Rally for the Republic, RPR) 
were in power in both countries, the main left-wing parties (in Germany the Social 
Democrats, SPD, and in France the Socialist Party, PS) achieved victories in the 1997 
elections in France and successively in Germany in 1998. The conservatives (now the 
Union fo r a Popular Movement, UMP) regained power in France in 2002 again, while 
this was also the case with the CDU in Germany three years later (although here the 
victory over the Social Democrats was only marginal and resulted in a grand coalition 
between the two parties). There has accordingly been no major variation between the 
two countries regarding a much stronger or longer-lasting influence of either left or 
right-wing parties, and accordingly we should therefore not see divergent developments 
between the two countries in this respect. But what we should see according to the 
assumptions o f the partisan theory are variations within the respective countries 
regarding the extent o f cost containment measures during the rulings 'of the different 
governments: what we should expect are stronger retrenchment efforts under 
conservative rule than under left-wing rule in both countries.
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But can we still assume that these predictions of partisanship influence are valid in 
times o f extreme financial pressures? Generally, studies about the effects o f political 
party ideologies on public spending have already come to very ambiguous and 
contradictory results when studying public expenditure developments prior to 1990 - 
this also being a consequence of the fact that the research methods applied are very 
sensitive to minor changes in the indices applied or the data used (for an overview see 
Cusack 1999). Depending on the countries and period analysed, the model 
specifications and the operationalisation of the various relevant variables, practically all 
possible outcomes regarding the role o f political determinants in explaining the 
variation of social spending have been presented (for an overview see Kittel and 
Obinger 2003: 27ff.). The same ambiguous results are true for the analysis focusing 
particularly on partisanship and social spending: some scholars argued that leftist parties 
have increased social spending more vigorously than right-wing ones (Garret 2001; 
Garrett and Mitchell 2001). But Kittel et al. (2000), Hicks and Kenworthy (1998), 
Iversen and Cusack (1998) and Swank (2001) only find inconsistent, that is, period- 
specific, or very minor evidence for partisan effects on social spending dynamics (see 
Kittel and Obinger 2003: 25). Armingeon et al. (2001) even come to the conclusion that 
leftist parties are more successful in containing social spending, as they appear to be 
more credible when it comes to retrenchment (see also Kitschelt 2001).
The majority o f results though seem to indicate that the room to manoeuvre for parties 
regardless of their political orientation has become smaller: what we can observe is a 
‘sharp narrowing o f political differences’ (Huber and Stephens 2001: 221; Castles 2001; 
Swank 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003). It is therefore assumed in this thesis that the 
various external as well as internal factors exerting pressure on public finances 
increasingly constrain policymakers in their policy scope and therefore also in their 
potential to follow distinct ideological policy programmes, as they are fighting against 
spending per se.
H4: A change o f  government that brings with it a change in the party ideology o f  the 
ruling party should not have an effect on the extent and form o f  cost containment 
measures in either France or Germany.
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2.4 Old vs. New Politics: Social Expenditure Developments
In order to be able to confirm or reject the hypotheses put forward in the previous 
section of this chapter, the following questions need to be answered: First, can we 
observe different reform developments on the national level between France and 
Germany -  or are reform outcomes in the two countries, despite the different class 
dynamics and governmental forces supporting cost containment, the same? Second, can 
we observe periods of increased cost containment measures during times of right-wing 
government rule, and do we vice versa see less cost containment reforms during times 
of left-wing rule? One possible indicator to answer these questions is to compare the 
development of social spending in both countries. Did Germany and France curb their 
social insurance spending to similar degrees, or can we observe differences? Can we 
observe variation over time in the spending developments in each country which 
coincides with a change in the political ideology of the ruling party?
As Graphs 2-1 and 2-2 show, we can observe a very similar, continuous growth of 
social insurance spending in both France and Germany between 1990 and 2005. In 
Germany, the gap between economic growth and social expenditure growth has been 
continuously growing between 1991 and 2003: spending of public social insurance 
schemes as a share of GDP rose from 29.6 percent in 1991 to 34.4 percent in 2003:
Graph 2-1 Social Insurance Expenditure Growth Germany 1990-2004
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The same expenditure pattern holds true for France, where social insurance spending 
also grew more strongly than the nominal GDP (see Graph 2-2).
Graph 2-2 Social Insurance Expenditure Growth France 1990-2004
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Social insurance spending in France rose from 25.6 percent in 1990 to 29.3 percent in 
2004. “Thus, seventeen years after the repudiation of dirigisme, the French state absorbs 
a greater share of the national product than at any time in the post-war period” (Levy 
2000: 309). Neither in France nor Germany can we see a dismantling of the welfare 
state merely based on public social expenditure measurements, but rather a stabilisation 
since the mid-1990s.
This sets both countries aside from the majority of other EU-15 countries who on 
average cut back social expenditure (as percentage of GDP) from 1993 onwards (see 
Graph 2-3).
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Graph 2-3 Development of Public Social Expenditure in France, Germany and
EU-15 1990-2001
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The very similar expenditure development in both France and Germany does not seem 
to confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3, which predicted a stronger cost containment in France. 
Furthermore, there is no straightforward indication that the different ideologies of the 
government had any impact on the development of social insurance spending as 
predicted in Hypothesis 4: in France, we see a period of slower expenditure growth 
during the left-wing government between 1997 and 2002, while in Germany we also see 
a stabilisation under the first years of left-wing government rule from 1998 onwards, 
but this changes again after 2001. Instead, it seems that the French and German welfare 
states are indeed ‘frozen’ which confirms Hypothesis 1 that due to the high degrees of 
fiscal commitment, cost containment measures remain limited in both countries despite 
the strong fiscal pressures.
But do these observations mean that we see stability in the French and German welfare 
states? Although the overall expenditure developments seem to confirm the path- 
dependency arguments of the new politics approach, overall social insurance spending 
is only one indicator for the development of welfare states. Aggregate spending 
developments do not capture structural reforms which do not directly impact upon 
spending in the short term but might do so strongly in the medium and long term. They 
also say nothing about the distribution of this spending: while the overall level can
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remain stable, insurance programmes might have been restructured in a way that has 
reduced the degree o f redistribution between the insured or in a way that has moved the 
benefit structure more towards a residual model of provision. Furthermore, while 
overall spending might have been maintained or increased it is possible that important 
cost containment measures have indeed been introduced without which the increase 
would have been even bigger. Aggregate spending measures also cannot capture 
“alterations o f the political environment in ways that enhance the probability of such 
outcomes in the future” (Pierson 1994: 17).
Furthermore, the mere observation that spending developments have been fairly similar 
between the countries on an aggregate level is not enough to reject the ‘old’ politics and 
fiscal institutionalism arguments, which might nevertheless have an influence on the 
respective reform processes. In order to be able to confirm or reject the ‘new politics’ 
lock-in arguments, two things are therefore necessary: (1) a more refined measurement 
of how strong fiscal commitment in the different insurance schemes has really been 
before fiscal pressures intensified; and (2) a more refined concept o f how to assess 
changes to these insurance schemes. This will be subject of the following chapter.
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3 Measuring Fiscal Commitment and Policy Change
The comparison o f social spending developments in France and Germany between 1990 
and 2005 has shown the continuous growth o f spending in both countries despite the 
increasing financial difficulties during this period (see Graphs 2-1 and 2-2). While this 
seems to confirm the argument that welfare spending is very ‘sticky’ in those countries 
due to the particular characteristics of their welfare states (see Hypothesis 1), the 
previous chapter has outlined that, firstly, spending patterns are not a sufficient 
indicator for welfare state change, and, secondly, the assumption that the French and 
German welfare states are generally prone to institutional lock-in seems too superficial 
and conflicts with the observation o f far-reaching reform processes after 1990.
This chapter presents an approach of how to measure the exact degrees o f fiscal 
commitment in social policy programmes, which is based on the different institutional, 
procedural and behavioral aspects o f political commitment outlined in the first part of 
the previous chapter (see 2.1). It focuses on fiscal commitment on four dimensions of  
social programmes, which are their administrative and budgetary regulations as well as 
their respective revenue structures and benefit regulations. This approach will make it 
possible to assess the degree to which the decisionmaking scope o f policymakers in 
France and Germany seeking to reform their welfare states and to contain spending in 
the social budget is -  as a result o f those pre-commitments -  restricted. The chapter 
furthermore presents a classification of policy change in terms o f fiscal commitments: 
the extent to which policy reforms represent retrenchment is assessed by analysing 
whether reform measures have the effect o f reducing existing degrees o f fiscal 
commitment (by either breaking or avoiding commitments) or whether they have the 
effect of sustaining these commitments. This approach allows for the incorporation of 
both immediate as well as future effects o f reforms in the analysis of policy change and 
the extent of retrenchment.
As the main social insurance programmes in the three sectors pensions, health and 
unemployment account for the predominant share of the social budget in both France 
and Germany, the following analysis will particularly focus on fiscal commitment in 
such schemes. The measurement approach is however applicable for the assessment of 
degrees o f fiscal commitment in all forms o f social policy programmes.
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3.1 Dimensions of Fiscal Commitment in the Social Budget
As outlined in Chapter 2, political commitment can result from a variety o f institutional 
and policy regulations. The approach to measuring fiscal commitment in social policy 
programmes presented in the following sections is therefore based on four different 
aspects o f such programmes: their administrative structure, their budgetary regulations, 
their revenue structure, and their regulations of benefit provision.
3.1.1 Formal and Informal Administrative Autonomy
One important element in the -  intentional -  creation o f credible commitment in the 
corporatist welfare states has been the institutional design o f their social insurance 
institutions. The decisive commitment-creating factor in this respect has been the 
establishment o f institutions with a certain degree o f administrative independence from 
the federal or central state. It is assumed that a greater degree o f administrative 
independence creates a greater degree o f fiscal commitment, as an independent 
administration limits the ability o f the central government to influence managerial 
decisions that strongly impact upon social spending. It also makes it more difficult to 
impose institutional change that limits this independence, as the actors involved will 
have an interest in defending their authorities.
How can the degree o f administrative independence be measured? A decisive element
of administrative independence is the governance structure of the institution. The fewer
state representatives are present in the administration, the greater is the degree of
11administrative independence. In corporatist insurance schemes, the composition o f the 
administrative bodies varies between bipartite institutions in which the state has no 
representatives and tripartite institutions, in which state representatives are permanent 
members of the administrative bodies. It can be assumed that a dominance o f union over 
employer representatives further increases fiscal commitment, as their interest in 
maintaining spending is particularly high.
Another important aspect for determining the degree o f administrative independence is 
not only the formal independence o f the institution, but also the degree to which the 
state can exert indirect influence (here labelled ‘managerial independence’). One
12 It is though necessary to also differentiate between different state representatives: it can be assumed 
that representatives o f  state bodies which are not spending carriers have less interest in cost containment 
than for example representatives o f the finance ministry.
62
relevant factor in this respect is the way top-officials are selected. While the 
administrative structure can be purely bipartite without any formal state involvement, 
this state influence can be indirect due to the appointment of top management positions 
by the government, or a necessary approval of decisions taken by the social partners.
A further factor determining the managerial independence of the administrative 
institutions is the nature and degree o f budgetary and legislative monitoring of 
administrative decision making. As the main social insurance programmes are public 
programmes, they are usually subject to some form of legal supervision. But the scope 
of this supervision can also go much further and include governmental approvals of 
organisational, financial or administrative decisions. The lesser the institution is subject 
to monitoring by the government, the greater is the degree o f administrative 
independence and thus o f fiscal commitment.
Another factor with -  indirect -  impact on the degree of the administrative 
independence of insurance schemes is the degree to which an insurance sector is 
fragmented into various insurance carriers. This fragmentation can be either 
geographical, or according to occupational groups or other socio-economic criteria. 
Fragmented schemes, particularly those split according to occupational criteria, create 
homogenous beneficiary groups (which also often enjoy specifically generous benefit 
regulations). The costs o f reforms in fragmented schemes are therefore more targeted 
onto this homogenous group of beneficiaries, which will likely be more able to organise 
resistance (see Olson 1965). Strong resistance to reforms can also result from the fact 
that while in bigger, unified schemes small changes can have big financial effects, 
retrenchment measures in smaller schemes have to be more comprehensive in order to 
have real fiscal effects. The higher the fragmentation o f insurance schemes -  measured 
as the number of special schemes within major social security programmes (see van 
Kersbergen 1995: 153) -  the higher the degree o f fiscal commitment should be.
Table 3-1 summarises the indicators for the measurement o f administrative 
independence outlined above, and specifies for each indicator the characteristics of 
insurance schemes with very high to very low degrees o f fiscal commitment.
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Table 3-1 Indicators and Measurement of Administrative Independence
Fiscal
Commitment
yen, high m Medium High Low Very low
Institutional 
Fragmentation 
of Insurance 
Sector
Very high 
number o f  
special 
schemes 
(occupational 
and regional 
fragmentation)
High degree o f  
occupational or 
regionally 
fragmented 
schemes
Medium 
degree o f  
occupational or 
regional 
fragmentation
Very limited 
number o f  
schemes (2/3)
Single
national
insurance
scheme
Composition of 
Administrative 
Body
Bipartite 
governing 
board with 
equal 
representation 
o f  the social 
partners
Tripartite 
Administration 
with only 
marginal state 
representation
Tripartite 
Administration 
with equal 
representation
Tripartite 
Administration 
with state 
majority
No
participation 
o f  social 
partners
Selection of 
Administrators
Autonomous 
selection o f  
officials by 
social partners
Autonomous 
selection by 
social partners 
based on 
suggestions by 
government
Selection by 
social partners; 
approval by 
government
Governmental 
appointment in 
consultation 
with social 
partners
Governmental 
appointment 
o f all officials
Degree o f  
Governmental 
Supervision
Only legality 
o f actions
Legality o f  
actions, as well 
as limited 
organisational 
and financial 
decisions
Limited degree 
o f professional 
oversight
Strong 
professional 
oversight; 
approval o f all 
important 
decisions
Direct state 
administration
In modem welfare states, various combinations of degrees of formal and managerial 
independence exist, which is illustrated in Table 3-2:
Table 3-2 Formal and Programmatic Independence
MkL
Formal Administrative Independence 
Medium Low
Bipartite administration, only 
legal oversight, own 
appointment o f  officials, high 
degree o f  occupational and 
regional fragmentation (e.g., 
German GKV)
State agency, no or very 
limited involvement o f  social 
partners in administration; 
low degree o f governmental 
oversight and interference 
(e.g., German VBL)
Tripartite administration, 
govt approves top officials, 
important organizational/ 
financial decisions need 
approval (e.g., German BA)
Bipartite administration, high 
degree o f  programmatic 
oversight, necessary govt 
approval o f top officials (e.g., 
French CNAM)
Single national insurance, 
direct state administration 
(e.g., British NHS)
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3.1.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
The creation o f credible political commitment through elements of institutional design 
has often been accompanied by the creation of ‘procedural’ commitment, as noted in the 
previous chapter. With regard to the welfare state, this means that administrative 
independence of insurance schemes often goes hand in hand with budgetary autonomy 
of these schemes. As public institutions, the spending o f social insurance organisations 
counts as public expenditure. But while the ‘power over the purse’ by the legislative is 
generally an essential element of democracies, not. only does the actual budgetary role 
of national legislatures vary considerably across countries (see Wehner 2006), but a 
considerable part of the ‘social budget’ is - despite being public spending - not always 
subject to the general annual budgetary processes.13 The intervention of parliament in 
the social budget often remains limited, and major decisions are often taken in bilateral 
agreements between ministers and social insurance bodies, or even independently by 
social insurance institutions themselves.
The ‘fiscal institutionalism’ literature shows that the institutions governing the budget 
process are important determinants of a country’s fiscal ability to limit expenditure (de 
Haan and Sturm 1994; von Hagen and Harden 1996; Perotti et al. 1998; Poterba and 
von Hagen 1999; Strauch and von Hagen 1999; 2001). According to this literature, the 
decentralisation o f budgetary control in welfare states should work against fiscal 
restriction, that is, make it harder for fiscal policymakers to control expenditures in this 
field, and therefore create fiscal commitment. Particularly in corporatist-continental 
welfare states, the number of actors involved in spending bargains is even greater due to 
the participation o f the social partners, which further increases the fragmentation of the 
process and entrenches the status quo.
As the degree to which social insurance schemes dispose o f budgetary autonomy 
influences the legal and political scope for policy change and cost containment to a 
large extent, it is the second important aspect to be considered when analysing the 
degree o f fiscal commitment in insurance schemes. In order to measure the impact of 
budgetary regulations on the scope for successive policy changes, two aspects need to 
be considered -  the first one being the formal decisionmaking powers over the main
13 The ‘social budget’ is not a classic institutional budget, but a statistical account o f the flows o f funds o f  
the totality o f all social programmes (Scholz et al. 2000; Bundesregierung 2001). In general, the social 
budget o f a state encompasses all social expenditure at all levels o f government as well as o f independent 
social institutions. If publicly mandated, private sector transfers to households can also be included.
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budgetary parameters, the second one the extent o f budgetary constraints in budgetary 
allocation and implementation processes.
3.1.2.1 Budgetary Decisionmaking Authority
In order to assess the degree o f fiscal commitment resulting from the specific budgetary 
regulations for social insurance schemes, it is important to assess who has the 
decisionmaking power regarding the formal adoption o f a social insurance budget, as 
well as regarding the decisive budgetary parameters. The first relevant aspect in this 
respect is whether a social insurance institution has formal budget autonomy, or whether 
its budget is part of the general state budget. In the latter case, fiscal commitment is low 
as this means that social insurance spending is subject to the general annual budgeting 
process, and therefore subject to changing parliamentary majorities which increases the 
volatility o f spending. If an institution has been formally granted budgetary autonomy, 
it is also relevant whether its budget needs the approval o f the government or o f an 
independent public supervisory institution. Again, governmental influence on the 
budget should lower the degree of fiscal commitment.
But similar to the administrative dimension, formal budget autonomy of insurance 
schemes does not mean much if  all relevant parameters regarding revenues and 
spending are already pre-determined by other decisionmakers, most likely by the 
government. Other central elements determining the degree of budgetary autonomy are 
therefore the degrees to which social insurance institutions have independent 
decisionmaking power or scope in determining the quantity of revenues for and 
spending o f insurance schemes.
Corporatist-continental social insurance schemes are usually financed through specific 
social insurance contributions that are earmarked for the insurance institutions rather 
than through general tax revenues. While the authority to determine tax rates lies with 
the respective governmental authorities, some social insurance institutions have the 
authority to determine their own contribution rates, and therefore determine their own 
revenues. In most cases though, the setting of contribution rates is a legal process and 
therefore requires a legislative act. In other cases, decisions regarding contribution rates 
are taken by the government via decree, whereas decisionmaking processes are often 
automated in the sense that the government is legally bound to adjust contribution rates 
according to the development o f other factors that impact on the fiscal situation o f the
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insurance schemes (e.g., growth rates or unemployment rates). What are the effects o f 
these different decisionmaking procedures on the degree o f fiscal commitment? The 
degree o f fiscal commitment is highest when an institution has contribution autonomy, 
as this means that it can independently decide about the contribution rate and can 
therefore always ensure a sufficient amount of revenues. In contrast, fiscal commitment 
is lowest when the decision of how much revenue is assigned to the insurance schemes 
is taken by the legislator as this makes allocatory decisions subject to the changing 
preferences o f the ruling majority in parliament. Compared to this, automatised decision 
via decree by the government increases the degree o f fiscal commitment when decisions 
are linked to certain fixed parameters, as it reduces discretion and makes short-term 
political interventions by the legislature more difficult.
The other decisive parameter for social insurance budgets is decisions regarding the 
amount o f spending. In most public insurance programmes, all relevant spending 
parameters (e.g., the generosity of benefits and eligibility rules) are defined by public 
law, and changes therefore require legislative decisions. In some cases, changes can also 
be implemented via governmental decree. While it is seldom the case that the public 
insurance institutions decide independently about benefit provisions, they have -  to 
varying degrees -  discretion in deciding about additional benefits and do usually 
determine their administrative budgets. Again, fiscal commitment increases with the 
degree o f autonomous decisionmaking power o f the insurance schemes.
3.1.2.2 Budgetary Constraints
For assessing the degree of fiscal commitment resulting from budgetary autonomy it is 
not only important who decides about the budget and its different parameters, but also 
how this decision is taken and -  subsequently -  enforced. In budgeting processes, 
spending demands by the politicians and bureaucrats at different levels o f government 
generally exceed the available resources. One of the main reasons is the incomplete 
internalisation o f the social costs o f spending, also described as the ‘Common Pool 
Resource (CPR) Problem’ (Weingast et al. 1981; Ostrom 1990; Perotti et al. 1998; 
Poterba and von Hagen 1999): it arises when public revenues are mainly generated by 
general taxes, while the programmes and benefits that the money is spent on target 
specific social groups and political constituencies. Policymaker misperceive the costs o f  
spending, as they take into account all benefits but only the marginal tax share that 
affects their constituency, and are therefore likely to demand increased spending (see
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Strauch and von Hagen 2001). This leads to an expansive fiscal policy and higher 
deficits than would be the case were political actors to internalise- all of the costs of  
spending.
Another reason that makes it difficult to constrain spending is that social insurance 
budgets often have an independent budget status and social insurance spending is often 
not included in annual spending processes executed by parliament. This is also a 
consequence of social spending not being determined a priori in budget laws, but 
instead being based on so-called ‘mandatory spending laws’, which define to what 
extent and under what conditions citizens are eligible for benefits (see von Hagen 2004). 
The overall amount o f spending is determined ex post by the number o f people eligible 
for those benefits during the fiscal year, which makes the imposition o f a-priori 
spending constraints difficult. But to varying degrees, social insurance programmes are 
also financed from tax revenues whose amount is specified in the annual state budget. 
The regulations o f the budgeting process on the central or federal state level do 
therefore play an important role when measuring the degree o f fiscal commitment in the 
welfare state, as they determine the overall strength of pressures to contain public 
spending and therefore also the pressures on social expenditure financed via taxes.
Budgetary allocation processes can broadly be distinguished by two main approaches: 
one way to allocate funds is the so-called ‘delegation approach’, in which governments 
transfer authority to the finance minister who has an encompassing interest in the 
budget and whose function is to ensure the continuing cooperation of the other 
policymakers throughout the process. In contrast, the so-called ‘contract approach’ is 
based on a set o f key budgetary parameters negotiated on a collective basis at the start 
of the budget process, which results in binding fiscal targets for individual sectors. A 
number o f studies about the fiscal effects of these different approaches conclude that the 
‘contract approach’ generally leads to a more restrictive and disciplined fiscal policy 
(Perotti et al. 1998; Strauch and von Hagen 2001; Hallerberg et al. 2001). The setting of 
fiscal contracts for each spending ministry is seen as the most effective way to deal with 
the CPR problem, especially under coalition governments with different spending 
priorities (Hallerberg 2000). Accordingly, fiscal commitment is low when the budgetary 
process follows such a contract approach as pressure for cost containment -  also for 
welfare spending -  is high. In case the budgetary allocation process follows a delegation 
approach, pressures to contain spending depend on the formal ability of spending
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ministers to overrule the finance minister in a cabinet vote. The stronger the position of 
the finance minister in this respect, the stronger are pressures to contain spending which 
lowers the degree o f fiscal commitment.
But pressures for cost containment in the insurance schemes do not only result from the 
budgetary allocation processes at the central state level. Even if schemes do not receive 
any tax revenues and have formal budget autonomy, spending constraints can be 
exercised by parliament or by the government. One way to do this is to set expenditure 
ceilings or to impose fiscal targets. In the case o f overspending, the relevant minister 
will then be required to propose spending adjustments and changes in the relevant non- 
financial laws if these limits are overrun (see von Hagen and Harden 1996). But as has 
been extensively discussed in the principal-agent and regulation literature (e.g., 
Niskanen 1971; McCubbins et al. 1987), rules themselves do not count for much if it 
cannot be ensured that implementing agents comply with the contractual agreements. 
The effect o f fiscal rules also depends to a large degree on fiscal monitoring and, in the 
case of overspending, the credible and effective enforcement o f the budgetary 
regulations (see Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Strauch and von Hagen 2001).
Furthermore, the rules o f deficit coverage have important implications for the fiscal 
behaviour o f welfare institutions. As most social insurance programmes are based on 
open-ended entitlement, the assigned revenues might not be sufficient to cover expenses 
and therefore some regulations for the coverage o f potential deficits need to be in place. 
This can be ensured in different ways: internally, an organisation can deal with potential 
deficits with the building up of sufficient reserve funds. But additional revenues can 
also be supplied externally: either by the state, by other insurance organisations, or 
through the private capital market. The question of who has the responsibility for 
ensuring the financial equilibrium of the respective organisation has implications for the 
degree of fiscal commitment: it is greatest when sufficient revenues are provided from 
the outset and internally, that is, if  the preventive measures of the insurance schemes 
such as reserve funds are sufficient to also cope with long-term fiscal difficulties. But 
often this is not the case, and instead the state covers the deficit. When the guarantees 
for liabilities by the state are automatic and the additional revenues do not have to be 
reimbursed by the affected public entity, this also creates a high degree o f fiscal 
commitment. For the state, on the other hand, such regulations make it hard to contain 
spending as they limit the effectiveness o f the budgetary process (von Hagen 2004).
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Fiscal constraints for the insurance schemes are strongest if  internal deficit regulations 
are non-existent or insufficient, and if  additional revenues have to be approved -  which 
makes it more visible -  and refunded in subsequent fiscal years or might not even be 
permitted at all.
Table 3-3 summarises the indicators for the measurement o f budgetary autonomy and 
constraints outlined above, and specifies for each indicator the characteristics of 
insurance schemes with very high to very low degrees o f fiscal commitment.
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Table 3-3 Indicators and Measurement of Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
Fiscal
Commitment
Very high High MediumVery lo .
Budgetary Autonomy
Degree of 
Formal 
Budget 
Autonomy
Full budgetary 
autonomy
Budgetary 
autonomy, but 
approval by 
independent 
supervisory 
institution
Budgetary 
autonomy, but 
government 
approval 
necessary
Separate 
budget, but set 
up by 
government 
authorities
No budgetary 
autonomy; 
budget is part 
o f state budget
Degree of 
Revenue 
Autonomy
Full
Contribution
autonomy
Contribution 
autonomy, but 
limited through 
certain 
conditions (e.g., 
wage dev.)
Formal 
contribution 
autonomy, but 
can be overruled 
by government
By
government, 
automatised 
(certain 
criteria), via 
decree
Revenues 
decided 
annually by 
parliament
Degree o f  
Spending 
Autonomy
Autonomous
decisions
regarding
spending
parameters
Autonomous 
decisions within 
framework set 
by parliament/ 
government
Main decisions 
by parliament;
limited 
discretion for 
insurance carrier 
regarding 
benefits
Decisions by 
parliament; 
insurance 
carrier only 
determines 
administrative 
spending
Decisions 
exclusively by 
parliament
Budgetary Constraints
Budgetary
Allocation
Process
Delegation 
approach; very 
weak role o f  
finance 
minister; 
bargains with 
spending 
minister
Delegation 
approach; 
bargains with 
spending 
minister, but 
strong role o f  
finance minister
Delegation 
approach; 
bargains with 
spending 
minister, but 
strong finance 
minister; strong 
multi-annual 
targets
Contract 
approach; 
government 
sets own 
parameters
Contract 
approach; 
tight fiscal 
parameters 
linked to 
economic and 
fiscal criteria
Enforced 
Fiscal Targets
No fiscal 
targets or 
guidelines; 
open-ended 
benefit 
entitlements
Non-binding
guidelines
Fiscal targets; 
enforcement 
weak
Fiscal targets; 
enforcement 
varies; effects 
on new fiscal 
cycle
Strictly 
enforced fiscal 
targets
Spending
Monitoring No spending monitoring
Restricted
spending
monitoring;
mainly
internally
Restricted 
spending 
monitoring by 
government
Strict 
spending 
monitoring by 
government
Strict 
spending 
monitoring by 
independent 
institution
Deficit
Coverage
Automatic 
deficit 
coverage by 
the central 
state
State guarantee; 
non-refundable 
subsidies/loans
State guarantee; 
refundable loans Debts allowed
No deficit 
coverage; no 
debts allowed
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3.1.3 Revenue Structure
A factor central to ‘Bismarckian’ social insurance regimes is the financing o f benefits 
mainly via employer and employee contributions. These contributions are earmarked for 
the specific social insurance purpose they are paid for, and are intended to secure (tax) 
independent revenues for the social security organisations which do not compete with 
other spending purposes. Besides this procedural aspect o f creating fiscal commitment, 
there is an important political dimension as citizens build their lives depending on 
benefit expectations for which they paid contributions. Furthermore, those entitlements 
often enjoy a high degree o f legal protection (Bieback 1997a; Hamisch 2001). 
Contribution financing also contributes to the reliability of the revenue base of 
insurance schemes, as contribution increases are often seen as more politically feasible 
as tax increases due to the perceived link between payments and benefits (Bonoli and 
Palier 2000). Furthermore it strongly contributes to the legitimacy of the social partners 
to be involved in the administration of the insurance schemes, as the unions act as 
representatives o f the employees paying contributions and the employer associations as 
representatives o f the contribution-paying businesses. This makes it highly likely that 
they will oppose changes to the revenue structure that would not only increase the 
volatility o f funds but also deprive them of their role in social policy administration.
To measure the degree of fiscal commitment resulting from the revenue structure of 
social insurance programmes, the share of contribution revenues compared to other 
sources is a determining feature.14 Table 3-4 summarises the revenue categories which 
are used in the subsequent analysis.
14 The term ‘contributions’ does not only refer to earmarked charges paid by employers and/or 
employees, but also includes contributions paid by other social programme carriers or by the central state 
instead o f the insured ( ‘public contributions’). These payments -  although stemming from tax revenues -  
still have the same entitlement and commitment-creating effect, as they replace wage-related 
contributions o f a particular insured individual. It is furthermore possible to distinguish between ‘actual’ 
(that is, real payments stemming from wages) and ‘fictitious’ contributions: in civil-service schemes or in 
public companies, contributions to special pension schemes are often not indeed paid out to these 
schemes, but are only fictitious accounts. The actual benefit payments do in fact stem from taxes (civil 
service schemes) or company profits.
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Table 3-4 Social Insurance Revenue Sources
Revenue Sources
■ Contributions
o Actual contributions
o
Employers 
Employees 
Fictitious contributions
o Public contributions
■ Taxes
o Earmarked Taxes
o Regular Subsidies
o Tax-Financing o f Insurance-External Benefits
o Compensations
o Deficit Coverage/Irregular Subsidies
■ Transfers (from other insurance carriers)
■ Credits
■ Investment Income
■ Other Revenues
With regard to the commitment-creating effect of the revenue structure it is also 
important to distinguish between the sources of non-contribution revenues. Most social 
insurance institutions receive a certain share of tax revenues and since taxes do not 
create entitlements, expenditure cuts should be politically easier to achieve in the future 
which lowers the legal spending commitment. A further effect that lowers the 
commitment factor is that a high share of tax revenues creates a strong government 
influence over the insurance scheme. But it is also necessary to differentiate between 
various categories of tax revenues: some tax funds assigned to social insurance schemes 
compensate those for redistributive functions fulfilled by them (e.g., additional child- 
related benefits; for details see 3.1.4). Such tax payments do not reduce the degree of 
fiscal commitment, as they are not replacing contribution payments but are paid 
additionally. The situation is different for tax payments which replace contribution 
payments and finance general insurance benefits. Such forms of tax-financing reduce 
fiscal commitment as they reduce the independence of the financing basis of schemes 
and give the government greater influence.15
Another factor important to the revenue structure of social programmes is the existence 
of financial equalisation processes or mutual contribution payments between different 
welfare state institutions and programmes. The extent of these fiscal interdependencies
15 A further tax category with similar commitment-reducing effects is tax resources which have a 
regulatory background (e.g. taxes on tobacco or alcohol). Such taxes are often earmarked for certain 
insurance institutions, which insure against the risks associated with the taxed object/service (e.g., health 
insurance).
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can be measured as the share of transfer revenues either paid or received by each social 
institution. These financial linkages influence the commitment device o f the social 
budget in various ways: on the one hand, strong interdependencies make it difficult to 
implement more wide-reaching changes without risking the balance of the whole system 
(see Trampusch 2003). Furthermore, they often disguise the actual financial situation of 
individual programmes, which makes it difficult for policymakers to correctly assess the 
situation and to react accordingly. In this sense, higher levels of financial 
interdependencies increase fiscal commitment as they make it harder to control and 
reform social expenditure. On the other hand, these financial interlinkages are often an 
access point for governments seeking to resolve financial problems without intervening 
directly into the financing or spending structures of the programmes. Budgetary 
interdependencies offer them the opportunity to solve financial problems through the 
introduction or expansion of financial equalisation processes, or the changing o f mutual 
contribution or compensation payments between insurance funds. In this sense, 
financial interdependencies reduce fiscal commitment as they violate the basic actuarial 
principle that benefits that fall into the scope of functions o f a social insurance also have 
to be financed by this insurance.
Furthermore, revenues can stem from credits taken out on the private capital market, 
although this possibility is often restricted. Apart from being an unsustainable financing 
mechanism, a high share o f credit financing decreases commitment as it involves 
interest payments which further drain the already tight budget. Other revenue sources 
which play a rather marginal role in public insurance schemes are investment or rental 
incomes, which are summarised under ‘other revenues’ (see Table 3.4).
To measure the degree of fiscal commitment inherent in a particular revenue structure, a 
score o f ‘very high’ is assigned if the share of earmarked revenue sources is above 90 
percent o f total revenues. As all public insurance schemes analysed in this thesis 
provide some degree of redistributive measures (see 3.1.4), a contribution share of over 
90 percent indicates that all insurance-related spending is financed entirely from 
earmarked revenues which creates a very high degree o f revenue independence for the 
insurance institution. In contrast, if  the share o f earmarked revenue sources in a social 
policy programme is below 30 percent, the degree o f fiscal commitment is considered to 
be ‘very lo w \ This threshold is set as, in this case, the financing body is predominantly 
dependent on the assignment o f funds from the tax pool which makes it highly
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dependent from governmental and parliamentary decisions. The intermediate levels of 
fiscal commitment in the revenue structure are ‘high’ (earmarked revenue share 
between 70 and 90 percent), ‘medium’ (between 50 and 70 percent) and 7ow’ (between 
30 and 50 percent).
3.1.4 Spending Structure
The fourth dimension of fiscal commitment is the specific spending structure of social 
insurance programmes. As outlined in Chapter 2, the rules and regulations o f benefit 
provisions do not only determine the financial expenses o f a programme, but also the 
costs o f its reversibility. These costs of policy change are strongly connected with the 
degree to which social insurance benefits are connected with individual contribution 
records. Two aspects are relevant in this respect: the first one is eligibility, which means 
the extent to which claims for social transfers are based on citizen rights and/or social 
characteristics as opposed to employment and contribution records. The second aspect 
of the benefit structure is reciprocity, that is, the degree to which the generosity and 
duration of benefit payments are directly related to a record of contributions.
A strictly applied insurance principle means that the contribution revenues are used for 
insurance purpose only and not for wider economic or socio-political goals. This means 
that (a), only those who paid into the system are eligible for benefits, and (b), those who 
paid in more contributions will also receive more benefits. In general, these principles 
apply to private as well as public insurance schemes alike, but public schemes make -  
to varying degrees -  exceptions from all these rules in order to achieve other political 
goals. Some form of redistribution is already involved in the general insurance 
principle: all social insurance programmes, also private ones, redistribute resources 
according to their insurance character (e.g., from non-claimants to claimants, from the 
young and middle-aged to the old, from the healthy to the sick, from the employed to 
the unemployed). But public social insurance schemes also redistribute resources in 
support o f various societal groups which are entitled to benefits despite insufficient 
contribution records. While in a tax-financed system, all citizens subject to taxation pay 
for these expenses, in a contribution-financed system they are covered only by the 
contribution payers. Therefore these benefits will be referred to as ‘insurance-external 
benefits’. It can be assumed that the lower the share o f such insurance-external 
provision, that is, the more restricted the circle o f beneficiaries is to those people who
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paid in contributions and the stronger the link between contribution record and benefit 
generosity, the stronger the degree of fiscal commitment should be. This is not only 
because contribution-based entitlements enjoy a higher degree o f legal protection, but 
also because political pressures should be stronger if  ‘earned’ entitlements are attacked 
in welfare reforms.
What indicators are suitable to measure the degree of eligibility and reciprocity in 
insurance schemes? Due to the different nature of benefits in different insurance sectors, 
it is partly necessary to consider different indicators for each sector. Regarding 
eligibility, the essential question is who receives benefits. It therefore needs to be 
determined what the conditions for the receipts of benefits are and how closely they are 
related to former contribution payments. The main eligibility factor in the pension 
sector is the mandatory retirement age at which the receipt o f a full pension is possible. 
There might be additional conditions for the receipt o f a full pension, such as minimum 
contribution times. In many schemes, certain times are accounted as contribution times 
although no contributions have effectively been paid, which lowers the link between 
contributions and entitlements, and therefore the degree of fiscal commitment. In 
unemployment insurance schemes, a certain minimum contribution time again tightens 
the link between contribution record and general benefit entitlements. Apart from these, 
there might be additional conditions for the receipt o f benefits, for example the 
availability for work or the attendance of qualification measures. In the health sector, 
certain minimum contribution times might apply before the insurance protection comes 
into effect. In this sector, many schemes also make major exceptions from the strict 
application of the insurance principle with the free insurance of non-employed 
dependents.
Regarding the degree o f reciprocity between contribution records and the generosity of 
benefits, the main question is who receives how much. In pension insurance schemes, a 
specific calculation formula constitutes the essential relationship between contribution 
payments and benefits and therefore plays the main role in assessing the degree of 
spending reciprocity. Other factors are the recognition o f certain non-contribution times 
as contribution-equivalent times. It is also important to what extent early retirement 
impacts on the generosity of benefits: as long as the diversion from normal retirement 
age is connected with equivalent reductions of the pension payments, the principle of 
equivalence between contribution payments and pensions is not violated. But for certain
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societal groups early retirement is possible without these reductions. A further indicator 
to assess the degree of spending reciprocity is the difference between minimum and 
maximum benefits (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 69; Kersbergen 1995: 152). The greater 
these differences in relation to previous earning-based contributions, the greater is the 
degree o f reciprocity. While these aspects affect reciprocity in the sense o f equivalence 
between individual contribution record and the level of benefits (‘internal reciprocity’), 
there is also another aspect of reciprocity that needs to be considered. This second 
aspect is reciprocity between the absolute value o f contributions at the time of payment, 
and the value o f benefits at the time of benefit receipts (‘external reciprocity’). Central 
elements determining the degree of external reciprocity are the regulations regarding the 
indexation o f benefits and successive charges on benefits (e.g., taxes or social 
contributions). The greater the degree to which the value o f benefits (measured as power 
purchasing parities) reflects the value o f contribution payments, the greater is the degree 
of external reciprocity.
In health insurance schemes, reciprocity is generally weaker due to the particular 
character o f the insurance: although contributions like in the other two insurance types 
are paid proportionally to the income up to the contribution ceiling, the benefits are 
independent from income, but instead depend on the individual medical needs of the 
insured. Furthermore, contribution rates between insurance funds can vary while the 
provision o f services might, due to legal specifications, be the same, which also distorts 
the principle o f reciprocity. Regulations regarding patients’ co-payments and possible 
reductions or exemptions for certain groups o f insured affect the generosity and 
reciprocity o f payments. Due to its direct link to former wages, sickness pay is usually 
the only element in the health insurance that follows the principle o f reciprocity.
In unemployment insurance schemes, reciprocity again plays a greater role as benefits 
are usually calculated as a percentage of former wages. Of importance is therefore the 
respective replacement rate and reference salary. The benefit development over time 
also plays a role, as in some schemes benefits are regressive. As in pension insurance 
schemes, indexation rules and char ges on benefits impact upon the generosity and 
‘external’ reciprocity o f benefits. Furthermore, the administrating agencies may provide 
consultation and placement activities available to every jobseeker, while they are only 
financed by the insured employees which is an important factor reducing the degree of 
reciprocity.
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Table 3-5 summarises the indicators for measuring the degree of eligibility and 
reciprocity for each of the insurance sectors.
Table 3-5 Indicators of Fiscal Commitment on the Spending Dimension
Pensions Health Unemployment
Eligibility ■ Mandatory Retirement 
Age
■ Conditions for Full Rate 
Pension
■ Accounting o f Non- 
Contribution Times
■ Minimum Contribution 
Time
■ Beneficiaries 
(Healthcare/Sickness 
Pay)
■ Eligible Dependants
■ Minimum Contribution 
Time (Healthcare/ 
Sickness Pay)
■ Exemptions from 
Compulsory Insurance
■ Minimum Contribution 
Time
■ Work Availability and 
other Conditions
Reciprocity ■ Pension Level
■ Benefit Inequality
■ Reduction for Early 
Retirement
■ Regulations o f  
Indexation
■ Charges on Benefits
■ Patient’s Co-Payments
■ Exemptions or 
Reductions to Co- 
Payments
■ Sickness Pay Benefit 
Rates
■ Replacement Rate
■ Reference Salary
■ Duration and Benefit 
Development over Time
■ Qualifying Waiting 
Period
■ Charges on Benefits
■ Universally available 
placement 
activities/active 
employment policies
3.1.5 Quantifying Fiscal Commitment
In order to arrive at a quantitative measure for the respective degrees of fiscal 
commitment, categorical values have been assigned on each of the four dimensions 
considered above. These values range from a maximum of ‘5’, characterising a ‘very 
high’ degree of fiscal commitment on the respective dimension, to a minimum of ‘1’, 
characterising a very low degree of fiscal commitment. Between these extreme scores, 
degrees of fiscal commitment can be identified as ‘very low’ (value 1), Tow’ (value 2), 
‘medium’ (value 3) or ‘high’ (value 4). As the purpose behind the measurement exercise 
is to provide an ordinal indication of how strong fiscal commitment in a particular 
social policy programme is compared to other programmes, the variables are weighted 
equally for the assignment of commitment scores to the individual dimensions.16 The 
aggregation of the respective commitment values on all four dimensions allows for the
16 For a similar approach in measuring the independence o f regulatory agencies see Gilardi 2002.
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comparison o f the social spending ‘stickiness’ in various social policy sectors and social 
policy programmes, as well as for the assessment of the implications of successive 
policy reforms for this political spending commitment. It is however important to stress 
that the dimensions cannot be directly summed as they measure different aspects. The 
objection that some o f the indicators used for measuring the degree o f commitment 
should be weighted more strongly than others is though valid, and the issue of how 
important single elements are for creating fiscal commitment is further discussed in 
Chapter 4 (see 4.3.1).
3.2 Three Strategies of Welfare Reform: Sustainment, Reduction 
and Prevention of Fiscal Commitment
While the previous section of this chapter dealt with the question of how to measure 
degrees o f fiscal commitment in insurance schemes at a given point in time, another 
important question is how we should assess the impact o f reforms on such fiscal 
commitment. What are the different modes o f policy change possible in policy areas 
with a high degree of spending commitment, and what is the impact of these changes on 
future commitments?
The following paragraphs present a categorisation of different reform steps under 
conditions o f financial pressure. These steps differ mainly between the sustainment of 
existing commitments in spite of financial pressures, or alternatively of either the 
reduction o f these commitments (which has immediate or medium-term effects) or the 
avoiding o f new commitments (which has long-term effects). This categorisation will 
help to assess the impact of reforms carried out on all four commitment dimensions and 
will make it possible to not only evaluate to what degree commitment has been 
sustained or reduced on those dimensions, but also to assess what modes of change have 
primarily been chosen.
3.2.1 Sustaining Fiscal Commitment
In accordance with the blame-avoidance arguments o f the ‘new politics’ literature, the 
most straightforward solution for policymakers facing the dilemma between high 
spending commitments and strong fiscal pressures would be to sustain the existing 
commitment in spite o f those pressures in order to avoid negative political 
consequences. This can be achieved in two ways: firstly, by increasing the revenues for
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the programmes either through raising contribution rates, or by subsidising the system 
through external revenues. Secondly, it can be achieved by reducing spending through 
‘tightening’ o f spending commitments. This encompasses all expenditure reducing 
reforms that do not negatively affect the reciprocity of the system, that is, that do not 
break the initial relationship between contribution payments and benefits as one o f the 
central elements o f fiscal commitment. This can be achieved either by retrenchment of 
‘insurance-external’ measures or by the shifting of beneficiaries with insufficient 
contributions into other, tax-financed programmes. Alternatively, non-contributory 
benefits can be financed via taxes. Another way o f reducing spending in programmes, 
while sustaining fiscal commitment, is to shift beneficiaries into other contribution- 
based insurance programmes facing fewer financial difficulties. Table 3-6 specifies the 
possible ways of sustaining fiscal commitment separately for each of the four analytical 
dimensions.
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Table 3-6 Sustaining Fiscal Commitment
Administrative Independence
The independent administrative competencies ■ N o changes to status quo
o f the social partners are sustained or ■ State withdraws from administrative bodies
expanded in insurance schemes
■ Insurance schemes gain management 
authorities
■ The degree o f  state supervision is reduced
Budgetary Independence
The degree o f budgetary independence is ■ No changes to status quo
sustained or expanded ■ Insurance schemes gain more formal
budgetary independence
■ Social partners gain authorities in 
determining spending or revenues
■ Fiscal constraints are reduced
Revenue-Structure
Spending commitment is sustained through ■ Increasing the contribution rate
the increase o f  revenues for the system ■ Broadening the contribution base
■ Making hitherto non-covered employed 
liable for mandatory insurance
■ Increasing the ceiling o f earnings subject to 
contributions
■ Increasing/introducing regular subsidies out 
o f general taxation to public schemes
■ Creation o f tax-financed reserve funds
■ Utilising parts o f an increased contribution 
rate to build up a fund reserve
Spending-Structure
Spending commitment is sustained through ■ No changes to status quo
- the tightening o f the link between ■ Tightening o f  eligibility criteria for non­
contribution record and benefit eligibility, contributory benefits
- or by shifting beneficiaries into other ■ Retrenchment o f non-contributory benefits
insurance or tax-financed programmes (in terms o f generosity or duration)
■ Financing o f insurance-external benefits via 
taxes (often connected with tightening o f  
eligibility rules)
■ Transfer o f insured risks into another 
contribution-based insurance sector
■ Transfer o f insured with insufficient 
contributions and/or redistributive benefits 
(e.g., pensions based on child-caring times) 
to a tax-financed system
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3.2.2 Reducing Fiscal Commitment
The other solution for policymakers facing the dilemma between high spending 
commitments and strong fiscal pressures is to reduce spending commitments in order to 
balance spending and receipts. The most obvious way o f reducing spending is to alter 
the benefit regulations of the schemes by either reducing the generosity of benefits or by 
tightening eligibility rules. As this means that entitlements and spending expectations 
based on former programme regulations would not be fulfilled, such changes will be 
labelled ‘commitment-breaking\  This can range from minor changes to annual 
adaptation regulations to major cutbacks o f current and future benefit entitlements.
Just to distinguish between the keeping and breaking o f commitment exclusively on the 
spending side o f programmes would however not sufficiently capture the complexity of 
the reform processes underway. The reduction of fiscal commitments can also be 
achieved by changes to the administrative, budgetary and revenue dimensions. Changes 
on all o f these dimensions have important implications for the welfare provision system 
as such, and lead to an internal transformation o f the system and its insurance logic. 
These ‘hidden politics o f social policy retrenchment’ (Hacker 2004) are not visible by 
merely focusing on changes to the formal institutional structure o f welfare states or the 
quantity o f social spending.
One form of such ‘hidden’ commitment reduction is the curtailment o f the independent 
revenue base of social insurance funds. This can take the form of cutbacks o f formerly 
earmarked tax subsidies, or can be executed more indirectly via the replacement of 
contribution revenues with tax revenues. A reduction o f fiscal commitment on the 
revenue dimension also takes place if  funds are channelled away from insurance funds -  
either into other social programmes, or back into the central budget. The replacement of 
contribution with tax revenues furthermore reduces fiscal commitment as it indirectly 
increases the control powers o f the government. Such changes to the revenue structures 
of insurance schemes should also be labelled ‘commitment-breaking ’ as they attack not 
only the basic insurance principle o f earmarked contribution payments (that is, the 
contributions paid by the insured go in full to the insurance scheme and are not used for 
other purposes), but also worsen the financial situation o f the schemes even further 
which makes the retrenchment of benefits more likely in the future.
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A further way o f reducing fiscal commitment in the welfare state is to make changes to 
the independent budget status of social insurance schemes and to increase the 
expenditure control through the central government. Such changes do not directly 
‘break’ commitments as they do not affect the relationship between contributions paid 
to the insurance schemes and benefits received by the insured, but they reduce the scope 
for the managers o f the insurance schemes to take independent budgetary decisions of 
how to cope with the financial situation. This reduction of the institutional barrier 
against governmental involvement will be labelled as ‘commitment-restraining’. The 
policy options available to the government to restrain fiscal commitments range from 
changes to the general approach in budgetmaking to a fixation of annual expenditure 
adaptations in individual programmes. Commitment is further reduced if  fiscal 
constraints are increased -  either through the introduction of fiscal targets, or through 
changes in the deficit coverage mechanisms of the schemes (either via a reduction of 
internal deficit coverage mechanisms or the abolition o f state guarantees). But fiscal 
constraints can also be increased more indirectly, for example through the introduction 
of competitive elements as in the creation of quasi-markets or the introduction of other 
incentives for cost-efficient behaviour.
Finally, a reduction in the degree o f fiscal commitment can be achieved through 
changes in the administration of the social insurance system that increases managerial 
control by the government over the schemes. Again, this does not directly break existing 
spending commitments but reduces the institutional barrier against governmental 
involvement and successive changes in the insurance schemes. Such changes to the 
administrative independence -  both formal as well as managerial -  o f the insurance 
schemes are labelled ‘commitment-controlling'. This can be achieved either through a 
stricter monitoring o f the behaviour o f the administrative agents or via a reduced role 
for the social partners altogether. Table 3-7 summarises the different options for 
reducing fiscal commitment on each of the four analytical dimensions.
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Table 3-7 Reducing Fiscal Commitment
Administrative Independence: ‘Commitment-Controlling*
The control by the government over the ■ Creating new institutions for closer
implementation o f  social security programmes is spending monitoring
increased through changes in institutional and ■ Increasing state influence in
administrative structures and procedures administrative bodies
■ Introducing fiscal incentives for cost- 
efficient behaviour
Budgetary Independence: ‘Commitment-Restraining’
Budgetary control over expenditure and revenues ■ Increasing budgetary control o f the
overall and in specific social security programmes parliament (pre-defined budget for social
is increased through changes in institutional and spending)
administrative structures and procedures ■ Moving from delegation to contract
approach in budgetmaking
■ Abolishing contribution autonomy of 
institutions
■ ‘Depoliticizing’ expenditure policies: 
fixing the level o f benefits, their annual 
adjustment and minimum reserve 
requirements
■ Introduction o f  competition and/or 
creation o f ‘quasi-markets’
Revenue Structure: ‘Commitment-Breaking’
The independent financial basis o f  the insurance ■ Funds are directly channelled away from
programmes is reduced social insurance budgets into other
public, non-insurance budgets
■ Formerly earmarked funds are cut back
■ Contribution revenues are used to 
finance new non-insurance tasks
■ Contribution financing is replaced by tax 
financing
Spending Structure: ‘Commitment-Breaking’
Entitlements based on former programme ■ Suspending automatic benefit indexation
regulations are not fulfilled and/or changing the indexing formula
■ Reducing/eliminating 
derivative/auxiliary benefits
■ Increasing co-payments
■ Changing the benefit formula
■ Raising the standard retirement age (with 
effect for older currently insured 
generations)
■ Increasing benefit reductions for early 
retirees
■ Reducing benefit duration
■ Tightening eligibility criteria
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3.2.3 Avoiding Fiscal Commitment
There is a further option available to policymakers seeking to limit the extent of fiscal 
commitments that does not affect existing commitments, but rather reduces them in the 
medium and long term. This can be achieved by either avoiding new commitments or 
by shifting the insurance of social risks to the private sector. Such changes will slowly 
phase out existing schemes and can thus lead to a gradual, but considerable, 
transformation of the existing system of social protection.
One way of avoiding the creation of future fiscal commitments is to change the revenue 
structure of the social programmes by shifting towards tax financing - either within the 
public insurance programme itself, or through a gradual shift of social protection 
towards complementary or supplementary tax-financed programmes. Another, more 
radical form of ‘commitment-avoiding’ takes place when the insurance of social risks is 
transferred away from a public, contribution-based system into private or occupational 
insurance schemes. While the already existing entitlements are usually legally protected, 
this means that commitment towards future generations is avoided. Table 3-8 
summarises these reform measures which have effects on fiscal commitment in the 
medium and long term.
Table 3-8 Avoiding Fiscal Commitment
“Commitment-Avoiding”
The creation o f future entitlements and spending 
expectations is limited or avoided through
- changes in revenue structures
- changes in benefit regulations for future 
beneficiaries
- shifting the insurance o f social risks into tax- 
financed programmes or into the private sector
Financing the insurance o f  social risks 
increasingly on the private market 
Introducing compulsory private and 
occupational insurance schemes, either 
by mandating participation or by 
creating incentives 
Introducing supplementary tax- 
financed/privately financed 
programmes
Raising the standard retirement age 
(for young or future generations o f  
insured)
3.2.4 Conclusions
This chapter has presented an analytical approach to measure the exact degrees of fiscal 
commitment in social insurance schemes. This approach includes not only institutional 
structures, administrative responsibilities and benefit regulations of the schemes, but
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also highlights the importance of budgetary responsibilities, budgetary constraints and 
revenue structures for the extent to which insurance schemes are shielded from 
successive institutional and policy changes. The chapter has also outlined the reform 
options available to policymakers facing a high degree o f fiscal commitments in times 
of fiscal austerity: they can either maintain those commitments by channelling 
additional revenues into the schemes, or they can focus on the spending side of the 
schemes by either reducing existing commitments or avoiding future ones.
A widespread conclusion in the welfare state reform literature of the last decade has 
been that the corporatist-continental welfare state schemes are ‘laggards’ in terms of 
cost-containing reforms, as the generally high degrees o f fiscal commitment in their 
social insurance schemes have sheltered them from retrenchment efforts (Esping- 
Andersen 1996; Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Bonoli 2000; Pierson 2001b; Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Scharpf and Schmidt 2001). Both France and Germany, two 
representatives of this welfare state type, are said to have been particularly immune to 
reform efforts. The resilience of the German welfare state against cost containment 
efforts is explained by its strong interlinkages with the economic and corporate 
governance system of the country, its strong public support in the middle-class 
dominated German society and its particular organisational structure dominated by 
insurance schemes administered by the social partners (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; 
Mares 2001). In France, the strong public support for social insurance provisions due to 
status-maintaining benefit structures and a union-dominated administration of insurance 
schemes are believed to be important barriers to reform which lead to a ‘frozen’ social 
security landscape (for a critical view see Vail 2004). But how strong have the 
institutional and political barriers for reform inherent in the German and French welfare 
state structures really been, and what have been the effects on reform processes? These 
questions will be the subject o f the following chapter.
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4 Variation and its Effects: Fiscal Commitment in 
France and Germany 1990-2005
Having established the analytical framework for measuring fiscal commitment, this 
chapter measures the degree of fiscal commitment in three social insurance sectors 
(healthcare, pensions and unemployment) in France and Germany in 1990. This is the 
point in time before financial pressures in both countries started to increase considerably
1 7(see Graphs 1-2 and 1-3). The measurement of fiscal commitment in these social 
policy sectors gives a good indication to which degree the decisionmaking scope of 
policymakers seeking to contain spending in the social budget is restricted, as spending 
in the three insurance sectors accounts for 81 percent of total social spending in France,
1 ftand 83 percent in Germany. The chapter also assesses whether there is evidence that 
the degrees o f pre-commitment in the insurance schemes do indeed create a lock-in of 
institutions and spending and therefore hinder changes even in times o f severe financial 
pressures.
The measurement o f the respective values of fiscal commitment in the three insurance 
sectors is based on two in-depth case studies outlining the administrative, budgetary and 
financial structures o f the main public insurance schemes (as summarised in Appendices 
I and II). Complementary social insurance schemes will only be taken into account if  
they are public, compulsory and a major element o f the social protection in a specific 
sector. The individual commitment scores for the insurance schemes are assigned 
according to the categories specified in the previous chapter (see Tables 3-1 -  3-5).
The analysis shows that there are considerable differences in the degree to which 
spending in social insurance schemes was pre-committed in 1990, and fiscal 
commitment in specific sectors differed furthermore strongly between the two 
corporatist-continental countries. These results cast doubts on the stereotype of the 
German and French welfare states being generally ‘frozen’ to comparable degrees and 
open up new perspectives for the analysis o f reform developments. The fiscal 
commitment scores of the individual schemes in 1990 are then contrasted with the 
respective scores measured in 2005 (see Appendices I and II). This comparison shows a
17 In the case of Germany, all descriptions and quantitative measures provided refer to the situation after 
unification; some measurements therefore refer to 1991 instead o f 1990, as this is often the first year for 
which numbers for the whole o f Germany are available.
18 Data for Germany: BMGS 2005; for France: CCSS 2005.
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reduction in the overall degrees of fiscal commitment in both countries, which indicates 
structural change and a regaining of fiscal control by the governments in both countries 
during this period. But in contrast to the assumptions outlined in Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
we do not observe a stronger reduction o f fiscal commitment in France than in 
Germany.19 The contrasting of the respective measurements in 1990 and 2005 shows 
that insurance schemes with an initially higher degree of fiscal commitment are more 
likely to maintain this commitment. Instead of cross-national we can therefore observe 
cross-sectoral variation, which indicates that sectoral and programme-specific 
differences do matter more for reform processes than country-specific factors.
4.1 Fiscal Commitment in the French Welfare State
The welfare state that evolved in France after World War II had all the standard 
characteristics of a conservative-corporatist welfare regime in which social insurance 
programmes played a central role (Flora 1986; Esping-Andersen 1990; 1996). In the 
period between 1945 and 1970, a specific set of non-state agencies were established 
with the aim to cover each French citizen against the main social risks. Since then, the 
system of ‘Securite Sociale' was divided into a number of different sectors (branches): 
healthcare, old age, family and unemployment insurance. These sectors were further 
fragmented into different schemes (regimes) covering different occupational groups. In 
addition to this set of compulsory basic schemes existed a further set o f -  often 
compulsory -  complementary programmes. Those without access to employment- 
related schemes had to rely on government-administered basic protection schemes -  
generally referred to as ‘Solidarite Nationale ’ (for an overview see Table 4-1).
The French pension system consisted of three pillars, of which the first two -  the basic 
social security schemes, and the complementary schemes -  were under public law and 
compulsory, and therefore subject of this analysis (for an overview o f all pension 
schemes see Figure 5-1 in the next chapter). The first (public and mandatory) pillar 
was constituted by the pension scheme of the Regime General, the CNAV (which 
covered the greater part of salaried private sector workers, which was about 65 percent 
of insured), and more than 600 special schemes. The second pillar was constituted by
19 See 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
20 The third pillar o f the French pension system was represented by supplementary and voluntary funded 
saving schemes within a professional framework. In 1990, about 31 percent o f French households were 
participating in such a scheme.
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two compulsory complementary schemes: AGIRC (Association Generate des 
Institutions de Retraites des Cadres) for higher paid staff and ARRCO (Association des 
Regimes de Retraite Complementaires) for lower-level cadres. Thes e two schemes 
played an important role in the financing of old age provisions: in 1997, their share 
amounted to nearly a third of all public pension spending.21
Table 4-1 The Institutional Structure of the French Welfare State
Four blocks o f  basic schemes: La Securite Sociale in 1990
( 1) Regime General (for employees in industry and trade, covering some 60 percent of the 
population); four branches: Sickness, Pensions, Family, Occupational Accidents
(2) Regime Agricole (for farmers and employees in the agricultural sector)
(3) Regimes Autonomes or Regimes des Professions non salariees non agricoles (for 
self-employed not in the agricultural sector, covering approx. 10 percent of the 
population); these groups decide for themselves the scope of coverage and the level of 
contribution paid; currently: cover the same risks as the Regime General, with different 
levels of contribution; usually less generous benefits, but lower level of contributions
(4) Regimes Speciaux  (mainly for civil servants and employees of the public and para- 
public sector, nearly 20 percent of population)
Le regime d\Assurance Chomage:
Unemployment Insurance is a separate scheme
Complementary Sch em es:
Les Regimes Complementaires (Complementary Pension Insurance Schemes): 
managerial staff demanded a supplementary pension scheme, as the ceiling on earnings 
taken into account for contribution did not enable them to draw retirement pensions 
related to the level of their own salaries; supplementary pension scheme for higher paid 
staff established in 1941; later extended to nearly all occupational groups and made 
compulsory
(1) Private Insurance Com panies: Commercial enterprises regulated by the Insurance 
Code.
(2) Les Institutions de Prevoyance Collective: Provident institutions, covering more than 
20 million people; are under private law and are run jointly by unions of employees and 
employers; regulated under the Social Security Code and authorised by the ministry of 
employment and solidarity
(3) La M utualite: The mutual insurance associations are non-profit bodies, legally and 
financially supervised by the state through the Mutual Insurance Code.
Solidarite Nationale: Means-tested schemes administered by the central state or regional and 
local administrations
(1) Solidarity funds: Provision of non-contributory benefits
(2) Aide Sociale: Means-tested and discretionary payments for social care
(3) Revenue Minimum d ‘Insertion (RMI): Provides, under certain conditions, a means- 
______ tested minimum income__________________________________________________
21 The financing shares in 1997 were: Regime general: 33.2% , other basic schemes: 38.9%, ARRCO and 
AGIRC: 28%; Source: Comptes de la Security Sociale 1998.
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Compared to the pension sector, the French health insurance sector was much more 
centralised. In 1990, three main health insurance schemes covered 96 percent o f the 
population, o f which the health insurance scheme o f the Regime General (the National 
Sickness Fund, CNAM) was the by far the most important (it covered salaried 
employees in commerce and industry, pensioners, unemployed, and their dependents, 
which was about 84 percent of the French population).22 The unemployment insurance 
sector was even more centralised with only one scheme, the UNEDIC (Union Nationale 
Interprofessionnelle pour VEmploi dans VIndustrie et le Commerce), covering all 
French private sector employees.
Due to the very high degree o f occupational fragmentation and the large number o f very 
small special schemes -  particularly in the pension sector -  a restriction o f the scope of 
the analysis is necessary. In the following chapters, the main focus will therefore be 
exclusively on the two main pension and health insurance schemes o f the Regime 
General, the CNAV and the CNAM, the supplementary pension schemes ARRCO and 
AGIRC, as well as the unemployment insurance scheme UNEDIC.
4.1.1 Administrative Independence in 1990
At first sight, the corporatist logic underlying the organisational structure of social 
protection in all three social policy sectors in France seemed to create a very high 
degree o f administrative independence in 1990. Formally, the institutions of the Securite 
Sociale (that is, the Regime General and the schemes affiliated to it) -  to which the first- 
pillar pension and health insurance schemes belonged -  were independent institutions 
administered by the social partners. But this administrative freedom was restricted as 
the insurance funds were subject to a strong supervisory role of the state, ‘la tutelle\ 
Through its power to appoint the heads of organisations, the state had considerable 
potential to influence administrative decisions that were also subject to an ex-post 
ministerial approval. Particularly in the main health insurance scheme, the CNAM, the 
degree o f direct state control was higher than in most other Bismarckian welfare state 
schemes as it controlled large parts of the hospital sector directly (Bellanger and Mosse 
2000; Sandier et al. 2004). For both the pension and health insurance schemes
22 The agricultural scheme (la Mutualite Sociale Agricole, MSA) covers agricultural farmers and 
employees (7%). The third scheme, the CAN AM, covers self-employed (5%). Besides these, there exist 16 
small independent schemes for specific occupational groups. Due to the high co-payments in the non- 
stationary sector, the vast majority o f population has (voluntary) complementary health insurance.
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associated to the Regime General, the degree of fiscal commitment constituted by 
administrative independence in 1990 was therefore only medium high.
But with the high degree of institutional fragmentation, particularly in the pension 
sector, came a big variance between schemes regarding their degree o f administrative 
independence. In the case of the supplementary pension schemes, which operated under 
private law, the degree of fiscal commitment on the administrative dimension was 
considerably higher: managed exclusively by the social partners, both ARRCO and 
AGIRC enjoyed full administrative autonomy. As the schemes were nevertheless public 
and compulsory, their rules needed legal status and therefore ultimately governmental 
approval. But the government’s authorities were exclusively ex-post and the state had 
no influence regarding the appointment of officials or the management of the schemes.
The French unemployment insurance scheme also scored high with regard to its 
administrative independence from governmental control: ASSEDICs, the local 
institutions o f the insurance scheme, as well as the national organisation UNEDIC were 
not only administered exclusively by the social partners without any a-priori or ex-post 
influence by the government, but they were also controlled by a legal convention agreed 
between employers and trade unions. This meant that the social partners had wide- 
reaching regulatory powers. But the government also retained some powers as the 
conventions needed its final approval before they came into effect (see Schmid et al. 
1992: 113; Clasen and Clegg 2004: 11).
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Table 4-2 Administrative Independence France 1990
Insurance
Sector Pensions Health Unemployment
Institutional
Fragmentation
Very high: more than 600 different 
schemes; basic scheme for salaried 
employees accounts for only 36% o f  
public pension spending
Medium  (3 main 
insurance schemes 
+ 16 special 
schemes)
Very low: one 
unified national 
scheme
Insurance
Scheme
Regime General: 
CNAV
ARRCO/AGIRC Regime G6n6ral: 
CNAM
UNEDIC
Composition o f 
Administrative 
BoBy
Bipartite 
governing board;
employee 
representatives in 
majority, with 
chairman elected 
from their ranks 
— ► Very high
Bipartite 
governing board 
with equal 
representation o f  
social partners 
— ► Very high
Bipartite governing 
board; employee 
representatives in 
majority, with 
chairman elected 
from their ranks 
—* Very high
Bipartite 
governing board 
with equal 
representation o f  
social partners 
— * Very high
Selection o f 
Administrators
h i ■ .»•’*
v ?  imM
Election o f board 
members; director 
is appointed by 
governing board in 
liaison with 
Ministry o f Social 
Affairs 
— ► Medium
Election o f board 
members; no 
government 
intervention in 
selection o f top 
officials 
—* Very high
Election o f board 
members; director 
is appointed by 
governing board in 
liaison with 
Ministry o f  Social 
Affairs 
—► Medium
Independent 
selection o f board 
members by 
social partners 
—* Very high
Governmental
Supervision
Wide-reaching a- 
posteriori approval 
o f  major 
organisational and 
financial decisions 
—* Low
Only legality o f  
actions 
— ► Very high
Wide-reaching a- 
posteriori approval 
o f major 
organisational and 
financial decisions 
— *  Medium
Very limited 
governmental 
supervision; ex­
post approval o f  
framework 
agreements 
High
Score 3 (Medium) 5 (Very high) 3 (Medium) 4 (High)
As Table 4-2 illustrates, the degrees of administrative independence differed 
considerably between the insurance schemes -  although all four were administered 
exclusively by the social partners, the de facto degree of managerial independence 
varied between medium and very high. This is a first indication that it is incorrect to 
classify corporatist insurance schemes as generally strongly detached from direct state 
influence.
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4.1.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
4.1.2.1 Budgetary A utonomy
As the social insurance system was not formally part of the French state in 1990, the 
social budget was presented separately from the central government budget as 
Accounts o f  the Administration o f  Securite Sociale’ (ASS). The only social security 
spending included into the government accounts was BAPSA, the separate budget for 
benefits in the agricultural sector. The reason for this was its high share o f tax financing. 
The overall social budget was not strongly affected by the annual budget process, which 
was dominated by bilateral bargains between the finance minister and individual 
spending ministers. Parliament also lacked influence on the social budget, as the 
insurance funds were not politically accountable to parliament. Parliamentary influence 
had been marginally strengthened with the introduction o f a number of taxes assigned to 
the Regime General on whose modalities it voted in the annual budgetary process. But 
the intervention of parliament remained limited and its abilities to determine the overall 
amount of social spending were highly restricted.23 The budgets of all schemes o f the 
Securite Sociale were instead voted on in their respective administrative boards, which 
meant that they had full formal budgetary autonomy. This was also the case for the 
schemes outside the Securite Sociale, including the unemployment insurance scheme 
UNEDIC as well as the supplementary pension schemes.
Nevertheless, the budgetary control powers of the state were not as restricted as it 
seemed: ‘la tutelle’ by the government was not limited to administrative oversight, as 
the government could in many ways exert influence over revenues and spending in the 
insurance schemes. Regarding the formal authority to determine the main budgetary 
parameters in the first-pillar pension and health insurance institutions, the government 
had considerable control over the budgets. Contribution rates were determined by 
ministerial decree, as were changes to the parameters determining spending (mainly the 
benefit regulations). Consequently, the degree of formal budgetary independence was 
low for the pension insurance scheme. Due to the limited discretion regarding benefit 
provisions in the case o f the health insurance carrier, its degree of independence was 
medium high.
23 The National Assembly was not allowed to increase spending or decrease taxation in the government’s 
draft, and it had little ability to monitor budget developments. Furthermore, the taxes and charges 
allocated to the social schemes did not appear as revenues in the state budget (see Cour des Comptes 
2001).
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In contrast, the degree of formal budgetary control by the government was much more 
restricted in the unemployment and supplementary pension sectors: in both cases, the 
social partners agreed independently on all factors determining spending and revenues. 
But despite the formally high degrees o f independence in both schemes regarding 
administration and budgeting, this freedom was nevertheless restricted as the regularly 
negotiated agreements between the social partners which determined all important 
organisational, administrative and financial aspects o f the schemes had to be approved 
by the government. This also included changes in contribution rates. Furthermore, the 
government could impose regulations for UNEDIC via decree in the case of non­
agreement between the social partners.
4,L2,2 Budgetary Constraints
As outlined in the previous chapter, another aspect with importance for degrees o f fiscal 
commitment is the extent of budgetary constraints in the insurance schemes. With 
regard to the allocation process for the French state budget, spending constraints should 
have been very high: although the French budget process followed a delegation 
approach which should have lowered spending constraints, the role of the finance 
minister in the process and its budgetary enforcement powers were very strong (see von 
Hagen 1992).24 But as the dominating share of the social budget was autonomous from 
the general budget, this had very limited relevance to social spending.
The possibilities for the government to exert spending constraints in the social insurance 
schemes were generally limited: in the pension sector, payments were based on 
entitlements and therefore open-ended -  this meant that fiscal constraints (based on 
existing benefit legislation) were difficult to achieve and restricted to administrative and 
other non-benefit expenditure. The same held true for the unemployment insurance 
scheme. Fiscal constraints were even weaker in the health sector: while the government 
had considerable financial planning authority in the hospital sector, spending control 
powers by the government in the ambulatory sector were weak -  despite the ability to 
define benefit legislation. This was due to the fee-for-service system in this sector and 
autonomous negotiations between health funds and health professionals about 
remuneration levels (see Sandier et al. 2004).
24 In von Hagen’s index France is assigned the highest value o f all EU-12 countries regarding ‘structure 
o f negotiations within government’ (see von Hagen 1992: 69ff.). Also in the category ‘Flexibility o f  
Budget Execution’ it achieves the highest score o f al EU-12 Member States, which means that the 
execution o f the budget should be comparatively strictly enforced.
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Expenditure monitoring by the French government was in 1990 also weak and there 
existed no spending ceilings. An annual report was published by the government 
reviewing the nation’s social policy expenditure for the preceding three years, but it had 
no fiscal implications. The only form of direct spending control could theoretically be 
exercised by the Regional Director of Health and Affairs, who was able to suspend 
decisions taken by the regional or local funds o f the Regime General in case their 
execution would compromise the financial balance o f the scheme. But this form of 
intervention was discretionary and hardly applied in practice.
While fiscal constraints for all insurance sectors were therefore either weak or very 
weak based on the degree to which fiscal targets could be enforced and the degree to 
which spending was monitored, there was more variance regarding another important 
element of spending control: the regulations of deficit coverage. In the Regime General, 
the social partners were by law responsible for the fiscal balancing o f the schemes 
administered by them -  despite the fact that they did not possess the decisionmaking 
authority to determine their revenues or spending. In other words, they had the 
responsibility for fiscal outcomes, but not the means to achieve them (see OECD 2003). 
An extensive transfer system between the schemes attached to the Regime General 
channelled funds to schemes with outstanding balances, but this was often insufficient. 
It was in the end the central state which was responsible to ensure the liquidity of the 
public insurance institutions. The existing deficit regulations did therefore not create 
incentives for the schemes to contain spending, and neither did the regulations regarding 
contribution and benefit legislation allow them to do so. This was very different for both 
the unemployment insurance carrier UNEDIC and also the supplementary pension 
schemes: here, budgetary responsibilities remained with the social partners who not 
only had authority over budgetary parameters but also sole responsibility for deficits.
The combination of these factors led to a difficult situation in terms of controlling social 
spending in the Regime General: the social partners were neither accountable for 
spending nor for the financial equilibrium of the regimes, but were mainly 
administrators of the funds and tasks assigned to them. Parliament was in a similar 
situation: it was not responsible for the financial equilibrium of the schemes, nor could 
it determine the revenues or spending. This lack of parliamentary control over social
25 Deficits o f UNEDIC had to be financed via private credits, but as a special entity recognised as 
‘pursuing a mission o f general interest’, its liabilities were guaranteed by the state (see OECD 2003: 128).
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spending pushed the legislative into a role where it reacted to the budgetary situation of 
its social insurance institution rather than actively managing it (see Laroque 1983). The 
government, with the formal authority to set the budgetary parameters, was limited in 
this pursuit through the uncontrollability o f central factors determining spending as well 
as the high degree of fiscal interdependencies.
As Table 4-3 shows, this mix of budgetary authorities created a medium high degree of 
budgetary independence and constraints for the first-pillar pension and health insurance 
schemes. Accordingly, the degree of fiscal commitment on this dimension was only 
medium high for these schemes, as the considerable government authority in budgetary 
decisions meant that there was no effective institutional barrier against fiscal 
interventions -  despite the formal independence of the insurance institutions.
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Table 4-3 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints France 1990
Sector Pensions Health Unemployment
Scheme CNAV ARRCO/AG IRC CNAM UNEDIC
Budgetary Autonomy
Formal
Budget
Autonomy
Budgetary autonomy, 
but approval by 
independent 
supervisory 
institution 
High
Full budgetary 
autonomy 
—*• Very high
Budgetary 
autonomy, but 
approval by 
independent 
supervisory 
institution 
- High
Full budgetary 
autonomy 
— *• Very high
Degree o f 
Revenue 
Autonomy
i. x U v
No contribution 
autonomy; rates set 
by ministerial decree 
—* Low
Full contribution 
autonomy 
—* Very high
No contribution 
autonomy; rates set 
by ministerial 
decree 
—* Low
Yes, but have to 
be approved by 
relevant ministry; 
contribution 
ceiling set by 
ministerial decree 
— » Medium
m g
Degree o f 
Spending 
Autonomy
Decisions by 
parliament; insurance 
carrier only 
determines 
administrative 
spending 
—* Low
Autonomous 
decisions within 
framework set by 
parliament/ 
Government 
High
Main decisions by 
parliament; limited 
discretion for 
insurance carrier 
regarding benefits 
— > Medium
Autonomous 
decisions by 
insurance carriers, 
but ex-post 
approval o f 
government 
-* High
Score
Autonomy 2 (Low) 5 (Very high) 3 (Medium) 4 (High)
Budgetary Constraints
Budgetary
Allocation
Process
Bilateral bargains 
between spending 
and finance minister 
— *  Medium
Bilateral bargains 
between social 
partners
—* Very high
Bilateral bargains 
between spending 
minister and finance 
minister 
— >  Medium
Bilateral bargains 
between the social 
partners, but 
government 
participation as 
spending carrier 
o f solidarity 
provisions 
High
Enforced 
d . , Fiscal
Targets
No fiscal targets or 
guidelines; open- 
ended benefit 
entitlements 
—* Very high
No fiscal targets 
or guidelines; 
open-ended 
benefit 
entitlements 
— > Very high
Fiscal targets only 
for public hospitals 
(under direct state 
control); 
enforcement weak 
—>High
N o fiscal targets 
or guidelines; 
open-ended 
benefit 
entitlements 
—*■ Very high
Spending
Monitoring
Weak ex-post 
monitoring 
— ► Medium
Only internal 
spending 
monitoring 
- ►  High
Weak ex-post 
monitoring 
— ► Medium
Only internal 
spending 
monitoring 
- ►  High
Coverage
Not automatic, but 
final government 
responsibility 
High
No governmental 
deficit coverage; 
credit financing 
possible 
—* Low
Not automatic, but 
fmal government 
responsibility 
-  High
No automatic 
governmental 
deficit coverage; 
refundable state 
or private loans 
—> Low
Score
Constraints 4 (High) 4 (High) 3 (Medium) 4 (High)
Total Score 3 (Medium) 5 (Very high) 3 (Medium) 4 (High)
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4.1.3 Revenue Structure
Originally, the French social insurance schemes were built on the principle of financial 
non-participation by the state, which meant that they were to be financed exclusively by 
contributions from the insured and their employers. Funding of the social insurance 
systems in 1990 was indeed based largely on contribution payments from employers 
and employees.26 But at this point in time social insurance schemes had also become 
increasingly supplemented by public contributions, transfers and taxes. While in 1980, 
the contributions from the active insured had funded the Regime General nearly 
exclusively (97 percent), in 1990 they did not account for more than 78 percent (Cour 
des Comptes 2004).
Graph 4-1 Revenue Structure Social Insurance France 1990
Public Contributions
5<>/0 Other resources
Transfers 
12%
Taxes
3%
Contributions
78%
Source: Compte de la Protection Sociale 1990 -  Drees
There were two main ways in which the French state participated in the financing of 
social insurance schemes: on the one hand, it contributed in its function as employer. 
On the other hand, it contributed to the Securite Sociale as public authority with overall 
responsibility for the social security system. These forms of state intervention were 
twofold: firstly, certain special taxes had been created to provide funds for the ancillary 
budget for agricultural social benefits (BAPSA) and to contribute to the financing of the 
autonomous sickness, maternity and old age insurance schemes for self-employed 
workers.27 Secondly, the state intervened by granting subsidies to maintain the solvency
26 While in 1970, 82 percent o f total contributions had been paid by employers, this share decreased to 58 
percent in 1990.
27 Most importantly is the C3S, a solidarity contribution charged to certain industrial and commercial 
associations established in 1970.
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of schemes that experienced particular difficulties due to the demographic or social 
structure of their insured.
With regard to the individual insurance schemes, the degree of fiscal commitment 
resulting from earmarked contribution revenues was very high in the case of both the 
CNAM and the UNEDIC, which in 1990 relied to over 90 percent on contribution 
financing.28 In contrast, the share of contribution financing in the pension schemes was 
slightly lower. But transfer payments also played a considerable role for some schemes. 
While ARRCO and AGIRC received transfers only from the unemployment insurance 
scheme (see Chapter 5), the CNAV received funds through the complex transfer system 
within the Regime General. Despite the fact that initially each of the branches of the 
Regime General was supposed to be financially autonomous (see Laroque 1983: 55), 
the expansion o f the social security coverage had led to the introduction o f demographic 
and financial compensation mechanisms between all insurance schemes (separately for 
employee schemes, salaried and non-salaried schemes, as well as for special schemes). 
The complexity of the transfer system highly reduced the visibility o f the real financial 
situation o f the schemes -  an aspect generally criticised by the French Auditors Court.
But despite these factors, all four insurance schemes analysed achieved a very high or 
high commitment score, as their predominant share of revenues stems from earmarked 
contributions. This gave the schemes a high degree o f independence from allocative 
decisions by parliament, and also entrenched spending as contribution payments created 
legal benefit entitlements.
28 In constrast, some accounts of other schemes were settled fully by the state (e.g., the MSA and the civil 
service scheme). Tax-financing also played a strong role in some special schemes, e.g. those for miners, 
rail workers, marines or the French opera, as in some o f those contribution payments only covered a third 
o f expenditure.
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Table 4-4 Social Insurance Revenue Sources France 1990
Suppl. Pensions: 
AG IRC/ARRCORevenue Sources Regime GeneraljSSHHHR (c n a v >
bn € % m € % bn € % m € %
Employees’ contrib. 35.9 88.5 28.7 81.3 20.1 32.2 5,9 31.1Employers’ contrib. 39.3 63.1 11,0 57.7
Public contributions 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.4 - - 0,8 4.3
Total contributions 39.8 89.5 28.7 81.7 59.4 95.2 17,8 93.1
Taxes 0.4 1.0 - - 1.0 1.6 0,4 2.1
State compensations* - - - - 0.3 0.5 - -
State Subsidies 1.2 2.9 - - - - - -
Transfers 2.7 6.6 6.5 18.3 0.7 1.1 0,5 2.6
Other 0.02 0.1 0.5 1.4 1.0 1.5 0,4 2.2
TOTAL 40.6 100 35.3 100 62.3 100 19,1 100
Commitment Score 4 (High) 4 (High) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high)
Source: Own calculations based on data from Cour des Comptes 2001; data for AGIRC/ARRCO 1995 from 
Annex G 2, A ssem b le Nationale 2001.
* The state compensates the health insurance funds for the loss o f contributions directly related to economic 
policy decisions
4.1.4 Spending Structure: Eligibility and Reciprocity
In contrast to the commitment scores on the revenue dimension, those on the spending 
dimension differ widely between the insurance sectors. In 1990, benefits in pension 
insurance schemes were strictly contribution and eamings-related and exceptions to the 
principle of proportionality were limited. Deviations from the conditions for a full-rate 
pension resulted in reductions of benefits. But there were also exceptions to this rule, 
such as the granting of minimum pensions or eligibility for full pensions despite 
insufficient contribution times for certain population groups (e.g., widowers, war 
veterans). But overall, the insurance-based provision dominated with 89 percent of all 
pension expenditure (see Cour des Comptes 2001: 178). The provision of insurance- 
external benefits was mainly limited to the accounting of the number of children raised 
-  which could be seen as an ‘indirect’ contribution to the pension insurance in the form 
of future contribution payers.
Overall wage replacement rates were fairly low, which was however compensated for 
by the supplementary schemes. In their case, the spending structure also created a high 
degree of fiscal commitment: eligibility for a pension from ARRCO and AGIRC 
depended strictly on former contribution payments. Benefits were strictly eamings- 
related, following a defmed-contribution mechanism: each year, a contributor bought 
points at a price systematically revised in function of the change in his or her 
occupational wage level (for details see Observatoire des Retraites 2004). The pension
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therefore reflected the salary levels during the whole career and not merely the last 
wage level. As far as private sector employees were concerned, the two pension pillars 
together ensured on average around 70 percent of the final salary of a pensioner having 
completed a full career.
The situation with regard to fiscal commitment deriving from the spending structure 
was very different for the health insurance scheme, which predominantly provided 
benefits not according to former contribution payments, but solely according to 
individual needs. The only exception to this principle was the provision of sick pay, 
whose generosity depended on former earnings and was accordingly correlated to 
former contribution payments. Regarding the general eligibility for healthcare, this was 
restricted through a specified qualifying period. This slightly strengthened the insurance 
principle, whereas the free co-insurance of dependent family members strongly 
weakened it. The degree of fiscal commitment inherent in the spending structure o f the 
CNAM was therefore only low.
In contrast, the spending structure in the unemployment insurance scheme created a 
high degree o f fiscal commitment. Eligibility for benefits was strongly related to the 
former contribution record. But also here, some provisions were available based on 
social criteria. These were however -  although administered by the ASSEDIC -  funded 
by the government. Benefits were also highly eamings-related and depended on the 
length o f time for which someone had contributed: with sufficient contribution time, an 
unemployed person could receive over half his or her previous salary. Insurance 
external provisions were marginal, and 96 percent o f the benefits administered through 
the ASSEDICs were contributory (Spicker 1998: 213).
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Table 4-5 Indicators and Degrees of Fiscal Commitment: Spending Structure France 1990
Pensions: CNAV Pensions: ARRCO/AGIRC Health: CNAM Unemployment: UNEDIC
Eligibility Mandatory Retirement Age:
■ 60 (since 1983); Minimum Retirement 
Age: 60
Mandatory Retirement Age:
■ 65; Minimum Retirement Age: 55
Beneficiaries:
■ All employees, pensioners, 
unemployed. Beneficiaries o f
Beneficiaries:
■ Unemployed with sufficient 
contribution times
Conditions for Full Rate Pension:
■ 60 and 37.5 years o f  contributions or 65 
without conditions on contribution period
Conditions for Full Rate Pension:
■ Full rate if  basic pension obtained 
at full rate
certain allowances (API, AAH, 
RMI). Students, priests, prisoners 
■ Sickness pay: all employees
Work Availability and other
Conditions:
■ ‘to be looking for work’
■ to be under the age o f  60. 
However, if  at this age the person 
concerned has not paid insurance 
contributions for long enough to 
justify receipt o f  the old-age 
pension at the full rate o f 50%, 
the indemnity is maintained until 
the period is achieved, and at the 
latest up to the age o f  65
Accounting o f Non-Contribution Times:
■ Full rate regardless o f  contribution times 
for: employees with 50% incapacity; 
manual workers having raised at least 3 
children; veterans o f  war or war victims
Accounting o f Non-Contribution 
Times:
■ “Credit points” for sickness
periods if  the insured was working 
and subject to the scheme for at 
least 3 months in a row 
(concerning executives’ scheme) 
or 60 days in a row (concerning 
non executives' scheme); also 
credits for times o f unemployment 
or disability
Eligible Dependants:
■ Spouse, dependent children; 
relatives in the ascending, 
descending or collateral lines; 
partner living with insured person
Minimum Contribution Time:
■ None
Minimum Contribution Time: 
■ None
Minimum Contribution Time:
■ Qualifying period: 1200 hrs 
worked during the year or 600 per 
half year or 200 per quarter or 120 
hrs per month
■ Sickness pay: First 6 months: 200  
hrs o f  employed work in 3 months 
preceding sickness; Subsequently: 
registered for 12 months, worked 
800 hrs during 12 months;
Waiting period: 3 days
Minimum Contribution Time:
At least 3 months insurance in last 12 
months
Score
Eligibility 4 (High) 4 (High) 2 (Low)
4 (High)
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Reciprocity Pension Level:
50% o f  average wage over 10 best years; 
pension increase for children raised
Pension Level:
Lifetime average: total number o f  
points multiplied by value o f points; 
Pension increase for children raised
Patient's Co-Payments:
■ Medical expenses: 25%; 20% for 
hospitalisation; Hospitalisation 
fee: FF50
■ Drugs: 30% or 60%; 100% on
ease drugs
Replacement Rate:
40.4% (Allocation Base) and 30.3% 
(Allocation de base exceptionelle; 
since 1984 for unemployed who do 
not have three months o f  
contribution records)
Benefit Inequality:
1992:
Minimum pension: FF 35.514 p.y. for 37.5 
contribution years; reductions for incomplete 
careers
Means-tested minimum: FF 15 800 for single 
person
Max.: 50% o f  social security ceiling
Benefit Inequality:
No minimum pension
Maximum pension: points granted up
to 8 times the social security ceiling
Exemptions or Reductions to Co- 
Payments:
Holders o f  an invalidity pension or a 
work injury pension at a rate > 
66.66% are covered 100% together 
with their family members. Persons 
suffering from certain diseases, 
for those diseases only.
Reference Salary:
■ Reference period: earning on 
which contributions have been 
paid for in the last 12 months; 
75% reference ceiling
Duration and Benefit Development 
over Time:
Minimum 3 months, up to 60 months 
for older employees
Reduction for Early Retirement:
■ Prorating effect plus 10% reduction per 
missing year (max. 5 years)
Reduction for Early Retirement:
■ A reduction is made by 7% per 
year from 55 to 59 years o f age, 
then a 5% reduction per year from 
60 to 62 years o f  age and a 4% 
reduction per year thereafter.
Sickness Pay Benefit Rates :
■ 50% o f  daily earnings; 66.66% for 
3 children
■ Minimum after 7 months: 1/365* 
o f  minimum invalidity pension
Qualifying Waiting Period:
None
Regulations o f Indexation:
■ Price (applied since 1986, become law in 
1993)
Regulations of Indexation:
■ Wages
Charges on Benefits:
Benefits are subject to taxation after 
deduction o f  10% and then o f  20%.
Universally available placement
Charges on Benefits:
■ 1.4% (health contributions)
Charges on Benefits:
■ 2.4% (health contributions)
activities/active employment 
policies:
None
Score
Reciprocity 4 (High) 5 (Very high) 2 (Low) 5 (Very high)
Total Score 4 (High) 4 (High) 2 (Low) 5 (Very high)
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4.1.5 France: Conclusions
The analysis of the degrees of fiscal commitment inherent in the organisational, 
budgetary and financial structures of the main French social insurance schemes shows 
that they differ not only between the different insurance sectors, but also within the 
sectors between the different schemes. In the pension sector, the Regime General 
scheme CNAV scores 14 out of 20, while the second-pillar schemes achieved a score 
close to the maximum at 18. This is despite both schemes scoring equally on the 
revenue as well as spending dimension -  but the similarities end with regard to the 
degrees of administrative and budgetary independence, which were considerably higher 
in the case of the supplementary schemes.
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Independence: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Total Score:
mmmmm
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Independence: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Total Score
Medium (3) 
Medium (3) 
High (4) 
High (4)
14
1900;
Very high (5) 
Very high (5) 
High (4) 
High (4)
18
In comparison, the main health insurance scheme CNAM only scores 13, which is the 
lowest of all analysed French insurance schemes. This is mainly due to the non­
contribution related benefit provision, which created a low degree of fiscal commitment 
on the spending dimension, but also due to the considerably restricted independence of 
the social partners regarding administration and budgetary decisionmaking. In contrast, 
the health insurance scheme had (compared to the other French schemes) the highest 
share of contributions in its revenue structure in 1990 which created a high degree of 
pre-commitment on this dimension.
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Independence: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Total Score:
HHHHHHHHI
Medium (3)
Medium (3)
Very high (5)
Low (2)
13
The unemployment insurance scheme UNEDIC achieves in comparison an overall very 
high commitment score. This was not only due to a greater independence of the scheme
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from state influence regarding administration and budgetary control as it was the case 
for the schemes of the Regime General, but UNEDIC was also the only scheme which 
achieved a very high score on the spending dimension.
an
Administrative Independence: High (4)
Budgetary Independence: High (4)
Revenue Structure: Very high (5)
Spending Structure: Very high (5)
Total Score: 18
These results suggest how problematic the broad stereotype of the ‘unreformable’ 
welfare state is. The differentiated picture that emerges from the analysis suggests that a 
more fine-grained perspective is required to account for institutional barriers for reform. 
The second part of the chapter will review to what extent this conclusion is also valid 
for the German case.
4.2 Fiscal Commitment in the German Welfare State
Representing the stereo-typical model for the continental-corporatist welfare states, the 
German welfare state was centred around its social insurance schemes for 
unemployment, health, pensions and (since 1995) long-term care. Being the pioneer in 
social insurance legislation, Germany introduced an industrial accident insurance as 
early as 1871, and was also first to introduce health insurance (1883) and pension 
insurance (1889). After the Second World War, these schemes expanded rapidly both in 
terms of population coverage and the range and generosity of benefits provided. In 
1991, the general statutory insurance programmes accounted by far for the biggest share 
of social expenditure in Germany, whereas special insurance schemes for certain 
occupational groups were fairly marginal in this respect (see Graph 4-2). The only 
programmes financed out of the general tax fund were social assistance, family benefits 
and housing allowance. Furthermore, the public bodies financed the provisions for their 
civil servants from tax funds, and granted indirect provisions through tax reductions. 
Besides this, occupational schemes existed, mainly providing supplementary old-age 
provisions.
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Graph 4-2 Germany: Social Spending by Institutions 1991
(Percent o f  Total Social Budget)
Social Assistance, 
Compensation and 
Support 
12.6 %
Indirect Provisions 
6 . 1%
Occupational Schemes 
10 .2 %
Civil Servant Provisions 
7 .8%
General Insurance 
Schemes 
62 .5%
Special Insurance 
Schemes 
0 .8%
Source: BMGS 2004
Compared to private provision, the public insurance programmes provided by far the 
biggest share of social spending as they were compulsory for the majority of employees. 
In 1991, the compulsory Statutory Pension Insurance (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung: 
GRV) accounted for 68.1 percent of all pension insurance spending (see Table 5-12). 
Also in the health sector, the Statutory Sickness Insurance (Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung: GKV) was the biggest spending carrier in the health sector: in 
1992, it covered 90 percent of the population and paid out €98.97 bn, which was 60 
percent of all health expenditure.29 Unemployment insurance in Germany was provided 
together with all active employment measures by one exclusive, fully integrated 
employment service administered by the Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt fur 
Arbeit’. BA). The following analysis will focus on these three main schemes (GRV, 
GKV and BA). The second-pillar pension provision provided via occupational schemes 
is not taken into account as it was not compulsory and played only a minor role in terms 
of overall public pension spending.
4.2.1 Administrative Independence
As corporations under public law, the German social security organisations in all three 
insurance sectors were independent institutions administered by the social partners (so- 
called ‘parafisci ’). The first formal introduction of self-administration took place with
29 Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2003.
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Bismarck’s social insurance legislation at the end of the 19th century.30 After its 
abolition during the Nazi regime, Chancellor Adenauer announced in its first 
government declaration in 1949 that the self-administration of the social partners was to 
replace ‘governmental paternalism’, which resulted in its re-establishment in 1951. But 
although self-administration became again a major characteristic of the German system 
of social policy, there were nevertheless important differences when it came to the 
degree o f budgetary and legislative control that could be exercised by the federal 
government in the three insurance sectors and their respective insurance schemes.
The internal governance structure of the Statutory Pension Insurance (GRV) carriers as 
well as the selection process for officials was strictly based on the principle o f equal 
representation of the social partners without any involvement o f the state. 31 
Governmental interference was highly restricted, as there was no direct guidance and 
instruction right towards the insurance carriers. Public oversight -  mainly limited to the 
supervision of the legality o f actions - was exercised by an independent institution 
subordinate to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Federal Insurance Office 
(.Bundesversicherungsamt). In addition to this legal supervision (‘RechtsaufsichV\ the 
government could also directly influence organisational or financial decisions. 
However, this professional supervision (‘Fachaufsichf) was only ex-post in the form of 
approvals.
The governance structure and administrative authorities of the Statutory Health 
Insurance (GKV) carriers were very similar to the GRV. All 1200 insurance funds 
belonging to the GKV were administered solely by the social partners and the federal 
government had no direct guidance and instruction rights towards the insurance carriers. 
The only way the government could exert influence was through its right to approve the 
charter o f the insurance carriers and all successive changes to it (§195 SGB V). For both 
major insurance schemes in the pension and health sector, the degree of administrative 
independence in 1990 was therefore very high.
The situation was different for the unemployment insurance carrier, the BA, whose 
independent administrative authorities were widely restricted. This was first of all due
30 For an overview over the historical development o f German self-administration see Lehmbruch 2003.
31 The GRV was in 1990 fragmented into different occupational schemes: the Pension Insurance o f  
White-Collar Employees (BfA), 22 State Insurance Agencies o f Blue-Collar Employees as well as the 
smaller Pension Insurance o f Mine-Employees (KnRV), Seamen’s Insurance Association and Railworkers 
Insurance Corporation.
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to the tripartite governing structure, which gave state representatives a say in all 
managerial decisions. Furthermore, the government could indirectly influence decisions 
due to the direct assignment of the president by the federal ministry of labour.32 The BA 
was also widely subject to legal supervision exercised directly by the Labour Ministry, 
which approved its charter and had the right to intervene in a number of administrative 
and financial matters (see Schmid et al. 1992).
Table 4-6 Administrative Independence Germany 1990
Insurance Sector Pensions Health Unemployment
Institutional
Fragmentation
Medium high (2+3 in 
GRV), small number o f  
independent schemes; 
civil service provision 
— *■ Medium
Very high (over 1200 
insurance funds)
— *• Very high
Single national scheme 
— ► Very low
Insurance Scheme GRV GKV BA
Composition of 
Administrative 
Body
Bipartite governing 
board with equal 
representation o f social 
partners 1 
—* Very high
Bipartite governing 
board with equal 
representation o f social 
partners (with few  
exceptions)
— ► Very high
Tripartite administrative 
committee with equal 
representation o f  
employees, employers 
and public bodies 
— *■ Medium
Selection of 
Administrators
‘Social elections’ by 
members; assembly o f  
representatives elects the 
supervisory board as 
executive body as well as 
the board o f directors 
(based on suggestions by 
the supervisory board) 
— ► Very high
‘Social elections’ by 
members; assembly o f  
representatives elects the 
supervisory board as 
executive body as well as 
the board o f directors 
(based on suggestions by 
the supervisory board) 
— *• Very high
Representatives directly 
appointed based on 
nominations (social 
partners) or directly by 
public bodies; 
administrative committee 
elects executive board;
president and vice- 
president appointed by 
labour minister 
— > Medium
' ■ , . 
Degree o f  
Governmental 
Supervision
Public oversight limited 
to the supervision o f  the 
legality o f actions, but 
approval applies to 
autonomous legal and 
various organisational 
and financial decisions 
-  Hi gh
Public oversight limited 
to the supervision o f  the 
legality o f actions, but 
approval applies to 
autonomous legal and 
various organisational 
and financial decisions 
— High
Public oversight limited 
to the supervision o f  the 
legality o f actions, but 
approval applies to 
autonomous legal and 
various organisational 
and financial decisions 
High
Score 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high) 3 (Medium)
32 The presidents and vice-presidents o f the BA were nominated by the Ministry o f Labour and Social 
Affairs and appointed by the Federal President. However, the federal government was required to consult 
with the BA's tripartite governing council before making nominations and could deviate from its advice 
only because o f "serious reasons" (see Schmid et al. 1992: 52).
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4.2.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
4.2.2.1 Budgetary Autonomy
The German federal state budget was in 1990 highly fragmented. This was not only due 
to the budgetary autonomy of the different levels of government, separating the federal 
and the sub-national states {Lander), but also due to a high number o f individual 
spending accounts and semi-independent institutions. The accounts o f the social 
insurance institutions as well as social expenditure at all levels o f government 
(including the provisions for civil servants) were annually published as the ‘social 
budget’. It is important to stress that this social budget, which in 1991 amounted to €426 
bn, was not a classic institutional budget, but merely a statistical account o f the financial 
flows of all social programmes (see Bundesregierung 2001). The direct financing share 
of the federal government (that is, state subsidies and direct provisions) only accounted 
for around 20 percent o f the social budget in 1991, which means that the remaining 80 
percent o f social expenditure were not included in the annual federal state budget and 
were therefore beyond direct control by the government and the ministry o f finance.
As corporations under public law, social security organisations were independent 
institutions with their own budgetary authority. In both the GRV and GKV, the 
assembly o f representatives had responsibility regarding all budgetary decisions as well 
as the approval o f the annual accounts. The budget o f the unemployment insurance 
carrier BA, drawn up by the executive board and approved by the administrative 
committee, was also separate from the state budget due to its status as a self-governing 
institution (see Bruche and Reissert 1985; Linke 1994). But here the federal government 
was represented in both the executive board and the administrative committee and 
therefore exerted its influence already in the process of drafting the budget.
All insurance budgets -  including those of the GRV and GKV -  were furthermore 
subject to control by a governmental supervisory body, usually the relevant federal 
ministry. But the degree of this control and the respective intervention powers varied 
strongly. In the case of the GRV, the supervisory body could reject budget plans if  they 
did not comply with the law or if  they ‘affected the service capacity of the insurance 
carriers’ and could demand changes. If these were not considered, it had the right to 
enforce the amended budget against the will o f the insurance carrier (§70 III 3, SGB
33 Own calculations based on BMGS 2005.
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IV). In practice, these intervention powers had not been applied before 1990 (also due to 
the inability o f the insurance carriers to determine a large share o f their spending, see 
below). In contrast, the supervisory body for the GKV -  the ministry o f health -  had no 
competency to enforce an amended budget but could object to it if  it conflicted with 
legal regulations or ‘threatened the economic efficiency’ o f the institution. Overall, the 
degree of formal budgetary independence in both the health and pension sector was very 
high.
In contrast, budgetary authority in the unemployment sector remained to a large extent 
with the government. The budget of the Employment Office had to be approved by the 
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, which since 1969 also disposed of the BA’s 
reserve fund. But changes in the budget could not be enforced unilaterally, which 
limited the intervention powers of the government. Formal budgetary independence in 
1991 was therefore medium high.
Additionally to the degree of formal budgetary autonomy, the de facto degree of 
budgetary self-determination has to be assessed according to who had the 
decisionmaking power over the main budgetary parameters and therefore over the 
amount o f revenues and spending. In the pension as well as unemployment sector, all 
key parameters determining the amount of revenues received by the insurance carriers -  
most importantly the contribution rate -  were determined by law. Consequently, the 
insurance carriers had no influence on the revenue side o f their budgets as this was 
decided by parliament. Only the reduction o f contribution rates in the pension insurance 
schemes could be decided by the federal government via decree with approval of the 
Bundesrat. 34 In both insurance schemes, this lack o f control by the schemes’ 
administrators over revenues considerably reduced the degree o f fiscal commitment 
resulting from budgetary independence. The situation was very different for the health 
insurance schemes, which had the right to determine their contribution rates 
autonomously.35
34 In the pension sector, a formal procedure was defined by law for the case that the reserve o f the pension 
insurance would fall below a monthly expenditure. This procedure prescribed that this should 
automatically lead to a proposal by the government to increase the contribution rate by the necessary 
amount (§ 1383 III RVO). This was intended to bind the executive to push through the necessary revenue 
increases and to avoid a solving o f the fiscal problem via benefit cutbacks, although this still meant that 
the proposal had to be accepted by the legislator.
35 Exceptions to this rule were the contribution rates for pensioners (which paid the average contribution 
rate o f all health insurance schemes) and for students (fixed reduced rate set by the legislator).
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With regard to the spending side of the budget, budgetary authority o f the insurance 
carriers also varied. This was despite the fact that in all three sectors, benefit regulations 
and therefore the decisive spending parameters were defined by law. For the pension 
insurance carriers this meant that their decisionmaking scope was limited to 
administrative expenditure. But in the other two sectors the insurance carriers had a 
greater influence on determining spending. In the unemployment sector, this was the 
case as spending o f the BA was not restricted to the legally pre-defined replacement 
benefits, but went also towards the financing of active employment measures (see 
Schmid 1983). In 1991, only one third of the BA’s expenses were devoted to the 
financing o f passive income-replacement benefits, whereas active measures accounted 
for nearly two-thirds of spending. While eligibility criteria and spending for some of the 
active measures provided were defined by law, others were discretionary and
l
decisionmaking power lay largely with the BA and its employment agencies.
Although ‘discretionary’, the influence o f the federal government in deciding how much 
and on what the funds were spent was however considerable (see Trampusch 2002: 
26/27). The ministry of labour was authorised to unilaterally issue a decree regarding 
the awarding o f job-creation measures if the administrative board failed to do so within 
a year, and to issue orders to the BA in certain circumstances without involving the self­
administration. Furthermore, the decisionmaking scope o f the decentralised level and 
their participatory rights in the budgetary process were restricted. This meant that the 
‘discretion’ over spending was largely exercised or supervised by the federal 
government and not by the self-administration itself. The degree of independent 
decisionmaking authority regarding spending was therefore only medium high in 1990.
In the health insurance schemes, the carriers had gained powers in determining the 
catalogue o f provisions paid for by the insurance carriers prior to 1990 (mainly in the 
ambulatory sector through the Bundesausschuss der Arzte und Krankenkassen) which 
gave them scope in determining spending. But similar to the unemployment insurance, 
also here the de facto decisionmaking scope was very restricted as all decisions had to 
be taken within the legal frameworks provided by the state and also had to be 
successively approved by the government (Urban 2001: 20; Gerlinger 2002: 21).
4.2.2.2 Budgetary Constraints
As outlined above, the predominant share o f social spending enjoyed separate budgetary 
status in 1990 and was therefore not subject to the annual budget bargaining in 
parliament. But the share of government expenditure for social insurance programmes 
(in the form of compensation, subsidies or contributions) was also considerable, 
amounting to 45 percent of total federal expenditure in 1992.36The federal budgetary 
allocation process and the degree to which it exerted pressure to contain spending is 
therefore o f relevance for the measurement o f overall budgetary autonomy o f the 
insurance schemes.
In 1990, the annual allocation process followed a delegation approach which meant that 
the finance minister negotiated bilaterally with each spending ministry about the 
financial allocation for the following budget year. Only the chancellor plus the majority 
of the cabinet could overrule a veto of the finance minister against an increase in 
spending beyond the initial targets set by his or her ministry (see Hallerberg 2000). 
Although this regulation was supposed to strengthen the position of the finance minister 
in the bargaining on settlements with cabinet colleagues, his or her overall role in the 
budgetary framework was weak compared to other countries (see Hallerberg et al. 
2001). Germany had a constitutional balanced-budget rule, stating that overall 
expenditure should not exceed state revenues and limiting debt revenues to the amount 
of state investment in the budget. Deviations from this rule were only allowed in a 
situation o f severe macroeconomic imbalances (Art. 115 GG). Yet the fiscal rules 
lacked strict enforcement and “often were not realised and rarely attracted a judicial 
challenge” (Kopits and Symansky 1998: 8). Furthermore, the hurdles for amendments 
of the initial law during the execution of the budget were not very high (see Sturm and 
Muller 1999: 128)'. In general, the budgetary process in Germany appeared to be rather 
weak as the institutional framework in which the draft budget was created did not set
36 Source: own calculations based on data from BMGS 2004 and 2005.
37 In Hallerberg et al.’s index measuring the strength o f finance ministers, Germany receives a score of 
4.5, which is 1.5 points lower than the median score o f all other EU-15 countries with a delegation 
approach. Regarding the Implementation o f the Annual Budget, Germany achieves a score o f 2, which is 
1 point lower than the median score for delegation member states (see Hallerberg et al. 2001: 65ff.).
38 There is also no binding multi-annual budgetary framework except o f voluntary announcements o f the 
government. Furthermore, the assessment o f the long-term sustainability of public finances is conducted 
by the social ministries, i.e. the ministry o f health and the ministry o f social affairs and labour (European 
Commission 2003: 72).
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many barriers to expansionist fiscal policies. Furthermore, external spending monitoring 
of the insurance accounts was very limited.
How strong were pressures for spending constraints in the individual insurance sectors? 
Due to mandatory spending legislation in the GRV, the state had to fund the pensions 
that claimants were eligible for regardless o f the revenues the scheme had received. This 
made spending open-ended and fiscal control during the budgetary year very difficult. 
The social security law stated that the insurance carriers had to ensure ‘basic principles 
of efficiency’ during the drafting and execution o f their budgets (§ 69, SGB IV), but 
there were no enforced fiscal targets (for example regarding administrative or personnel 
spending).
The possibilities for fiscal control were more varied in the health sector: although 
spending in this sector was also open-ended and based on existing legal regulations 
defining eligibility for and generosity of services and benefits, the amount spent for 
healthcare strongly depended on the settlements with the health providers in the 
ambulatory, hospital and pharmaceutical sector about the costs o f their services. As 
these bargains were the task of self-administration by the associations of insurance 
carriers, the extent to which the government could exert spending constraints in this 
respect was minimal.
In the unemployment insurance scheme, wage replacement provisions were also based 
on entitlements created by contribution payments, which made spending open-ended 
and often difficult to predict -  even more than in the other two insurance sectors due to 
the effect o f economic developments on the unemployment rate. But as outlined before, 
another large share o f spending was ‘discretionary’ for active employment measures. 
The social security code stated that the BA was obliged to exert its functions within the 
framework o f the social and economic policy o f the federal government. Therefore 
factors such as the unemployment or economic growth rate had to be taken into account 
in planning expenditure for active measures, but there were no pre-defined spending 
caps. Although the ministry of labour had to approve the budget, demands for changes 
had to be agreed with the self-administration bodies and could not be unilaterally 
imposed. The ministry o f finance had therefore no direct influence on the BA budget,
39 For all insurance carriers under public law or for those in which the federal government had some 
financing share, the German Federal Court o f Auditors (Bundesrechnungshof) audited the accounts.
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but only came into play if  deficit coverage from the general tax fund had to be approved 
(see below). Pressures for cost containment were therefore low.
Finally, the regulations of deficit coverage had important implications for the extent of 
cost containment pressures. Due to the fact that the insurance carriers in the pension and 
unemployment sector had no discretion regarding the parameters determining revenues 
or spending, their budgets were subject to a federal guarantee. In the GRV, the state 
only intervened if  liquidity problems could no longer be solved merely through the 
existing equalisation processes between the insurance schemes or via the internal 
reserve fund (see Chapter 5), and was legally obliged to provide financial assistance 
(either in form of subsidies or in form of loans). In contrast, deficits o f the BA were 
automatically covered by the government -  which created a high degree o f fiscal 
commitment, but also gave the state an important stake in budgetary issues.
For the insurance carriers in the GKV, there was neither automatic deficit coverage nor 
a federal guarantee in place. Instead, each individual health insurance fund had the legal 
obligation to set contribution rates so that it enabled it to cover its expenses. But this 
meant that although the level of budgetary autonomy was formally very high, the 
legislator could indirectly influence the setting o f contribution rates as it determined the 
main parameters of service provision. This combination of self-determination of 
contribution rates and state-controlled spending parameters, together with the legal 
obligation to balance the accounts and no possibilities to acquire additional revenues, 
lead to a mechanism which disadvantaged the insurance carriers. If the government 
maintained or increased provisions in times o f declining contribution revenues, it was 
the insurance carriers who had to react in raising the contribution rate in order to be able 
to balance their accounts. As this connection between legal changes in benefit 
regulations and autonomous increases of contributions was often not obvious to the 
general public, the insurance sector was particularly susceptible to the passing on of  
costs (see Gossl 1992). The possibility for the government to indirectly influence 
budgetary decisions of the health insurance carriers by determining the degree of fiscal 
pressures constrained the otherwise very high degree o f budgetary independence of the 
GKV. But taking all factors determining budgetary independence and constraints into 
account, the overall degree o f fiscal commitment in the GKV was still high in 1990 (see 
Table 4-7).
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Table 4-7 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints Germany 1991
Sector Pensions Health Unemployment
Insurance Scheme GRV GKV BA
Budgetary Autonomy
Degree o f Formal 
Budget Autonomy Formal budget autonomy —* Very high
Formal budget autonomy 
—* Very high
Formal budget 
autonomy, but subject to 
approval by federal 
government 
—> Medium
Degree o f Revenue 
Autonomy
Contribution rates and 
subsidies defined by law
—* Very low
Contribution autonomy 
— *• Very high
Contribution rates 
defined by law
—* Very low
Degree o f 
Spending 
Autonomy
Carrier only determines 
administrative spending 
— ► Low
Considerable self­
administration powers 
regarding definition o f  
provision catalogue in 
ambulatory sector, but 
govt approval 
— ► Medium
2/3 o f  spending based on 
benefit legislation; 
flexibility regarding 1/3 
for active 
policies/placement 
— *■ Medium
Score 2 (Low) 4 (High) 2 (Low)
Budgetary Constraints
Budgetary 
Allocation Process
Delegation approach; 
weak role o f finance 
minister 
— *  Very high
Delegation approach; 
weak role o f finance 
minister 
— ► Very high
Delegation approach; 
weak role o f  finance 
minister 
— *■ Very high
Enforced Fiscal 
Targets No—* Very high
No; spending bargains 
with health providers 
task o f  self­
administration 
— ■* Very high
No
— > Very high
'  V.
Spending
Monitoring
Approval o f Ministry o f  
Social Affairs; no 
approval o f extra 
spending necessary 
—* High
Approval o f  ministry o f  
health; no approval o f  
extra spending necessary 
High
Extra spending needs 
approval o f Ministry o f  
Labour and Finance; 
internal spending 
monitoring weak 
— *  Medium
Deficit Coverage
‘Federal guarantee’ if  
threat o f illiquidity; no 
legal specification 
whether in form of 
subsidies or credits; 
automatic coverage o f  
miners insurance 
->H igh
No state coverage; no 
credit financing allowed 
—* Very low
Automatic deficit 
coverage by federal state 
—* Very high
Score 5 (Very high) 4 (High) 4 (High)
Total Score 3 (Medium) 4 (High) 3 (Medium)
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4.2.3 Revenue Structure
Similar to France, contribution financing represented the predominant source of 
revenues for all German social insurance schemes in 1990, which created a high degree 
o f fiscal commitment due to the creation of legal benefit entitlements. The share of 
contribution financing was particularly high in the Statutory Health Insurance with 96.5 
percent, which meant that the revenue base of the insurance funds was protected from 
any possibilities of state involvement. The degree of fiscal commitment on this 
dimension was accordingly very high. Although in the other two insurance schemes 
contribution financing was also predominant, tax financing also played an important 
role. In the GRV, these tax revenues came in the form of an annual federal subsidy, 
which in 1991 accounted for nearly a fifth of all revenues. Although the subsidy 
followed a fixed annual adaptation process, it had been repeatedly altered and even 
temporarily abolished during previous decades, which shows that tax revenues did 
indeed represent a more volatile source of revenues.
In the unemployment sector, the federal government reimbursed the BA for non­
insurance related expenses that were financed directly from the federal budget. These 
were accounted for separately and therefore did not affect the insurance-based 
provisions. But the federal government also provided a subsidy -  but not already at the 
beginning of the year, but only ex-post for the coverage of deficits (see 7.2.3). Overall, 
the degree of fiscal commitment in both sectors was high.
Table 4-8 Social Insurance Revenues and Degrees of Fiscal Commitment 1991
..
Revenue Sources GRV(Pensions)
GKV ■ ■  
(Health) (UnemptAiloyment)
DM (m) % DM (m) %  DM (m) %
Contributions 214210 77.8 173101 96.5 7 B 6 0 88.5
- Insured 111653 40.6 112454 62.7 35337 43.6
- Social Insurance Carriers 10106 3.7 26559 14.8 465 0.5
- Employers 102557 37.3 60648 33.8 36023 44.4
Taxes 57305 20.8 1854 L0 23820 !0.5
Other 3603 1.3 2733 1.5 660 1.0
TOTAL 275183 100.0 179313 iOO.O 95840 100.0
Commitment Score 4 (High /\7£*.r^xrhigh) 4(1ligh)
Source: Own calculations 
2001 .
based on data from Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit 1993 and Bundesregierung
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4.2.4 Spending Structure
As outlined in Chapter 3, the different spending logic o f insurance schemes with regard 
to whether they insure against life or income risks leads to big differences in the degree 
of fiscal commitment. As in most contributory pension systems, the degree of 
reciprocity between personal contribution record and pension payments was very high 
in the case of the GRV, which created a very high degree o f fiscal commitment towards 
pension spending.40 Another important aspect in terms o f commitment was the 
constitutional protection of pension entitlements against short-term cutbacks, as it 
locked in spending considerably -  at least in the medium term. But the GRV also 
provided a considerable degree of non-insurance related benefits: although the exact 
extent is hard to calculate, estimates suggest that the share of non-contribution- 
equivalent provisions accounted for around 35 percent o f total provisions in 1989 
(Rehfeld and Luckert 1989; see also Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager 
1995; Borsch-Supan and Reil-Held 1999). Although the federal subsidy to the GRV was 
supposed to cover those redistributive expenses, it only accounted for 20 percent o f 
revenues in 1991, which means that a high share o f non-insurance benefits were 
financed by contribution payers. This lowered the overall degree o f reciprocity and the 
degree of fiscal commitment.
Due to the different spending logic o f the health insurance scheme which did not 
provide income replacement but instead needs-based provision equally to all insured 
regardless of their contribution records, the degree o f reciprocity in the spending 
structure was very low. There was furthermore a very high degree o f redistribution due 
to the free co-insurance of dependent family members. The only element which 
increased the degree o f fiscal commitment was a high degree of reciprocity and 
restricted eligibility regarding sickness pay, which was strictly equivalent to former 
earnings and therefore to contribution payments. But overall, the degree o f fiscal 
commitment based on the spending structure could be classified as low.
For assessing the degree o f fiscal commitment resulting from the spending structure in 
the unemployment insurance scheme, two different aspects have to be taken into 
account: on the one hand, there was a high degree of reciprocity between contribution
40 The fact that certain pensions were granted not merely due to the reaching o f  a certain age, but also due 
to unemployment or other social factors was reflected in the benefit level through the lRentenartfaktor’ in 
the pension calculation.
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payments and unemployment benefits which represented a percentage of former wages. 
Eligibility was restricted to those who actively paid contributions and who fulfilled 
certain minimum contribution times. On the other hand, a high percentage of funds 
which stemmed from contribution payments financed active labour market measures, as 
well as assistance and placement activities of the unemployment agencies. These 
services were not restricted to contribution payers and were also not granted according 
to contribution records but according to other social criteria. In 1991, only one third of 
the BA’s expenses were going towards the financing of passive income replacement 
benefits. This fact strongly reduced the degree o f fiscal commitment resulting from the 
spending structure, which could be classified as medium high.
118
Table 4-9 Indicators and Degrees of Fiscal Commitment: Spending Structure Germany 1990/91
Pensions: GRV Health: GKV Unemployment: BA
Eligibility Mandatory Retirement Age:
■ 65 years (in principle), but several exceptions
Beneficiaries:
■ Healthcare:
Persons in paid employment and those
Beneficiaries:
■ Unemployed with sufficient previous 
contribution payments
Conditions for Full Rate Pension:
■ Reaching o f  65 year age limit and minimum 
contribution time; exceptions:
■ Men and Women:
63 yrs (or 60 yrs for war invalids and 
invalidity) after 35 yrs o f  insurance 
60 yrs, if  180 contr. months, in 
unemployment for a year in last 18 
months, at least 8 yrs compulsory 
insurance in last 10 yrs
■ Women only:
60 yrs, if 180 contr. months, compulsory 
insured for at least 10 years since age 40
receiving vocational training, trainees, 
students
Pensioners with a sufficient period o f  
insurance.
Unemployed, receiving benefits o f  
unemployment insurance.
Handicapped persons.
Artists and writers; Farmers 
Personally insured
■ Sickness pay:
Employees and assimilated; Incapacity 
for work certified by a doctor from the 
3rd day o f  illness
Work Availability and other Conditions: 
■ Available for work
Accounting o f Non-Contribution Times:
■ Substitute periods  (military service and war-
related non-employment times)
■ Assessment periods  (periods o f  sickness,
rehabilitation, or certain times o f  
unemployment; periods o f  pregnancy and 
child-bed; school or higher education 
times up to limit o f  4 years; finished 
university education up to 5 years; 
pension times before age limit o f  55 years
Eligible Dependants:
■ Spouse and children, income not exceeding 
DM500 (west) or DM 300 (east)
Minimum Contribution Time: 
■ 60 months o f  insurance
Minimum Contribution Time:
■ Healthcare: None
■ Sickness Pay: None
Minimum Contribution Time:
■ Compulsory Insurance for at least 12 months 
during the last 3 years.
Score
Eligibility 3 (Medium) 2 (Low) 4 (High)
119
Reciprocity Pension Level:
■ Individual components:
Personal Income Points (PIP)
Access Factor depending on pension age (AF) 
General component:
Pension Type Factor (PTF)
Monthly Pension = PIP x AF x PTF
Patient's Co-Payments:
■ Medical Expenses: no co-payments
■ Hospitalisation co-payment: DM10 per 
calendar day during a maximum period o f  14 
days
■ 50% o f dental prostheses and connected 
treatment
■ Drugs: Fixed amount on fixed price products; 
DM3 on all other prescribed drugs; no 
reimbursement o f comfort drugs (since 1989)
Replacement Rate:
■ Unemployment Benefit: 68% o f  net earnings;
without children: 63%
■ Unemployment Assistance: 58% o f  net
earnings; without children: 56%
Benefit Inequality:
■ No statutory minimum pension (but minimum
number o f ‘Entgeltpunkte’ granted for 
marginal incomes)
■ No statutory maximum pension
Reference Salary:
■ Average weekly wage for last three months
Duration and Benefit Development over Time:
■ Proportional to periods o f employment and age: 
o Minimum: 12 months empl. —► 156 days
benefits
o  Maximum: 64 months empl., 54 years —> 
832 days benefits;
■ Unemployment Assistance: unlimited
■ Development stable
Reduction for Early Retirement:
■ None, but different pension access accounted 
for through Access Factor and Pension Type 
Factor
Exemptions or Reductions to Co-Payments:
■ No co-payments for children and ‘special cases’
Regulations o f Indexation:
■ Every 1st o f  July adaptation according to 
development o f gross wages
Sickness Pay Benefit Rates :
■ Sickness pay: 80% o f  the normal salary (wages 
and income from work during last 3 months, 
insofar as subject to contribution; annual 
adaptation as for pensions) but not exceeding 
100% o f the net salary
Qualifying Waiting Period:
■ None
Charges on Benefits:
■ Health Insurance Contributions (6.4%)
Charges on Benefits:
■ None
Universally available placement activities/active 
employment policies:
■ Information and placement services 
universally available
■ Active employment measures not 
connected to contribution records
■ Share o f  active employment measures 
compared to passive 45.3% in 1992
Score
Reciprocity 5 (Very High) 2 (Low) 2 (Low)
Total Score 4(High) 2 (Low) 3 (Medium)
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4.2.5 Germany: Conclusion
Compared to France, there is less distinct variation between the overall degrees of fiscal 
commitment in the analysed German insurance schemes. While the insurance carriers of 
the Statutory Pension Insurance were restricted with regard to autonomous budgetary 
decisionmaking, they were not subject to strong fiscal constraints and fiscal 
commitment on the budgetary dimension was overall medium high. The high degree of 
contribution financing as well as a high degree of reciprocity in benefit spending created 
high degrees of commitment on both the revenue and spending dimension, and together 
with a very high degree of administrative independence, fiscal commitment was overall 
high with a score of 16.
Fiscal Commitment Pensions Germany 1990:
Administrative Independence Very high (5)
Budgetary Independence Medium (3)
Revenue Structure High (4)
Spending Structure High (4)
Total Score 16
The German Statutory Health Insurance (GKV) achieved the same overall score, but the 
comparison of the two insurance schemes highlights that, in the aggregate, fiscal 
commitment is constituted by very different institutional and programmatic aspects. In 
the case of the GKV, fiscal commitment mainly resulted from a very high degree of 
administrative independence, and a very high reliance on earmarked contribution 
financing. In contrast to the pension insurance scheme, the spending structure created 
only a low degree of fiscal commitment.
Fiscal Commitment Health Germany 1990:
Administrative Independence Very high (5)
Budgetary Independence High (4)
Revenue Structure Very high (5)
Spending Structure Low (2)
Total Score 16
Compared to the other two insurance sectors, the unemployment insurance carrier BA 
had an overall lower degree of fiscal commitment. The state retained considerably more 
decisionmaking and intervention rights as in the other two schemes which resulted in 
only medium high degrees of fiscal commitment on both the administrative and 
budgetary dimensions. Also the degree of contribution-based eligibility and reciprocity 
in the spending structure was only medium high due to the financing of universally
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available active employment measures from the same contribution-financed budget. All 
these factors together made the German unemployment insurance “highly susceptible to 
politically and fiscally motivated interventions” by the government (Schmid et al. 1992: 
38).
Administrative Independence Medium (3)
Budgetary Independence Medium (3)
Revenue Structure High (4)
Spending Structure Medium (3)
Total Score 13
These results for the German social insurance schemes confirm the conclusions for the 
French case: the ‘obvious’ high commitment of the French and German social insurance 
systems did not exist throughout. Although both the German and French states formally 
left decisions and tasks of the three main insurance sectors to the self-administration, it 
still maintained important regulatory powers. Furthermore, this ‘self-regulation in the 
shadow of the state’ (Scharpf 1997), or in other words the degree to which the 
government could intervene in the social insurance sectors, varied considerably across 
the different insurance sectors. The insurance schemes also differed considerably with 
regard to their spending structures, as some were characterised by a very strong 
connection between contribution payments and the eligibility and generosity of benefits. 
In contrast, the health sector had a much lower degree of fiscal commitment on this 
dimension. But the variation regarding the respective degrees of fiscal commitment did 
not only exist between the insurance sectors, but even within the sectors there was 
variation between the different public schemes.
Contrasting the commitment scores of the French and German insurance schemes 
within the same policy sectors highlights another interesting pattern: the unemployment 
insurance scheme which in the German case only achieved a comparatively low 
commitment score (13) was the one which (together with the supplementary pension 
schemes) achieved the highest score in France (18). Reciprocally, the French health 
insurance scheme CNAM achieved the lowest score in France (13), while its German 
equivalent, the GKV, had a comparatively high score (16). This shows that not only the 
assumptions of the French and German welfare states as generally institutionally 
‘sticky’ and unreformable are not appropriate, but also that general assumptions about 
insurance sectors are equally problematic.
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4.3 Welfare States Unfrozen?
The initial assumption derived on the basis of the ‘new politics’ literature was that the 
corporatist structure o f the German and French social insurance schemes should create a 
generally high degree of pre-commitment due to their institutional and policy 
characteristics, and this should make changes to the status quo difficult. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that we should only see a very limited reaction to financial 
pressures in the form of retrenchment in both countries (both in spending terms as well 
with regard to structural reforms). In other words, the corporatist-continental welfare 
states in France and Germany should be largely ‘frozen’ in their institutional status-quo 
(Esping-Andersen 1996). But the analysis of fiscal commitment prevalent in the main 
social insurance schemes in both countries has shown that the degrees to which 
institutional and programmatic features o f these schemes created barriers for change in 
1990 varied widely between the different programmes and insurance sectors. What 
implications do these results have for the assumption o f generally locked-in corporatist 
welfare states and the analysis of welfare reform processes?
4.3.1 The Systematic Lock-In Effects of Fiscal Commitment
The fiscal commitment scores measured in 1990 range from an overall score of 13 (for 
the German BA, and the French CNAM) to a score o f 18 (for the French UNEDIC, as 
well as the supplementary pension schemes ARRCO/AGIRC). This means that we have 
to refine Hypothesis 1, which predicted that due to generally high degrees o f fiscal pre­
commitment in the French and German social insurance schemes, we should see only 
limited cost containment measures in both countries (see 2.1.2). We do know now that 
the extent of fiscal commitment inherent in the individual schemes differs. If we still 
assume that the arguments o f ‘institutional stickiness’ are right, and if  we further 
assume that the institutional and policy characteristics used to measure fiscal 
commitment really safeguard policy programmes from successive retrenchment, we 
should expect to see fewer cost containment measures in the schemes with a higher 
degree o f fiscal commitment and more in those with a lower degree of fiscal 
commitment. The higher the government’s degree o f regulatory, managerial and 
budgetary intervention powers in the formally independent insurance schemes and the 
weaker the connection between contribution payments and benefit entitlements, the 
more options policymakers should have to push through unpopular retrenchment 
measures.
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H5: We should see less retrenchment in schemes with a high degree o f  fiscal 
commitment than in those with a lower degree o f  fiscal commitment.
As outlined below, similar degrees of fiscal commitment for different insurance 
schemes can still mean that this commitment is based on different dimensions -  while 
some schemes have a high degree of fiscal commitment on the administrative and 
budgetary dimensions but only low scores on the spending dimension (such as the 
German GKV), others have a very high degree o f fiscal commitment on the spending 
dimensions but only medium or low degrees on the other dimensions (such as the 
French CNAV). We should expect a stronger reduction of fiscal commitment on those 
dimensions that provide more intervention powers for the government, that is, those 
which already had lower degrees of fiscal commitment in 1990, and fewer retrenchment 
measures on those dimensions with a high or very high degree o f fiscal commitment in 
1990.
H6: We should see less retrenchment on those dimensions with a high degree o f  fiscal 
commitment in 1990 than on those dimensions with a lower degree o f  fiscal 
commitment.
To analyse whether it is possible to observe such a systematic effect of fiscal 
commitment for the individual insurance schemes, the degrees o f fiscal commitment in 
1990 are contrasted with those measured for the same schemes in 2005 (see Table 4- 
10).41 This comparison shows to what degree fiscal commitments have been reduced or 
sustained during this period.42 The degree to which fiscal commitment has been reduced 
is an indicator for the degree of retrenchment measures which encompasses both 
expenditure-reducing measures as well as structural reforms which make future 
interventions in the schemes easier. It shows to what degree the governments have 
intervened in the welfare state in order to regain financial control.
41 For details o f the 2005 measurement results see Appendices I and II and the following three chapters 
which outline the reform processes in detail.
42 For details o f different forms o f commitment-sustaining or -reducing measures see 3.2.1.
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Table 4-10 Degrees of Fiscal Commitment in France and Germany,
1990 and 2005
Country Germany France
Year 1990/91 2004/05 1990/91 2004/05
Sector: First-pillar Pensions GRV CNAV
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Autonomy: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Very high (5) 
Medium (3) 
High (4) 
High (4)
Very high (5) 
Medium (3) 
Low (2) 
High (4)
Medium (3) 
Medium (3) 
High (4) 
High (4)
Low (2) 
Low (2) 
Medium (3) 
High (4)
Commitment Score 16 14 (-2) 14 U M ___
Sector: Suppl. Pensions ARRCO/AG1RC
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Autonomy: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Very high (5) 
Very high (5) 
High (4) 
High (4)
Very high (5) 
Very high (5) 
High (4) 
High (4)
Commitment Score 18 18 (+/-0)
Sector: Health GKV CNAM
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Autonomy: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Very high (5) 
High (4) 
Very high (5) 
Low (2)
Very high (5) 
Medium (3) 
High (4) 
Low (2)
Medium (3) 
Medium (3) 
Very high (5) 
Low (2)
Low (2) 
Low (2) 
Very low (1) 
Very low (1)
Commitment Score 16 .....KM..... 13 6 (-7)
Sector: Unemployment BA UNEDIC
Administrative Independence: 
Budgetary Autonomy: 
Revenue Structure:
Spending Structure:
Medium (3) 
Medium (3) 
High (4) 
Medium (3)
Very low (1) 
Very low (1) 
Medium (3) 
Low (2)
High (4) 
High (4) 
Very high (5) 
Very high (5)
High (4) 
High (4) 
High (4) 
Very high (5)
Commitment Score 13 ..... , 7 M ......... 18 17 (-1)
As the comparison between the different insurance schemes in 1990 and 2005 shows, 
fiscal commitment in the social insurance schemes has been overall considerably 
reduced during this period. While it is not possible to observe straightforward 
retrenchment in overall expenditure terms (see Graphs 2-1 and 2-2), the governments in 
both countries have nevertheless regained influence over the determination of social 
insurance spending and therefore over their social budgets. Merely using social 
insurance spending as an indicator for cost containment measures is therefore not 
sufficient for the analysis of financial adaptation processes as it leaves out important 
institutional and programmatic adaptations which might not have immediate, but 
medium and long-term implications for social spending (see also Vail 2004).
The extent to which fiscal flexibility has been regained varies considerably between the 
insurance sectors. As Graph 4-3 shows, the initial degrees of fiscal commitment seem to 
be an effective indicator of the respective ‘stickiness’ of organisational, budgetary and 
financial regulations securing spending for the particular insurance purpose: the higher
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the degree of commitment in an insurance scheme prior to the intensification of fiscal 
pressures from 1990 onwards has been, the lower has been the degree of commitment- 
reduction in the following years. This indicates a systematic effect of institutional lock- 
in, which supports the assumptions formulated in Hypothesis 5.
Graph 4-3 The Correlation between Initial Degrees of Fiscal Commitment and
Successive Reductions
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While we can observe a systematic effect of aggregate commitment levels on the extent 
of successive commitment reductions, the question remains whether this effect is also 
visible for each of the four dimensions. Can we observe a stronger reduction of fiscal 
commitment on those dimensions with a medium or low score in 1990 than on those 
with a high or very high score, as predicted in Hypothesis 6? The results presented in 
Table 4-10 indicate systematic effects of fiscal commitment on two dimensions: if the 
degree of administrative autonomy was very high or high, we do not see any successive 
reductions on this dimension -  in contrast to schemes in which this autonomy was only 
medium high or lower in 1990. The same holds true for the degree of contribution-based 
eligibility and reciprocity, creating fiscal commitment on the spending structure. Here 
we cannot observe any change in the schemes which had either very high or high scores 
on this dimension. Interestingly, we cannot detect the same relationship on the revenue 
and budgetary dimensions.
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4.3.2 Initial Results and Open Questions
This chapter has shown that fiscal commitment in the French and German social 
insurance schemes is neither equally high for all schemes, nor is this commitment 
distributed uniform across the different dimensions. Instead it has been demonstrated 
that fiscal commitment varies considerably across the different insurance schemes 
within each country. These differences also matter for successive reform developments: 
while overall fiscal commitment has been reduced in both countries, there is strong 
evidence that this reduction varies systematically according to the previous degree o f  
commitment in the insurance schemes. This confirms the anticipated effects of 
institutional lock-in outlined in Hypothesis 5. In contrast, there is no evidence for an 
overall stronger reduction of fiscal commitment in France which could have been 
expected based on differences regarding corporatist relationships and the position and 
involvement of the finance ministry in budgetary and social policy decisionmaking 
processes (Hypotheses 2 and 3). But taking a closer look at the different dimensions 
creating fiscal commitment, we can observe a straightforward relationship between 
initial high degrees o f fiscal commitment and low degrees of change as predicted by 
Hypothesis 6 only on the dimensions ‘administrative autonomy’ and ‘spending 
structure’.
These results leave the following open questions: does the fact that we cannot detect 
cross-national differences in the extent of cost containment measures mean that the 
differences in industrial relations and the role o f the finance ministries in social policy 
processes do not play a role, or is it rather that we have to also differentiate these 
arguments according to programme-specific aspects? While we do know that fiscal 
commitment has been reduced in both countries, we do also not know how political 
change in those institutionally highly committed environments took place: what were 
the political strategies behind reductions and non-reductions of fiscal commitment, and 
why was commitment reduced on certain dimensions on not on others? Further, what 
implications did reforms have for budgetary control and spending in the short as well as 
long term?
The second part of this thesis will present a detailed analysis o f the developments in the 
two countries, aiming to shed light on these questions. As the above results have 
stressed, the ongoing reform processes cannot be explained by purely applying a
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national perspective. The following analysis will therefore contrast the developments in 
France and Germany separately for the three insurance sectors.
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Part II
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5 Avoiding Commitment: Welfare Reforms in the 
Pension Sector
Despite their same aggregate commitment scores in 1990, the main first-pillar pension 
schemes in France and Germany make interesting cases for comparison as they differ 
with regard to the dimensions on which this commitment is based. While both schemes 
had a high score on the spending dimension, the French scheme was to a very large 
degree financed from contribution revenues which created a very high degree o f fiscal 
commitment, while in Germany the score on this dimension was lower. In both 
countries, budgetary independence of the first-pillar pension schemes was restricted -  in 
Germany to an even larger degree (‘low’) then in France (‘medium’). But the main 
difference between the two cases lies on the administrative dimension: while in France, 
the independence of the administrators from state supervision and interference had only 
been medium high, it was very high in Germany. A further factor which makes the 
comparison of pension reforms in the two countries interesting is the fact that the 
compulsory, second-pillar pension schemes in France achieved an overall higher 
commitment score than the first-pillar schemes.
This chapter contrasts developments in the French and German pension insurance sector 
in the 15 years subsequent to the initial measurement of fiscal commitment in 1990. It 
answers the open questions noted in the previous chapter: To what extent did the 
differences in the overall commitment scores between the schemes, but also the 
differences on the individual dimensions, matter for reforms in times of fiscal 
pressures? What have been the predominant modes o f change and what were the 
implications of reforms for the degrees of fiscal commitment on the different 
dimensions? And finally, what role did the social partners and the retrenchment 
advocates within government play in the reform processes, and is there evidence that the 
French governments focused more strongly on cost containment than the German ones? 
The analysis studies the reform processes along the four dimensions o f fiscal 
commitment, which makes it possible to establish in what way the different elements 
constituting fiscal commitment have been affected by these reforms.
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5.1 The Battle for Control: Pension Reforms in France
5.1.1 Administrative Independence
The overall structure of the French pension insurance sector, and with it the high degree 
of fragmentation, remained unaltered in the period between 1990 and 2005 (see Figure 
5-1). The importance of the individual schemes -  in terms of pension expenditure -  did 
also not change considerably during this period. The basic scheme for salaried 
employees, the CNAV of the Regime General, accounted for 36 percent of spending in 
2004, which was a slight increase compared to 33 percent in 1997. In contrast, the two 
supplementary schemes ARRCO and AGIRC had to denote a slight reduction during 
the same period (from 27 to 24 percent of spending).
Graph 5-1 Share of Public Pension Expenditure 2003 by Scheme
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But while the general structure of the pension insurance system remained widely 
unaltered, important changes have been implemented affecting the governance structure 
of the first-pillar pension institutions. While employee representatives used to be in the 
majority in the administrative boards since 1982, this changed in 1996 within the 
framework of the so-called ‘ Juppe-reforms’ named after the then prime minister.
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Figure 5-1 Overview Pension Insurance System France 2005
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The government returned to the principles of 1967 by reintroducing parity between 
employers and employees on all levels. This move could be interpreted as an attempt to 
restrict the powers of the unions, which increasingly opposed the reform plans of the 
government. By strengthening the employer representation, pressures for cost 
containment within the insurance administration were also strengthened (Catrice-Lorey 
1997; Damamme and Bruno 2000). Furthermore, the government increased its direct 
control powers in the administration o f the social insurance institutions by changing the 
rules of appointment for board members -  while prior to 1996 those were elected by the 
social partners, they were now appointed by the government itself.
Besides changes that directly increased governmental authority in the administrative 
institutions, the 1996 reforms also introduced an important new element o f  
administrative and budgetary control over the social insurance institutions o f the 
Regime General, the so-called ‘Objective and Management Agreement’. Since their 
introduction, the French insurance funds had not been politically accountable to 
parliament. This was changed through these ‘Conventions d ’Objectifs et de GestiorC 
(COG), which were concluded between the relevant ministries and the national funds of  
the main schemes o f the Securite Sociale.43 These agreements formalised in a 
contractual form the delegation o f public service administration and regulated the 
provision o f funding, which was linked to efficiency indicators (see Soulie 1996; Marie 
1997; OECD 2002).
43 The COGs are signed for a duration o f four years by the president and the director o f the relevant fund 
and the supervising minister. They are then transformed in multi-annual management contracts (CPG) 
between the national and the local funds. A Surveillance Council, headed by a member o f parliament, 
examines their implementation and reports to parliament.
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Figure 5-2 The Objectives and Management Agreement Framework
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The COGs were an attempt by the government to indirectly gain control over the usage 
of funds and to increase transparency, but the actual effect remained limited: while the 
surveillance council reported annually to parliament, its recommendations often 
remained without consequences (see Cour des Comptes 2004: 162ff.). Compared to the 
COGs, the direct appointment of board members by the government had a much 
stronger effect on increasing administrative control. Overall, the administrative 
independence of the CNAV was considerably reduced from a medium high to a low 
level during the analysed period (see Appendix 1-1).
In contrast, the supplementary, second-pillar schemes ARRCO and AGIRC retained 
their very high degree of administrative independence during the same period. There 
were neither reforms nor reform attempts to challenge the exclusive administrative 
powers of the social partners in this pillar of pension insurance.
5.1.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
While reforms on the administrative dimension have remained limited since 1990, there 
have been wide-reaching reforms with regard to the budgetary framework of the French 
pension schemes.
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5.1.2.1 Budgetary Independence: CNAV
The degree of formal budgetary autonomy of the first-pillar pension schemes did not 
change between 1990 and 2005: the budget o f the CNAV was still formally separate 
from the state budget and not subject to the annual state budgeting process. But there 
have been changes regarding the authorities to determine the revenues for the schemes. 
On the one hand, the government lost powers to determine contribution rates via decree 
with the introduction of an annual Social Security Financing Law (see 4.1.2.2) in 1996. 
Since then, changes to contribution rates had to be decided upon by parliament. But on 
the other hand, there has been an important expansion of revenue-determining powers 
o f the government: since 1990, an important phenomenon in social security financing 
was the widespread introduction of financing funds as administrative bodies o f the state 
(see Appendix IV). Besides administrative funds within the national insurance schemes 
which provided revenues for the financing of specific insurance-external social tasks, 
the French government created specific funds for the purpose o f channeling revenues -  
mainly stemming from taxes -  from the state to the social insurance organisations, or 
between insurance schemes. Three o f these funds -  the Fonds de Solidarity Vieillesse 
(FSV), the Fonds de Financement de la Reformes des Cotisations Patronales de 
Securite Sociale (FOREC) and the Fonds de Reserve des Retraites (FRR) -  had 
important implications for the degree o f budgetary autonomy of the pension schemes 
(for details regarding the FRR see 5.1.3.1).
In the mid-1980s, a number of reports commissioned by the government had already 
warned o f a serious financial crisis in the existing pension system if  no major reforms 
were undertaken. Besides an increase o f the retirement age, it was suggested to detach 
the provision of non-contributory benefits from the insurance system in order to 
improve the financial situation (see Bonoli 2000). In 1993, this resulted in the 
introduction of a Pension Solidarity Fund, the FSV, for the financing o f these non­
insurance-related expenditures. The FSV was a public institution with autonomous 
character regarding administration, budgeting, financing and accounting, but under the 
paternalism of the ministry responsible for social security and the finance ministry. As 
Bonoli (2000) argues, the fact that the distinction between social insurance and non­
contributory provision had not been made organisationally, but merely financially via 
this tax-based fund, showed the recognition and acceptance by the government o f the 
social partners’ managing role in social insurance. But in practice, this ‘recognition’ of 
the role o f the social partners was rather symbolic, as the government retained its
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powers to assign revenues to the FSV. In fact, the revenue sources for the FSV changed 
considerably over the years, which created pressures for various insurance schemes to 
adapt to the new financing regulations.44
The same held true for the other fund with major implications for the pension insurance 
budgets, FOREC. Economic reforms at the end of the 1990s which were intended to 
boost employment -  such as the introduction o f the 35-hours-week -  resulted in a loss 
of contribution payments for the social insurance schemes, for which they were, in 
theory, to be compensated by the state (Bode and Veil 2003: 39). Initial plans to finance 
these compensations by siphoning cash away from the budget of the UNEDIC (justified 
on the grounds that it would offset the financial gains for the unemployment insurance 
through the creation of employment) were abandoned after threats of MEDEF, the 
employers' confederation, to pull out o f the management o f the social insurance 
schemes. Instead, it was decided to finance the compensations for contribution losses 
via FOREC, a new fund established in 2000. It was financially dependent on the 
transfer o f revenues from various regulatory taxes as well as from two new levies on the 
corporate sector.45
One major consequence of the introduction o f these funds was that it gave the 
government a great deal of flexibility to reassign revenues from one scheme to the 
other, which further decreased the degree o f budgetary independence o f the schemes. 
While for the social insurance funds it made no difference whether the taxes assigned to 
them came directly from the state budget or from funds (as long as the amount remained 
the same), for the state the creation of the funds can be seen as a form of ‘de-budgeting’: 
they introduced a shield between the state and the social schemes and were supposed to 
increase the transparency regarding the usage o f certain resources for social security 
spending (see Cour des Comptes 2001: 200). But the multiplication o f various tax 
allocations to the funds as well as the increasing number o f funds itself, who then in 
turn assigned their funds to various insurance schemes, made the budgetary allocation 
of resources increasingly complex (see Figure 5-3).
44 From 1994 to 1999, the revenues o f the solidarity section o f the FSV were constituted o f the revenue of
1.3 point o f the CSG, the major part of the taxes on alcoholic drinks as well as the tax o f 8% on 
complementary pension provisions. In the following years, the share o f the GSC was gradually reduced to
1.03 points in 2005 and the other revenue sources were assigned to FOREC. As a compensation, various 
other revenues -  mainly from the CNAF - were temporarily assigned to the FSV (see Cour des Comptes, 
various years).
45 The social contribution on profits (CSB) and the general tax on polluting activities, which in 2001 was 
extended to include energy consumption.
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Figure 5-3 Finance Flows of the French Social Security System in 2001 
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With the creation of funds as intermediaries in the financing flow, the relationship 
between the state and the administrators of the social insurance schemes became 
increasingly hostile as both unions as well as employers were more and more opposed 
to budgetary interferences by the government. The extended possibilities to adapt the 
financing of the insurance schemes short-term via the funds gave the government much 
more budgetary control, which also reduced future fiscal commitment considerably.
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The French executive also extended its influence regarding the determination of pension 
spending, which was growing strongly: while in 1990, public pension spending had 
equalled 11.1 percent of GDP, this increased to 12.1 percent in 2000 and was expected 
to reach a level of 15 percent in 2030 (see Natali 2004; OECD 2004a). As the majority 
of pension spending was based on entitlement legislation, the major decisionmaking 
power over spending determinants was in the hands of parliament. But the pension 
reform of 1993 made it possible for the government to fix the amount of indexation by 
decree -  under previous legislation this decision had to go through parliament as well.
5.1.2.2 The Increase of Budgetary Constraints in the CNA V
Besides the decisionmaking power over budgetary determinants, the degree of fiscal 
constraints in the insurance schemes plays an important role in determining fiscal 
commitment. In 1990, these constraints had been limited for the first-pillar pension 
scheme of the Regime General, but also in this respect we can observe important 
changes in the following years.
Budgetary Allocation Process, Enforced Fiscal Targets and Spending Monitoring 
The extent o f constraints resulting from the budgetary allocation process changed with 
the introduction o f a new national budgetary approach in 1996. The formerly only 
marginal influence of parliament in the social budget process was significantly 
increased when the annual voting of a Social Security Financing Law (Loi de 
Financement de la Securite Sociale: LFSS) was introduced. Using a cap system, the law 
estimated the receipts o f social security bodies for the year to come, and from 2005 
onwards also included a long-term plan for the coming years. In connection with the 
LFSS, the French parliament now also set spending targets for the pensions sector in 
line with forecast revenues, and the implementation was then delegated to the CNAV 
within the COG framework (see 5.1.1).
But despite this new budgetary process, parliament still had little direct input: the 
National Assembly was not allowed to increase spending or decrease taxation in the 
government’s draft (elaborated by the national insurance funds as well as finance 
ministry). Article 49.3 also gave the government a tool to pass the social budget without 
parliamentary consent if this was ‘necessary to maintain the functioning of the 
schemes’. In addition, parliament had little ability to monitor budget developments. 
This changed however in 2001: the government now had to provide the National
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Assembly more frequently with detailed information about the budget execution, and 
parliament could now also redesignate some spending among programmes (see 
Hallerberg 2004: 104ff).
Whereas before the government remained in the passive position o f having to deal with 
social insurance deficits after they occurred, the new regulations were an attempt to 
impose budgetary limitations and in this way to follow a more preventive approach in 
budget allocation. Some author’s saw this therefore as major step increasing 
government control over social security finances: “Instead o f having to justify 
intervention in domains controlled by the social partners, governments can now 
regularly plan adaptation measures, especially cost containment ones” (Serre and Palier 
2004: 109). But it seems that the real effect on fiscal commitment has not been very 
strong: due to the very restricted powers o f parliament, the voting o f the social security 
budget did not really have a constraining effect. It did however improve budget 
transparency and the reporting about the real financial situation of the insurance 
schemes. Another factor which decreased the overall importance o f the LFSS was that, 
in contrast to the state budget, it had no associated balance because the range of 
expenditure programmes (obligatory schemes) and revenues (all o f the schemes and 
funds that contribute to their financing) were not identical. As deficits therefore did not 
occur in the law, it did not contain measures to cope with those.46 The overall effect of 
the attempt to restrain commitment via a tighter budgetary allocation process remained 
therefore very limited.
Deficit Coverage
After high deficits between 1990 to 1994, the financial situation of the first-pillar 
pension schemes gradually improved again and between 1999 and 2003 they had 
moderate positive results (see Graph 1-2). But from 2004 onwards, the schemes were in 
deficit again and it became increasingly clear that -  if  no further reforms were 
undertaken -  the financial situation would further worsen drastically due to the 
demographic development which negatively affected the relationship between active 
contributors and recipients o f benefits: calculations by the Conseil d’Orientation des 
Retraites (COR) in 2001 predicted deficits of nearly €47 bn for the CNAV alone in 
2040, and up to €125 bn for all pension schemes together.
46 The reform o f 2005 changed this is slightly insofar as parliament now voted on the balance o f the main 
sickness insurance schemes (OECD 2005a: 53), see Chapter 6.
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Table 5-1 Development of Pension Scheme Balances 2000-2040 (in bn €)
Technical Balance Extended Balance
(contributions minus benefits) (incl. administrative expenditure,
compensations, subsidies, and 
other charges)
2000 2020 2040 2000 2020 2040
CNAV HI* 1.5 -10.9 -39.7 - - -
CNAV H2 1.5 -15.2 -49.6 - - -
CNA V HI + sal. agricoles - - - 0.1 -11.1 -36.5
CNA V H2 + sal. agricoles - - - 0.1 -15.5 -46.7
Salaries agricoles -2.2 -2.7 -3.1
AGIRC 0.3 -1.6 -3.8 -0.1 -1.9 -4.1
ARRCO 3.9 0.0 -13.2 2.9 -1.1 -14.2
IRCANTEC 0.2 -0.6 -2.0 0.2 -0.6 -2.1
Civil Service 0.0 -20.0 -36.8 0.0 -18.7 -35.2
CNARCL 2.7 -7.5 -20.5 -0.3 -9.3 -19.9
SNCF -2.7 -2.7 -3.0 0.0 0.3 0.7
IEG 0,0 -1.7 -1.1 0.0 -1.6 -1.2
RATP -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.0
CANCAVA -0.7 -1.2 -1.8 -0.2 0.3 0.1
CNAVPL 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Exploitants agricoles -6.4 -4.6 -3.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
Other schemes -5.6 -7.4 -8.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.6
TOTAL HI -9 -61.4 -136.9 +1.9 -45.9 -115
-19 -65.7 -146.8 +1.9 -50.3 -125.2
Source: COR 2001
* For the balance o f CNAV, two hypothesis regarding the development o f  average pensions provided by 
the Regime G6n6ral have been applied. This uncertainty is based on the complexity in modelling the 
development o f  the pensions o f the Regime G6n6ral, particularly in the transition period following the 
1993 reforms.
As the regulations of deficit coverage for the CNAV were not changed, the financial 
responsibility for the scheme remained with the central state. In order to avoid the 
massive predicted liabilities in the future, the government took action in 1999 and 
established the Pension Reserve Fund FRR {Fonds de Reserve pour les Retraites). The 
FRR had the sole purpose of building up financial reserves for the future financing of 
pensions, which were supposed to be not available before 2020. The revenues of the 
FRR were, as in the case of the FSV and FOREC, not permanent and were mainly 
stemming from surpluses of the FSV and the CNAV. First administrated by the FSV, 
the FRR was transformed in 2001 in a separate public institution under the supervision 
of the state and administered by the Caisse des Depots (see FRR 2004). Although it was 
supposed to secure revenues for the pension insurance schemes, it was therefore not 
administered by the social partners.
Until the end of 2004, the FRR had accumulated €19 bn -  but compared to the 
expenditure of the CNAV of 72.1 bn in 2003, this only created a reserve of 27 percent 
of spending in one year. The reserves were expected to rise to €152 bn in 2020 -  half 
the deficits the pension schemes were expected to accumulate between 2020 and 2040.
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Besides the fact that the collected funds were therefore unlikely to be sufficient to cover 
future deficits, the FRR was furthermore only destined to support the regimes 
CNAVTS, CANCAVA, ORGANIC and the Agricultural Schemes as well as to 
contribute to the redemption of the pension system for miners. But according to the 
COR predictions, nearly half o f the deficits were to occur in the civil service scheme. 
Parallel to this insufficient funding strategy, the state even aggravated its future pension 
financing problem in shifting future fiscal responsibilities to the Regime General in 
order to benefit from short-term fiscal gains. One example was the decision at the end of 
2004 to entrust the FRR with the management of €3.1 bn resulting from a cash payment 
by the public electricity and gas companies to the CNAV. This payment was made for 
the transfer o f outstanding pension liabilities for employees o f these companies, as the 
EDF/GDF scheme was legally incorporated into the Regime General. During the 
previous pension reforms, this special scheme had remained unaffected due to the 
powerful strike potential of its employees as demonstrated during the protests against 
the 1995 and 2003 pension reforms (see Agence France Press, 5 September 1995; Le 
Monde, 2 June 2003). But the privatisation of EDF/GDF in 2004 made the 
incorporation o f the pension scheme into the Regime General possible. The resulting 
big lump sum helped to reduce the deficit in the Regime General in the short-term, so 
that this move could be categorised as a measure to maintaining spending commitment 
via the increase of revenues for the system. But the associated acquisition o f future 
pension liabilities will lead to increased financial pressures in the medium and long 
term, which overall reduces fiscal commitment for the initial ‘core’ scheme o f the 
Regime General.
5.1.2.3 The Expansion of Budgetary Independence in the Supplementary Schemes
Budgetary Autonomy
The degree o f budgetary autonomy had been extremely high for the two main second- 
pillar pension schemes ARRCO and AGIRC in 1990. Over the course o f the following 
15 years, no major changes occurred in this respect: the formal budgetary independence 
remained very high, with the social partners having not only full formal budget 
autonomy, but also decisionmaking power over revenues as well as wide-reaching 
spending autonomy. But also the supplementary schemes were never completely 
immune from state influence regarding their budgetary decisions, which became 
increasingly visible during the 1990s: already in 1983, the state had put pressure on the 
schemes to align themselves to the basic schemes which had lowered the retirement age
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to 60 years. The additional costs, to be financed by the newly established Association 
pour la Structure Financiere (ASF), were only covered to one third by the state. This 
insufficient financial coverage resulted in a two percent contribution increase for the 
supplementary schemes.47
The financing of the early retirement regulations remained a contentious issue 
throughout the 1990s. A victory for the employers was achieved in 2001 when they 
tried to push through an increase of the necessary pension contribution time from 40 to 
45 years for the receipt o f a full pension, which was opposed by both the unions as well 
as the government. In order to strengthen their bargaining position, they threatened to 
stop paying contributions to the ASF. Although the government was generally opposed 
to this demand, it feared that it had to step in financially to secure the benefit payments 
in the case o f MEDEF implementing its threat. Although the employers were not 
successful in achieving the increase o f the retirement age in the end, they were 
successful in pushing through a different financing mechanism for the ASF: unions and 
employers agreed to harmonise AGIRC and ARRCO in December 2002 and created the 
"Association pour la Gestion du Fonds de Financement” (AGFF). Formerly financed by 
contributions collected by the unemployment insurance agency, it was now managed by 
AGIRC and ARRCO and financed by a slightly increased contribution rate. Through 
this move the supplementary schemes further expanded their budgetary autonomy and 
financial self-determination powers.
Budgetary Constraints
The downside of the fact that the two supplementary schemes enjoyed revenue 
autonomy was that they did not dispose o f any other financing sources than the social 
contributions of their members and their employers: this meant that the social partners 
had to realise a permanent equilibrium between the paid pensions and the received 
contributions, which created strong pressures to contain spending. In the years after 
1990, the scheme’s own responsibility for deficits led to necessary adaptations both on 
the revenue as well as spending side (see 5.1.3 and 5.1.4). Besides this, there have been 
no further changes regarding fiscal constraints: due to their very high degree of 
administrative and budgetary independence, the supplementary pension schemes were 
not included in the annual Social Security Financing Law, which meant that they were
47 For more information see
http://www.observatoire-retraites.org/observatoire/rubriques/dossiers/Dossiers_ay/fmancement.htm
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still beyond parliamentary control. Also internally, there have been no changes affecting 
the extent of budgetary constraints.
5.1.3 Revenue Structure
5.1,3,1 The Impact o f  Increasing Tax and Fund Financing o f  the CNA V
Due to the increasing complexity o f the financing mechanisms of the French social 
insurance schemes after 1990 -  accentuated by the multiplication of transfers between 
the schemes, various contribution exemptions compensated by the state and the 
establishment o f new revenue sources -  it is very difficult to analyse the exact structure 
of revenues of the different insurance schemes (Cour des Comptes 1995: 53). The 
continuous changes in the procedures o f budgetary allocations even pushed the French 
Auditors Court to its analytical limits:
“The complexity o f the financial relationship between the state and social security is the 
most obvious sign o f both the mess one has arrived at and o f the necessity o f reform: the 
criss-cross o f financial flows, the debts and other dues that need to be recovered as a result 
o f this, the heterogeneous invoicing rules o f services rendered by the state to social 
security and o f social security to the state, the existence o f disparate and multiple 
vocational funds financed in a diverse fashion that vary from year to year, the existence of
r
‘separate’ structures, that are neither the state nor social security but that play a big role 
like the CADES -  all o f this renders the situation incomprehensible” (Cour des Comptes 
2001: 197; author’s own translation).
The following graph illustrates the considerable changes in the revenue structure of 
social insurance financing that took place in France between 1990 and 2003: taking all 
social insurance together, the share of actual contributions paid by employees and 
employers decreased from 78 to 61 percent in this period. This was balanced by a sharp 
increase in tax-fmancing from 3 to 18 percent, as well as an increase in transfer 
payments (from 12 to 17 percent).
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Graph 5-2 Resource Structure Social Insurance Schemes France
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Also the revenue structure of the CNAV as the most important first-pillar pension 
scheme changed considerably during this period:
Table 5-2 Revenue Sources CNAV 1991 and 2004
1991 ■ v  % m 2004 %
Social Contributions 35624 88.52 52670 70.13
Public Contributions* 384 0.96 5849 7.79
Taxes 387 0.96 272 0.36
Transfers** 2656 6.60 15631 20.81
State Subsidy 1176 2.92 7 0.01
Other 15 0.04 674 0.90
Source: Cour des Comptes 1992; Commission des Comptes 2005; own calculations 
* Contains former FOREC payments now again taken over directly by the state budget 
** Contains FSV payments
In 2004, the share of contribution financing in the pension insurance scheme of the 
Regime General had sunk from 88.5 percent in 1991 to just over 70 percent. The 
remainder was mainly borne by FOREC (6.42 percent) and the other big share stemmed 
from the FSV (15.04 percent).48 Of the direct taxes which were assigned to the social 
insurance schemes (CSG, CRDS, Prelevement Sociale, tobacco and alcohol tax), only 
15 percent went to the pension insurance directly, while the remainder was transferred 
via the different financing funds (CADES, FSV and FOREC). In the future, the tax-
48 The FSV finances the means-tested ‘Minimum V ieillesse’ and covers the pension increases for 
pensioners with dependent children and spouses, as well as - on a flat-rate basis - the costs o f  validating 
certain times as contributory.
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financed reserve fund FRR will further increase the share of non-contribution revenues 
in the pension sector.
The increase of tax-financing had the effect that parliament gained control over the 
social budget as it voted on tax rates and the modes of tax collection. But as outlined 
above, most taxes were not directly assigned to the social insurance carriers, but were 
channelled to them via financing funds. This fund-financing drastically decreased the 
revenue stability for the insurance schemes, as financing sources and payments were 
continuously adapted. Many unions, but also the employer representatives, criticised 
what they perceived as a ‘robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul attitude’ by the government with 
regard to social security financing, particularly the channelling of the CSG from one 
fund to another every year (see Volovitch 2001). The Auditors Court also repeatedly 
criticised the great instability of revenue sources for particular funds as well as the great 
complexity of financing flows (see Cour des Comptes 2001: 201). Furthermore, 
conflicts erupted between the social insurance funds and the state about the 
responsibility for deficits of the FSV (see Graph 5-3) and FOREC, which occurred not 
long after their establishment.
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This conflict about responsibilities was partly a consequence o f the lack o f reciprocity 
between state and social insurance accounts.49 Another reason was that funds had 
continuously been channelled away from the FSV for other policy purposes (one of 
them the financing of FOREC), which resulted in fierce opposition o f the social 
partners. The French employer representatives MEDEF drew their consequences of the 
-  as they saw it -  ‘hollow tripartism’ in 1999: a proposal for ‘selective disengagement’ 
was passed by 95 percent of the business representatives’ assembly (see Woll 2005). 
The explicit goal since then has been the reorganisation o f social relations with the 
unions, which the employers wanted to draw to their side in their battle against 
government interference in the social insurance budgets. The conflict escalated when at 
the end of 2000, a deficit of €1.6 bn by FOREC resulted in a major dispute between the 
government and the social partners about the responsibility for the rising deficit -  
although the task to ensure a strict equilibrium had been assigned to the government 
when the fund was established with the Social Security Financing Law in 2000. Jean- 
Francois Mattei, the French health minister, criticised Securite Sociale for the lack of  
transparency in its accounts and held the service responsible for the public deficit 
because it has falsified the figures o f FOREC. The social partners, in turn, criticised the 
government for using funds which should have been assigned to the Regime General 
and FSV to finance its economic policy: from 2000-2002, the revenues diverted from 
these institutions and instead channelled to FOREC amounted to €4.5 bn.50 In 2001, the 
conflict about the financing escalated when the debts the fund owed to the Securite 
Sociale -  now amounting to €2.5 bn -  were written off via decree by the Jospin 
government. The employers accused the government for using the social security fund 
as a ‘cash cow’, thereby evading responsibility for the cost o f its social initiatives (see 
Financial Times, 21 June 2001).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, French business leaders had increasingly criticised 
their role in the social insurance schemes as mere ‘window-dressing’ for state decisions 
it did not support (see Ebbinghaus 2002a; Woll 2005), but this was the first time that the 
employer representatives formally decided to draw consequences: in September 2001, 
MEDEF implemented its threat in not nominating candidates for the insurance 
administration and withdrew from the boards of the health and pension insurance funds
49 According to the accrual accounting rules applied the accounts o f  both the state as well as o f the social 
insurance organizations had to include all mutual receivables or debts, but this reciprocity was not always 
the case. One example was that the state accounts did not include the 100 bn debt of the FSV vis-^-vis the 
state, which evolved due to the take-over o f the ACOSS debts (Cour des Comptes 1995: 23).
50 La Tribune, 10 July 2002.
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(ACOSS). Also some of the unions (CFDT and CFTC) had initially threatened to leave 
the administration as well, but in the end remained. Parallel with announcing its 
withdrawal, MEDEF presented a paper with the conditions for taking up new talks with 
the government: main points were the demands for a transparent budgeting, as well as a 
clarification o f the relationships between the government and the social partners in 
running the Secu. MEDEF’s president Ernest-Antoine Seilliere seized the occasion to 
call for a complete overhaul o f the whole French social system, saying it was time for 
business and unions to draw up a new ‘social contract’ with much less state 
intervention: “We have denounced parity, as collective agreements have been 
denounced (by the government)”.51
In December 2001, the Constitutional Council ruled in favour of employers and unions 
and against the government in deciding that the financing regulations of the 35-hour- 
week were unconstitutional (along with various other regulations, which had burdened 
the pension insurance with €5 bn). It also reminded the government o f the constitutional 
guarantee for a financially balanced social insurance system which had been introduced 
in 1996. The government tried to downplay the meaning of the verdict, saying that the 
FOREC financing issue was merely a ‘technical’ and ‘accounting’ question. In 2004, 
the conflict was finally resolved in favour of the social partners. FOREC was abolished 
and the exemptions were now directly compensated by the state. State contributions to 
the basic social insurance schemes for this purpose increased from €13.9 bn in 2003 to 
€30.9 bn -  an increase of 122 percent (CCSS 2005). Besides this, CADES partially 
reimbursed the insurance funds in 2004 for the non-paid debts of the state from 2000 
(€1.1 bn). This resulted in a major increase of revenues received by ACOSS, which 
outstripped forecasts by far and enabled a balancing o f the basic insurance accounts.
51 Agence France Presse, 18 January 2000.
52 Agence France Presse, 18 January 2000.
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Graph 5-4 Exemptions Compensated by the State by Category 2001-2005 
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All these developments in the financing of first-pillar pensions taken together have 
considerably reduced fiscal commitment. This is firstly due to the fact that the first- 
pillar pension schemes have become increasingly dependent from taxes and financial 
transfers from the central state. In particular the increasing financing o f the pension 
schemes via funds strongly reduced fiscal commitment: attempts to increase 
transparency between contributory and non-contributory benefits (FSV), or to clearly 
earmark state compensations for the insurance funds (FOREC), have -  due to the use of 
the funds for various other purposes -  led to even more complex financial relationships.
This resulted in strong conflicts between social partners and the government.
In the case of the FSV, the separation of non-contributory and contributory benefits has 
also not been conducive to the maintenance of commitment. This had only been the case 
if this financial separation between non-contributory and contributory provision had 
gone along with an institutional separation. But the mere financial separation had wider 
implications for the power distribution between the government and the social partners: 
the government gained more influence due to a higher dependency of the schemes from 
tax revenues. Furthermore, the insecurity of the funds’ resources strongly decreased the 
degree of fiscal commitment within the social insurance schemes. As the development 
of FSV financing since its creation in 1993 has shown, the fiscal commitment for the 
government has been very low, as it was still able to redistribute funds according to its
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political priorities every year. In reassigning revenues away from the FSV for other 
purposes, the government tried to shift the burden o f its economic policies to the social 
insurance schemes. This strongly weakened the commitment factor as the social 
insurance organisations had to again carry a higher burden of financing benefits not 
resulting from contribution payments.
A similar logic also holds true for the case o f FOREC: created as an institutional 
commitment to the compensation of contribution exemptions, the opaque regulations of 
deficit coverage and the unstable and complex assignments o f various revenues allowed 
the government to ‘opt out’ of this commitment, which resulted in a high financial 
burden for the social insurance schemes. This accordingly resulted in a lowering o f the 
commitment factor, as the loss of contribution revenues was not sufficiently replaced by 
other revenues. But in the end, this attempt by the government to break commitments 
via the reduction o f the independent financial basis o f the insurance programmes failed 
due to the resistance of the social partners: the conflict about FOREC in the end resulted 
in the sustainment o f existing commitments via increased state subsidies. Also the 
Pension Reserve Fund FRR brought along a reduction in the degree o f institutional 
commitment towards social insurance funding: Although initially ‘sold’ by the Jospin 
government as an instrument to strengthen the pay-as-you-go system, the introduction 
of the FRR was by many seen as a first step towards the setting o f a retirement savings 
plan based on capitalisation. The direct administration o f the fund by the state without 
inclusion of the social partners meant that in the longer term, these would lose control 
over a major share of their schemes’ revenues. While contributing to the financing of 
insurance-based contributions on the one hand, the fund’s creation therefore also meant 
the reduction o f fiscal commitment in the future.
5,1,3,2 The Increase of Financial Transfers
Another revenue source which gained increasing importance after 1990 were transfer 
payments between different insurance carriers. Changes regarding the transfer 
regulations were common and a popular way o f indirectly changing the fiscal situation 
of schemes. A high dependence from transfer revenues generally lowers the degree of 
fiscal commitment, as they represent a volatile source o f revenues. But also a high 
degree of transfer payments by schemes reduces fiscal commitment, as revenues which 
have been earmarked for a certain insurance institution are channelled away from the 
initial insurance purpose.
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Table 5-3 Transfer Payments between Social Security Schemes 1991 and 2005
1991
(m €)
% of total 
transfers
2005
(m €)
%  of total 
transfers
Change (% 
points)
EMLOYEE SCHEMES
Contributing Schemes
- Regime General 5 341 53.1 7374 59.2 +6.1
- Fonctionnaires civils 2 305 22.9 2140 17.2 -5.7
- CNR A CL 1 729 17.2 2622 21.0 +3.9
- EGF/IEG 137 1.4 116 0.9 -0.4
- Banque de France 27 0.3 17 0.1 -0.1
-RATP 22 0.2 27 0.2 -0.0
- Clercs de notaires (CRPCEN) 9 0.1 -5 0.01 -0.1
Benefiting Schemes
- Mines (CANSSM) -1623 -16.1 -2180 -17.5 -1.4
- Salaries agricoles -1 638 -16.3 -2220 -17.8 -1.5
- SNCF -1 018 -10.1 -1066 -8.6 +1.6
- Fonctionnaires militaires -541 -5.4 -305 -2.4 +2.9
- Marins (ENIM) -209 -2.1 -391 -3.1 -1.1
- Ouvriers de VEtat (FSPOEIE) 0 0.0 -159 0.0 -0.0
- CAMR -64 -0.6 -32 -0.3 +0.4
- SEITA -18 -0.2 -22 -0.2 -0.0
NON-EMPLOYEE SCHEMES
Contributing Schemes
- CAN AM 225 2.2 973 7.8 +5.6
- CNA VPL 255 2.5 350 2.8 +0.3
-CNBF 16 0.2 57 0.5 +0.3
Benefiting Schemes
- BA PSA -3883 -38.6 -5690 -45.6 -7.1
- ORGANIC -652 -6.5 -960 -7.7 -1.2
- CANCA VA -169 -1.7 -472 -3.8 -2.1
- CAMIVAC -154 -1.5 -176 -1.4 +0.1
TOTAL TRANSFERS 10 066 100% 13733 100% -
Source: Comptes de la S6curit6 Sociale 1995; own calculations
Note: negative signs indicate that the scheme is overall receiver o f transfer payments; positive signs 
show that the scheme is overall contributor o f  transfers.
The transfer mechanisms have become very important on the aggregate level, but as can 
be seen in Table 5-7, mainly determine the equilibrium of certain schemes depending on 
whether they are receivers of these transfers or make obligatory payments (see Cour des 
Comptes 1995: 53). In general, the complex transfer system between the different 
insurance schemes has, due to its high importance for the balancing of the accounts of a 
large number of schemes, not been reformed -  despite continuing criticism by the 
Auditors Court. Regarding the amounts paid and received by the different schemes, the 
majority of payments came from the Regime General, while the balancing mechanisms 
generally benefited the majority of other schemes. This led to a much higher deficit for 
the Regime General than it would have been the case without the transfer mechanisms 
(see Cour des Comptes 2004: 9). The negative effects of the transfers for the Regime 
General and therefore for the CNAV increased even further after 1990, as the central 
state made use of the system to reduce its own subsidy payments. One major example is
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the pension fund of the agricultural scheme (MSA), which had been accounted for in the 
separate budget BAPS A. As Table 5-4 shows, the sources of the high share of external 
financing in this scheme changed considerably between 1994 and 2003:
Table 5-4 Development of Financing Structure of BAPSA 1994-2003 (in %)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
O ccupational Financing 17.2 14.9 15.5 17.1 17.5 18.0 17.7 17.3 16.5 16.1
- Contributions 16.5 14.6 15.4 17.1 17.5 18.0 17.7 17.3 16.5 16.1
- Taxes 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
External Financing 82.8 85.1 84.5 82.9 82.5 82.0 82.3 82.7 83.5 83.9
- Public Subsidies 57.5 50.3 45.4 45.7 45.9 43.4 42.6 43.9 41.1 42.5
- State Intervention (I) (33.3) (17.9) (12.4) (12.6) (12.6) (8.7) (6.4) (7.6) (3.2) (4.4)
- Taxes and Charges (24.2) (32.4) (33.0) (33.1) (33.1) (34.7) (36.2) (36.3) (37.9) (38.1)
- Regime General Allow. 25.3 34.8 39.1 37.2 36.6 38.6 39.7 38.8 42.4 41.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(1) State interventions comprise: the balancing subsidy o f  the state, the reimbursement by the state for the
allocation for handicapped and the allowances o f FSV and FSI.
Source: MSA 2005
While the public subsidies were reduced from 57.5 percent in 1994 to 42.5 percent in 
2003, this was compensated by an increase in allowances from the Regime General 
(from 25.3 to 41.4 percent). Besides this, the scheme’s deficit had been balanced each 
year with a state subsidy. This was not the case any longer from 2004 onwards, when 
BAPSA was replaced by FFIPSA (Fonds de fmancement des prestations sociales des 
non salaries agricoles), a financing fund detached from the state budget. Effectively, 
the burden of deficit coverage was entirely shifted to the Regime General with this 
reform: the Social Security Financing Law 2004 specified that the CNAF had to pay a 
contribution to the fund ‘corresponding to the difference between the benefits paid out 
to the beneficiaries and the contributions recovered’ in order to guarantee the financial 
equilibrium. This resulted in a reduction of state subsidies by 7.4 percent in 2004 
compared to 2003 (see CCSS 2005). The structural deficit of FFIPSA in was expected 
to amount to €1.6 bn in 2005, which was supposed to be nearly fully covered by 
transfers from the CNAV as part of the inter-regime transfers. This resulted in strong 
protests from the management of the pension scheme, which demanded a modification 
of the inter-regime compensation mechanism.53
A similar shift of fiscal commitment from the state to the Regime General also occurred 
with the reform of the French Military Pension Scheme (CNMSS). The coverage of the 
charges of the CNMSS had originally been ensured by state contributions and by the 
contributions from military personnel. As this financing mode did not allow to balance
53 See http://www.web-agri.fr/Outils/F.iches/FichesDetail.asp?idRub=202&id=21928
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the budget any longer from 1974 onwards, the CNMSS benefited since then from inter­
regime compensations o f the Regime General. In 1997, the scheme was financially 
integrated into the Regime Generate, which eliminated the inconveniences o f 
compensations and ensured a permanently balanced budget.
Overall this meant that instead of reforming the generous and financially unsustainable 
special schemes, the French governments did not break those spending commitments 
but instead shifted the responsibility at the expenses o f the contributors to the Regime 
General. This in turn represents a breaking of commitment in those pension schemes, in 
particular for the CNAV, which had to shoulder the main additional burden.
5.1.3.3 Supplementary Schemes
In 1990, the revenues o f both AGIRC and ARRCO derived to 81.7 percent from 
contributions and to 18.3 percent from transfers (mainly from ASF, see 5.1.2.3). In 
order to cope with rising expenditures at the beginning o f the 1990s, the social partners 
administering the schemes decided to react mainly via resource increases and the 
contribution rates for the schemes were successively raised from 1993 onwards.54 But 
the developments o f the revenue structures in the following years differed for the two 
schemes. In 2004/05, contributions from the insured accounted for only 77 percent o f 
AGIRC revenues, while ARRCO was still financed to 87 percent by contributions (see 
AGIRC and ARRCO 2004). The reason for this difference was the extension o f the 
financial transfer mechanism to the supplementary schemes in 1996. This was done to 
partially compensate the consequences o f the social security contribution ceiling (which 
increases the contribution assessment basis of the ARRCO, but reduces the one o f the 
AGIRC as the contributors of the latter usually earn wages below the ceiling). In 1999, 
the ARRCO contributed to the financial equilibrium of the AGIRC with €350 million.
Furthermore, the conflicts about the financing o f early retirement compensations for 
ARRCO and AGIRC led to changes in the financing mechanisms o f the supplementary 
schemes. The replacement of the ASF with the AGFF (see 5.1.3.1), financed via a 
contribution of 2 percent on wages, did not only affect the financing mechanism of early 
retirement benefits: the AGFF also contributed to the financing of AGIRC deficits (in
54 In 1993, the minimum contribution was increased (progressively from 8% in 1993 to 16% in 2003) and 
the ‘applied contribution rate’ was raised from 117% to 121% from January 1994, and to 125% in 
January 1995.
152
2004: €650 m), which reduced the transfer payments from ARRCO (€682 m).55 These 
changes in the revenue structure represented a considerable strengthening of the 
commitment factor, as now those people who paid for the benefits also profited from 
them. The creation of AGFF reduced financial interdependencies between the 
unemployment and supplementary pension insurance schemes, and also increased the 
overall revenues for the system and in this way maintained commitment.
5.1.4 Spending Structure
In 1990, the first-pillar pension schemes in France had a high degree o f fiscal 
commitment with regard to both spending eligibility and reciprocity, which means there 
has been a strong relationship between contribution records and the receipt as well as 
the amount o f benefits. The same has been the case for the supplementary schemes. 
What has been the development regarding the reciprocity between contribution 
payments and benefits in the successive 15 years?
S,1.4,l The Breaking of Eligibility-Commitments in the Regime General 
The regulations of benefit provision in the main first-pillar pension scheme CNAV have 
been subject to considerable changes in the period between 1990 and 2005. One element 
of these changes has been a tightening of eligibility criteria, as the necessary 
contribution time for the receipt of benefits was considerably extended. Since the 1993 
reform of the pension insurance schemes for employees in the private sector, 40 
contribution years instead of 37.5 were necessary in order to receive a full pension. This 
had a direct impact on the generosity of pensions, as it led to either an increase in the 
effective age of retirement or a decrease in the amount of pension benefits received. As 
this change did not only affect future insured but a large share of current scheme 
members, this was a case o f commitment-breaking. After Juppe failed in 1995 to 
implement a similar reform also in the generous public pension schemes due to massive 
public strike action, the French government decided finally in August 2003 -  after 
weeks o f parliamentary debate and strong union protests -  to align the generous public 
schemes with those o f the Regime General. The law foresaw an increase of the standard 
retirement age in both the private and public sector from 60 to 65 years and an extension 
of the contribution period in all schemes (see Appendix III). The reform furthermore 
introduced financial disincentives to early retirement and bonus payments in the case of
http://www.observatoire-retraites.org/observatoire/rubriques/dossiers/solidaritearrcoagirc/solidarite.htin
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late retirement, as well as further restrictions of eligibility in the private sector schemes 
via the introduction of a minimum contribution time. These changes are a further case 
of commitment-breaking, but they also restrict the development o f future commitments 
due to the delayed retirement age which is a case o f commitment-avoiding. 
Commitment was also reduced due to the extending of non-contribution times which 
account for pension eligibility, such as the accounting o f parental leave and certain 
periods of unemployment (see Appendix 1-4.1).
5.1.4.2 Tightened Reciprocity in the Regime General
With the 1993 reform, the reciprocity between contribution record and future pension 
entitlements in the Regime General was tightened considerably. While in 1990, pension 
payments amounted to 50 percent of the average wage during the 10 best years, this was 
progressively increased to the 25 best years in 2008 which resulted in a reduction o f the 
replacement rate. The benefit inequality between minimum and maximum pension 
payments remained equal, which means that while the internal reciprocity o f the benefit 
provision -  that is, the status-maintaining element -  has been maintained, external 
reciprocity has been reduced as overall pension levels were falling. For insured affected 
by these changes these measures represented a breaking of previous commitments made 
to them regarding future pension levels, while for future generations of insured the 
development o f commitments was restricted.
Another element o f external reciprocity, establishing the link between the value of 
contribution payments and future benefits in real terms, has also been tackled: by 
modifying the regulations regarding the value of pension points, the government had an 
important tool available to influence the level o f future pensions. The 1993 reform 
implemented an indexation of pensions of the Regime General according to prices, and 
not longer according to gross salaries -  extending the implicit practice applied since 
1987.
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Table 5-5 Evaluation of Net Amounts of Principal Pension Benefits in %
f/JZ CancavaOrganic ARRCO AGIRC Sup pi. Cancava sZL
1991 -1.4 -1.5 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 -2.3
1992 -0.2 -0.2 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.2
1993 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.1 0.0 0.0
1994 -0.3 -0.4 -1.9 -2.3 -0.8 -1.2
1995 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -1.7 -0.6 0.8
1996 -1.4 -0.2 -1.9 -2.2 -0.2 -1.4
1997 -1.3 -0.1 -1.9 -2.0 -0.7 -1.6
1998 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.7 -3.2 0.5
1999 0.7 0.7 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.6
2000 -1.2 -1.2 -0.9 -1.7 -0.7 -0.8
2001 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.7
2002 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6
2003 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -1.8 -1.3
2004 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -2.1 -0.6
Average
1991-2004 -0.41 -0.29 -0.57 -0.82 -0.71 -0.60
Source: DREES Les retraites en 2001/2003
The impact of all these changes on future pension expenditure was considerable: 
projections by the CNAV indicated that without the 1993 changes the increase of 
contribution rates to finance the scheme would have been around 5 percentage points 
higher (see Ruellan 1993: 921). The same is true for the effect on future pension levels: 
particularly the extension of the reference period used for the calculation of benefits had 
a considerably decreasing effect on future pensions, particularly for high wage earners 
(see Table 5-6).
Table 5-6 Development of Replacement Rates 2000-2040
Beneficiaries 2000 2020 2040
Employee, private sector, average non-executive salary 84% 71% 67%
Executive employee, private sector, average executive salary 75% 62% 58%
Executive employee, private sector, increasing salary level 
from one to two ceilings
56% 50% 47%
Civil Servant with salary increase o f 6% 78% 78% 78%
Civil Servant with salary increase o f 36% 60% 60% 60%
Source: COR 2003, p. 30
Note: rates for beneficiaries with complete careers, with social contribution and CSG rates unchanged
But besides changing indexation rules, the French government also made considerable 
use of a less visible way of retrenching benefits: it increased the social charges which 
had to be paid on them. In 1990, only health insurance contributions of around 2 percent 
had to be paid on wage replacement benefits, but with the introduction of the CSG and 
CRDS the charges increased to 7.1 percent in January 2005. These changes had and will 
have a considerable impact on the level of pension payments and therefore on spending
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commitment. Taking the changes in indexation and the increase o f social charges 
together, this “retrenchment through gradual erosion” (Mandin and Palier 2002: 34) has 
resulted in a reduction of the net amount of pensions for all schemes.
The implication of the 2003 reform, which aligned public employee schemes with the 
Regime General, was that for the first time civil servants no longer enjoyed a defined 
level o f security, i.e., a certain wage replacement rate, through their first-pillar pensions. 
There remained, however, a number o f exceptions as some public sector schemes 
continued to be more generous, such as those for employees of the national railways, 
the electric and gas company (EDF-GDF) and Parisian public transport (OECD 2005: 
46). This shows that the high degree o f fragmentation in the pension sector indeed 
hindered widespread commitment-breaking over all public schemes.
In order to maintain an equal level of replacement of old age income, funded pension 
schemes have been developed further in order to compensate for the declining 
replacement rate through the basic pension schemes.56 In 2000, about 46 percent of 
French households owned one of the private pension programmes against an average 
level o f around 31 percent in 1990 (see Natali 2004). This growth of the third pillar of 
pension insurance -  although still quite moderate and not compulsory -  can be seen as a 
first step o f commitment-avoiding by shifting the insurance o f social risks into the 
private sector.
5.1.4.3 Falling Pension Levels in the Supplementary Schemes 
In contrast to the first-pillar pension schemes, changes in the second-pillar schemes 
have remained limited. Eligibility remained strongly connected to former contribution 
payments and the generosity o f benefits continued to be based on the number o f pension 
points earned multiplied by the value of those points. This means that the very high 
degree o f internal reciprocity has been maintained, as has the high degree o f fiscal 
commitment resulting from it. But also in the case of both AGIRC and ARRCO, the 
overall level of pensions was reduced after 1990. In the 1994 agreement between the
56 In 1997, the Juppe government failed with an attempt to encourage non-obligatory private savings 
schemes for private sector employees as the new Jospin Government blocked the implementation o f the 
law. In February 2001, the so-called ‘Fabius law’ introduced so-called 'Plans Partenariaux d ’Epargne 
Salariale' (PPESV), which were employee pension saving schemes financially supported by employers 
and the state. But as these pension funds were only targeted at special categories o f employees and self- 
employed people, the foundations for a genuine ‘third pillar’ o f pension funding were not implemented 
before 2003 with the ‘Fillon Law’ which set up two retirement savings schemes (see Annex III).
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social partners, pension point values were frozen as a result of financial difficulties 
which, for the first time, led to a reduction o f pensions over time. This was 
accompanied by the introduction of price-based indexation o f future pension levels. In 
the following years, annual pension adaptations were also often below those o f other 
pension schemes (see Table 5-7).
Between January 1993 and 1996 -  a period o f severe financial difficulties -  there were 
no benefit increases at all in order to deal with the financial crisis. ARRCO in contrast, 
which benefited from a more favourable contribution-benefit ratio, increased pensions 
more strongly. This shows the effect of strong budgetary constraints due to the absence 
of deficit coverage by the state: in order to achieve balanced accounts, benefits levels 
were reduced. This is also confirmed by the fact that we can observe the highest overall 
adaptation o f benefits in CANCAVA -  a fragmented special scheme, which benefits 
highly from transfers from other schemes (see Table 5-7).
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Table 5-7 Revalorisation of the principal pension benefits in %
Date Regime 
Gdniral
ARRCO
(2)
A C K C Fonction
Publique
■S.
CANCAVA
01/01/1990 2,.45 2.35 0.50 2.20
01/04/1990 1.20
01/07/1990 1.30 2.85 2.50
01/12/1990 1.30
01/01/1991 1.70 1.70 4.11 2.10
01/07/1991 0.80 1.05 1.90
01/08/1991 0.50
01/11/1991 1.00
01/01/1992 1.00 2.22 2.89 1.60
01/02/1992 1.30
01/07/1992 1.80 1.53 1.70
01/10/1992 1.40
01/01/1993 1.30 2.72 1.30
01/02/1993 1.80
01/04/1993 1.60
01/04/1993 1.60 1.20
01/01/1994 2.00 0.70 0.90
01/08/1994 0.50
01/12/1994 1.10
01/01/1995 1.20 1.17
01/03/1995 1.20
01/04/1995 1.20
01/07/1995 0.50
01/11/1995 1.40
01/01/1996 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.79
01/07/1996 0.85
01/01/1997 1.20 0.50
01/03/1997 0.50
01/04/1997 0.80 1.53
01/10/1997 0.50
01/01/1998 1.10
01/04/1998 1.20 0.80
01/11/1998 0.50
01/01/1999 1.20 0.40
01/04/1999 0.90 0.50 0.29
01/12/1999 0.80
01/01/2000 0.50
01/04/2000 0.80 1.19
01/12/2000 0.50
01/01/2001 2.20
01/04/2001 1.90 2.30 2.00
01/05/2001 0.50
01/11/2001 0.70
01/01/2002 2.20
01/03/2002 0.60
01/04/2002 1.60 1.60 0.90
01/12/2002 0.70
01/01/2003 1.50
01/04/2003 1.60 1.60
01/01/2004 170 1.50 1.70
01/04/2004 1.80 1.80
TOTAL
1990-2004 25.20 25.85 21.77 22.00 26.82
(1) And aligned schemes
(2) UNIRS points before 1 January 1999, ARRCO points thereafter
Source: DREES: Les retraites en 2001; Les retraites en 2002; Les retraites en 2003
Similar to the first-pillar scheme, a further reduction of future pensions was 
implemented in the supplementary schemes: in 1993, the minimum contribution rate 
and the so-called ‘applied contribution rate’ were progressively increased. The 
distinction between a ‘taux contractuel’ and a ‘taux appele’ had the important 
consequence that the difference in the contribution amount between ‘contractual’ and 
‘applied’ rate did not create entitlements. As the social partners had to realise a
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permanent equilibrium between the paid pensions and the received contributions, the 
increase o f the taux appele was a way o f increasing revenues without increasing future 
financial liabilities. Despite higher charges for the contributors, the number o f pension 
points gained remained the same: 16 percent of contributions to AGIRC represented in 
reality 20 percent, 6 percent of contributions to ARRCO 7.5 percent. This represented 4 
de facto retrenchment of pensions, as entitlements were only gained on the 100 percent, 
and was a way to avoid commitments.
Conclusions
As the analysis of reform developments in the French pension insurance sector has 
shown, fiscal commitment in the first-pillar scheme has been reduced from an overall 
score o f 14 in 1990 to a score of 11 in 2005. Particularly on the administrative and 
budgetary dimensions, but also with regard to the financing structure, the social partners 
lost the battle for control with the government, which considerably increased its 
administrative and budgetary competencies in the scheme. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the developments in the second-pillar schemes, which retained their very high degree 
of fiscal commitment on all four dimensions. The second part o f this chapter analyses 
the developments in this respect in the German pension sector.
5.2 Still For Certain? Pension Reforms in Germany
5.2.1 Administrative Independence
The overall structure of the German pension insurance sector has remained stable 
between 1990 and 2005: by far the largest share o f pension spending was paid out by 
the Statutory Pension Insurance GKV, while special schemes for certain occupational 
groups played a much more marginal role than in the French case. Compared with the 
second and third pillars o f pension provision we can however observe an increasing 
importance of private pension insurance (see Table 5-8).
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Table 5-8 Expenditure for Old-Age Provisions by Institution 1991 and 2003
Institution Amount (bn €) % of Pension 
Spending
Change in 
% points
1991 2003 1991 2003 1991-2003
Statutory Pension Insurance (GRV) 133.3 238.5 68.1% 65.1% -3.0
Blue Collar Employees 68.6 115.2 35.1% 31.5% -3.6
White Collar Employees 54.6 108.8 27.9% 29.7% +1.8
Miners, Rail, Sea Insurance 10.2 14.5 5.2% 4.0% -1.2
Farmers Pension Insurance 2.5 3.3 1.3% 0.9% -0.4
Civil Service Pensions 23.2 35.8 11.8% 9.8% -2.0
SuppL Scheme for Public Employees 6.0 8.7 3.0% 2.4% -0.6
Funds o f Professional Associations 2.1 2.6 1.1% 0.7% -0.3
Occupational Pensions 10.8 16.1 5.5% 4.4% -1.1
Private Life Insurance 17.9 64.3 9.1% 17.6% +8.5
TOTAL 195.7 366.1 100% 100% +/-0
Sources: Own calculations based on data from Sozialbudget 2003, Gesamtverband der Deutschen 
Versicherungswirtschaft; ABV, VDR Rechnungsergebnisse 2004
The traditional set-up of self-administration in the German GRV with its dichotomy 
between white and blue collar employees had remained untouched for decades. But as a 
consequence of an ongoing quantitative shift towards white collar employment (see 
Table 5-8), a major organisational reform was enacted in 2005. The white-collar 
insurance carrier BfA and the blue-collar carrier VDR merged to ‘Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung BuncT (German Pension Insurance Federation), which reduced the 
number of carriers on the federal level from five to three (as also miners, rail and sea 
insurance schemes merged). 57 Besides improving management and co-ordination 
between the different carriers, the reform was supposed to reduce administrative costs 
and increase financial transparency.
For the DRV Bund, a new self-governance structure was created which incorporated a 
shift of authority from the self-administration committees towards the professional 
administrators of the schemes: all binding decisions of the federal pension insurance 
regarding basic or horizontal questions now needed the approval of an Extended Board 
of Directors, which was constituted by five directors from the regional carriers, the 
board of directors of the Federal Pension Insurance and one director of the Miners-Rail- 
Sea insurance. While the Federation of Germany Employers (BDA) approved of the 
change, the German Union Federation (DGB) claimed that the new regulation 
represented the factual abolition of the autonomous decisionmaking competency of the 
self-administration (see DGB 2004b). But the de facto interference in the self-
57 The omission o f the independent legal regulations for the three insurance branches had already taken 
place in 1991.
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administration authority of the social partners was indeed limited: while the 
administrative committees did lose authority towards the board of directors, this did not 
mean an increase of state involvement in decisionmaking as it were still the social 
partners who elected this board. Despite the changes in the governance structure, the 
degree o f administrative independence was therefore overall maintained.
5.2.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
5.2.2.1 Budgetary Autonomy
Between 1990 and 2005 no changes were made to the formal degree of budgetary 
autonomy o f the GKV, and also the organisational reform in 2005 maintained the 
budgetary independence of the individual insurance carriers. Changes regarding benefit 
legislation as well as the provision o f revenues and subsidies in the public pension 
schemes had to be decided in parliament. While the government was able to lower the 
contribution rate via degree (with approval of the Bundesrat), the law prescribed that the 
government had to propose a sufficient increase o f the rate in case the reserve fell below 
the legally defined amount. But although this regulation was supposed to commit the 
government to increase revenues via contribution rates if the fiscal situation made this 
necessary, this did not have an impact on the political practice. At the beginning of the 
1990s, unpopular contribution increases were avoided by shifting funds from the 
unemployment into the pension insurance (see Trampusch 2003). The pension reform 
1992 tackled the problem of effectively committing the legislator to provide sufficient 
revenues in introducing a self-regulating mechanism o f contribution rate, federal 
subsidy and pension adaptation: the contribution rate was now to be set on a level which 
ensured that contribution revenues and federal subsidy covered expenditures and that a 
monthly reserve was maintained. T he federal subsidy now also followed the 
development o f gross wages and additionally changes in the contribution rate.
As outlined in the statement of the government, this automatic adaptation regulation 
was intended to make short-term political interventions o f the legislator more difficult 
(BTDrs 11/4124; cf. Gossl 1992: 27, see also Aust et al. 2002). “There was and is no 
longer room for policy deliberation and public discussions about the tasks and aims of 
public pension policy” (Lamping and Rub 2004: 177). But parallel to those changes 
which were intended to stabilise the revenue provision to the GRV arid therefore 
increase the degree o f fiscal commitment towards pension spending, the introduction of
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additional subsidies again increased the leverage o f the government to de- or increase 
revenues for the pension schemes. The government made repeatedly use o f this scope 
and changed the calculations of the additional subsidies several times (see 5.2.2.2).
The legal regulation that all relevant parameters determining pension spending were 
determined by law or decree did not change since 1990. But despite the external 
determination o f the most important spending parameters, pension carriers were free to 
set up their budgets (particularly in terms of administrative and personnel expenditures). 
In line with the organisational reform of the GKV in 2005, the government made an 
attempt to decrease this budgetary independence. According to the initial reform plans, 
the budgets of the pension insurance carriers were supposed to be generally subject to 
approval by the ministries of social affairs and finance -  something which formerly only 
existed for the miners insurance and the unemployment insurance due to their 
regulations o f automatic deficit coverage by the state. After strong protests from both 
unions and employers (see Deutscher Bundestag 2004a), the plans were withdrawn 
again. But while the unions had mainly stressed the resulting restrictions to the self­
administration and feared that it would create intense pressures for cutbacks, the BDA 
rejected them because of fears that the new regulations would stand in the way of 
possible cost reductions (BDA 2004; DGB 2004b). The common resistance o f the social 
partners therefore had very different motivations, as they anticipated different 
consequences o f the proposed changes for the degree o f fiscal pressures for the 
schemes. But in the end, they were successful together in defending their budgetary 
autonomy.
5.2.2.2 Budgetary Constraints
The overall allocation approach in the social budget remained unaltered after 1990 -  a 
large share of social spending enjoyed a high degree o f independence from the 
government budget, and the social ministers bargained with the finance minister about 
the allocation o f supplementary tax funds to the insurance schemes. But despite this 
formal stability, von Hagen and Strauch find indications o f ‘institutional deterioration’ 
(2001: 27) in the German budgetary process: increasingly, decisions about how to cope 
with financial pressures were taken in the chancellery and in so-called ‘round tables’, in 
which the finance minister was not present. This loss of finance minister influence in 
decisionmaking processes meant that overall pressures to contain spending should have
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also been reduced. But what has been the specific development regarding the extent of 
budgetary constraints in the pension sector?
In 1990, fiscal constraints in the GRV had been very low due to the absence of direct 
finance ministry influence on allocative decisions, as well as only limited possibilities to 
implement expenditure targets due to mandatory spending legislation. This did not 
change in the successive 15 years. But there have been changes to one important 
element in this respect, which are the regulations of deficit coverage. In order to cope 
with short-term fiscal deficits, the carriers of the GRV were in 1990 legally obliged to 
hold a financial reserve of one month’s expenditure (the so-called ‘fluctuation reserve’). 
In the case that the liquid assets o f this financial reserve were not sufficient to cover the 
financial obligations, the federal government had to provide financial assistance (§1384 
RVO). But the law did not specify whether this financial help had to be provided in 
form of non-refundable subsidies or in the form of (interest-free) credits.
With the Pension Reform Act 1992, the regulations regarding the ‘federal guarantee’ 
were changed. In case the GRV carriers were unable to fulfill their obligations, the 
federal state only provided interest-free loans. These loans were to be paid back as soon 
as the fiscal situation of the pension insurance improved (§214, SGB VI). This meant 
that the federal government now only intervened in order to overcome acute illiquidity, 
but did not longer cover financial deficits. In a further attempt to reduce its 
responsibilities to cover deficits, the Kohl government attempted in 1991 to integrate 
the miners insurance -  the deficits of which were automatically covered by the federal 
state (§215 SGB VI) -  into the GRV. This would have had the side-effect that its deficit 
would now have to be covered by the other GRV carriers. If this would result in an 
overall illiquidity o f the pension carriers, the central state -  due to the reform of the 
‘federal guarantee’ -  would only be liable to provide temporary interest-free credits. 
After strong union protests, this measure was withdrawn.
Facing fiscal pressure but having no incentives to pursue unpopular spending cuts, both 
the Kohl and the Schroder governments pursued a strategy o f making use of all 
available resources within the pension insurance budgets. This resulted in an ‘attack’ on 
the fluctuation reserve in order to make more funds available short-term, which started 
in 1997 with the regulation that also illiquid assets were taken into account for the 
reaching o f the reserve requirement. In 2001, the minimum reserve was reduced from
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1.0 monthly expenditures to 0.8. This allowed the pension contribution rate to be 
maintained at 19.1 percent, which otherwise would have risen by 0.3 percentage points 
(Genzke 2003). But as also this target could not be met, the required reserve amount 
was reduced to half a monthly expenditure at the end of 2003. In the following year, the 
reserve was further reduced from 0.5 to 0.2 monthly expenditures and successively 
relabelled ‘sustainability reserve’. This name change can be interpreted as an indirect 
acknowledgement that the reserve at this level was unlikely to be effective in dealing 
with changing financial circumstances.
Graph 5-5 Fluctuation Reserve Statutory Pension Insurance (ArV + AnV)
z y '
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: VDR Rechnungsergebnisse 2004
As Graph 5-5 shows, the reserve fell from 2.6 monthly expenditures in 1991 to just 0.31 
in 2004. The strong reduction meant that the pension insurance became more vulnerable 
to short-term fluctuations in revenues, and was from 2003 onwards in acute danger of 
illiquidity. In fact this situation already occurred at the end of 2005: in the last three 
months of the fiscal year, the GRV was unable to fulfill its financial obligations and 
therefore needed -  for the first time in 20 years -  an advance payment from the federal 
subsidy. Due to the high amount of the outstanding funds, the finance minister also had 
to grant -  for the first time ever in history -  an interest-free loan in November, 
amounting to €900 million. This shows that the gradual reduction of the internal deficit 
coverage mechanisms drastically reduced the capacity of the insurance carriers to deal 
with financial pressures independently from the state, which not only increased fiscal 
constraints but also the likelihood of state interference. This reduction of budgetary
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autonomy also represented a considerable reduction o f fiscal commitment towards 
pension spending.
5.2.3 Revenue Structure
Between 1990 and 2005, the revenue structure o f the social insurance schemes in 
Germany was gradually -  but considerably - transformed. Unification in 1990 created a 
major financial challenge for the social funds, as political union meant that East 
Germans joined the pension and unemployment insurance schemes with eligibility 
based on their former employment records (Nullmeier 1992; Czada 1998; Alber 2000). 
This was less a problem for the Statutory Health Insurance, which established separate 
funds for East Germany, but created a great financial challenge for the insurance 
schemes with nation-wide budgets. This was the case for the GRV, which had to cope 
with millions o f new pensioners while receiving only limited social contributions. As 
only a minor part o f this additional expenditure was covered by federal funds, the main 
burden had to be shouldered by the social insurance schemes themselves.
5.2.3,1 Commitment-Sustaining via Revenue Increases
The decision of the Kohl government against unpopular tax increases in order to finance 
the integration o f East German pensioners in the GRV resulted in rapidly increasing 
contribution rates (see Appendix III). According to estimates of the BMAS, the West- 
East-Transfer o f the pension and unemployment insurance during 1992 and 1993 caused
co
an increase o f the contribution rate by three percentage points (BMAS 1994: 16). Due 
to growing disparities between revenues and expenditure also in the following years, 
contribution rates continued to increase (from 17.7 percent in 1991 to 19.5 percent in 
2005), and with it increased contribution payments as a share o f total tax revenues (from 
37 percent in 1990 to 45 percent in 2004).59
Besides this, attempts by the federal government to increase revenues did also focus on 
broadening the circle o f contributors. During the mid-1990s, the possibilities to become 
exempt from insurance duty were restricted.60 With the Short-Time Employment Reform 
Act in 1999, employees working limited hours and earning up to a certain threshold
58 For estimations o f unification-related costs for the GRV see also SchmShl 1994; Hinrichs 1994: Aust 
et al. 2002.
59 Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
60 This was the case for members of insurance schemes o f a professional organisation (1995), as well as 
for students with more than a marginal employment (1996).
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(€315 per month), which were formerly exempt from insurance, were now also obliged 
to pay social contributions, as were their employers (see Appendix II-5). In the same 
year, compulsory insurance was also extended to ‘employee-similar’ self-employed, 
which were now considered normal employees and were therefore subject to the general 
contribution regulations. Furthermore, the government increased the contribution 
assessment ceiling faster than the development o f average gross earnings, which meant 
that less people were exempt from insurance duty in the health insurance and that 
pension contributions had to be paid on a higher share o f earnings (which increased 
revenues for the pension insurance at the time, but in turn created more future 
entitlements).
S.2.3.2 The Increase of Federal Subsidies
All these revenue-increasing measures were however not sufficient to keep up with 
expenditure growth. As one of the few points that the social partners could usually agree 
on during the increasingly conflictual decisionmaking processes since the 1990s was the 
demand for more state subsidies (see Richter 2001), the structure of pension insurance 
financing shifted further and further towards a dependency from federal state funds (see 
Graph 5-6). In 2004, the pension insurance subsidy was the biggest single expenditure 
item in the federal government budget, amounting to €61.4 bn (which was 24 percent o f 
the total federal budget). The first major reform of the General Federal Subsidy was -  
despite the approval o f the ministry of finance -  implemented in 1992. Since then, the 
subsidy was no longer only adjusted according to gross wage developments, but 
additionally also according to changes in contribution rates in the previous year (which 
means that the subsidy increased if contribution rate increases were necessary). This 
meant a one-time increase in the size o f the grant followed by its stabilisation at the 
level o f about 20 per cent of overall pension spending (see Lamping and Rub 2004).
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Graph 5-6 Revenues Statutory Pension Insurance 2004
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Besides this, an additional subsidy was paid from April 1998 onwards.61 This was 
intended to stabilise the contribution rate of the pension insurance in line with the 
overall attempt to reduce non-wage labour costs. The additional subsidy was not subject 
to the adjustment regulations of the general federal subsidy, but was paid -  following 
demands by the social partners -  for the lump-sum coverage of a share of the insurance- 
external provisions. It was financed by an increase of VAT by one percentage point. But 
it is important to note that the calculation procedure of this additional subsidy led to a 
smaller amount than it initially seemed, as provisions which were in any case 
compensated by the state to the pension insurance carriers were taken into 
consideration.62 Furthermore, the subsidy was reduced from 2000 onwards by a fixed 
annual amount (see §213 SGB VI). This meant that additional revenue from the 
increase of the VAT flowed into the general budget, and not exclusively into the 
pension insurance -  the public justification for the tax increase. This should have been 
in the interest of finance minister Hans Eichel, whose predecessor Theo Waigel had 
initially been against an increase of VAT for the financing of the additional subsidy (see 
SZ, 13 May 1996).
61 The additional subsidy did not lead to a reduction o f  the general subsidy as in the calculation o f  the 
general subsidy a hypothetical contribution rate - which would have existed without the additional federal 
subsidy -  was applied (see Genzke 2003).
62 This was partly changed with regard to child-related compensations, which were from 1999 onwards 
additionally compensated, but remained the case for other expenses.
Compensations, 0.4%
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With the introduction of the ‘Eco-Tax’ in 1999, the additional subsidy was further 
increased as a part of this new tax revenue was earmarked for the pension insurance. 
Without these Eco-Tax revenues, which between 1999 and 2004 amounted to €69.9 bn, 
the pension contribution rate would have been 1.7 percentage points higher (see 
Deutscher Bundestag 2005). As Graph 5-7 shows, the increase of the additional subsidy 
therefore more than compensated for the slight reduction of the general subsidy. In total, 
the federal budget foresaw €58.8 bn subsidies for the pension insurance in 2005, which 
represented a share of 27.5 percent of total pension expenditure.
Graph 5-7 Federal Subsidies in the Statutory Pension Insurance 1991-2005
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It is important to note that the earmarking of revenues from the Eco-Tax for pension 
insurance purposes was abolished shortly afterwards.63 In contrast to the amount fixed 
in the initial law, the increase of the additional federal subsidy was reduced for the years 
2001 until 2003. Further it was decided that the assignment of funds was to be 
disconnected from the development of the tax revenues. Instead, the indexation of the 
increased amount was changed to the development of gross wages from 2004 onwards. 
This made it now possible to channel further increases of the tax directly into the state 
budget, instead of to the GRV.64 The justification by the ministry of finance for this
63 Through the ‘Diminished Earnings Capacity Pensions Reform Act ‘ decided at the end o f 2000.
64 Introduced with the ‘Act for the Further Development o f  the Ecological Tax Reform’ in December 
2002 .
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manoeuvre was that the amounts which were now flowing directly into the general state 
budget would still benefit the pension insurance indirectly, as they created ‘budgetary 
scope to absorb increasing financial burdens o f the federal budget for the pension 
insurance’.65 This shows again that while overall the share o f tax-financing stemming 
from the federal government budget increased, and with it the liabilities for the 
government, the finance ministers usually found ways to design the technicalities of the 
subsidy provisions in a way which not only gave them leverage in changing those 
regulations subsequently, but also allowed the discrete rechannelling o f funds into the 
government budget.
5,2.33 The Increase of Transfers
Another important element of the GRV revenue structure is the extent of transfers 
received or paid by the scheme as those increase the volatility of the revenue basis and 
therefore the degree of fiscal commitment. Since the foundation o f the GRV at the end 
of the 19th century, the finances of the individual spending carriers have been strongly 
interlinked: besides an equalisation process between the different insurance carriers for 
blue-collar employees (‘Gemeinlastverfahren’, § 287 f  SGB VI), there was also an 
equalisation process between the insurance carriers for blue-collar employees (LVAs) 
and the pension insurance scheme of white-collar employees (BfA) (§§ 218, 219 SGB 
VI). They were liable to pay funds to each other in case the liquid funds o f one 
insurance carrier fell below half a monthly expenditure o f the former year, which was 
the case in the blue-collar insurance from 1992 onwards. With the Pension Transition 
Act 1992, a further equalisation process between the Miners Insurance (KnRV) and 
those o f the white and blue collar employees (‘ Wanderversicherungsausgleich\ § 223 
SGB V) was introduced which compensated the KnRV for its declining number o f  
insured.
65 Source: http://vww.bundesfmanzministerium.de/lang_de/DE/Service/Downloads/Abt IV/
061 ,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf
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Table 5-9 Importance of Transfer Revenues 1991 and 2004
% of Tot 
Revenues
Miners Insurance (KnRV) 21.8% 45.7% +23.9
White Collar Insurance (AnV) 0.1% 0.1% +/-0
Blue Collar Insurance (ArV) 4.6% 5.3% +0.3
Source: Own calculations based on data from VDR Rechnungsergebnisse 2005
This basically represented a subsidy of the Miners Insurance through the two main 
pension funds (see Table 5-9) and a shift of the financial burden from the state to the 
GRV, which was heavily criticised by the unions who demanded the tax-financing of 
the KnRV deficits.66 Due to the rapidly declining number of insured, it was expected 
that in 2008 the equalisation payment would be three times the amount of the 
contribution revenues in the miners scheme (see Deutscher Bundestag 2004b). This 
channelling away of funds particularly from the BfA represented therefore a major case 
of commitment-breaking towards the insured of this insurance carrier.
5.2.3.4 The Increase o f Interdependencies with Other Insurance Sectors
Besides those internal financial interlinkages, the pension insurance had also various 
financial connections with insurance carriers in other social sectors. A good example of 
how the so-called ‘ Verschiebebahnhof in the German social insurance sectors is 
practiced shows the repeated reform of contribution payments by social insurance 
carriers for their beneficiaries: for beneficiaries of sick pay as well as unemployment 
benefits, it were the carriers of those benefits which paid pension contributions to the 
GRV. 67 With the 1992 Pension reform, it was introduced that these pension
contributions were in the future paid on the basis of 80 percent of the former gross wage 
of the beneficiaries, and not longer on basis of their current benefits. As this share was 
usually higher than the benefits received, this increased pension contributions paid by 
the sickness pay and unemployment insurance carriers to the GRV.
While this reform benefited the pension insurance at the expense of social insurance 
carriers, the subsequent changes had the opposite effect: in 1996, the assessment base 
for unemployment assistance was reduced due to the crediting of additional income in 
the calculation process. This also reduced pension contribution payments for
unemployment assistance beneficiaries and with it the federal expenditure by €300
million -  and resulted in revenue losses for the pension insurance. In 1999, the Red-
66 Source: http://www.n24.de/wirtschaft/hintergrund/index.php/n2005041209331600002
67 Carriers were the health insurance institutions and insured half/half, the Federal Employment Agency 
or the federal state.
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Green government cut back the contribution payments even further for unemployment 
assistance recipients.68 With the Hartz Reform in 2002, the contribution payments were 
again reduced: pension contributions were now detached from the replacement benefit 
and a fixed amount of €400 was paid.
But the continuing reduction of pension contribution payments for unemployment 
benefit recipients was only one example of a series of measures which had a negative 
effect on pension insurance revenues: in 1991, the increase in the unemployment 
contribution rate from 4.3 to 6.8 percent was counter-financed through a reduction of 
the pension contribution rate by one percentage point. This resulted in a financial relief 
for the BA amounting to €20.5 bn in 1991 and 1992, while it meant a reduction of 
revenues in the pension insurance of nearly €10 bn (BR-Drks. 12/56: 3; cf. Trampusch 
2003: 39). In 1996 -  a year in which the deficit o f the BA was again calculated to be 
very high, which would have meant high federal subsidies to cover this deficit -  the 
eligibility conditions for the former old-age pension because o f unemployment were 
changed so that they were now also fulfilled through employment in partial retirement 
for at least 24 months after the age of 55. This represented a shifting of costs from the 
unemployment to the pension insurance, as older unemployed could now take up a 
pension more easily, which reduced spending of the BA and connectedly the necessary 
federal subsidy.
But as the financial situation o f the pension insurance carriers worsened and further 
contribution rate increases seemed inevitable at the end o f the 1990s, the focus shifted 
from burdening the pension insurance to lowering its expenditure at the expenses of 
other insurance institutions. In 2000, the Diminished Earning Capacity Pensions 
Reform Act introduced changes which aimed at distributing the cost for employment- 
related pensions more equally between unemployment and pension insurance. The 
reason was that ‘labour-market related’ diminished earning capacity pensions shifted 
unemployed with little or no chances o f re-employment into the pension insurance, 
which disburdened the BA at the expenses o f the GRV. A financial equalisation process 
between BA and GRV was introduced, in which the BA compensated the pension 
insurance for half o f the expenses for these pensions for the average time period during 
which the person would have been eligible for unemployment benefits. This partial
68 It was since then calculated based on 80% of replacement benefits. In the same year the contribution 
assessment base was reduced from 80 to 60% in calculating pension contributions for insured in civil and 
military service.
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transfer o f the costs for employment-related pensions to the BA secured the 
contribution-rate stability in the GRV.
Besides these processes of shifting funds and financial burdens, the interdependency 
between the different sectors of social insurance was temporarily considerably increased 
with the introduction o f the net wage and automatic pension adaptation in 1992 (see 
5.2.4.2). Now changes in the contribution rates of the other insurance sectors and the 
overall tax rate had a direct influence on the pension adaptation, which resulted in 
increased pressures on the other insurance sectors to stabilise or reduce contribution 
rates in order to avoid a zero or negative adaptation of pensions. These unwanted 
interaction effects were reduced again with the shift to the modified gross wage 
adaptation in 2001. But nevertheless changes in health insurance rates still had an 
indirect effect on the revenues of the pension insurance schemes, as contribution rate 
increases resulted in higher spending for the pension insurance due to the co-fmancing 
of pensioner health contributions (Barth 2004).
5.2.3.5 Conclusions: The Effect on Fiscal Commitment on the Revenue Dimension 
The continuously increasing revenue share of federal tax funds in the GRV meant that 
the institution became increasingly dependent on non-contributory revenues, which 
increased the influence o f the central government and reduced fiscal commitment. 
Furthermore, the structure and financing o f the federal subsidy became more and more 
fragmented after 1990, also due to the introduction o f various financial equalisation 
processes. This created additional levers for the government to adapt the funding 
situation o f the GRV according to its preferences and allowed it to relieve its own 
budgetary constraints at the expense o f the pension schemes. This strongly reduced the 
stability of pension financing and overall the degree o f fiscal commitment on the 
revenue structure from medium to low.
5.2.4 Spending Structure
Since 1990, a considerable number of smaller and bigger changes regarding eligibility 
rules and the current and future generosity of pension payments have been implemented 
in the German GRV. While those have widely maintained existing spending 
commitments, they strongly decrease the extent o f fiscal commitment in the longer 
term.
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5.2.4.1 Changes to Pension Ages and Eligibility
The first major reform in this respect was the 1992 Pension Reform (see Nullmeier and 
Rub 1993; Schmahl 1999; Lamping and Rub 2004), which introduced a new retirement 
age of 65 for female wage earners. Early retirement -  very popular and associated with 
high costs -  remained possible but on the basis o f benefit reductions (of up to 18 
percent). Due to the constitutional protection of social insurance entitlements as 
property rights in Germany, all reforms that negatively affected retirement ages and 
conditions had to be accompanied by transitional arrangements which protected the 
benefit entitlements for insured close to the retirement age -  in this case, deductions 
were scheduled to be phased in gradually between 2001 and 2010 (for women until 
2017). Regardless o f these new provisions, numbers o f insured going into early 
retirement continued to increase. In response, the transition period was again shortened 
in 1996 with the phasing-in o f the increase in the retirement age to be completed in 
2009.69
Alternative exit options for early retirement (due to unemployment, partial retirement, 
long contribution records or disability) remained in place in 1992, but were tackled in 
the following years (for details see Annex II-5). The pension reform decided by the 
Kohl government in 1998 entailed a major reform of disability pensions, but after the 
change in government this reform was suspended. Instead, the Red-Green coalition 
came up with its own ‘Diminished Earning Capacity Pensions Reform A ct* in 2000 
which basically implemented the formerly abolished reform in a slightly more moderate 
way. With the reform, a two-tiered diminished earning capacity pension replaced the 
former benefits. Claimants which were able to work less than three hours a day were to 
receive a full invalidity pension (voile Erwerbsminderung), while claimants who were 
able to work between three and six hours a day received a reduced invalidity pension 
(teilweise Erwerbsminderung), which amounted to 50 percent o f the full invalidity 
pension instead o f the 66 percent before. The benefit level o f the full invalidity pension 
was also reduced by bringing it in line with early retirement pensions -  which lead to 
benefit reductions up to 11 percent. The law also considerably restricted benefit 
eligibility, as now all affected insured who were still able to work for at least six hours
69 A constitutional complaint against the acceleration o f the age increase from 60 to 65 years was not 
accepted by the Constitutional Court (BVerfG), as due to ‘the important public interest regarding the 
stabilisation o f the contribution rate and the reduction of supplementary wage costs’, the regulations were 
found to be proportional.
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in general -  and not only in their occupation as before -  did not receive a pension. Due 
to the regulations protecting the confidence o f insured which were close to reaching 
pension eligibility under the abolished regulations, the extension of retirement ages and 
tightening o f eligibility criteria for full-rate pensions did not break existing spending 
commitments, but rather represented a case o f commitment-avoiding. The abolition of 
the various forms o f special pensions on the other hand strengthened the commitment 
factor as it reduced redistributive elements in the pension provision.
5.2.4.2 Sustained Redistribution and Commitment
After 1990, insurance-external elements (which were mainly related to the crediting of 
child-rearing times) were moderately expanded.70 With the change o f government in 
1998, this focus shifted: instead of crediting family work, other vulnerable groups on 
the labour market were protected more strongly.71 But parallel to the expansion, of these 
non-insurance related eligibility regulations, the German governments reduced other 
redistributive measures according to the policy principle o f strengthening the insurance 
principle (see Lamping and Rub 2004). From 1992 onwards, only the first 4 (formerly: 
5) insurance years were credited with 90 percent o f the average income of all insured 
(which was usually higher than the real income as contributors were at the beginning of 
their careers). In 1997 the Growth and Employment Promotion Act (Wachstums- und 
Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz) further reduced redistribute elements, as educational 
assessment times (‘Anrechnungszeiten’) were now only credited up to three (formerly: 
seven) years.
Besides targeting redistributive elements on the spending side, federal compensations
77for insurance-external benefits provided by the GKV were increased. While those 
compensations were initially deducted from the additional federal subsidy, this was not 
any longer the case from 2003 onwards. The government claimed that from 2004 
onwards, parental times and unification-related benefits were financed to 100 percent by 
taxes. Overall, the expansion o f redistributive elements has therefore -  at least partly -
70 The 1992 pension reform extended credits for child rearing significantly (from one to three years for 
births after 1991). The 1999 pension reform further extended the value o f credits for child rearing (from 
75 to 100 percent o f average wages).
71 Since 2001, times o f sickness, pregnancy/motherhood or unemployment o f young insured between 17 
and 25 years are credited as pension contribution times, even if  this does not interrupt employment with 
mandatory insurance.
72 Since June 1999, the federal state paid a compensation for child-rearing contribution times. 
Furthermore, it continued to compensate the GKV for additional benefits connected with pensions in the 
new Lander as well as provisions related to the professional rehabilitation law.
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been counter-financed by tax compensations, which means that the degree of 
commitment resulting from eligibility regulations remained high.
5.2.4.3 Changes to the Generosity of Benefits and Indexation
Besides the increase in retirement ages, the changes with the greatest financial impact 
were changes to the indexation formula of pensions. The first of those changes was 
implemented in 1992 with the switch from gross to net earnings adaptation. This now 
meant that increases in tax or contribution rates resulted in slower pension growth, as 
the growth o f net earnings was reduced -  and given the expected rise in tax rates and 
social insurance contributions, this implied a major reduction in future pension claims. 
Furthermore, the definition of a pension level o f 70 percent for the ‘standard 
pensioner’73 which had to be stabilised in the future meant a radical change in the logic 
of the system -  “the focus on external or social needs was now substituted by fulfilling 
the internal or system needs o f the pension system itself’ (Lamping and Rub 2004: 177). 
Although pension levels still varied according to individual contribution records, the 
overall level o f pensions did not longer correspond to the value o f contributions paid in, 
but instead to a pre-defined benefit level. This ‘cybernetic self-regulation mechanism’ 
(Lamping and Rub 2004: 178) meant that the concept of (external) reciprocity lost 
importance.
After 1992 the GRV carriers and the ministry for labour and social affairs insisted 
continuously that a further reduction in the pension level would not be necessary (see 
Nullmeier and Rub 1994). However, another reform became inevitable as financial 
projections worsened drastically. With the 1999 Pension Reform Act, a so-called 
demographic factor was introduced in the pension formula: in accounting for the 
increase in the life expectancy, it was intended to produce a gradual decline of the 
pension level from 70 percent of average net earnings in 1997 to 64 percent in 2030 
(Schmahl 1999).
This again shows that while there existed an internal differentiation of pensions 
according to contribution records, i.e., an ‘internal reciprocity’, this differentiation took 
place on a declining overall level. Economic, social and demographic factors now 
increasingly played a role in the overall level o f pensions, and less the equivalence
73A Standard Pension Level ( ‘Eckrentennrveau') is defined as numerical proportion o f a net pension 
based on 45 insurance years with average wages compared to the effective net average wage.
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between contributions and pension payments according to either wage or inflation 
development. This drastically reduced the degree of fiscal commitment. But as Lamping 
and Rub (2004) point out, the linkage of the pension development to these changes also 
backfired for the government insofar as it displayed a new visibility o f economic and 
political changes within pension politics (see also Nullmeier and Riib 1993: 63-6). 
Perversely, the new adaptation mechanism now abolished incentives of reducing 
contribution rates in other insurance sectors: lower contribution rates resulted in higher 
net wages, which then led to increased pension payments.
In 1998, the new Red-Green government abolished the ‘demographic factor’ after it 
took over power, fulfilling its election campaign promise. But facing the same fiscal 
pressures and negative prognoses for the future development o f pension spending as its 
predecessor, it was forced to also implement cost-containing reforms. With the Budget 
Recapitalisation Act it was decided that the indexation of pensions in 2000 and 2001 
would not follow the development of net wages, but only the changes o f prices. In 2001, 
further major changes were introduced in line with the major goal o f stabilising the 
contribution rate and to reduce the federal subsidy. In contrast to initial plans by Labour 
Minister Walter Riester to introduce a minimum pension and to make a private pension 
obligatory, which were fiercely opposed by both the trade unions, the pension insurance 
carriers and the CDU/CSU opposition, his new plans -  which the CDU failed to block 
in the Bundesrat -  were less far-reaching. The pension adjustment according to inflation 
was abolished and wages became again the reference indicator. But in contrast to former 
years, indexation did not follow the development o f the average net wages directly. 
Instead, it now followed the development of the gross wage bill per average employee 
in the previous year to the then previous year, which was then multiplied with a factor 
for the development o f the pension contribution rate. This meant that the fateful linkage 
between the development of tax and contribution rates and pension adjustment was 
abolished, and pension policy was again decoupled from other policy areas.
With these changes, the level of the standard pension was expected to decrease from 70 
percent to 67 percent o f average net earnings. Original plans o f the government to 
reduce the level even further (to 64 percent -  exactly the level which would have 
resulted from the two years ago abolished ‘demographic factor’) had failed, and the law 
now contained a guarantee that the level o f 67 percent was to be maintained (see VDR 
2001: 5). As a compensation for the lower replacement rates in the future, the reform
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strengthened fiscal incentives to take out additional funded pensions (‘Riester-Rente’).74 
But this again meant further reductions of the pension adjustment in the future, as from 
2003 onwards, the indexation of pensions was reduced in proportion to the -  assumed -  
increase o f the new private provision expenses (up to 4 percent in 2008). Although this 
additional pension was only voluntary, it was in this calculation treated as if  it was 
mandatory -  and this assumed amount was then taken into account for calculating 
pension adjustments. In doing so, a lower absolute level o f pensions led to a higher 
percentage in relation to average net earnings. As this figure was ‘a political construct 
and therefore to some extent ‘fictitious’ (Schmahl 2004: 175), the government had 
considerable scope in calculating its value according to political preferences -  “again a 
prime example o f low visibility policies” (Busemeyer 2005).
Besides these major changes to the annual adaptation regulations, the adaptation o f  
pension benefits has also been suspended for some years in the last decade due to the 
fiscal crisis in the pension funds. Furthermore, pensioners had to pay the contributions 
for the long-term care insurance themselves (formerly half o f those had been covered by 
the pension insurance carriers, see Table 5-10) which was another way o f indirectly 
cutting back pensions.
74 The unions were heavily opposed to this move, as they saw the danger o f an erosion o f the old system 
which also would strip them o f their powers and influence. The government therefore made concessions 
to the unions by also making occupational pensions more attractive and by including them in collective 
wage agreement, which granted the unions considerably more influence over this field o f provisions (see 
Schmahl 2004: 184; Busemeyer 2005: 585).
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Table 5-10 Development of Pension Adaptation and Contribution Charges
Year Pension Adaptation Health and Care Insurance
Contributions
West East Pensioners Insurance
1991 (1.1.) - 15.00 6.10 6.10
1991 (1.7.) 4.70 15.00 6.10 6.10
1992(1.1.) - 11.65 6.10 6.10
1992(1.7.) 2.87 12.73 6.25 6.25
1993 (1.1.) - 6.10 6.70 6.70
1993 (1.7.) 4.36 14.12 6.70 6.70
1994(1.1.) - 3.64 6.70 6.70
1994(1.7.) 3.39 3.45 6.70 6.70
1995 (1.1.) - 2.78 7.20 7.20
1995 (1.7.) 0.50 2.48 7.10 7.10
1996(1.1.) - 4.38 7.55 7.55
1996(1.7.) 0.95 1.21 7.55 7.55
1997 1.65 5.55 7.50 7.50
1998 0.44 0.98 7.65 7.65
1999 1.34 2.79 7.60 7.60
2000 0.60 0.60 7.60 7.60
2001 1.91 2.11 7.60 7.60
2002 2.16 2.89 7.85 7.85
2003 1.04 1.19 8.00 8.00
2004 - - 8.85* 7.15
2005 (1.1.) - - 8.55 6.85
2005(1 .7 .) - - 9.00** (9.25)*** 6.40
Source: BMWA; BMG
* From 1.4.2004, the contribution share for the long-term care insurance covered by the pension 
insurance was abolished; from then onwards, it was to be covered solely by the insured.
* * Extra contribution o f  0,9% solely covered by insured
*** Extra 0.25% long-term care contribution for childless members
In line with these mainly short-term actions to contain expenditure, the Pension 
Insurance Sustainability Act 2005 implemented more long-term measures to cope with 
the financial constraints. The pension indexation formula was supplemented by a so- 
called 'sustainability factor ’, which took the changing ratio between pensioners and the 
number of contributors into account.75 This new factor was supposed to ensure that the 
annual adaptations of the actual pension value turned out to be smaller if the ratio 
between pensioners and contributors deteriorated. For the ‘standard’ pensioners, the 
modification of the adaptation formula meant a pension reduction of around 7 percent in 
2030 (see Kramer 2004). The former ‘pension level protection clause’ for the standard 
net pension level (67 percent) was abolished. Instead, a net pension level of 46 percent 
(until 2020) and 43 percent (until 2030) was defined as minimum protection level.
75 It was calculated by deducting the change o f the pensioner ratio in the previous year compared to the 
then previous year from the value 1, and this value was then multiplied by the parameter o f  0.25 and 
finally increased by the value 1. A protection clause avoided negative pension adaptations due to this 
factor, but allowed for zero adaptations.
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Two other changes implemented in 2005 also had a negative affect on future pension 
levels: firstly, the dynamic of pension adjustments followed in the future the gross wage 
bill liable to social security contributions, instead o f before the average wage bill of 
employees. This meant that the formerly considered wages o f employees above the 
contribution assessment ceiling were no longer taken into account, which reduced the 
relevant wage bill and therefore the pension adaptation. Besides those drastic changes 
which affected the degree of external reciprocity, there have also been a few smaller 
changes which have on the contrary increased the degree o f internal reciprocity by 
eliminating a series of non-core elements of the pension insurance scheme.77 While 
pension levels would therefore considerably deteriorate in the future, the eligibility for 
those benefits was tightened and increasingly restricted to those who paid into the 
system over a sufficient period o f time.
S.2.4.4 Conclusions: The Reduction of Future Spending Commitments
Since 1990, there have been two major changes in the logic o f pension provisions which 
already had and will have serious effects on future benefit levels. The introduction of a 
defined benefit level (70 percent) in 1992 represented a first move away from the strict 
equivalence between the value of contribution payments and the value o f pension 
benefits, that is, a move away from the logic that pensioners should equally benefit from 
the economic development. The 2001 reforms had even stronger implications, as the 
goal o f contribution rate stability and therefore the concept o f a revenue-oriented 
expenditure policy became decisive for GRV reforms. While the reduction o f the future 
replacement level to 67 percent was still quite modest, the 2005 changes to the 
adaptation formula had more drastic effects. Overall, the standard net pension level to 
be achieved in the long term deteriorated from 70 percent in 1992 to 43 percent in 2005, 
which will drastically reduce the degree of fiscal commitment in the future:
“There was (and still is) a widespread myth that German pensions are calculated on the
basis o f a strict equivalence between contributions and pensions, normatively termed the 
‘insurance principle’. This myth had been part o f the political semantics o f the German 
welfare state that worked as a self-interpretation o f the pension policy. Like all myths, it 
was astonishingly resistant to the truth. But policymakers and younger generations are now
76 The average wage bill o f employees is calculated without civil servants and inclusive of
unemployment benefit recipients.
77 In 1997, the Growth and Employment Promotion Act reduced the level o f transition benefits 
( Ubergangsgeld). The Old Age Assets Supplementation Act o f 2001 reduced the pensions for surviving 
dependants. Furthermore, now all sources o f income were taken into account for the calculation of 
eligibility: the reaching o f an income limit resulted in reductions o f pension benefits or even non­
eligibility. Besides this, the duration o f the ‘small widowers pension’ was limited to two years.
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challenged by a bitter but obvious truth: increasing contributions to the pension system go 
hand in hand with decreasing pension benefits” (Lamping and Rttb 2004: 177).
The answer to the introductory question whether German first-pillar pensions are 
‘still for certain’ is therefore clearly no.
But in contrast to the strong reduction o f overall pension levels which would take effect 
in the medium and long term, the majority o f reforms in pension provision left the 
strong internal reciprocity of the system untouched or even reinforced it. This had been 
an explicit goal by the government: “Savings in the pension insurance have to follow 
the goal to strengthen the insurance principle and therefore the principle of the wage and 
contribution-relatedness of the pensions” (Deutscher Bundestag 2000; see also Schmahl 
2001). This strengthening of the insurance principle had been mainly implemented 
through the abolition of special regulations for various social groups (women, 
unemployed, disabled) and the harmonisation of their retirement conditions with the 
general regulations of an old-age pension.
The introduction of the subsidised private pension pillar did, however, not seem to 
represent, as Lamping and Rub (2004: 170) argue, a ‘pioneering law’, which would 
over time alter ‘substantially both the institutional logic and the perception of the 
actors’. Due to its voluntary character, its volume remained only marginal compared to 
the first-pillar provisions. The avoiding o f future commitments due to the reduction of 
pension levels therefore did not go along with a systematic shift of this commitment 
into the second or third pillars of pension provision, but instead the responsibility for 
securing sufficient income in old age was left to the individual households.
5.3 Common Patterns and Differences in the French and 
German Pension Reforms
The previous sections of this chapter have analysed the reform developments in the 
main French and German pension insurance schemes between 1990 and 2005 separately 
for the effects these reforms had on the four dimensions o f fiscal commitment. It has 
been demonstrated that the increasing fiscal pressures prevalent during this period 
combined with the negative demographic prediction, which would increase these 
pressures further in the future, resulted in a large number and variety of adaptation
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processes in both countries and all analysed pension schemes. As the contrasting o f the 
commitment scores in the individual schemes in 1990 and 2005 has shown (see Table 4- 
10), fiscal commitment has been most strongly reduced in the French first-pillar scheme 
(-4), and to a lesser degree in the German GKV (-2). In contrast, the French second- 
pillar schemes ARRCO and AGIRC have maintained their high degree of fiscal 
commitment during the same period. Looking back at the open questions outlined at the 
beginning o f the chapter which followed from this observation, what can we conclude 
from this more in-depth analysis of the reform processes?
(1) To what extent did the differences in the overall commitment scores between the 
schemes, but also the differences on the individual dimensions matter fo r future reforms 
in times o f  fiscal pressures? Contrasting the developments in the German GRV with 
those in the French first-pillar pension scheme CNAV and the supplementary schemes 
ARRCO and AGIRC, it seems that a high degree o f administrative independence (as in 
both the GRV and the French second-pillar schemes) did indeed make intrusions into 
the self-administration powers of the social partners very difficult. Attempts to limit 
managerial authorities by the social partners or to make decisions subject to 
governmental approval met fierce opposition by both unions and employer associations 
and were subsequently abandoned. In contrast, the already stronger state influence in the 
first-pillar French scheme CNAV represented a gateway for further reductions of this 
independence.
The effect o f fiscal commitment on the budgetary dimension seems more complex: 
fiscal commitment on this dimension had in 1990 only been medium high in the first- 
pillar schemes in both France and Germany -  while both schemes enjoyed formal 
budget autonomy, the state retained the decisionmaking power over all important 
budgetary parameters. But budgetary constraints in both schemes were limited due to 
the final responsibility o f the state for deficits, which reduced pressures to contain 
spending for the administrators of the schemes. However, their possibilities to contain 
spending were in any case very restricted as expenditure was based on legal 
entitlements by the claimants.
In Germany, the formal budgetary autonomy of the schemes was sustained due to 
common resistance by the social partners against attempts by the government to gain 
influence. Regarding the allocation of funds, the increased automatisation of the
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development o f contribution rates, federal subsidies and pension adaptation detached 
this process further from political debates, which increased fiscal commitment. But the 
loss of decisionmaking scope led policymakers to look for other ways to solve financial 
problems in order to avoid unpopular spending cuts or contribution rate increases. One 
way of doing so was to make additional revenues available without burdening the 
federal budget, which resulted in a dramatic reduction of the fluctuation reserve o f the 
GRV. The parallel abolition of the federal guarantee for occurring deficits, which meant 
a shift o f financial responsibilities away from the state to the insurance carriers, made 
the fiscal situation o f the GRV extremely volatile and increased fiscal constraints for the 
scheme. Overall, the degree of budgetary autonomy for the GRV remained medium 
high.
In contrast, fiscal commitment on the budgetary dimension has been further reduced in 
the French CNAV: not only regarding the determination o f pension insurance revenues, 
but also regarding the determination o f spending the French state gained formal 
influence mainly due to the voting of a social security budget since 1996. But the effects 
on fiscal commitment were not very strong: due to the very restricted powers of 
parliament and open-ended spending in the pension schemes, the voting of the social 
security budget did not have constraining effects on pension expenditure. The peculiar 
situation of the insurance carriers having formal responsibility for deficits, but no means 
to avoid those, was not tackled with the reforms during the observed period. But the 
maintenance of the formal separation of the insurance budgets and deficits from the 
government accounts created incentives and opportunities for the government to shift 
future fiscal responsibilities to the Regime General in order to have fiscal short-term 
gains for its own budget.
The much clearer budgetary authorities in the case o f ARRCO and AGIRC, which 
entirely rested with the social partners, were not affected by changes during the 
observed period. Through changes in the financing of early retirement regulations, the 
supplementary schemes did indeed further expand their budgetary autonomy and 
financial self-determination powers. But the high degree o f fiscal constraints due to the 
absence of any external deficit coverage mechanism had its effect during periods of 
financial difficulties and led to both adaptations on the revenue as well as spending side.
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Regarding the revenue structure o f the pension schemes, fiscal commitment has been 
reduced in both first-pillar schemes due to an increasing dependence from tax subsidies. 
A particular aspect o f this increasing tax financing o f the CNAV in France was the fact 
that most taxes were not directly assigned to the social insurance carriers, but were 
channelled to them via financing funds. This fund-financing drastically decreased the 
revenue stability for the insurance schemes, as financing sources and payments were 
continuously adapted. The comprehensive transfer system between different pension 
insurance carriers also had negative implications for the degree o f fiscal commitment in 
the CNAV, as the central state made use o f it to reduce its own subsidy payments.
The development in the German GRV has been very similar on this dimension: the 
continuously increasing revenue share of federal tax funds in the GRV meant that the 
institution became increasingly dependent on non-contributory revenues, which 
increased the influence of the central government and reduced fiscal commitment. 
Furthermore, the structure and financing o f the federal subsidy had since 1990 become 
more and more fragmented and opaque. This furthermore reduced the degree o f fiscal 
commitment, as it created various levers for the government to adapt the funding 
situation o f the GRV. As in the French case, existing transfer mechanisms led to the 
shifting o f deficit coverage obligations by the federal state to the pension insurance 
carrier. Although after 1990 also a transfer mechanism between the French 
supplementary schemes was introduced, the social partners as regulators of the scheme 
were keen on reducing financial interdependencies with other insurance schemes. By 
increasing revenues for the system via contribution increases, they secured the financial 
independence of the scheme from state subsidies, which meant that the high degree o f  
fiscal commitment on this dimension could be maintained despite temporary financial 
difficulties.
The degree of fiscal commitment on the spending dimension, which has been high for 
all three pension insurance schemes, has been maintained. This corresponds to the logic 
of blame avoidance (Weaver 1986; Pierson 1996; Ross 2000), which essentially states 
that politicians will refrain from cutting back programmes which enjoy a high degree o f  
popular support. Due to both the strong public support for the maintenance of the link 
between contribution payments and benefit entitlements (as signalled through public 
protests against reform plans which took the form of widespread strike action in 
France), but also due to high legal transaction costs associated with the attack on benefit
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entitlements, the degree of internal reciprocity in the pension schemes has been further 
strengthened while overall benefit levels will deteriorate considerably in the future. Due 
to the fact that the supplementary French schemes followed a defined contribution 
principle, the reduction of future benefit levels was already built into the benefit 
formula. But in both countries, the future reduction of old-age income provided by the 
public pension schemes has not been accompanied by a comprehensive strengthening of  
a private, third-pillar provision. This has in both cases been mainly a consequence o f  
strong resistance by the social partners -  particularly the unions - ,  who were successful 
in pushing through a further promotion of occupational schemes instead, which secured 
them a role in pension provision outside the public schemes.
(2) What have been the predominant modes o f  change and what are the implications o f  
reforms for the degree o f fiscal commitment in the future? Instead of attacking existing 
spending commitments, reforms across all schemes have -  despite already existing 
acute financing problems -  mainly focused on avoiding spending commitments in the 
future. While the formal independence o f the schemes has in none o f the cases been 
attacked, the already restricted managerial independence has offered a gateway for a 
further restraining of independent decisionmaking powers. The only dimension on 
which the breaking of commitments can be observed is the revenue dimension: while 
the breaking of commitment on the spending dimension -  very visible to the 
stakeholders o f the schemes -  has been avoided, revenues of both the GRV and the 
CNAV have been re-channelled to other insurance schemes with financial problems, 
which represented a less visible, but no less important case o f ‘delayed’ commitment- 
breaking. This was the case as due to these measures the independent financial basis of  
the insurance schemes was reduced, which increase pressures for cost containment 
measures and will very likely result in benefit cuts for the insured of GRV and CNAV 
at some point in the future.
(3) What role did the social partners and their relationship with the state play in the 
reforms? The different developments between the French first-pillar and second-pillar 
schemes in terms of revenue structure and budgetary authority (in the case o f the latter 
commitment was maintained, in the case of the former reduced) are good examples 
illustrating the dilemma the social partners as administrators of the schemes face in 
times of financial pressures: on the one hand, they have an interest in protecting their 
own budgets against the involvement o f the finance minister in order to maintain their
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budgetary independence (see Nullmeier 1992; Richter 2001). On the other hand, they 
also have an interest in increasing revenues for the institutions administered by them in 
order to avoid benefit cuts for their insured, and also to ensure the future of their 
institution (and, accordingly, their influence). In the case o f the first-pillar schemes in 
both France and Germany, the social partners chose the second option and demanded 
further subsidies for the schemes, although this meant a further dependence on the 
government. But in the French case this resulted ultimately in harsh conflicts between 
employers and the French state, as the latter made extensive use o f its revenue- 
determining powers to the disadvantage of the social insurance schemes. While the 
employers were willing to risk their role in the administration o f the scheme and pressed 
for a clarification o f budgetary authorities between insurance schemes and the 
government, the unions showed more office-seeking behaviour. Although they 
supported the employers in demands for a more stable revenue basis for the insurance 
scheme, they were reluctant to endanger their role in the system. In Germany, the 
increasing participation of the federal government in the financing of pension benefits 
also went along with demands for more budgetary powers. Similar to France, this 
resulted in common resistance by the social partners. But again, this coalition between 
employer and employee representatives had quite different motivations as they 
anticipated different consequences o f the proposed changes: while the employers feared 
further attempts by the government to use the insurance budgets for its own fiscal 
benefits, the unions feared further benefit cuts.
In contrast to the increase o f tax financing and the connected increase of state influence 
in the German and French first-pillar schemes, the administrators o f the French second- 
pillar schemes were keen to avoid any budgetary links with the central state or other 
insurance schemes, but had as a result to dea 1 with the consequences of financial 
pressures themselves. This forced them to pursue unpopular contribution increases and 
benefit reductions. But it seems that blame-avoidance arguments even have validity in 
this example, as the social partners were keen to hide those benefit cuts as much as they 
possibly could, for example through the increase o f the gap between ‘contractual* and 
‘applied* contribution rates instead o f direct benefit cuts.
(4) Is there evidence that the French governments focused more strongly on cost 
containment than the German ones? While institutionally the position o f the French 
finance minister is said to be more dominating in political decisionmaking processes
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than in Germany, also in the case of the latter the aim of cost containment in the welfare 
state became a central issue after 1991 not only for the finance minister, but for the 
whole government. But a stronger orientation towards cost containment did not always 
prove successful in welfare reform processes: in order to push through more 
comprehensive pension reforms, Chancellor Schroder detached decisionmaking 
processes as far as possible from the corporatist pension policy network, and the 
influence o f the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was restricted by centralising 
decisionmaking power in the chancellery (see Der Spiegel, 29 January 2001; Lamping 
and Rub 2004: 187; Busemeyer 2005: 584). In 1996, the French Prime Minister Alain 
Juppe had tried to do the same and prepared its plans of a public pension scheme reform 
without consultation o f the social partners and in strong co-operation with the finance 
ministry. But in both cases, this strategy of pushing through reforms completely 
backfired due to the resulting resistance o f the social partners, and future reforms 
followed a more consensus-oriented bargaining approach (see Vail 1999: 319). It seems 
that an overall stronger position of the finance ministry in reform decisionmaking 
processes is irrelevant if  this causes the unified resistance o f the social partners, since 
they have considerable possibilities to block reforms if  they can agree on common 
policy positions. This strengthens institutionalist arguments that “devolved forms o f  
social administration have a significantly tempering, if  not always completely 
paralysing, influence on social security reform (Crouch 1999)” (Clasen and Clegg 2003: 
375).
Furthermore, the assumption that the finance minister has a general interest in 
containing spending and should therefore push for more cost containment in social 
insurance schemes if he or she has a strong position in the budgetary allocation process 
needs to be put into perspective: while this assumption might apply to the federal or 
central state budget, reforms in the pension sector in both countries have often rather 
worsened than improved the financial situation of the schemes. In line with arguments 
from the literature about fiscal federalism (see Ter-Minassian 1997; Oates 2005), the 
arguments about finance minister strength therefore need to be put into perspective with 
regard to the specific budgetary connection o f insurance schemes with the government 
budget.
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Conclusions
The results o f the in-depth analysis o f pension insurance developments strengthen 
institutional lock-in arguments insofar as high degrees o f commitment in pension 
insurance schemes seem to indeed provide effective barriers against successive 
reductions of this fiscal commitment in times o f financial pressures. But the analysis o f 
the developments on the individual dimensions of fiscal commitment has also provided 
first insights into the question why a straightforward relationship between high degrees 
of commitment and low degrees o f cost-containment reforms could not be observed 
equally on all dimensions (that is, the budgetary and revenue dimensions): whereas high 
degrees of commitment do make it generally more difficult to reduce commitment on all 
dimensions, the degree to which (a) retrenchment advocates target commitment on the 
different dimensions, and (b) the degree to which the social partners defend 
commitment on the different dimensions, differs.
Commitment on the revenue dimension of the schemes was often reduced despite high 
or very high degrees o f commitment due to ambiguous position of the social partners -  
tom between their interest to maintain financial independence of the schemes, and their 
interest to receive more revenues. In both first-pillar schemes the social partners lacked 
the necessary authority to impose spending reductions or to reduce contribution 
revenues themselves, which often made demands for federal subsidies the only available 
option to react to financial difficulties. A reduction o f fiscal commitment on this 
dimension then often resulted in attempts by the government to also gain more 
budgetary authority. In contrast, there have been no attempts to directly challenge the 
formal self-administration structure of each o f the observed schemes (but a lower degree 
of managerial independence in the CNAV has enabled the government to further expand 
its powers in this respect). Despite various reforms o f the benefit regulations in both 
countries, existing commitments have been maintained also on the spending dimension 
of all three analysed schemes. Here it seems that the intention to avoid blame has 
shaped the content of these reforms considerably -  regardless o f whether the social 
partners (ARRCO/AGIRC) or the government (GRV or CNAV) had decisionmaking 
authority. All decisionmakers made changes to the benefit regulations as invisible as 
possible, which resulted in more tightening and avoiding than the breaking of 
commitments. In practice this meant a strengthening o f the insurance principle and 
concentration of resources on long-term contribution payers, combined with a strong 
reduction of pension levels for future generations.
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Overall, these results neither directly confirm the institutional lock-in arguments o f  
Hypotheses 1, nor do they confirm the hypotheses that due to different corporatist 
relationships in the two countries and different strength o f retrenchment advocates in 
government we should see stronger cost containment in France. Instead, the results o f  
the pension reform developments indicate that those actor-centred factors are strongly 
influenced by institutional factors of the individual insurance schemes, and that - vice 
versa -  the development of fiscal commitment on the individual dimensions is also 
dependent on the motivations of the involved actors to challenge or defend these 
commitments. The findings furthermore confirm the hypothesis that partisanship factors 
did not play a decisive role in times of strong financial pressures: while in both France 
and Germany reform measures introduced by the conservative governments in the first 
half of the 1990s were partly reversed after the election victories o f the left-wing parties 
in 1997 and 1998, all cost-containment measures were successively reintroduced and 
even intensified in the face of increasing budget deficits.
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6 Regaining Fiscal Control: Welfare Reforms in the 
Health Sector
The health sector has -  due to a combination of demographic developments, the 
advancement o f medical treatments and in many countries problems to avoid cost 
inflation and to control supply (Giaimo 2001) -  been one o f the main expenditure 
growth sectors since the 1970s. This ‘cost explosion’ has been often made responsible 
for the increasing difficulties of mature European welfare states to finance their 
healthcare bills. But the term ‘cost explosion’ is insofar incorrect as in most cases not 
above-average expenditure growth rates, but rather an erosion o f revenues led to 
financing difficulties (see Braun et al. 1998; Alber 1998). Nevertheless, public health 
expenditure has been growing faster than the GDP in all OECD countries (except 
Finland) between 1990 and 2004: its share o f the GDP rose from 7 percent in 1990 to 
8.9 percent in 2004. This has also been the case for Germany (1990: 8.3%; 2003: 
10.9%) and France (1990: 8.2%; 2004: 10.5%).78
Pressures to consolidate health spending have similarly increased in both countries, as 
deficits in this insurance sector were growing rapidly after 1990 (see Graphs 1.2 and 
1.2). The following analysis investigates how the two countries have dealt with these 
financial pressures in the period between 1990 and 2Q05, taking into account the 
different fiscal commitment scores of the health insurance schemes in 1990 (13 out o f 
20 in the case of the main French health insurance scheme CNAMTS, and 16 in the case 
of the German Statutory Health Insurance). The reason for the overall higher score for 
the German scheme has been a higher degree of both administrative independence and 
budgetary autonomy than in the French scheme. As the previous chapter on the pension 
sector, this chapter analyses the effect of the degrees of fiscal commitment on the four 
dimensions for successive reform paths in the health insurance schemes, and focuses on 
the particular modes of change visible as well as the role played by the social partners 
and different governmental actors in the reform processes.
78 Data Source: OECD Health Data 2006
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6.1 Lacking Commitment: Health Reforms in France
6.1.1 Administrative Independence
In 1990, the administrative structure o f the dominant French health insurance scheme 
CNAM corresponded to the one o f the pension insurance scheme CNAV, as both 
schemes were part o f the Regime General. The existence o f a formally independent, bi­
partite governing board, combined with a high degree o f state intervention and control 
powers, created a medium high degree of administrative independence.
5
During the following years, the managerial independence o f the social partners was 
further reduced. The 1996 reforms affecting the governance structure o f the national 
funds in the Regime General also applied to the CNAM: besides reintroducing equal 
representation o f the social partners, the government increased its direct control powers 
in the administration of the social insurance institutions by appointing board members 
directly and attempted to exercise stricter control o f internal administration processes 
through the Objective and Management Agreements. But reforms went much further in 
the health insurance than in the pension sector, and the discretionary co-management 
system was replaced by a much tighter regulatory framework under control by the state 
(see Bellanger and Mosse 2000; Sandier et al. 2004). A main aspect o f the reform 
process was the regionalisation of the organisation, management and control o f the 
health insurance system. In this context, the 1996 reform directly affected the basic 
institutional framework o f the health insurance branch o f the Regime General, since its 
introduction in 1967 a pyramidal structure (see Figure 6-1).
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Figure 6-1 Administrative Structure Regime General
National
Regional
Local
Administrative Institutions
UCANSS: Union of National Social Security
CNAF:
National
Family
Allowance
Fund
CNAV:
National
Old-Age
Insurance
Fund
CNAMTS:
National
Health
Insurance
Fund
URCAM*:
Regional 
Union of 
Health 
Insurance 
Funds
ACOSS:
Central
Agency of
Social
Security
Organisations
CRAM**:
Regional
Health
Insurance
Fund
CRAV
Alsace-
Moselle:
Regional
Old-Age
Insurance
Fund
CAF: 
Family 
Allowance 
Funds (4)
CPAM:
Primary
Health
Insurance
Funds
(129)
URSSAF:
Union for the 
collection of 
social security 
and family 
allowance 
contributions 
(105)
Note: not included are the four overseas CGSS’s (Caisse Generate de S6curit6 Sociale)
* introduced as part of institutional reform in 1996
** Although pension and health administration are separated on a national level, the pension administration on the 
regional level is executed by the regional health insurance funds.
In 1996, the Directorates of Health and Social Affairs in the Regions (DRASS) were 
given more responsibilities for hospital planning and hospital budget allocations. In 
addition, newly established Regional Hospital Agencies (ARHs) brought together the 
health services directly provided by the state and those of the health insurance funds, 
which previously shared management of this sector. The ARHs became responsible for 
hospital planning, the financial allocation to public hospitals and the setting of tariffs for 
private hospitals (within the framework of national agreements). Government control 
over the ARHs was considerable, as it appointed the directors which were also directly 
responsible to the minister of health. Furthermore, half of the members of the ARHs 
were state representatives. Compared to the previous shared management of the sector, 
the government therefore considerably extended its control powers.
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The primary funds o f the Regime General were gathered around a new institution, the 
Regional Union o f Health Insurance Funds (Union Regionale des Caisses d  ’Assurance 
Maladie, URCAM), which monitored ambulatory care expenditure. The social partners 
therefore again lost independence, as also these new institutions were dominated by 
state representatives. In relation to the ARHs, whose role was operational, the function 
o f the 22 URCAMs was to secure co-operation (between the funds on the regional level 
as well as between the different health insurance schemes) and to enforce expenditure 
reductions. Their role in this respect was further strengthened in a new governance 
framework introduced in 2004: each URCAM was now committed vis-a-vis the new 
National Union of Sickness Insurance Funds (Union nationale des caisses d ‘assurance 
maladie, UNCAM) to quantitative objectives of improving the efficiency of healthcare 
provision. The foundation of UNCAM was the most important of the four new national 
representative bodies established in 2004, whose purpose was to improve co-ordination 
between the different health sectors and organisational levels, but also to improve
70control over spending. In contrast, the rather weak system of ex-post control of the 
health insurance scheme has not been changed since 1990.80
The social partners had to share administrative and bargaining powers with state 
representatives to an even greater degree than they already used to in 1990. Overall, the 
government had moved from being one o f many players in the system to being “the 
central figure shaping the provision of the system” (Bode and Veil 2003: 35). This loss 
of administrative independence led -  not surprisingly -  to major conflicts between the 
social partners and the government. Discrepancies also erupted between the social 
partners themselves which had very different positions regarding the appropriate 
strategies to react to the increasing state involvement. The unions could rarely agree on 
a common position and some of them acted increasingly as ‘internal opposition’ (Bode 
2002: 44). While the socialist FO had traditionally provided the chairperson o f the 
CNAM administrative committee, this tradition ended in 1996 due to the reintroduction
79 In order to improve co-ordination on the national level, two other bodies - the National Union o f  
Supplementary Health Insurance Bodies (Union nationale des organismes d ‘assurance maladie 
complementaires) as well as the National Association o f Healthcare Professionals (Union nationale des 
professionnels de sante) - were set up.
0 In 1990, the system o f ex-post control had been executed by three public authorities: The Inspection 
generate des affaires sociales (IGAS) exercised control over the internal operations o f all social security 
services but it had no direct intervention powers. Similarly, the Inspection Generate des Finances (IGF) -  
which specialised in the financial control o f the organisations o f social security -  issued 
recommendations, but final decisions were taken by the Ministry o f Finance. Finally, the Auditors Court 
(Cour des Comptes) controlled the accounts of all social insurance schemes. Also this institution did not 
have any sanctioning authority, but merely issued recommendations.
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o f parity, and a new dominating coalition between the more moderate CFDT (who since 
1996 provided the chairperson), CGC, CFTC, FNMF and the employer representatives 
developed (Bandelow 2005).
In September 2001, the employer representatives withdrew not only from the boards of 
the pension, but also o f the health insurance funds after the conflict with the government 
had culminated with the debate about the financing o f the 35-hours work week (see 
Chapter 5). Efforts by the employers to strike a deal with more moderate unions (the 
CFDT and CFTC) in order to create a common opposition against the further state 
involvement and to exit from the committees together were not successful. In 2004, the 
employer representatives returned into the administration o f the health insurance funds 
by nominating representatives for the newly established UNCAM. One reason for their 
return was the fact that they now had a much stronger voice in the committees than they 
had in the CNAM.81 But while the employers strengthened their position vis-a-vis the 
unions, the introduction of the UNCAM also strengthened the position o f the 
government, as the general director of the UNCAM was the president of the CNAM -  
and this person was, as outlined above, since 1996 nominated directly by the ministry of 
health.
Parallel to their (conditional) return into the self-administration, the French employers 
also repeatedly pushed for the transfer of health provisions to private providers and for 
the introduction of stronger competition. MEDEF suggested to their self-administration 
partner CFDT at the end of 2000 to develop an initiative for introducing insurance fund 
competition, but the union rejected this idea. After the employer representatives 
rejoined the self-administration boards in 2004, they repeated their demands for a 
privatisation of the system, but still failed to gain enough political support for this 
proposal.
While overall, the basic self-administration structure o f the CNAM has been maintained 
during the observed period, the degree of independence o f the administrators has been 
further reduced to a low level -  both via changes within the self-administration bodies 
but also via the introduction of new institutions under much more direct state control. 
This has connectedly also reduced commitment not only towards future spending, but
81 In the CNAM, the Mutuality was represented with three voices besides 13 voices each for employers 
and employees; in the UNCAM, the Mutuality was not represented, which gave employer representatives 
50% of the votes and therefore veto power.
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also towards the maintenance of the scheme itself by its administrators and in particular 
the employer representatives.
6.1.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
6.1.2.1 Budgetary Autonomy
The analysis o f budgetary decisionmaking authorities in the French social insurance 
schemes in 1990 has shown that the French state had considerable influence on the 
health insurance budgets: despite the fact that the CNAM had formal budgetary 
autonomy, most o f the structural or resource-related decisions were subject to 
ministerial regulation and control -  either ex post via necessary approvals as in the 
ambulatory sector, or upfront via decree as in the hospital and pharmaceutical sector 
(Dohler and Hassenteufel 1995; Bode 2002). The budget autonomy o f the insurance 
funds was therefore in practice reduced to approving externally pre-determined revenue 
and spending decisions.
The health insurance carriers retained their formal budgetary autonomy in the 
successive years, but lost influence regarding the determination of revenues: in line with 
the 1996 reforms which introduced the annual Social Security Financing Law, the 
French parliament not only gained powers in defining spending targets for all 
mandatory basic schemes, but also gained influence in determining the resources 
available to the S6curit6 Sociale. The legislator now set objectives for the solvency of 
the social security schemes, provided different types o f revenues to fund the mandatory 
basic schemes and also decided about the contribution rates -  a power originally 
exercised by the government departments. The government also increased its control 
over health insurance funding with the increasing replacement o f health contribution 
payments with the Contribution Sociale Generalisee (CSG) after 1991, a tax on wages 
earmarked for social security (see 6.1.3 for details). Although many unions repeatedly 
demanded that the CSG should be clearly labelled as insurance contribution, it did not 
lose its status as a general income tax and therefore remained part o f the general 
revenue fund exclusively controlled by the government. This was also the reason why 
the ministry of finance, once opposed to the CSG out of macroeconomic reasons, finally 
supported it: while the government had no control over the assignment o f contribution 
payments as they were paid to the insurance funds directly, it was in direct control over 
the assignment o f the CSG revenues to the different insurance schemes. The 
government had therefore regained control over a considerable share of the social
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budget (see Kato 2003: 105ff.). Together with the far-reaching authority o f the 
government regarding the determination of spending parameters, the degree of 
budgetary autonomy of the CNAM was overall reduced to a low level.
6.1.2.2 Budgetary Constraints
Despite the fact however that the state retained and even expanded its decisionmaking 
power over all relevant revenue and spending parameters, this gave it only limited 
effective control over the amount o f health spending. In contrast to the pension 
insurance, where the government decided about the rules o f how entitlements translated 
into benefits, the quantity of healthcare supplied as well as the remunerations paid for 
health services were largely beyond its control. This uncontrollability o f health 
expenditure was facilitated by the very structure o f the French healthcare system, which 
was characterised by unrestricted freedom of choice for the patients, fee-for-service 
payments for doctors and retroactive reimbursements by the insurance funds (see 
Huteau 2001; Sandier et al. 2004). The responsibilities between the state and the health 
insurance funds were basically divided between sectors: while the state was responsible 
for most aspects of public hospitals and the provision o f drugs, the health insurance 
funds were widely in charge o f the independent, ambulatory sector on the basis of 
contracts with service providers. Bargains about those contracts took place on a national 
level between the insurance funds and the health professional organisations. The 
government formally only oversaw this process and approved it in the end, but often 
exerted considerable influence on the outcomes in informal pre-bargains with the 
provider associations (see Bode 2002; Bandelow 2005). This practice created a medium 
high degree o f fiscal constraints in 1990.
Fiscal reforms during the following years were -  besides efforts to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency through better regional co-operation -  focused on 
increasing fiscal constraints mainly on the supply side. The only true economic 
constraint until the early 1990s had been the global budget system for public hospitals, 
which had replaced per diem rates in 1984. But after 1990, expenditure caps were 
introduced in all sectors and the overall control over spending was strengthened. From 
1996 onwards, parliament voted an Annual National Ceiling for Health Insurance 
Expenditure (ONDAM). All formerly existing expenditure frameworks had been 
subsumed under this new ceiling, which was based on reports o f the Auditors Court and 
the National Health Conference. But as parliament itself did not dispose o f sufficient
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professional knowledge to determine these expenditure ceilings, it was in fact the 
government which decided about the spending limits (Hassenteufel and Palier 2005). It 
was also the ministry of health which was now responsible for dividing the budgetary 
expenditure between the different sectors and, where hospitals were concerned, between 
the different regions. Furthermore, it set the prices of specific medical procedures and 
drugs and also engaged directly in the supply control (see Hassenteufel 1997). The 
government therefore gained considerable direct allocation powers, further reducing the 
powers o f the health insurance carrier CNAM.
Particularly in the hospital sector, which was already widely under state control, the 
government attempted to further increase spending constraints. It defined a separate 
budget for the sector after parliament decided about the ONDAM, and also the budget 
for private hospitals was now subject to an annual maximum target set by the ministry 
of health -  which, after 1999, was no longer negotiated but unilaterally imposed. But 
the capped budget system did not have the intended effect, as it did not provide 
incentives to improve the efficiency o f health provisions.82 In the case o f private 
hospitals, the payment system led them to specialise in those treatment areas where the 
difference between the fee schedule and costs were widest. As a consequence, the 
ministry of health introduced a new financing method in 2002 (Le plan Hopital 2007) 
which progressively moved the system from capped budgets towards pricing based on 
activity (Tariflcation a I ’activite or T2A; see OECD 2005).
But efforts to expand financial control also focused on the ambulatory sector: in 1993, 
the French government attempted to change from an open-end reimbursement system to 
a system of prior spending agreements (see Bellanger and Mosse 2000). It decided to 
force the medical professions and the health insurance funds to agree so-called ‘Medical 
Care Agreements’ (Conventions Medicates) that contained quantified national spending 
targets for overall healthcare spending and practitioners remunerations. Applying an 
“apparent consultation and divide-and-rule strategy” (Vail 1999: 316), the strategy of 
the reforms promoted by prime minister Balladur was to breach the unity o f the medical 
profession and to allow for more cost-saving individual bargains (see Sandier et al. 
2004: 13).83 In order to increase pressure on both sides to reach such agreements, the
82 Public hospitals became extremely constrained by excessive regulation and red tape: the appointment 
of a hospital doctor, for example, required the signature o f the national minister (OECD 2005: 74).
83 In an attempt to further reduce the freedom o f the ambulatory sector in providing services, medical 
practice guidelines (Reference Medicale Opposables, RMOs) were introduced. It was originally intended
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1995 Juppe plan established that the government could unilaterally impose regulations 
if  the insurance carriers and providers were not able to reach an agreement.
Within the framework o f the ONDAM, a separate budget was also decided for the 
ambulatory sector and a specific expenditure target was set for the self-employed 
healthcare professionals. The management o f this expenditure target was delegated to 
the health insurance funds, who were supposed to negotiate with the relevant health 
professionals how to meet this target. But after such an agreement could only be 
reached for 2000 and failed in other years due to the resistance o f the medical 
professions against a pre-defmed ceiling, the target was no longer defined from 2002 
onwards (see Sandier et al. 2004: 25). Also the previous introduction o f the Medical 
Care Agreements, to be negotiated between the insurance funds and the doctors 
representatives, proved ineffective: between 1996 and 2002, the Confederation of 
French Medical Unions (CSMF) did not sign a single agreement, and agreements with 
representatives o f particular medical professions were annulled by courts as the unions 
supporting them did not represent a sufficient number o f affected professionals.
A further attempt to clarify budgetary responsibilities between the state and the health 
insurance funds was made in 2000. According to the terms o f the Social Security 
Financing Law for 2001, the whole hospital sector was to be the responsibility o f the 
state, but in return the government delegated to CNAM the dual responsibility of 
regulating the fees charged by all self-employed healthcare professionals and 
negotiating with them target ceilings for expenditure. However, these negotiations only 
took place in 2001 and were, due to the inability o f the funds to reach stable agreements 
with the service providers, subsequently abandoned (Sandier et al. 2004: 11). The effect 
of the new regulations on cost containment had anyway been arguable: “New  
institutional arrangements by themselves will not change the nature of the economic 
incentives that in the past encouraged over-consumption and over-prescription” (OECD 
2000: 122). But a first step towards the breaking of the expenditure-increasing spiral 
resulting from the direct reimbursement of doctors was taken with the introduction of 
the CMU in 2000 (see 6.1.4): The law prescribed that all health professionals providing 
treatment under the CMU system had to work under a system of fixed fees (which was 
in the absence of agreements between health insurance funds and professionals set by
that non-compliance with the RMOs should result in financial penalties, but these penalties were opposed 
by the Conseil d’Etat and therefore not applied.
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the ministry of health). This step was heavily criticised by most doctors unions, which 
saw this as the first step towards a salary-based system.
Despite the considerable strengthening of the allocatory powers of the government, as 
well as the extensive use of fiscal targets in an attempt to limit spending, the effects of 
the reforms during the 1990s were limited: since its introduction, the overall health 
expenditure ceiling was exceeded every year which shows the rather ineffective nature 
of ONDAM (see Graph 6-1).
Graph 6-1 The Systematic Overrun of ONDAM
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The continuous overrun of the spending ceiling was also a consequence of the fact that 
ONDAM rather resembled a mere expenditure target instead of being an enforceable 
limit. Due to the continuing overspending, the calculation procedure was changed in 
2000: in its annual revision of the spending ceiling, parliament now based its 
calculations on the actual spending of the former year. This further weakened the 
already limited effect of ONDAM on spending levels -  many commentators saw this 
move therefore as a capitulation of the government in its effort to effectively restraining 
expenditure: “Cette acceptation des faits scelle la deconfiture d’une ambition 
irrealisable” (Les Echos, 16 Nov 2001).
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In 2004, a major health insurance reform introduced a new form of fiscal governance 
for the health insurance sector in order to improve financial discipline: all national 
health insurance funds were required to submit an 'estimated budget proposal' in the 
first half o f every year. A Health Insurance Spending Increase Watchdog (Comite 
d ’alerte sur revolution des depenses d ’assurance maladie) was made responsible for 
developing remedial measures when spending overran estimates by 1 percent or more. 
In return, the new National Union of Health Insurance Funds (UNCAM) became the 
authority in negotiating fee agreements with health professionals. In an attempt to shift 
expenditure control measures towards steering demand, all sickness insurance 
beneficiaries were now only eligible for standard user fees if they had a regular general 
practitioner which limited patients free choice.
A further factor which reduced the overall importance o f voting an expenditure target as 
part o f the LLFS was also tackled: in contrast to the state budget, the LLFS had no 
associated balance because the range of expenditure programmes (obligatory schemes) 
and revenues (all o f the schemes and funds that contribute to their financing) was not 
identical. As deficits therefore did not occur in the financing law, it accordingly did not 
contain measures to cope with these. From 2005 onwards parliament now voted on the 
balance o f the main sickness insurance schemes which was supposed to increase 
transparency of the financial situation o f those and to subsequently increase cost 
containment pressures (OECD 2005: 53). But one major reason for uncontrollable 
spending -  the system of mixed responsibilities between the government, the insurance
r\
carriers and the providers -  remained untackled.
Deficit Coverage:
Besides the allocation of resources and the degree o f enforceable fiscal target, the 
regulations o f deficit coverage play an important role in determining the degree o f fiscal 
constraints on spending. The deficit regulations for the Regime General in 1990 did not 
create incentives for the schemes to contain spending, and neither did the regulations 
regarding contribution and benefit legislation give them the competency to do so (see 
Chapter 3). Since then, the balance of the CNAM had continuously been negative (see 
Graph 6-2). After a short-term recovery between 1997 and 1999, the deficit in the 
following years grew larger than ever before which was a consequence o f increasing
i
expenditure (the volume of benefits increased by 7 percent in 2002, and expenditure in 
the ambulant sector by nearly 9 percent) on the one hand, and sinking contribution
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revenues on the other (the lowering of contribution rates for employers due to economic 
considerations were a burden for the insurance budgets, and in 2003 alone the decline in 
revenues amounted to 9 percent; see Bode and Veil 2003: 32).
Graph 6-2 Deficits of the CNAM 1990-2004
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the French government solved the increasing financial 
needs of the CNAM via instalments by the finance ministry (see Cour des Comptes 
1995: 90) and took over liabilities in 1993 amounting to €16.77 bn. As the deficit 
continued to grow over the following years, ACOSS (the financing body of the Regime 
General) took out considerable loans from the public Caisse des Depots. In order to 
refinance these loans as well as to refund the state for the liabilities it had taken on in 
1993, the government established a Social Debt Redemption Fund (Caisse 
d ’Amortissement de la Dette Sociale, CADES) in 1996. As an administrative public 
agency, CADES was a separate entity from the French state, but operated under its strict 
control.84 Every year until its planned abolition in 2005 -  when it was supposed to have 
accomplished its mission -  CADES was under the obligation to make a €3 bn payment 
to the state budget. The repayment of these funds was mainly financed via the 
Contribution au remboursement de la dette sociale (CRDS), a 0.5 percent charge levied 
on all income as well as capital gains introduced in 1996. But the government did not 
stick to its original plans to use CADES exclusively for the amortisation of the debts
84 CADES operated under the dual authority o f the Minister o f Economy, Finance and Industry and the 
Minister o f  Employment and Social Security, which appointed CADES senior managers and closely 
monitored their operations.
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which it had accumulated until 1996, but repeatedly shifted new liabilities into the 
institution.85 In addition, any surplus from the health insurance branch was allocated for 
its financing.
CADES did through these continuing assignments of new social security debt become 
“inseparable from efforts to balance the accounts of the French social security system” 
(Court des Comptes 2004: 143). As the Auditors Court pointed out, burdening the fund 
with these new debts was a contradiction o f the initial principle of creating a temporary 
institution. The transformation in a quasi-permanent institution that enabled the state to 
repeatedly transfer the social security debt without having to account for it in its own 
budget was counterproductive to efforts to bring the social insurance schemes into a 
financial equilibrium and to increase pressures for cost containment. The overall effect 
of the reforms in the observed period in terms o f cost containment has therefore 
remained limited.
6.1.3 Revenue Structure
As illustrated in Graph 5-2, tax revenues gained increasing importance in social 
insurance financing between 1990 and 2005. This was mainly related to the introduction 
and then continuous increase of the Contribution Sociale Generalisee (CSG), replacing 
health contribution payments by employees from 1991 onwards (see Appendix III). The 
CSG was introduced as a 1.1 percent tax on wages, accompanied by some reductions in 
contributions to the Regime General. Although once opposed by the Conservatives, the 
CSG was in the following years used extensively by both political camps and its rate 
was increased multiple times - in 2005, it stood at 7.5 percent (see Kato 2003). While 
the increase of the CSG in 1993 by 1.3 points had been a pure revenue-raising measure 
for the FSV, the replacement o f employees’ health contributions with the CSG in 1997 
was initially announced by Prime Minister Jospin as a zero-gum game. But in fact, it 
resulted in a net increase in revenues (see Kato 2003: 105). In 2004, the CSG generated 
€66.8 bn and constituted over 80 percent of the taxes assigned to the social budget 
(Source: DREES 2005b).86
85 A first reform in September 1997 extended the duration o f the fund by five years until 2014 in order to 
deal with the absorption o f the additional debts from the years 1996 and 1997 (in total amounting to €34.2 
bn between 1994 to 1998). In 2004, the Health Reform Act stipulated that the accumulated deficit in 2004 
(a total o f €35 bn), as well as the forecasted deficits for 2005 and 2006 (up to a maximum o f  €15 bn), 
would also be transferred to CADES.
86 While the majority o f CSG revenue was assigned to the CNAM, it also paid into the FSV, the Family 
Allowance Scheme and, since 2002, to the Financing Fund o f the Allocation Personnalis6e a 1’Autonomie.
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Although earmarked for social security purposes, the CSG had the legal status o f an 
income tax levied on all types o f earnings. It was therefore a ‘hybrid’ deduction, neither 
traditional social security contribution, nor general tax revenue. Due to this special 
status, it is debatable whether these revenues counted as ‘state expenditure’, as they 
were collected with the sole purpose to contribute to the social insurance system. 
According to the traditional Bismarckian insurance logic, CSG revenues were clearly no 
contributions, as they lacked the distinctive aspect of creating entitlements 
corresponding to the amounts paid in. The refusal o f the French government to label the 
CSG as a social security contribution rather than taxation, despite continuing demands 
by the labour unions, clearly shows the reduction of the commitment factor through this 
change in revenue sources. The replacement o f contribution revenue also gave the 
government more scope in rechannelling the funds, as in contrast to contribution 
revenues which were clearly earmarked for one special insurance scheme, CSG 
revenues were freely assigned by the government to various schemes and financing 
funds.
Due to the replacement of employee health contributions by the CSG, the CNAM was 
most strongly affected by its introduction: in 2004, it accounted for a third o f its 
revenues. Besides this, also other tax revenues (stemming from charges on tobacco, 
alcohol and car insurance) allocated to the CNAM were increased in 1996, 2001 and 
2004 (see Appendix 1-5). Overall, the share o f tax revenues increased from 1.6 percent 
in 1990 to 36 percent in 2004.
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Table 6-1 Revenue Structure CNAM 1990-2004
1990 2000 2004
€(m ) % €(m ) % € (m ) %
Em ployees’ contributions 20.1 32.2 3.4 3.4 4.0 3.4
Employers’ contributions 39.3 63.1 49.8 51.1 56.1 47.3
Contributions covered by the state 
(CMU)
“ - ” 7.8 6.6
Total contributions 59.4 95.2 53.2 54.4 67.1 57.3
CSG 0.0 0.0 33.8 34.6 39.5 33.3
Specific taxes (cars, tobacco, alcohol) 1.0 1.6 4.0 4.1 3.1 2.6
Total taxes 1.0 1.6 37.8 38.7 42.6 35.9
State compensation for loss o f  
contributions1
0.3 0.5 4.8 4.9 5.2 4.4
Adjustment between health insurance 
schemes
0.7 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5
Other 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 4.7 1.9
Total revenues 62.3 100.0 97.6 100.0 113.2 100.0
Source: Commission des Comptes de la S6curit6 Sociale 2001; Commission de Comptes de la Securite 
Sociale: Rapport June 2004; own calculations
As argued already in the case of pension insurance financing, the replacement of 
contribution with tax revenues strengthened the influence of the government at the 
expenses of the social partners as it gave the government increased leverage about the 
assignment of funds. Particularly the employer representatives continued to press for an 
end to this trend: their return in the self-administration committees in 2004 was 
connected with the fulfilment of a set of their demands, such as a stop of additional tax 
financing and a stabilisation of the C3S tax rate. Furthermore, it was agreed with the 
government that the CNAM had to be in financial balance by 2007, which meant 
savings of around €16 bn and a stronger financial participation of the patients. The 
package of additional revenues provided by the state was also fixed (€5 bn), and it was 
agreed that the CSG was not to be increased from its level of 7.5 percent. But overall, 
the drastic changes which occurred on the revenue dimension between 1990 and 2005 
decreased the degree of fiscal commitment in the French health insurance scheme from 
very high to low.
6.1.4 Spending Structure
The degree of fiscal commitment inherent in the spending structure of the CNAM had 
only been low in 1990 -  eligibility for healthcare and sickness pay was restricted to 
insured with a minimum contribution time, but the free co-insurance of dependent 
family members strongly weakened the insurance factor. Since then, the circle of people 
eligible for healthcare has been even further expanded. Until 2000, the basis of 
entitlement for health insurance benefits had been the employment status. But with the
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introduction o f the Universal Health Coverage Act (CMU) in 2004, the small proportion 
of the population without public health insurance was now also entitled to healthcare on 
the basis o f legal residence in France, with the state taking over their contribution 
payments. Furthermore, the co-insurance of dependants was widened (see Appendix I- 
4.2). These measures further reduced the link between contribution payments and 
eligibility for healthcare.
The reciprocity factor, which is generally low within most health insurance schemes due 
to the widely non-eamings-related benefit provision, has also been further reduced since 
1990 through a series o f reforms breaking former spending commitments. Not only in 
France, but in many other European health insurance schemes it has been common 
practice to increase co-payments by patients in order to lower health expenditure, which 
can be interpreted as a ‘benefit reduction through the back-door’ (see Couffinhal and 
Paris 2003: 17). In the French scheme, the daily hospital fee charged to patients was 
raised several times between 1990 and 2005 and the rules for the inclusion o f drugs in 
the positive, reimbursable list were tightened repeatedly while reimbursement rates 
were lowered (see Appendix 1-5). As a consequence, the share o f private health 
spending increased slightly from 23.4 percent in 1990 to 23.7 percent in 2003.87 But it 
were not private households which spent more on healthcare: while out-of-pocket 
payments by the patients decreased considerably from 48.7 percent o f private health 
spending in 1990 to 40.9 percent in 2003, the bill had been picked up by private health 
insurance providers. This explains why the increasing co-payments did not have a 
moderating effect on healthcare demand: most o f the population had supplementary 
medical insurance while others were fully covered by means-tested arrangements, so 
that only few were directly affected by the lower reimbursement rates (see Spicker 
1998:210).
The overall effect of broadening the circle of insured while reducing reimbursement 
rates and increasing co-payments has been a further reduction of the degree o f fiscal 
commitment inherent in the spending structure o f the CNAM from low to very low (see 
Appendix 1-4.2). Together with the changes on the other three dimensions, this means 
that fiscal commitment in the French health insurance scheme has been considerably 
reduced from an overall score o f 13 in 1990 to a score o f 6 in 2005. The second part o f
87 Source o f data: OECD Health Data 2005.
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this chapter will assess to what degree fiscal commitment in the German equivalent to 
the CNAM, the GKV, has been affected by reforms during this period.
6.2 Formal vs. Effective Commitment: Health Reforms in 
Germany
6.2.1 Administrative Independence
In 1990, the degree of administrative independence in the German Statutory Health 
Insurance (GKV) had been very high due to a very high degree o f institutional 
fragmentation and very restricted possibilities o f government influence in institutional 
and managerial matters (see 4.2.1). But in the following years important changes in the 
institutional landscape of the GKV took place. One o f those changes was the extensive 
reduction of the number of insurance carriers (from over 2000 in 1991 to 262 in 2005). 
In contrast to the Statutory Pension Insurance, the reduction of insurance schemes 
occurred through voluntary mergers, a consequence o f increased competition between 
the different health insurance providers. Following the introduction o f the Healthcare 
Structure Act in 1996, all insured were allowed to freely choose their insurance funds 
instead of being assigned according to profession and residence. In 2001, it was made 
even easier to change providers, which strengthened this competitive element. The 
reduced fragmentation in the insurance sector and the introduction of free choice o f  
insurer turned the individual schemes into competitors, which weakened their potential 
for common resistance against government interventions, and strengthened the influence 
of the central state. While this had no direct impact on the administrative independence 
of the schemes, it had a considerably effect on the degree of fiscal constraints in the 
insurance sector (for details see 6.2.2.2). In 2005, health minister Ulla Schmidt 
demanded an even further reduction of the number o f insurance companies to around 30 
in order to achieve further efficiency gains, particularly regarding administrative 
spending (see SZ, 17 November 2005).
During the same period there were also moderate changes regarding the internal 
governance structure o f the health insurance providers: while the degree of 
administrative independence regarding the selection o f administrators and the degree of 
governmental supervision remained very high, the composition of the administrative 
bodies was changed with the Healthcare Structure Act passed in 1992. The health 
insurance funds were restructured following the example o f public limited companies,
205
and received a full-time, professional board o f directors. This reduced the influence of 
the social partners in the daily management o f the schemes, but again did not directly 
impact the administrative independence o f the schemes regarding budgetary control as 
the board o f directors was not nominated by the government but by the social partners 
themselves (see Bandelow 2004). The GRV therefore sustained its very high degree o f 
administrative independence.
6.2.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
6,2.2,1 Budgetary Autonomy
Although the federal government was at the beginning o f the 1990s not participating in 
the financing of the GKV, it had a growing interest in reducing health insurance 
contributions. The reason was that a reduction in this sector enabled it to increase 
contributions in other insurance sectors without increasing the overall non-wage labour 
costs (see Alber 1992). But the possibilities for the government to interfere in budgetary 
decisions o f the GKV were limited, mainly as the health insurance carriers had the right 
to set their own contribution rates. In 1996, the Contribution Relief Act in 1996 
temporarily abolished this right and the contribution rates o f the GKV were 
compulsorily reduced by 0.4 percent. Many insurance carriers criticised that this solely 
served the purpose to counter-balance the parallel rise o f pension contributions (see 
Appendix III). This “declaration of war” (Kania and Blanke 2000: 579) to the self­
administration bodies of the health insurance funds however did not have the intended 
effect, as insurance funds circumvented the imposed contribution stability with early 
contribution increases.
The government subsequently changed its strategy from direct enforcement to indirect 
pressure: the Healthcare Reorganisation Act in 1997 intended to link contribution 
increases o f insurance funds with an automatic increase o f co-payments for the insured 
of this fund. The idea was to exert pressure on the funds to stabilise their rates, as 
increased co-payments would result in insured changing their providers. But after the 
change in government in 1998, this regulation was abolished and therefore never 
implemented. As fiscal pressures in the pension insurance became more severe in 2002, 
the SPD/Green coalition agreed on another ‘contribution rate exchange’ between old 
age and health insurance (see Trampusch 2003): the contribution rate in the health 
insurance was fixed in order to counterbalance an increase in pension contributions by
206
0.4 percentage points to 19.5 percent. A further intrusion in the contribution autonomy 
o f the insurance funds was undertaken in 2005, when an exceptional, compulsory 
contribution o f 0.9 percent o f gross wages -  solely funded by the insured -  was 
introduced. Parallel, the other contribution rates were reduced by law.
In contrast to a high degree o f revenue autonomy, the degree to which the health 
insurance carriers could determine their spending -  that is, make decisions regarding the 
range of services provided and reimbursement rates -  was only medium high in 1990. 
Although the self-administration gained authority during the 1980s in defining the 
provisions paid for by the GKV, this had been restricted to the ambulatory sector and 
main changes still had to take the form of a law and therefore remained under the 
control of parliament. But during the 1990s, the self-administration gained further 
authority in this respect. With the Second Restructuring Act in 1997, the Federal 
Committee o f  Doctors and Insurance Funds gained the authority to issue binding 
guidelines to nearly all areas in ambulatory care (§ 92 SGB V), and furthermore to 
assess all insurance fund provisions regarding their quality and economic efficiency,
O Q
which gave it a big influence in designing the catalogue o f provision (Urban 2001). 
But this delegation did not mean that the central state had reduced its influence -  the 
government secured itself a decisive influence on the content of regulations via 
objection rights, conditions o f approval and the threat to impose decisions unilaterally in 
case decisions were not taken within a time limit or were found professionally faulty.
Besides this, a similar form of self-administration was also created in the hospital sector 
with the foundation o f a “Committee Hospital’ ( ‘Ausschuss Krankenhaus’) in 2000. 
This Committee disposed of similar competencies as the ‘Bundesausschuss Arzte und 
Kranhenkasserf in the ambulatory sector, which means that it had the task to evaluate 
whether the services provided in the hospital sector were ‘sufficient, appropriate and 
cost-effective’. If the committee found these criteria not fulfilled, certain services were 
no longer covered by the GKV (see Sachverstandigenrat 2005: 57). It was 
complemented by a ‘Co-ordination Committee’ which was supposed to improve the co-
88 The Federal Committee of Doctors and Health Insurance Funds (Bundesausschuss der Arzte und 
Krankenkassen) was founded in 1956 order to issue (non-binding) guidelines regarding the content and 
capacity o f the ambulatory provision (see Dbhler 1994; Urban 2001). Its role was strengthened during the 
1980, when it became limited powers to define the benefit provided by the health insurance carriers. But 
the self-agreements by insurance carriers were subject to considerable state intervention and were subject 
to approval by the ministry (see Alber 1992: 160). Furthermore, legal frameworks existed for the 
guarantee o f sufficient ambulatory provision which set considerable limits to the independence o f the 
self-administration bargains.
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ordination between ambulatory and hospital sector. In 2004, a central corporatist ‘super­
organisation’, the ‘Collective Federal Committee ’ (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss), 
was created. This Committee, which replaced all three previously existing ones, 
disposed of much greater regulatory authority as the former organisations and had 
competencies to exclude or restrict provisions from the benefit catalogue o f the GKV. It 
therefore represented the most relevant decisionmaking body for the allocation in the 
health sector, and its establishment meant an important intensification of centralised 
corporatist steering in the ambulatory sector (Sachverstandigenrat 2005: 57). While the 
chairman of the Federal Committee had been nominated by the Ministry o f Health, the 
new committee had an independent chairman which strengthened the self­
administration.
6.2.2,2 Budgetary Constraints
Particularly in the health insurance sector, the ability to contain spending did not depend 
on the decisionmaking power over the budgetary parameters alone, but to a very high 
degree also on the ability to implement spending constraints. Also in this respect 
considerable changes have been implemented between 1990 and 2005.
Budgetary Allocation Process/Enforced Fiscal Targets:
At the beginning of the 1990s, the mechanisms used to allocate the scarce resources 
were very different for the three sectors of health provision in the German Statutory 
Health Insurance (see Bandelow 2004; Sachverstandigenrat 2005). In the ambulatory 
and the dental sector, the allocation of funds was carried out via corporatist co­
ordination mainly on the state level: the Associations o f Insurance Funds negotiated 
with the representatives of healthcare providers -  the Associations o f Insurance Doctors 
(Kassenarztliche Vereinigungen) -  over the total allowances paid for the provision of 
health services (see Moran 1994).89 This system o f  bargains without any direct state 
involvement made the control o f expenditure very difficult, and the ‘fee for service’ 
payment system for the health service providers furthermore created incentives for them 
to maximise the number of services provided and respectively their share of the funds. 
Possibilities o f cost control for the government in both the ambulatory as well as the 
pharmaceutical sector were therefore only limited, which created a high degree of fiscal
89In order to increase the co-ordination between the different payers and providers in the negotiations, the 
'Konzertierte Aktiori - consisting o f around 60 representatives o f  providers, insurance funds and the state 
- was introduced in 1977 to develop benchmarks regarding the development of expenditure and structural 
reforms (see Oberender and Zerth 2002: 16).
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commitment.90 In the hospital sector the allocation o f funds was mainly carried out 
through public planning. But again, the federal government lacked direct regulatory 
powers as the most important actors in this sector were the federal states, so that health 
policy decisions demanded difficult consensus building processes between federal 
government and states (see Alber 1992). Fiscal constraints were therefore weak in this 
sector. This, together with the absence o f spending caps or enforced budgetary targets, 
created a high degree of fiscal commitment.
Despite increasing pressures on the insurance administrators and the service providers 
by the central government in annual spending bargains since 1990, the lack o f effective 
instruments and powers to constrain spending in the health sector remained. In 1989, the 
government made an (unsuccessful) attempt to balance revenues and expenditure o f the 
GKV via the institutions of self-administration (see Kania and Blanke 2000: 572). In 
line with the goal to stabilise the contribution rate, the Healthcare Reform Act contained 
a series of instruments which primarily focused on a reduction o f available provision 
and a limitation of doctors’ freedom regarding prescriptions. The corporatist bargaining 
structure with service providers remained untouched, but in return they were supposed 
to agree benchmarks regarding the amount o f provisions prescribed by doctors. “Overall 
the GRG can be interpreted as punctually targeting symptomatic therapy, in which the 
cost-driving structure has remained widely untreated” (Oberender and Zerth 2002: 25; 
author’s own translation). But the limitations o f  corporatist bargaining models when 
faced by declining distributional scope became quickly visible, as neither the peak 
associations o f the insurance funds nor the German Hospital Association could agree on 
the demanded spending volumes and as a result asked the federal government for the 
provision o f a legal directive. This shows that a govemmentally imposed solution 
created fewer legitimatory problems for the associational elites than a self-agreed 
compromise (see Alber 1992: 116).
After the failure to contain spending in the medium and long term through the reforms 
became obvious in 1992, the government changed its strategy of relying on the social 
partners to reduce spending (see Lauer-Kirschbaum 1994; Blanke 1994; Kania and 
Blanke 2000). The 1993 Health Structure Act -  made possible through a broad cross­
party agreement and the successful exclusion of negatively affected provider groups -
90 There was no state control o f pharmaceutical prices and also price competition between producers only 
played a minor role. The pharmaceutical providers were subject to an ‘associational self-control’, but its 
influence was rather weak (see Alber 1992: 132).
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increased governmental powers vis-a-vis the self-administration (see Perschke- 
Hartmann 1993; Hinrichs 1994). Instead of relying on the corporatist structures to 
achieve cost containment through consensual decisionmaking, widespread budgeting 
was introduced for all expenditure sectors in the health insurance, which represented a 
strong intervention in the domains of self-administration. In an attempt to limit political 
conflict the government also automatised the future development of expenditure 
ceilings, which was linked to the development o f the base rate of pay.91 Furthermore, 
the government announced plans to draft a ‘positive list’ o f prescribed drugs and the 
abolition o f the principle of automatic cost coverage (‘Selbstkostendeckungsprinzip’) in 
hospital financing. Pressure was also put on dental provision with the intention to lower
92 'payments by 10 percent in 1993. This widespread introduction of fiscal targets was 
propagated as only a temporary solution while the new regulatory system based on 
competition between the insurance carriers was implemented (see Kania and Blanke 
2000: 567).
Expectations were however once more disappointed: the introduction o f different 
budgets for the different health sectors lead to the shifting o f patients between sectors, 
or the delaying o f service provision into the following budget year. As a result, the 
budgeting for the contractual ambulatory sector was broken up again in 1995 and the 
expenditure limit was raised beyond the increase of the base rate o f pay. Furthermore, 
the plans for a ‘positive list’ of drugs were abandoned again.
After this attempt to achieve cost containment via centralised control had failed, the 
government changed its strategy again. The new idea was to force the self­
administration to improve the efficiency in the health provision via a restrictive resource 
regulation. In 1997, the insurance carriers and service providers gained -  under the 
heading ‘right o f way for self-administration’ -  not only more influence on defining the 
catalogue of provisions, but also more scope for contractual designs. But parallel, the 
legal and financial framework for decisions became increasingly tight. With the change 
of government in 1998, a stronger focus on capping budgets in order to limit 
expenditures was reintroduced. The 1999 Act for the Strengthening o f  Solidarity in the
91 The Base Rate o f Pay is the sum of the income o f all insured in a Statutory Health Insurance fund up to 
the contribution assessment ceiling.
92 Main mechanism was the introduction of a degressive point value for all dental services in case o f the 
exceedance o f a certain amount of points.
93 Insurance carriers were now also allowed to offer additional provisions besides the legally regulated 
provision catalogue.
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Health Insurance aimed again at automatising expenditure growth in linking the 
developments o f budgets with those of revenues. But plans for a ‘global budget’ for all 
sectors promoted by health minister Andrea Fischer were not realised.94 Instead, the 
2000 Health Reform Act maintained the system of sectoral budgeting -  but the 
expenditure o f the GKV was to only increase according to the annual rate o f pay. The 
reform also introduced a new case-based lump-sum price system for hospitals from 
January 2003 onwards.
But the limits o f the state-imposed capping of expenditure became obvious relatively 
quickly: in 2001, the regulations prescribing a lowering o f the overall pay for the 
ambulatory sector in the case o f an exceedance o f the budget limit for pharmaceuticals -  
introduced in 1993 -  were abolished again (see Lehmbruch 2003). The reasons for the 
elimination o f the collective recourse were ‘problems of acceptance’ o f the former 
regulations by doctors. In fact, during the nine years since the introduction o f the 
pharmaceutical budget, doctors were never subject to reductions o f pay despite 
continuing and sometimes quite drastic overruns o f the budgetary limit. Instead of the 
former pre-defined budget, the self-administration was now supposed to reach annual 
agreements about the expenditure volume for pharmaceuticals on the regional level. In 
the case of non-agreement, this volume could be defined by the ministry o f health via 
decree. Thus, while the self-administration gained allocatory decisionmaking authority, 
the government strengthened its powers in the case this allocatory procedure did not 
produce results -  which became, due to the difficult financial situation, increasingly 
likely. The implemented fiscal targets however remained widely ineffective due to the 
lack of enforcement powers.
The Healthcare Modernisation Act 2004 loosened the centralised corporative structures 
in many respects, for example by granting the health insurance funds more options in 
their statues and by granting more contractual freedom to hospitals and ambulatory 
medical care centers. Also in the hospital sector the trend to increasingly assign 
authority to the insurance funds and hospital associations continued: now the German 
Hospital Association became, together with top associations of insurance funds, 
responsible for the fixation and development of case-based lump sums (§ 17 Abs. 2a
94 Not only the resistance by the service providers against a global budget led to the failure o f the plans, 
but it was in the end the federal chamber who blocked the reform. The reason was that Fischer was 
planning to unite the authority for hospital financing in the hands o f the insurance funds, which would 
have meant a loss o f influence for the Lander governments.
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KHG). But again, this strengthening o f corporatist decisionmaking powers was 
accompanied by tighter financial frameworks: from 2004 onwards, also administrative 
costs of the insurance funds were linked to the development o f the base rate o f pay until 
2007 or were frozen, in case they were 10 percent above the average o f all insurance 
funds.
Deficit Coverage:
Since the foundation of the GKV and still the case in 1991, every health insurance had 
been obliged to set its contribution rates for the budget year in a way that the expected 
revenues would be sufficient to cover the expected expenditure and -  if  necessary -  to 
fill up the compulsory financial reserve. Credit financing was generally not allowed, 
except for the bridging of a short-term financial gap within a fiscal year. The fact that 
deficits were not covered by the federal state put pressure on the health providers to 
consolidate their budgets. On the other hand, the fact that they had the possibility to 
adjust the contribution rates to match their spending development meant that incentives 
to reduce spending were low. Overall, these regulations ensured sufficient funds for the 
health insurers while incentives for fiscal constraints were minimal. The degree o f fiscal 
commitment on this dimension was therefore high in 1991.
These regulations of deficit coverage worked well as long as expenditure and 
contribution revenues increased at the same pace, and as long as contribution increases 
did not create undesired economic side-effects (such as low employment levels due to 
high non-wage labour costs). But with the worsening o f the financial situation in the 
1990s, the limits o f this system became quickly apparent. As the fiscal reserves after the 
deficits in the middle o f the 1990s barely covered the legal minimum of a quarter of a 
monthly expenditure, the new deficits could often only be covered through borrowing -  
even despite the legal regulations which did not allow this. The government, keen on 
avoiding further contribution increases, reacted in March 1998 with the ‘GKV Finance 
Strengthening Act’. The insurance funds in the new Lander now became the legal 
possibility to avoid contribution rate increases until the end o f 1998 by taking up loans. 
All insurance funds who had previously taken out loans against the legal regulations had 
to present detailed plans to the supervisory authority how to cancel their debts within 
five years, and how to repay all the new debts within a ten year period.
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But despite the fact that insurance funds were still not allowed to accumulate debts 
beyond a fiscal year, the reality of budgeting looked very different. From the year 2001 
on, the public health insurance schemes had continuous deficits ranging from €3 bn to 
€31.2 bn, although the average contribution rate rose from 13.6 to 14.3 percent during 
the same period. Driven also by desires to lower the contribution rates in order to be 
competitive, many insurance institutions took out loans to overcome financial 
difficulties. But as the financial situation failed to improve as expected by most 
insurance carriers, these initially short-term loans turned into long-term debts. The exact 
amount of debts accumulated between 2001 and 2004 by the insurance funds is hard to 
calculate, as the balances of the funds often did not show these outstanding amounts. 
According to Der Spiegel (15/2004), those ‘hidden debts’ amounted to €14.4 bn at the 
beginning o f 2004. Even health minister Ulla Schmidt admitted that she was surprised 
by the figures, and commented that she “would have wished the number was lower” 
(SZ, 18 June 2004). In order to put pressure on the insurance funds, the GKV 
Modernisation Act 2004 stated that those funds with debts had to reduce those until 
2007 by at least a quarter. But in 2005, Schmidt complained that the insurance funds 
used their positive results in 2004 to eliminate their debts ‘too quickly’ -  instead, 
Schmidt wanted to push through further contribution rate reductions. But despite these 
demands by the health minister, some health insurance funds did not even reduce their 
contribution rates by the legally prescribed 0.9 percentage points (which was approved 
by the Federal Insurance Agency due to their difficult financial situation (Spiegel 
Online, 12 July 2005).
In 2004, the government had to introduce a federal subsidy in order to cope with the 
high deficits in the health insurance. The law stated that these revenues had to be used 
for the reduction of contribution rates and could not be used for the reduction of debts. 
According to the coalition agreement between CDU and SPD in 2005, the subsidy was 
supposed to be abolished in 2007. But the agreement did not contain plans to also lower 
the tobacco tax, which had been increased in 2004 to finance the subsidy. This meant 
that from 2007 onwards the additional revenues from the tax increase would flow into 
the federal budget instead of into the health insurance schemes.
6.2.2.3 Conclusion
Overall, fiscal commitment on the budgetary dimension o f the GKV has been reduced 
from high to medium between 1990 and 2005. Although direct attacks on the
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contribution autonomy of schemes have remained widely ineffective and the GKV has 
sustained its high degree of formal budgetary autonomy, the degree o f fiscal constraints 
has been increased considerably. Despite the fact that the government formally granted 
more autonomy regarding spending bargains with the service providers and therefore 
budgetary authority to the insurance scheme associations, it defined the increasingly 
tight bargaining scope and increased its authority in the case o f non-agreement. Also in 
terms of deficit coverage, no sufficient regulations have been put into place which 
would have allowed the insurance funds to effectively manage their outstanding 
liabilities -  instead, the revenues generated to finance a temporary federal subsidy to the 
GKV were successively channelled back into the state budget. While fiscal pressures 
have steadily increased over the observed period, the GKV has therefore increasingly 
lost its ability to independently react to them.
6.2.3 Revenue Structure
As outlined in the paragraphs above, the health insurance funds had continuing 
problems in balancing their budgets since the mid-1990s. While these financing 
problems had often been attributed to a ‘cost explosion’ in the health sector, they had in 
fact several reasons -  the availability o f more expensive treatments being only one of  
several. The probably biggest problem in healthcare financing was in fact reclining 
revenues as the amount of wages on which contributions were paid was not growing as 
fast as health expenditure.95 Another factor was the changing structure of membership, 
with a growing number of dependents, pensioners and unemployed insured, which also 
reduced revenues as they paid no or lower contributions. But there were also a series of 
political factors which had negative effects on the revenues o f the GKV.
Contribution vs. Tax Revenues
In order to tackle the problem of a widening gap between expenditures and revenues, 
every German government since 1990 tried to increase contribution revenues by 
increasing the circle of contributors. A series of consecutive reforms limited the 
possibilities for voluntary members in the Statutory Pension Insurance to automatically
95 As the Advisory Council (Sachverstandigenrat 2003: 15) pointed out, the growth o f assessable income 
per member in the old Lander was 31 percentage points lower than the growth o f GDP per worker 
between 1980 and 2000. If the assessable income had grown at the same rate as GDP, €17.8 bn more in 
GKV revenues would have been created in 2000 alone.
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become members of the health insurance for pensioners.96 This had the effect that they 
had to insure themselves voluntary, which increased their contribution payments. But 
the widening of the circle of contribution payers was not restricted to pensioners: with 
the Laws for Modem Services in the Labour Market passed in 2002, it was introduced 
that also employees in minor employment -  formerly exempt from social contribution 
payments -  had to pay a compulsory contribution to the GKV. Revenues were also 
increased by raising the contribution assessment ceiling.97 In 2004, it was furthermore 
decided that insured had to pay an additional exceptional contribution of 0.5 percent of 
their gross wage subject to contributions from 2006 onwards. In order to avoid looming 
contribution increases for 2005, this exceptional charge was in 2004 brought forward 
and increased to 0.9 percent. This new split between a general and additional 
contribution rate meant that the basic approach of parity between employers and 
employees was given up for the first time since the introduction of social insurance in 
Germany.
Graph 6-3 Revenue Sources GKV 1991-2004
100%
0  Other Revenues
■ Contributions Pensioners
■ Contributions Insured
Source: BMG, Statistisches Taschenbuch 2005
96 1993 Healthcare Structure Act, 2001 AvmErgG (see Appendix II-5).
97 From 2001 onwards, the social security ceiling as well as the contribution assessment ceiling in the new 
Lander had been raised to the level o f the old Lander, along with the level o f  co-payments -  which meant 
an increase o f revenues for the East German funds.
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Overall, the very high share of contributions in the revenue structure of the GKV 
remained stable between 1991 and 2004 at around 97 percent o f total revenues. But due 
to the increased contribution rate for pensioners and the reduction o f possibilities for 
free co-insurance, the share of contributions paid by this group increased considerably 
(from 16.5 to 22.7 percent). In contrast to France, the share of tax-financing did not 
increase -  the introduction of the federal subsidy financed via taxes in the GKV in 2004 
accounted for only a marginal share o f overall revenues, and was intended to only be 
temporarily (see 6.2.2.2).
Transfers:
Another important aspect regarding the volatility o f revenues o f the GKV were existing 
financial interdependencies between the GKV insurance carriers, as well as between 
them and other institutions. The degree o f such interdependencies had initially been 
relatively low. Until 1994, each insurance fund was solely responsible for the balancing 
of its revenues and expenditures. The only exception was the equalisation process in the 
health insurance of pensioners introduced in 1977, which covered all insurance funds 
and partly reimbursed them for their relative expenses on pensioner’s provisions. But in 
1994, the degree o f financial interdependencies between the different insurance carriers 
increased considerably.
As a pre-condition for the introduction of more competitive elements in the form of free 
insurance fund choice for all insured, the Healthcare Structure Act introduced a national 
and comprehensive revenue-oriented risk equalisation process (‘Risiko- 
Strukturausgleich\ RSA). In order to provide equal ‘starting positions’ for the funds in 
the competition between each other, socio-demographic factors of their insured which 
had an impact on contribution revenues (such as the base rate o f pay, the quota o f co­
insured, the age and gender structure) were financially compensated. While the 
equalisation process was initially designed to be separate for the new and old Lander, 
this separation was abolished in 1998 which lead to an expansion of West-East- 
transfers. From 2000 onwards, a national equalisation process was introduced. Basis for 
the calculation o f the transfers was the standardised expenditure for provisions on the 
one and contribution-based revenues of the health insurance schemes on the other hand. 
This had the effect that the GKV East and GKV West had the same base rate o f pay 
available for the financing o f their individual, risk-weighted expenditure -  which also 
increased the volume of transfers.
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Not only because of these large payments from insurance funds in the old to the ones in 
the new Lander the equalisation process was subject of much criticism and conflict 
between the insurance funds. Some funds argued that it was not in the interest o f the 
insured, but rather purely served the purpose o f securing the continuing existence of 
more inefficient health insurance funds (see Oberender and Zerth 2002: 30). In 2000, 
the Ersatzkassen and the AOK demanded corrections o f the equalisation process 
mechanism after experiencing a massive decline in their respective memberships, as 
they had higher contribution rates. They argued that this was not due to bad 
management, but due to their membership structure (consisting o f a high share of  
pensioners and other groups with above average healthcare needs). On the other hand, 
insurance funds with a profitable membership structure (mainly the company-specific 
Betriebskrankenkassen), demanded a reduction o f the redistributive elements with the 
argument that they did not want to co-finance the inefficiency o f other insurance fund 
types (see Bode 2002). Despite this opposition, the government decided to even extend 
the equalisation mechanism: for a transition period from 2002 until 2006, the 
equalisation factors of the existing transfer process were expanded and supplemented by 
a risk pool. From 2007 onwards, the contribution demands o f insurance funds within the 
RSA were to be determined on the basis of direct morbidity characteristics o f the 
insured.
Besides increasing the amount o f transfers between the insurance carriers, there have 
also been several reforms which have increased the extent o f financial interdependences 
between the GKV insurance carriers and other insurance schemes. Repeatedly, financial 
burdens were shifted from other social programmes to the health insurance carriers: 
according to calculations by Beske (2004), the extent o f these burdens resulting from 
political decisions between 1989 and 2002 amounted to €30.41 bn. Major reforms in 
this respect were changes in the contribution assessment base for recipients of 
unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance (see 5.2.3.4). The reforms in the 
unemployment insurance since 2002 burdened the health insurance funds with 
additional €6.04 bn (2002-2005), as did the pension legislation since 2002 (€0.48 bn 
from 2004-2005; see Beske 2004). But on the other hand, the GKV has also been 
disburdened with the introduction of the long-term care insurance (see Table 6-2). The 
overall degree o f fiscal commitment on the revenue structure remains therefore very 
high.
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6.2.4 Spending Structure
The main element creating an only low degree o f contribution-based eligibility in the 
GKV in 1991, the free co-insurance of family members, has remained untouched since 
1990. But some reforms of the Schroder government focused on reducing redistributive 
elements in the eligibility for healthcare: the GKV Healthcare Reform 2000 
implemented that persons who after the age o f 55 became eligible for statutory 
insurance were excluded from public insurance if  they had not been insured in the GKV 
during the previous 5 years. According to former regulations, these persons were able to 
become a compulsory member of the GKV even if  they never contributed to the scheme 
at any time before. Spouses, who were formerly privately insured, did not longer have 
access to the family co-insurance during times o f pregnancy or child rearing. These 
measures represented a process of commitment-tightening, as the conditions for 
eligibility were more closely linked to former contribution payments.
Reciprocity between contribution payments and benefits -  only low in 1991 -  was also 
tightened and redistributive elements were reduced. A basic principle o f the GKV had 
been that all members were generally eligible for free healthcare treatment. But due to 
mounting fiscal pressures since 1991, several diversions from this principle were 
introduced. One major element in this respect was the continuing increase o f patients’ 
co-payments (see Appendix II-5). These increases were also a consequence o f a report 
by the Council of Advisors (Sachverstandigenrat: SVR) in autumn 1996, which 
acknowledged the health sector as an important economic growth and employment area. 
Accordingly, the political agenda changed from being exclusively focused on saving to 
rather stabilising health expenditure. In order to allow for continuously high healthcare 
spending -  while avoiding contribution rate increases -  the government decided to 
make patients contribute more to the financing o f provisions (see Kania and Blanke 
2000: 578). Certain benefits were excluded from the list of provisions provided or
Q O
reimbursed by the GKV, and allowances and reimbursement rates were reduced. 
Regarding the effect on reciprocity, these measures strengthened the insurance 
principle: “The effects of the solidarity principle decrease as the definition of the 
benefits catalogue narrows, for such measures are a greater burden on insured persons
98 In 1989, death benefits were reduced and for newly insured completely abolished, while also the 
reimbursement o f orthodontic treatment for adults and the provision o f dental prostheses were step by 
step removed from the list o f provisions.
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with low incomes; i.e. from the perspective of distribution policy, it has a regressive 
effect” (Sachverstandigenrat 2003: 14)."
As in the other social insurance sectors, the health insurance saw a short-time reversal 
of tighter regulations in the first months after the change of government in 1998: the 
Strengthening o f  Solidarity in the Statutory Health Insurance Act reduced co-payments 
for drugs, reintroduced the free provision of dental prostheses and abolished fixed co­
payment regulations. But a consequence of the revision of the previous reforms was 
rapidly mounting cost pressure, which after much political conflict not only between the 
government and the opposition (see FR, 16 August 2003), but also with the insurance 
schemes and doctors associations (see FR, 15 November 2003), led to the passing of the 
2004 Statutory Health Insurance Modernisation Act. This reform more than re­
implemented the formerly abolished cost-reducing measures. Co-payments were 
increased to generally cover 10 percent of the costs for all provisions. Furthermore, a 
€10 practice fee for ambulatory treatment was introduced despite much criticism, and 
some provisions (such as death benefits and dental prostheses) were eliminated from the 
benefit catalogue. But after strong protests from both provider as well as patient groups, 
some provisions -  such as dental prostheses -  were revoked in 2005, and the former 
regulation regarding hardship cases was reintroduced.
Besides burdening patients with increased co-payments, the share of health expenditure 
covered by public households did only increase moderately between 1992 and 2003 (see 
Table 6-2).
Table 6-2 German Health Expenditure by Carrier (in percent)
1992 1998 2003
Public Households 11.0 8.4 7.8
GKV 61.9 56.1 56.7
Long-Term Care Insurance - 7.0 6.9
GRV 2.3 1.6 1.8
Statutory Accident Insurance 1.7 1.7 1.7
Private Health Insurance 7.3 7.7 8.6
Employers 4.4 4.1 4.1
Private Households and Organizations 11.4 13.4 12.3
Source: Gesundheitsausgabenrechnung 1998; 2003; own calculations
99 To limit this effect, the Healthcare Reform Act in 1989 contained a ‘hardship clause’ which regulated 
that all insured with a household income below 40% o f  a defined threshold were exempt from co­
payments.
219
In contrast, the share covered by the GKV decreased more markedly. This was mainly 
due to the establishment of long-term care insurance in 1995, which reduced spending 
o f the GKV carriers for care services -  an insurance-external provision -  considerably.
Reforms between 1991 and 2005 also targeted the element with the strongest reciprocity 
in the health insurance, sickness pay. In 1997, this wage-related benefit was with 
immediate effect reduced from 80 to 70 percent of the former net wage. In 2000, the 
provision was reduced further as the Budget Recapitalisation Act changed the annual 
adaptation of the benefits from net wage developments to price developments. In the 
following year, the annual adjustment was then linked to the last pension adjustment 
rate -  again a reduction compared to inflation adjustment. While the internal link of 
sickness pay to previous wages has therefore been maintained and accordingly the 
degree of ‘internal reciprocity’ remained high, the degree o f external reciprocity 
between the factual value of contribution payments and the equivalent benefit payments 
decreased which represents a case of commitment-breaking.
Overall it can be concluded that the degree of fiscal commitment on the spending 
structure has remained low. Despite the reduction of redistributive elements mostly with 
regard to eligibility for health and the introduction o f the long-term care insurance, the 
overall financing share for insurance-external elements remained very high. The 
introduction o f the federal subsidy from 2004 onwards failed to make a big difference: 
while the GKV was supposed to receive €1 bn from the federal budget in 2004, €2.5 bn 
in 2005 and from 2006 onwards €4.2 bn annually, this did not cover all the insurance- 
external costs which were estimated to be at least €10 bn annually (Beske and Drabinski 
2003). Furthermore, the generosity of the only benefit provision in the GKV with a 
strict reciprocal character between the amount o f contribution payments and the 
generosity of benefits, sickness pay, was reduced overall, which meant a reduction in 
the degree of external reciprocity between contribution and benefit values.
6.3 Common Patterns and Differences in the French and 
German Health Reforms
The analysis o f reform developments in the main French and German health insurance 
schemes has shown that in both cases, fiscal commitment has been reduced in the period 
from 1990-2005. But the extent of these reductions differs considerably between the
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schemes: in the case o f the German GKV, the reduction of fiscal commitment has 
remained moderate with only slight reductions on both the budgetary and revenue 
dimensions. In contrast, fiscal commitment inherent in the French CNAM decreased 
from a score of 13 in 1990 to a score of 6 in 2005. While commitment has been reduced 
on all four dimensions, this reduction has been particularly strong on the revenue 
dimensions due to the switch from contribution to tax financing. The in-depth analysis 
o f the reform processes which have led to these reductions of fiscal commitment has 
shed light on the questions to what extent previous commitments have had an impact on 
successive reform developments, as well as on the role that the social partners as well as 
retrenchment advocates in government have played in these processes:
(1) To what extent did the differences in the overall commitment scores between the 
schemes, but also the differences on the individual dimensions matter for future reforms 
in times o f  fiscal pressures? Reforms on the administrative dimension have gone much 
further in France than in Germany: the restriction of managerial independencies by the 
social partners in the French CNAM went hand in hand with an organisational 
reorganisation process which reduced the institutional fragmentation in the scheme on 
both national and regional level, and increased central administrative control by the 
government. At the same time the French government expanded its control powers via 
the creation of new institutions for closer spending monitoring. These measures have 
reduced the score o f administrative independence from medium high in 1990 to low in 
2005. In contrast, the very high degree of administrative independence o f the German 
GKV carriers has been maintained throughout this period in spite o f an overall 
reduction of the number of insurance carriers and an internal shift o f authorities towards 
professional staff. This supports the hypothesis that a high degree of fiscal commitment 
on the administrative dimension builds an effective barrier against further state 
involvement.
In contrast, we can observe reductions of the degree o f fiscal commitment on the 
budgetary dimension in both countries -  despite the fact that the German GKV had a 
high degree of commitment on this dimension in 1991, while the budgetary autonomy 
of the French CNAM was only medium high. The formal budgetary autonomy of the 
CNAM decreased when the state for the first time took over formal responsibility for 
the social insurance budgets with the introduction of the SSFL in 1996. The government 
further widened its grasp over the determination of revenues with the introduction and
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expansion o f the CSG (which gave it powers to assign revenues more freely than it was 
the case with contribution revenues) as well as with the centralisation o f the allocation 
process in both the ambulatory and hospital sector. But while the hierarchical steering 
of the healthcare system was further reinforced, the French government did not succeed 
in increasing fiscal constraints (see also Bandelow and Hassenteufel 2006). Despite the 
widespread introduction of expenditure ceilings and the foundation o f new institutions 
for the monitoring o f spending, the new budgetary framework did not prove effective in 
limiting expenditure growth. One of the main reasons was the lack o f enforcement 
power behind the introduced spending caps. Another reason was that while the 
insurance carriers have been increasingly deprived o f their bargaining powers with the 
service providers, this has not solved the problem o f reaching stable agreements. The 
health professionals still disposed of considerable veto powers and showed strong 
resistance against all attempts to enforce spending limits. Parallel, the introduction o f  
CADES to finance social security debts counteracted those efforts to increase spending 
constraints as new health insurance debts were repeatedly shifted into this semi­
independent institution instead of tackled effectively.
While the formal budgetary autonomy of the German GKV has never been formally 
abolished, it has been factually constantly undermined which also reduced the degree of 
fiscal commitment on the budgetary dimension in this scheme. On the one hand, the 
mandatory reduction of contribution rates in 1997 was an unprecedented interference in 
the authority o f the self-administration institutions. But on the other hand, the 
government granted the self-administration actors more authority in determining 
spending: the German government seemed to “systematically abandon intervention 
powers in the healthcare system” (Bandelow 2005: 8). The self-administration was 
increasingly seen as a steering instrument for the restriction o f costs and for the 
development of the GKV. But while this strengthened the formal independence for the 
insurance carriers regarding spending, it was accompanied by a process which has 
limited the financial scope o f the insurance carriers and increased spending constraints. 
The governmental frameworks set for the bargains in the self-administration were due to 
the difficult financial situation becoming increasingly tight, which made the reaching of  
bargains ever more difficult. Increased budgeting in all sectors as well as stronger 
intervention powers for the government in the case o f non-agreements between the 
actors of the self-administration showed the ‘mistrust towards the ability and
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willingness o f the self-administration to comply with global expenditure goals out of 
their own instigation” (Gerlinger 2002: 22).
For the government, this combination o f delegating bargaining powers while retaining 
the definition powers over the rules o f the game had the advantage of it not being 
directly responsible in the case o f the exceedance o f spending. Instead the self- 
administration was left with the task of bargaining provisions and remunerations in the 
government-defined framework -  and was therefore responsible for the outcome.
“Under the heading ‘right o f way for self-administration’ and talks about the ‘model o f  
partnership’, a strategy has been continued with which the legislator -  through the transfer 
o f central regulatoiy tasks — has integrated the social self-administration directly in the 
process o f cutting back provisions, in order to disburden itself -  in best corporatist manner 
-  from potential conflict and legitimatory risks” (Urban 2001: 29; author’s own translation).
The result was a situation which Noweski (2004) describes as “self-administration in 
the shadow o f hierarchy”: while the government was no longer directly involved in the 
conflict-ridden budget bargains, it had considerable powers in the increasingly likely 
incident o f non-agreement. A growing number o f  decisions about the allocation of 
scarce resources was shifted to arbitrations boards, or in cases o f non-agreement, the 
Ministry o f Health had to issue regulations (see Sachverstandigenrat 2005: 36). Parallel, 
the goal o f cost containment has been internalised in both the incentive structures o f the 
insurance funds (via competition between them) as well as of the service providers (via 
incentives in the financing structures) -  in this way, the state exploits the corporatist 
structures for its own cost containment goals (see Noweski 2004). In terms of fiscal 
commitment, the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘effective’ commitment is important 
in this case: while formally assigning authority to the social partners, they did in fact not 
gain much decisionmaking scope while being used by the government as a tool for cost 
containment. The increased formal autonomy in spending bargains is therefore not 
effective in terms o f commitment-maintaining.
With regard to fiscal commitment on the revenue structure, the French health insurance 
scheme has seen a drastic reduction between 1991 and 2005 mainly due to the 
replacement o f contribution revenues with the earmarked income tax CSG. In contrast, 
the high share of earmarked contribution-financing has remained stable in the GKV. 
The only limited reduction o f fiscal commitment on this dimension in the German
223
scheme has been due to the introduction o f a limited purpose-earmarked federal subsidy 
in 2004 -  which has opened the door for further financial interventions by the federal 
state. Furthermore, the health insurance has been struggling with the reduction of 
overall contribution revenues, also due to political decisions which disburdened other 
insurance carriers at the expenses of the GKV. This represents a case o f commitment- 
breaking (which remained however limited due to the parallel disburdening o f the GKV 
with the introduction of the long-term care insurance).
The decoupling of health insurance eligibility from the employment status and the 
further expansion of the coverage of the French CNAM has also further reduced the 
degree o f fiscal commitment on the spending dimension. Regarding the generosity o f  
benefits, the consecutive increase of co-payments as well as the lowering o f  
reimbursement rates did in fact represent benefit cuts. The repeated use of these 
measures to curb public spending seems to confirm the hypothesis that benefit cuts 
should be easier to implement if the benefit-contribution link is weak. The increasing 
share of healthcare financing by private, supplementary insurers shows however that the 
private sector gained increasing importance in securing against health risks, which 
avoided future commitments for the public insurance schemes. Also in Germany, the 
low degree o f spending reciprocity seemed to have made it easier to implement benefit 
cuts: there has been a continuous increase o f co-payments as well as the exclusion of 
provisions from the catalogue o f financed services. Also the only provision which was 
equivalent to contribution payments, sickness pay, has been cut back which broke prior 
spending commitments. In contrast to France, the eligibility for benefits has not been 
further expanded by extending the insurance cover to those in the society previously 
without insurance protection. Instead there has been a process o f commitment- 
tightening through the aggravation of eligibility rules. Due to the maintenance of strong 
administrative independence, the employment-related eligibility for health insurance 
benefits still played a greater role than it was the case in France. Here the social partners 
did not only lose managerial authority, but the employers also left the administrative 
boards temporarily and did not hide their willingness to completely privatise the health 
insurance schemes even if this would have meant the loss o f their direct administrative 
authority. This indicates a strong link between the governance form of the insurance 
scheme and the development of benefit reforms.
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(2) What have been the predominant modes o f change and what were the implications 
o f  reforms for the degrees o f  fiscal commitment on the future? France experienced 
reductions o f fiscal commitment on all four dimensions: existing spending commitment 
is more directly controlled by the state via reductions of administrative independencies 
of the social partners, and commitment is also more strongly restrained in budgetary 
terms due to a more centralised allocation process (although the effect remained more 
limited than intended by the government). But the major shift in the financing structure 
away from contribution to tax financing also represents a major case of commitment- 
avoiding in the future as no new benefit entitlements are created.
In contrast, future commitment in this respect was much more maintained in Germany. 
Here the less visible restraining of commitment on the budgetary dimension via the 
increase o f financial constraints has been the dominating mode o f change. 
Commitment-breaking on the spending dimension has remained marginal with the 
introduction and increase of patients co-payments, and has been accompanied by a 
tightening o f eligibility rules.
(3) What role did the social partners and their relationship with the state play in the 
reforms? The incentive for governments to limit blame for unpopular decisions via the 
delegation to other decisionmaking bodies has, among others, been pointed out by 
Fiorina (1982: 53): “Legislators have incentives to shift the costs o f making decisions 
and to take advantage o f imperfect information on the part o f constituents by evading 
responsibility for the consequences of policy decisions”. In the German health sector, 
exactly this shifting o f unpopular decisionmaking into the self-administration sphere 
could be observed. But as the government still held the powers to set the frameworks 
for bargains and had the capacity to intervene in cases o f non-decisions, it was in the 
comfortable situation to then blame the social partners for having failed to make use of 
their responsibilities if  bargains could not be reached. The social partners were rarely 
able to resist this development as they formally gained budgetary authorities while still 
maintaining their full administrative independence. Furthermore, the increased 
competition between both insurers as well as providers had led to a fragmentation of 
interests, which made common resistance more difficult and unlikely. The parallel 
process o f centralising the self-administration committees also had a positive effect on 
the regulatory capacity o f the government (see Noweski 2004: 77): the centralisation of 
decisionmaking brought with it a reduction o f possible veto points and made
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decisionmaking processes more efficient, which weakened the possibilities of 
fragmented interest groups to interfere in the process.
In contrast, the French state assumed administrative and budgetary authority much more 
direct in the health sector. But despite this fact, it remained unable to push through its 
goals o f a further liberalisation o f the system and the implementation o f stricter cost 
containment mechanisms against both the resistance o f the insurance carriers and the 
service providers (see Bandelow 2005). One explanation is that these attacks on the 
existing system of healthcare financing and provision were much more direct than in the 
German case. But in contrast to Germany, the French sector also lacked a system of 
organised group bargains to which unpopular decisions could have been delegated.
Within the French corporatist administration, the employers gained a stronger presence 
compared to the unions. But their return into the self-administration committees cannot 
be interpreted as an expression o f strong support for the system: the employers’ 
continuing demands for a further privatisation o f the system showed that their ‘office- 
seeking’ attitude was in fact limited. Their main concern seemed to be the control of the 
system’s costs. If that was not possible within the old system, that is if  the interfering 
hand o f the government could not be held back or be pushed back, they preferred a 
transfer o f social security provision to the private sector. In other words, they did not 
seem to care about the governance system as a whole, but more about the restriction of 
state involvement in the Regime General. Their withdrawal further reduced the 
legitimisation of the bi-partite governance structure o f the health insurance scheme. In 
contrast, the maintenance of the corporatist administrative structure o f the GKV has not 
been challenged by any side o f the social partners.
(4) Is there evidence that the French governments focused more strongly on cost 
containment than the German ones? As outlined in the conclusions to the previous 
chapter, there is strong evidence that in times o f considerable, long-lasting financial 
pressures the aim of cost containment is not only pursued by the finance ministry alone, 
but also becomes a major goal of the relevant spending ministries in order to safeguard 
their competencies. In both countries, the ministers responsible for health were involved 
in a continuing battle to regain control over the finances in their sector. Equally 
regarding the extent o f cost containment measures implemented there existed no major 
differences between the two countries.
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Even if  we assume that pressures for cost containment were stronger in the French case, 
they did not have much effect: while the French scheme developed towards a 
centralised, state-regulated system and the German scheme towards a delegated 
bargaining system in the area o f self-administration, we can paradoxically observe a 
strengthening o f budgetary influence and cost containment pressures in the German 
case, while the efforts in France remained without much effect. This was the case 
although the French government did not face powerful veto players such as the centrally 
organised associations of insurance funds and service providers in Germany. Instead, it 
was the absence o f such strong self-administration bodies which hindered the French 
state from finding a way to effectively implement its cost containment plans (see 
Bandelow 2005: 22). In the German case in contrast, the delegation of bargaining 
powers was combined with the parallel introduction of more and more competitive 
elements between the insurance carriers. This led to a process o f internal fragmentation 
between the insurance funds as well as the service providers, which weakened their 
bargaining powers. The pressure on the self-administration to reach unpopular 
restrictive decisions itself has therefore grown considerably, as have the institutional 
pre-conditions for the enforcement of these decisions. This confirms that the withdrawal 
of the state actually can sometimes contribute more to cost containment than the other 
way around, i.e. more direct state authorities as in the French case (see also 
Sachverstandigenrat 2005).
The analysis of the reform developments in the health sector also confirms the 
observations made in the previous chapter that the state is also more concerned with its 
own budget than with the apparent ‘independent’ insurance budgets. The reduction of 
budgetary autonomy in the French case has reduced the possibility for the shifting of 
financial burdens to the social insurance schemes (although the foundation o f CADES 
can also be seen as a way to avoid responsibilities for the health insurance deficits). In 
the German case, the introduction of the temporary subsidy for the GKV had the 
positive side-effect that it also increased revenues for the federal budget. While after the 
planned abolition o f the subsidy in 2007 the additional revenues were to fully flow into 
the federal budget, the deficit situation o f the GKV -  for years ignored by the federal 
government who pretended not to be informed about the illegal credit-financing strategy 
of many insurance funds -  served as a welcome justification for the tax increases which 
were necessary to pay for the subsidy.
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Conclusions
The analysis o f the reform developments in the French and German health insurance 
schemes confirms the findings o f the previous chapter that fiscal commitment on the 
individual dimensions and the behaviour of actors are connected, and not independent, 
aspects of the reform process. The willingness o f the French social partners to defend 
their administrative authority in the scheme was reduced drastically with their ongoing 
loss o f budgetary authority and the increasing shifts in the revenue provision due to the 
shift to tax-financing, which effectively left them in charge of the scheme without 
having any relevant influence regarding its performance or development. The extension 
of insurance cover to the whole population with the introduction of the CMU in 2004 
also abolished the occupational character o f the insurance scheme -  another reason why 
the employer representatives showed only limited commitment towards the maintenance 
of the scheme and proposed alternative solutions such as privatisation or competition 
between funds. In contrast, their German counterparts heavily defended their authority 
against further state involvement -  here fiscal commitment was mainly maintained, as 
was the occupational character o f the insurance. But also here the government managed 
to increase indirect influence by increasingly setting tight frameworks for the self- 
administration while leaving the formal authorities o f the social partners untouched.
In line with the findings o f the previous chapter, the results of the analysis do not 
confirm the hypothesis that the French government should pursue cost containment 
stronger than the German one due to the strong position o f the French finance minister 
in policymaking. In Germany there were also several attempts, mainly led by the health 
ministry, to impose tighter spending constraints on the health insurance schemes but due 
to the higher degree of independence o f the GKV schemes those were more able than 
their French counterparts to counter-act those attempts. The results also do not support 
partisanship arguments: although a short-term revision o f some cost containment 
measures could indeed be observed in Germany after the election victory o f the Social 
Democrats in 1998, these measures were all reintroduced after a short while due to the 
difficult financial situation. The change in government therefore had merely a delaying 
effect on cost containment measures in Germany, while no visible change in the cost- 
containment strategy could be observed in the French case.
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7 The Effects of Fiscal Dependence: Welfare Reforms 
in the Unemployment Sector
The financing of unemployment provisions has, due to the rise of unemployment rates 
in both Germany and France, become a major issue since 1990. While high 
unemployment had already been a problem in the mid 1980s, the situation in Germany 
improved considerably at the end of the 1980s while the recovery in France was less 
pronounced. But in both countries, the problem worsened again after 1990: in France, 
unemployment rates climbed above 10 percent from 1992 onwards which was a level 
unprecedented during the 1980s. Also in Germany unemployment rates increased 
drastically during this period due to mass unemployment in the Eastern part of the 
country after unification and slow economic growth from the mid-1990s onwards. In 
both countries, the situation on the labour market improved in line with economic 
performance at the end of the 1990s, but worsened again thereafter (see Graph 7.1).
Graph 7-1 Standardised Unemployment Rates, 1991-2005
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The following chapter examines the development of unemployment insurance provision 
during this period in the two countries, with particular focus on the fact that at the 
beginning of the 1990s France and Germany had very different degrees of fiscal 
commitment in this insurance sector. While in France, fiscal commitment in the
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unemployment insurance scheme UNEDIC had been very high or high on all four 
dimensions, the degree of fiscal commitment in the German Federal Employment 
Agency (BA) had been the lowest o f all three examined schemes with an overall score 
o f 13 out o f 20. While the share of earmarked contribution revenues in the financing 
structure o f the BA has been very high, this was counterbalanced by strong limitations 
to the administrative and, particularly, the budgetary autonomy of the administering 
institution. The spending structure furthermore entailed a high degree of redistributive 
elements. This chapter examines the impact o f these different degrees of fiscal 
commitment in the two unemployment insurance schemes on successive reform paths 
and analyses, as in the previous two chapters, the particular modes o f change as well as 
the roles played by the social partners and different governmental actors in the reform 
processes.
7.1 The Price of Independence: Unemployment Reforms in 
France
7.1.1 Administrative Independence
The French unemployment insurance scheme UNEDIC -  founded as an autonomous 
scheme based on national agreements between the social partners -  enjoyed a 
considerable degree o f formal independence from the state in 1990. The government 
had no direct hierarchical control powers over the scheme, which also selected its own 
officials. This wide-reaching administrative autonomy had been connected with a strong 
decentralisation of the unemployment insurance system, with UNEDIC consisting o f 30 
ASSEDIC which did not only have their own legal status, but also their own scope for 
administrative and budgetary decisionmaking.
But despite this formally high degree of administrative independence, there were 
various ways in which the government could and did exert influence (see Mosley et al. 
1998). One channel o f state influence derived from the fact that the scheme was based 
on regularly negotiated agreements between the employers’ associations and trade 
unions which determined all important organisational, administrative and financial 
aspects o f the scheme and which were binding upon employers and employees alike. 
These agreements had to be approved by the government. Furthermore, in cases of non­
agreement, the government had the right to impose measures through a decree -  in the 
past, often the threat o f making use of this power alone was sufficient to exert influence
230
on the social partners’ decisions. Another aspect of state influence derived from its 
direct responsibility over the solidarity system, as institutional or programmatic changes 
in this institutionally separate system could result in adjustment reactions which forced 
the administrators of UNEDIC to successively implement changes as well (Erhel et al. 
2000: 126).
The unemployment insurance sector already faced financial as well as managerial 
problems during the 1980s, and these continued throughout the 1990s. The government 
increasingly took advantage of the difficulties o f the social partners to reach agreements 
and often interfered in the bargaining. But this repeated intervention led to conflicts and 
the relationship between the government and the social partners, as well as between the 
social partners themselves, became increasingly fragile. In particular, the employers 
increased their pressure in trying to re-establish the autonomy of the scheme and those 
of the social partners within it, as part o f their strategy for ‘selective disengagement’ 
decided in 1999 (see Woll 2005).
As in the pension and health insurance sectors, the employers raised their profile at the 
end o f the 1990s by repeatedly threatening to withdraw from the self-administration 
committees o f UNEDIC. This put pressure on the unions to reach agreements with the 
employers if  they did not want to endanger the system of self-administration. This 
proved repeatedly successful: a threat to leave UNEDIC led to the agreement between 
MEDEF and the majority o f unions about an unemployment insurance reform in 2000, 
which limited access to unemployment benefits and imposed a set of new obligations 
for long-term unemployed (see 7.1.4.1). For the first time, the employers had struck a 
deal exclusively with the unions, while excluding the Socialist-led government under 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin from any direct involvement. But the agreement was only 
signed by the three trade union federations covering mostly private sector employees, 
headed by the moderate CFTD. The leftist CGT and Force Ouvriere, representing 
mainly public sector workers, opposed the deal and urged the government to intervene 
by denying the pact the necessary ministerial approval (see Financial Times, 15 June 
2000). Initially, the Minister of Finance, Laurent Fabius, and the Minister of 
Employment and Social Affairs, Martine Aubry, did refuse to approve the agreement 
and demanded re-negotiations. They argued that the implications of the proposed 
reforms particularly on long-term unemployed would be too severe, and furthermore 
challenged the sustainability o f the proposed financing concept. But the refusal o f the
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ministers to approve the agreement by the social partners had also different motivations: 
“If Martine Aubry, the labour minister, had approved the scheme, she would have given 
a new political dimension to MEDEF, since the state would have been seen to surrender 
part o f its traditional role as arbiter of social policy” (Financial Times, 28 July 2000).100 
But the fact that the majority of the unions and the employers were -  for once -  united 
in their reform plans gave the government no real possibility to block the reform. The 
MEDEF threatened to place the matter before France’s State Council, as it considered 
the governments’ refusal an abuse of its powers. The hopes o f the government that the 
CFDT would back out of the agreement due to pressure by the other unions as well as 
the government did not materialise either. In October, after months o f fierce battles 
about the agreement and one week after the departure o f Aubry from the cabinet, Jospin 
-  who was according to government officials in ‘no mood to pick a fight with business’ 
due to falling public support and a negative economic outlook (see Financial Times, 27 
October 2000) -  solved the confrontation by approving the agreement. The final retreat 
of the government meant that the social partners successfully fought off the increasing 
involvement of the state in its decisionmaking processes, and UNEDIC retained its high 
degree o f administrative independence without any further challenges to its regulatory 
and administrative authority.
7.1.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
7.1.2.1 Budgetary Autonomy
Corresponding to its high degree of administrative independence, UNEDIC also 
enjoyed a high degree o f autonomy in budgetary issues in 1990. In contrast to the social 
insurance schemes of the Regime General, it was able to determine its own revenues by 
setting the contribution rate and also defined the regulations of benefit provision 
independently (with ex-post approval by the government). This has not formally 
changed since then, but the importance of the necessary governmental approval -  
particularly with regard to the contribution rate -  increased with the financial difficulties 
of the scheme. As a parliamentary report o f 1993 emphasised, “in reality the bipartism 
of the system is widely fictitious, as a change of contribution rates has to be approved 
by the government -  which is, due to the financial situation o f the associations, in the
100 With the signing o f the employment contracts, UNEDIC and the social partners would have also 
entered the area of employment services, administered by the employment service agency APNE under 
direct governmental control. This would have further limited the influence o f the government on 
employment matters, which explained its strong resistance to the plans.
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majority o f cases in the position to get its way” (Delalande 1994, cf. Erhel et al. 2000:
126). The increasing financial difficulties of the scheme due to rising unemployment at 
the beginning o f the 1990s enabled the government to gain influence on decisions of the 
social partner in exchange for monetary help. In 1993, it committed itself to pay a 
subsidy to UNEDIC, and the social partners committed themselves in exchange neither 
to lower the contribution rate nor to increase benefits (see Mosley et al. 1998: 15). As 
part o f this agreement, the state also formally gained influence over the unemployment 
insurance budget through the establishment o f a tripartite supervisory council, the 
Conseil d ’Orientation et de Surveillance (COS), which was responsible for the auditing 
of UNEDIC's accounts as well as for co-ordination and control measures. Furthermore, 
the budget of UNEDIC was from 1994 onwards underlying a duty of parliamentary 
permit which was justified by the provision of the state subsidy (see Erhel et al 2000:
127).
But in line with the 2000 reform, with which the social partners had pushed through 
their reform plans against the will o f the government, the budgetary autonomy of the 
scheme in determining its own revenues was also reinforced. While the government had 
initially challenged the sustainability o f the financing plan o f the reform, it finally 
accepted the proposal by the social partners. One important factor which certainly 
contributed to the final acceptance of the agreement was the fact that UNEDIC offered 
to provide €2.3 bn in the following two years to the state budget, financed from its 
surpluses. Additionally, the government cancelled the subsidy o f €770 million annually 
which it had previously agreed to pay to the unemployment scheme. In a way, it seemed 
that the government ‘sold’ its consent to plans of the social partners, and in this way 
part of its budgetary powers over the unemployment insurance. But although the state 
subsidy had been abolished, the parliamentary permit o f UNEDIC’s accounts which had 
been introduced with it remained.
7,1.2.2 Budgetary Constraints
Due to its high degree of formal budgetary independence, UNEDIC had not been 
subject to fiscal targets or pre-defined budgets by the state, but allocated its finances via 
settlements between the social partners. However, the deficit regulations in place 
resulted in strong budgetary constraints and pressures to contain spending. In contrast to 
Germany, deficits were not automatically covered by the state but had to be financed via
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credits. But as a special entity recognised as ‘pursuing a mission of general interest’, 
UNEDIC’s liabilities were guaranteed by the state (see OECD 2003: 128).
As the financial situation of the insurance scheme was highly dependent on the 
development of the overall employment situation in France, the increase of 
unemployment at the beginning of the 1990s had strong negative effects on the fiscal 
situation of UNEDIC. Between 1991 and 1993, the scheme was in deficit (see Graph 7- 
2).
Graph 7-2 Balances UNEDIC, 1990-2004
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As a consequence, UNEDIC was forced to take out a €5 bn credit in 1993. In addition, 
measures to limit expenditure were agreed in the 1993 settlement between the social 
partners (see 7.1.4). The important aspect of this agreement was that besides an increase 
in the contribution rate, the government and the social partners agreed the provision of a 
state subsidy for the next 10 years amounting to a third of the deficit of UNEDIC (see 
Financial Times, 24 November 1993). In turn, the social partners agreed to repay their 
debts (particularly to the ASF which financed early retirement benefits partly from 
transfers by UNEDIC, see 5.1.2.3). But in 1995, the government broke its promise of 
providing the subsidy to UNEDIC and stressed that public deficits had to be cut. In an 
interview, President Chirac said that he was ‘confident’ that employers, unions and the
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government would find a way of solving the funding problems (see Agence France 
Presse, 5 September 1995). Both the employers’ federation CNPF as well as the unions 
reacted angrily to the government’s backtracking on its funding promises, but were -  
due to an improvement of the employment situation and savings resulting from the 
former benefit reforms -  able to avoid deficits in the coming years. After this short-term 
financial recovery, the situation worsened significantly again after 2001 and after three 
consecutive years of deficits, the accumulated debt of UNEDIC had reached almost 
€10.3 bn at the end of 2004 (see Table 7-1).
Table 7-1 Financial Situation UNEDIC (Accumulated Accounts)
2003 2004 2005 2006 (P) 2007 (H) 2008 (H)
Revenues 25 784 26 732 27 695 29 328 30 288 31 083
Expenses 30 067 31 152 30 887 29 024 27 492 25 704
Annual Result -4 282 -4 420 -3 192 304 2 796 5 379
Financial Situation 31/12 -5 836 -10 260 -13 452 -13 148 -10 352 -4 973
Source: Unedic, Direction des Etudes et de Statistiques, 2006
P: Prediction ; H: Hypothesis
As UNEDIC’s deficits were not taken over by the state, it was forced to turn to the 
financial markets to solve its liquidity problems.101 The interest charges associated with 
this way of financing amounted to €236.6 million in 2005 alone (Unedic 2005: 28). But 
the government also helped out, albeit temporarily: in May 2004, Social Affairs 
Minister Jean-Louis Borloo agreed to bail out UNEDIC in order to fund benefits of 
long-term job-seekers, who won a legal battle against the cutting back of their monthly 
benefits implemented in January 2004.102 In order to further improve the financial 
situation of the unemployment insurance scheme, Borgoo agreed to forgo the collection 
of €2 bn owed by UNEDIC to the state. It was reported that finance minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy was not very happy about this deal (Market News, 4 May 2004).
In order to cope with future deficits, the 2004 convention of employers and trade unions 
contained plans for the creation of a reserve fund -  equivalent to 3 months of expenses -  
designated to guarantee the stability of benefits and contributions during periods of 
economic instability (Unedic 2005: 12). Due to the difficult financial situation however, 
the building up of this fund was by the end of 2005 still only an intention. The danger of
101 Deficits were covered via the emission o f bonds after obtaining a state guaranty, state loans as well as 
short-term credits (see Unedic 2005: 11).
102 In this case, the implementation o f the PARE contracts between the beneficiaries and UNEDIC 
backfired (see 7.1.4): the courts ruled that UNEDIC had to life up to the agreements o f the initial 
contracts made with the beneficiaries, which meant that successive reductions o f  the duration o f benefits 
were not possible.
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future financial difficulties, and with it the possibilities for further state involvement, 
therefore remained.
7A,2,3 Conclusions
Despite several attempts by successive French governments to increase their budgetary 
authority in the unemployment insurance scheme, UNEDIC retained its high degree of 
budgetary autonomy during the observed period. This has been in spite of considerable 
and re-occurring financial pressures, which have made state subsidies necessary. But as 
these subsidies have always only been temporary and UNEDIC did not enter into 
automatic coverage arrangements with the government, this did not have a direct impact 
on its budgetary independence. Other attempts by the state to increase fiscal control, 
such as the institutionalisation of a tripartite supervisory council and the ex-post 
approval o f the budget by parliament, have also only had a limited effect and the bi­
partite bargains between the social partners remained the central decisionmaking mode 
in the unemployment sector.
7.1.3 Revenue Structure
Since the separation between the solidarity and the insurance scheme in 1984, the state 
had gradually withdrawn from the financing of unemployment. Despite the short-term 
payment o f a state subsidy in 1993 and 1994, the relative share o f taxes in 
unemployment financing sank after 1987 -  even during periods o f strongly increasing 
unemployment as at the beginning of the 1990s (see Erhel et al. 2000: 144). The very 
high contribution share o f around 90 percent in the revenue structure o f UNEDIC
1 f t tremained stable throughout the 1990s. From 2000 onwards, contribution revenues 
even increased to nearly 93 percent o f revenues in 2005 (see Table 7-2).
103 Data Source: UNEDIC, Statis No 174.
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Table 7-2 Revenues Unemployment Insurance 2000-2005
REVENUE SOURCES
If 2003
(m €)
% 2005 %
Contributions 20376 89.46 23780 92.23 25685 92.74
Surcontribution 234 1.03 0 0.00 0 0.00
Other Technical Revenues 136 0.60 121 0.47 98 0.35
Prelevements Retraite 228 1.00 910 3.53 1011 3.65
Conventions Diverses 179 0.79 191 0.74 213 0.77
Part Etat AFR 348 1.53 4 0.02 0 0.00
Participation Enterprise CRP 0 0.00 0 0.00 38 0.14
Frais de Fonctionnement IDE 31 0.14 0 0.00 0 0.00
Gestion Administr. Hors IDE 239 1.05 193 0.75 213 0.77
Contribution ARPE 202 0.89 1 0.00 0 0.00
Cotisations Licenciement 550 2.41 585 2.27 32 0.12
Subvention Etat 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Revenus Financiers 252 1.11 9 0.03 0 0.00
TOTAL 22776 100.00 25784 100.00 27695 100.00
Source: Own calculations based on data from UNEDIC UNIstatis
But there have been indirect ways in which the state contributed to the scheme: from 
1996 onwards, it paid the social security contributions of older unemployed workers, 
which was effectively a subsidisation of UNEDIC’s de facto early retirement scheme 
financed via the ASF (see OECD 2003: 147). The 2004 agreement also contained the 
creation of a specific fund intended to finance benefits of artists and technicians in the 
media industry, previously hit hard due to their irregular employment patterns by 
reforms to the eligibility rules. The provisions of this fund were to be financed by the 
state with €80 million via the Allocation du fonds specifique provisoire (AFSP), which 
represented an indirect subsidisation of UNEDIC’s accounts. But as the amount of these 
tax allocations remained marginal compared to contribution revenues, the degree of 
fiscal commitment on the revenue dimensions remained very high.
7.1.4 Spending Structure
In 1990, a high degree of fiscal commitment had derived from the spending structure of 
UNEDIC: eligibility for benefits was strongly related to the former contribution record 
of the insured, and insurance-external provisions were mainly financed by the state.
7.1.4.1 Eligibility
With the strong increase of unemployment and the worsening of the financial situation 
of UNEDIC, the 1992 agreement between the social partners tightened the already 
restrictive benefit conditions even further (see Bonoli and Palier 2000). The three 
different forms of unemployment insurance benefits were replaced by the Allocation
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Unique Degressive (AUD). The AUD was characterised by an even stricter 
proportionality between the duration of contribution times and the duration o f benefits 
and was meant to ‘activate’ the expenses of the unemployment insurance: depending on 
the contribution record, the amount of the benefit decreased with time (between 8 and 
17 percent) and entitlements expired after 30 months. After eligibility for the AUD ran 
out, the unemployed had to rely on a variety o f other measures. Most important o f these 
was the Allocation de Solidarite Specifique (ASS), which was -  although still 
contributory -  subject to a means test. Besides this, the minimum contribution time for 
general eligibility for unemployment benefits was raised sharply, which again restricted 
the circle of beneficiaries.
As a consequence of these tighter eligibility regulations which disadvantaged the 
unemployed with short employment and contribution records, the share of employment- 
seekers reimbursed via the unemployment insurance fe ll.104 As unemployment rose 
again after 1999, further reforms became necessary in order to cope with rising deficits. 
In 2000, the social partners signed a new agreement that limited access to 
unemployment benefits further and imposed new obligations on the unemployed. The 
new Plan d ’Aide et de Retour a VEmploi (PARE) ended benefit degressivity but 
required recipients to sign a contract with the national employment office that obliged 
them to participate in a personalised job search.
This new programme was part of the reform that followed the power struggle between 
the government, MEDEF and the trade union confederations which signed the deal 
(CFDT, CFE-CGC and CFTC). As outlined before, the government at first refused to 
approve the agreement, arguing that the right to establish benefits should remain the 
prerogative o f the state (see Vail 2004: 162). But unable to break the union between the 
social partners, the government had to finally back down. The system of contracts 
finally came into force, but the unemployed were assured by the government that their 
benefit entitlements would also then be maintained if  they would not enter a PARE 
contract. This meant that despite the restriction o f eligibility through UNEDIC, 
commitment was maintained as the new eligibility rules introduced were not enforced. 
Therefore the state effectively maintained its promise towards the social status 
protection, as a move towards workfare models did not seem acceptable regarding the
104 More and more people received means-tested instead o f insurance benefits: the number o f people 
receiving ASS increased from 34 800 in 1992 to 467 000 in 1995 (Join-Lambert 1997: 576).
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high support of the traditional insurance model in the French society (Barbier and 
Theret 2001; Clasen and Clegg 2003; Bode and Veil 2003; Smith 2005).
But as a consequence of enduring financial pressures, in 2002 the former maximum 
duration of unemployment insurance benefits within the PARE scheme was reduced 
from 30 to 23 months. This led to a massive shift of beneficiaries from the contribution- 
based to the tax-based benefit systems.105 The French government reacted to this 
expected increase in beneficiaries in their schemes with a tightening of eligibility rules 
and duration on their part: provisions from the ASS, formerly without duration limits, 
were now provided to a maximum of two years for new beneficiaries and three years for 
people already receiving them. Overall, the number of beneficiaries in means-tested 
solidarity schemes (ASS and Allocation d’lnsertion) increased by more every year 
between 1995 and 2003 than the number of people receiving unemployment insurance 
benefits (see Table 7-3). But the tightening of eligibility rules in the ASS scheme in 
2002 is also clearly visible, with an ever increasing share of unemployed people 
receiving the less generous Allocation d’lnsertion.
Table 7-3 Development of Unemployment Compensations by Benefit Type 
(Number of beneficiaries, change compared to previous year in %)
Potential
Beneficiaries
Allocation 
d ’Assurance 
Chomage
Allocation de 
Solidarite 
Speciftque (ASS)
Allocation
d ’lnsertion
All
Schemes
1995 -1.1 -3.5 +7.0 -12.2 -1.6
1996 +4.3 +1.2 +5.6 -12.7 +2.0
1997 +2.8 +1.1 -6.4 +6.6 -0.5
1998 +0.7 +0.6 +0.4 +33.6 +0.8
1999 -3.6 -3.9 -2.5 +24.6 -3.4
2000 -9.7 -5.9 -9.5 +19.4 -6.4
2001 +1.0 +12.9 -7.9 +15.1 +8.8
2002 +3.5 +12.2 -5.0 +18.6 +9.6
2003 +5.7 +6.7 -6.3 +7.2 +5.8
TOTAL +3.6% +21.4% -24.6% +100.2% +15.1%
Source: DARES (Premiere Syntheses; various issues)
7.1.4.2 Reciprocity
The link between contribution records and benefit generosity had also been very strong 
in 1990, whereas the provision of insurance-external benefits had been very marginal. 
As the financial situation still looked favourable in 1990, the basic unemployment
105 This shifting o f insured into the solidarity system was also the case in 2002 with the foundation o f  the 
Allocation Equivalent Retraite (AER), a special benefit securing a minimum income for unemployed 
under 60 who already had 40 contribution years. While a former similar scheme had been financed by the 
social partners, this new benefit was now also part o f the state-financed solidarity scheme.
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allowance was slightly increased and contribution rates were reduced. But this situation 
changed quite rapidly in 1992, and the focus shifted more towards fiscal consolidation. 
In 1993, benefit payments did not follow the usual annual adaptation and were not 
increased. Insurance benefits were, however, reduced to a lesser extent overall than tax- 
financed means-tested benefits -  despite the fact that in 1993 the benefit regulations had 
once more been tightened. This was also the case after 1998: the replacement rates of 
the state-financed benefits as the ASS remained stable, while insurance-based benefits 
(ARE) increased more strongly:
Table 7-4 Replacement Rates Unemployment Insurance and Solidarity Benefits
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Aide au retour a I’emploi (ARE)
RR(gross) (1) 56% 57% 56% 58% 59% 60%
RR (net) 68% 68% 68% 70% 72% 72%
Alocation de Solidarite Specifique (ASS)
RR (gross) 35% 35% 36% 36% 36% 34%
RR (net) 43% 44% 45% 45% 45% 43%
(1) Replacement Rate: Relationship between gross or net monthly benefit and the gross or net 
monthly reference salary o f the beneficiary
Source: Dares, Insee, Unedic; DARES: Premieres Syntheses 2005-No 10.2
In 2001, the surplus due to the improvement in the labour market allowed a reduction of 
the contribution rate and also meant the end of the decline of unemployment benefits. 
But this had a quick ending in 2002, when facing a deficit of €3.7 bn, the social partners 
decided to increase the contribution rate again and to also modify the benefit regulations 
(see OECD 2005: 127). Allied to the further tightening of eligibility criteria (see above), 
the amount of benefits was generally reduced according to household income of the 
beneficiary (see Veil 2004: 144). But overall, benefit levels in the insurance scheme 
have remained fairly stable between 1990 and 2005.
7.1.4.3 Conclusions
Generally, both the very high commitment scores with regard to eligibility and internal 
as well as external reciprocity have been maintained in the French unemployment 
insurance scheme between 1990 and 2005 -  despite a series of reforms which have had 
considerable impacts on the nature and generosity of benefit provision. This has been 
possible as the reforms have mainly targeted redistributive elements and those insured 
with only short-term contribution records, which have been shifted into the state- 
financed solidarity schemes. Spending commitments have therefore not been broken, 
but have been widely maintained via the strengthening of insurance elements.
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7.2 Breaking Fiscal Commitments: Unemployment Reforms in 
Germany
7.2.1 Administrative Independence
Reforms o f the governance structure o f social insurance carriers in Germany have been 
the most far-reaching in the case o f unemployment insurance. As outlined in Chapter 4, 
the managerial independence of the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit was in 1990 restricted as 
the government was not only represented in the tripartite administrative committees of 
the institution, but had also wide-reaching intervention and supervisory powers both in 
administrative and budgetary matters (see 4.2.1). These interlinked decisionmaking 
processes led to conflicts between the administrators o f the BA and the government 
when the financial situation deteriorated due to mass unemployment in Eastern 
Germany after 1991: unions, employer representatives and the government found it 
increasingly difficult to agree the amount and distribution o f spending in the annual 
budgeting process, which resulted in lengthy bargains as neither side could unilaterally 
impose the budget (see 4.2.2). In order to avoid these annual struggles, the Kohl 
government made an attempt in 1996 to disempower the self-administration of the BA 
nearly completely. The draft law o f the AFRG reform planned to grant the Ministry of 
Labour and its statutory ordinances categorical primacy, which would have resulted in 
the function o f the central administrative level of the BA being reduced to a mere legal 
oversight. But the draft law did not survive negotiations in the parliamentary 
committees, in which the social partners had great influence: “Like Don Quichote with 
the windmills the coalition parties failed with their plans due to the committee for 
labour and social affairs, and therefore due to the social partners” (Trampusch 2002: 30; 
author’s own translation).
Parallel to the CDU/CSU-FDP reform initiative, the Social Democrats came up with 
their own version o f an unemployment insurance reform. Their draft of an ‘Employment 
and Structural Promotion Act’ (Arbeits- und Strukturfbrderungsgesetz) granted the 
social partners not less, but more administrative and budgetary powers: the right to pass 
ordinances was to be clearly assigned to the administrative committee of the BA, and 
the Ministry o f Labour was not to act paramount, but subordinate to the self­
administration. Furthermore, the right o f the government to enforce an amended budget 
-  introduced in 1993 (see 7.2.2.1) -  was to be abolished again. But these reform plans 
also failed in parliament.
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After taking over power in 1998, the position of the Social Democrats took a 180 degree 
turn: the reform of the BA implemented in 2002 and the successive Hartz legislation 
represented the greatest interference in self-administration powers o f a social insurance 
body since WWII. The changes implemented were a direct response to a report from the 
Federal Auditors Court which in 2002 discovered the systematic falsification of 
placement statistics by BA officials who wanted to improve their activity levels. All 
actors agreed that a major reform of the governance structure o f the BA was inevitable, 
but the ideas o f how such a reform should look differed widely. The BDA, representing 
the employers, demanded the abolition o f the tripartite administration in the 
unemployment insurance and its replacement with bipartite committees without any 
state representation (see BDA 2004). It accused the state representatives o f ‘massive 
self-interest’ in budgetary decisions which hampered the economical and efficient use 
of budgetary funds (see Trampusch 2002: 36). In the eyes o f Jurgen Husmann, member 
of the executive board of the BDA, the presence of the state representatives had “the 
effect that both employers as well as employees always try to pull them to their side at 
the expense of efficiency” (Financial Times Germany, 22 February 2002). In addition, 
the BDA argued for the strengthening of self-administration on the local level. The 
unions also wanted more independence for the insurance institution: in line with the 
employer representatives, they demanded that the executive board had to be responsible 
to the administrative committee, which included the right of appointing and dismissing 
its directors (see DGB 2003; BDA 2004).
But the demands of the social partners for more independence o f the self-administration 
remained unheard, as the government publicly blamed the self-administration o f the BA 
for not taking appropriate action after the scandal. Chancellor Schroder stated that 
“unfortunately it had to be accepted” that the federal government did “not dispose of the 
necessary powers to draw consequences” in the current administrative framework.106 It 
is debatable whether Chancellor Schroder was just ill-informed and did not know that it 
was not the BA’s executive board, but his very own labour minister Walter Riester who 
was responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the BA’s president and vice- 
president, or whether it was a strategic move to publicly blame the self-administration
106 Interview Gerhard Schroeder with the NDR (Northern German Broadcasting Corporation), 
17.02.2002.; author’s own translation.
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for the discovered failures.107 In light of the subsequent reform of the BA, which was 
announced just three weeks after the scandal became public, the latter seems more 
likely: instead of expanding self-administration authority as demanded by the social 
partners, their competencies on the top-level o f the BA were further restricted. The 
election of employee representatives to the supervisory board o f the BA, as well as the 
structure o f this board, was reformed. The board now consisted o f three directors 
(recommended by the government), who were employed on a contractual basis for 5 
years and could be replaced by the government if  the ‘mutual trust’ was destroyed. The 
tripartite administrative committee was transformed into a supervisory board, which had 
extended information rights but fewer formal executive functions. These wide-reaching 
changes of the upper level o f self-administration met harsh criticism from both sides o f  
the social partners, which were opposed to the further reduction of their administrative 
authorities and the even stronger governmental powers in administering the institution. 
But, parallel to the restriction of budgetary and administrative authorities of top level of 
BA, there was an expansion of self-administration capacities at the regional level: 
‘decentralisation’ became the main topic o f the AFRG reform, which contained 
numerous regulations that gave the administrative boards o f the local employment 
agencies more decisionmaking scope.
These first reforms were the forerunner for the following major organisational reform of 
the BA following suggestions developed by the so-called ‘Hartz Commission’.108 In 
January 2004, the former ‘Federal Employment Office’ (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit) was 
turned into the ‘Federal Employment Agency’ (Bundesagentur fur Arbeit). The agency 
structure consisted o f a head office, executives on the regional level and employment 
agencies on the local level. That the unions had a stronger ‘office-seeking’ attitude than 
the employer representatives showed their opposition to the connected abolition o f self­
administration on state level which provided 3,600 administrative positions (see DGB 
2003: 6). In contrast, the employer representatives -  interested in streamlining the 
administrative structures -  approved of this reform.
The Hartz reform also implemented changes regarding the legal oversight o f the BA’s 
procedures: From 2005 onwards, the Ministry o f Economics and Labour had to
107 Admittedly, Riester’s hands were also tied: as non-political civil servant, then BA president Bernhard 
Jagoda could only have been dismissed by the minister if ‘severe misconduct’ in his actions could be 
legally proven; this was, despite the placement statistics-scandal, not the case.
108 The Commission was named after its chairman Peter Hartz, then personnel director at Volkswagen.
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negotiate an agreement o f  objectives (Zielvereinbarung) with the BA. This new tool 
aimed at separating policy formulation from implementation was supposed to give the 
BA the autonomy needed to implement the necessary measures without interference 
from politicians (see Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005: 4). But this apparent granting of 
managerial independence to the BA administration did not really give the social partners 
any real influence on managerial decisions due to the dominant representation of state 
officials in the BA. The overall degree o f administrative independence, and with it the 
degree o f fiscal commitment, has therefore been reduced from medium-high in 1991 to 
very-low in 2005.
7.2.2 Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
7.2.2.1 Budgetary Autonomy
As has been the case in the main German pension and health insurance schemes, the 
budget o f the unemployment insurance scheme was in 1990 formally fully separated 
from the federal state budget. But the de facto autonomy of the budget was considerably 
restricted: the BA had no direct influence over its revenues, as contribution rates were 
determined by law. This did not change after 1990, but in line with the organisational 
reform of the BA in 2004 it was introduced that the federal government could now 
decide how the federal funds were distributed to the local Employment Agencies. This 
allocation could also be amended during the budget year by the Ministry o f Economics 
and Labour (in agreement with the Ministry o f Finance). This meant that besides not 
having control over the amount o f revenues, the BA lost influence regarding the internal 
distribution of funds, and therefore the decisionmaking competency over where and 
how the money would be spent.
With regard to the federal process o f budgetary allocation in the unemployment 
insurance sector, the authority o f the Ministry o f Labour was also expanded. These 
changes were a consequence o f a distributional conflict between the federal 
government, the Lander, the councils and the BA, which erupted during the 
consultations about the BA budget in 1993. The then Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel, 
increasingly criticised the high level of expenditure o f the BA. Within the framework of 
his ‘Savings, Consolidation and Growth Programme’, he therefore initiated a reform 
which enabled the ministry of labour to reinstate the budget against the will o f the 
administrative committee o f the BA in case the budget was showing a deficit (§216
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AFG). This step represented a major reduction in the budgetary autonomy of the BA 
and -  as the federal government decided on the main revenue and spending parameters 
of the unemployment insurance and therefore also about its financial situation -  
basically represented the complete abolition o f the budgetary decisionmaking powers o f  
the BA.
7.2.2,2 Budgetary Constraints
In 1990, budgetary constraints and therefore pressures for cost containment had been 
low for the BA. As the preparation of the annual budget was the task of its 
administrative committee, the finance ministry had no direct say while the ministry of 
labour had only indirect influence via its representatives in the committee. Furthermore, 
the procedures of deficit coverage created no incentives for the BA administration to 
contain spending: any surpluses in the unemployment insurance were accumulated in a 
reserve fund, which was supposed to cover any subsequent deficits. But as the 
unemployment insurance was usually particularly badly affected by economic 
recessions (as increasing unemployment not only resulted in higher spending for 
unemployment benefits, but at the same time also reduced contribution revenues due to 
the declining number o f employees), this reserve fund was usually not sufficient in 
times of high unemployment. As the BA had no legal instruments available to either 
reduce provisions or to increase contribution rates, the federal government was in the 
end responsible for ensuring the financial liquidity o f the institution and paid a federal 
loan amounting to the exact amount of the outstanding balance (Art. 120 GG). If the BA 
was unable to repay this loan from its receipts at the end o f the financial year, it was 
converted into a non-refundable subsidy.
But while these procedures ensured the fulfilment o f the spending commitments 
towards the insured, they gave the German government not only a strong motive, but 
also the opportunity to intervene in the BA’s budget. First o f all, it gave the government 
discretion in deciding on whom to place the burden for the financing o f deficits: 
increases of the contribution rate burdened the insurance members, whereas increases of  
the federal subsidy burdened the general taxpayer (see Schmid et al. 1992: 90). In case 
subsidies were necessary to cover the outstanding charges, the regulation also gave the 
government influence on the BA’s budget: as Bruche and Reissert (1985: 76) argue, the 
self-administration of the BA had largely lost its autonomy o f preparing the budget in 
case of anticipated deficits already before the introduction o f a governmental approval
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of the budget in 1993. During the parallel budgeting processes of the BA and the federal 
state, the latter usually calculated a lower federal subsidy than the BA. As this was the 
determining factor, the BA was forced to adapt its budget according to the approved 
subsidy by the government. This meant that the finance minister and the parliamentary 
budget committee gained considerable influence of the BA’s budget in times of 
austerity.
As outlined above, the necessary governmental approval of the BA budget introduced in 
1993 increased these powers considerably. The Ministry o f Labour did not hesitate to 
make use of its new competencies and, for the first time since the foundation of the BA, 
pushed through a revised budget in 1993 against the resistance o f the BA’s 
administrative committee. The strong reduction of the subsidy payments to the BA in 
this revised budget led to a conflict between government and the social partners, 
particularly with the unions109 : Ursula Engelen-Kefer, deputy chairperson o f the DGB, 
accused the government of ‘bending, pulling and massaging’ the budget so it could 
avoid a subsidy (SZ, 8 May 1993). In the end, the reversed subsidy for the 1993 budget 
turned out much too small -  instead of the calculated €2.5 bn, €6.3 bn were necessary in 
the end (mainly to cover overspending for active employment measures). The blame for 
overrunning the budget lay mainly with the BA, actuated by the government itself: “We 
have to protect the contribution payers from their self-administration” (Ina Albowitz, 
FDP; Focus, 5 July 1993). But Engelen-Kefer defended the overrunning o f the budget, 
arguing that the self-administration had “tried to receive the money in the correct way”, 
that is via the initial budget proposal, but the government representatives in the BA had 
been ‘stringing her along’ (Focus, 5 July 1993).
The conflicts continued in the following years as the ministry of labour corrected the 
budget plans in 1994 and 1995. The ministry o f finance, with a strong interest to reduce 
the federal subsidy due to consolidation pressures stemming from the Maastricht Treaty, 
increasingly pressed for a reduction in expenditure. The mid-term financial planning of 
the federal government for 1995-1999 even envisaged an omission of the federal 
subsidy from 1996 onwards. In order to reduce the BA deficits accordingly, the ministry 
of labour reduced the proposed spending by €1.6 bn in 1995 and this mainly affected
109 The original budget o f the BA entailed a predicted deficit o f €4.1 bn. With the changes in the 
Employment Promotion Act (AFG), strongly influenced by the Minister o f Finance Theo Waigel (CSU), 
this subsidy was supposed to be eliminated or to covered by additional revenues. This -  according to the 
great majority of the board o f directors in the administrative committee -  exceeded by far the budgetary 
implications o f the AFG-reform (see SZ, 18 December 1992).
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active employment measures (see Trampusch 2002: 29). Due to the continuing negative 
development on the labour market, the goal to avoid federal payments in 1996 was not 
achieved, but instead the necessary amount doubled compared to 1995 (€7 bn).
The persistent financial difficulties in the following years also increased tensions 
between social partners in BA budget decisions. In 1997, independent saving 
suggestions by the Ministry of Labour and the BDA were rejected by the majority of 
representatives from the Lander, communities and unions. In turn, the employer 
representatives complained about the fact the budget plans in 1997, 1999 and 2001 were 
accepted by the administrative committee against their votes (see Trampusch 2002). 
Changes implemented with the Hartz III legislation in 2004 finally put an end to these 
continuing disputes: now the administrative committees o f the local employment 
agencies were no longer allowed to make suggestions on the drafting of the budget. 
Instead, the budget was now prepared by the federal board o f directors which assumed 
sole responsibility. This again meant a sharp restriction in the budgetary authority o f the 
social partners and indirectly increased pressure to contain spending, as the spending- 
oriented employment agencies were excluded from the process, while actors closer to 
government interests came to dominate. Parallel to these direct interventions in the 
budgetary allocation process, the internal spending monitoring process of the BA was 
also strengthened throughout the observed period.110 Taken together, all measures 
aimed at increasing spending constraints had the effect that fiscal commitment on the 
budgetary dimension was reduced to a very low level.
7.2.3 Revenue Structure
Contribution vs. Tea Revenues
In 1991, the BA was financed by 88.5 percent from contributions, with the remaining 
11.5 percent predominantly coming from the taxpayer. After unification, the financial 
challenges which the mass unemployment in the Eastern Lander represented for the BA 
resulted in the biggest contribution rate increase in a social insurance sector since the 
pension reform of 1957 (see Appendix III). But despite these contribution increases, the 
revenues were not sufficient. The BA’s deficits in East Germany between 1991 and
110 In 1997, an internal revision was implemented with the AFRG reform act with the (limited) task to 
control whether the employment agencies followed the aim to prefer active to passive measures. With the 
Hartz-legislation in 2003, this task was expanded to the control o f whether fluids could have been used 
more ‘appropriately and economically’. The revision reports were then submitted to the administrative 
committee for final acceptance.
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1993 amounted to €46.3 bn, which were financed via the transfer of West German 
contribution surpluses of €29.3 bn and via €16.9 bn of federal subsidies. Two-thirds of 
the deficits resulting from unification were therefore covered by the West German 
contribution payers, while the federal government only covered one third (Kuhn 1994: 
17). As the situation on the nationwide employment market worsened once more in 
1993, the federal government had to provide a record subsidy of €12 bn -  which made 
up 23 percent of the total insurance revenues of the BA. In the following years, the BA 
remained dependent on federal subsidies, and after a short-term improvement in 2000, 
the fiscal needs increased yet again (see Graph 7-3).
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Despite the strong increase of federal subsidy payments since 1991, the overall share of 
expenditure from the federal budget for unemployment remained nearly stable when 
comparing it with federal state allocations to the BA in 1991 and 2003 (see Table 7-5).
Graph 7-3 Federal Subsidy to the BA, 1991-2004
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Table 7-5 Federal State Allocations to the Federal Employment Agency
Purpose______________________________________________ 1991 (m €)___________ 2003 (m €)
Unemployment Assistance 3 659 16 532
Early retirement benefits in the new Lander 2 920 -
Wage supplements for long-term unemployed 207 -
Unemployment Assistance Supplements in new 9T
Lander 7J
Other supplements for long-term unemployed support 42 -
Other 20 -
Deficit Coverage 526 6 2 1 5
Arbeitnehmerhilfe - 2
Eingliederungshilfe - 198
Jump Plus (Sonderprogramm Unemployed Youth) - 39
Zuschiisse Vermittlung Arbeitslosenbezieher - 2
Innovative Measures Fighting Unemployment - 29
TOTAL 7 466 23 017
Revenues Total 25 397 74 378
% of BA Revenues 29% 31%
Source: Bundeshaushaltsplan 1993, Einzelplan 11; Bundeshaushaltsplan 2005
Note: Unemployment Assistance does not count towards BA revenues, as the federal state is the
spending carrier and the BA only the administrator.
This stability has been the case as other reimbursements paid by the federal government 
to the BA were abolished or reduced. Except for years in which the deficit of the BA 
was extremely high (as in 1993 and 1996), the increasing costs of unemployment have 
been mainly covered by the contribution payers and therefore by the BA, not the federal 
budget.
Moreover, the federal government found several ways to redirect funds from the BA 
back into the federal budget. One was the assigning of additional tasks to the BA 
without financial compensation in order to relieve the federal budget.111 Another, more 
direct way of channeling funds back into the federal budget was introduced with the 
Hartz IV legislation (§46 SGB II): for unemployed people who -  after exhausting their 
eligibility to unemployment benefit -  made use of the tax-financed basic cover for job­
seekers, ‘Unemployment Benefit II’, the BA now had to pay the federal government a 
so-called ‘displacement fee’ [Aussteuerungsbetrag\, which corresponded to the one year 
expenditure for an unemployment benefit II beneficiary. In 2005, the BA transferred 
€6.72 bn to the federal budget. A large share of Unemployment Benefit II was therefore 
financed via contributions to the unemployment insurance and not, as originally
111 The costs o f the 1999 introduced emergency programme against youth unemployment were mainly 
covered by the BA. In 2000, the financing o f  the 1989 introduced special programme .Action 
Employment Assistance for Long-Term Unemployed’ was transferred to the BA (extension o f §42 lc  
SGB III). From January 2001 onwards, the federal state also did not participate any longer in the 
financing o f the structural adaptation measures (SAM §§272ff SGB).
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intended, via taxes. The ‘displacement fee* even exceeded the envisaged federal subsidy 
for the budget 2005 by €2.7 bn. This means that without this payment, the BA could 
actually have had a positive budget balance. Employer representatives and unions 
fiercely rejected the new rules:
“The ‘displacement fee’ is nothing but a haphazard penalty fee, and the argument of the 
legislator is obviously invented: the money from the displacement fee flows openly in the 
general tax fund o f the finance minister. Therefore the displacement fee is not only an 
absurd, system-violating misconstruction burdening the contribution payers, but also an 
unacceptable subsidy o f the federal budget, which has to be abolished as quickly as 
possible” (BDA 2005; author’s own translation).112
As the Federation of German Unions criticised, the unemployment insurance had with 
this fee to “assume liability also for cyclical and structural long-term unemployment, 
although it has only a very marginal influence on it” (DGB 2004b). Despite the large 
amount o f the fee and the strong negative consequences for the BA finances, its 
introduction only attracted limited public attention.113
Besides this channelling of contribution funds into the state budget, it was decided by 
the new coalition parties CDU, CSU and SPD in 2005 to replace contribution revenues 
partly with taxes.114 The unemployment insurance contribution rate will be reduced 
from 6.5 to 4.2 percent in January 2007, counter-financed by an increase o f VAT. This 
represents a further important change regarding the revenue independence of the BA, 
and a significant reduction of the degree o f fiscal commitment.
Transfers/Interdependencies:
Another important aspect with regard to the volatility o f unemployment insurance 
revenues was the financial interdependencies o f the BA with other social insurance 
institutions. “The redistribution of burdens between the different public budgets and 
funds is a long-standing noticeable characteristic of the financing of unemployment and 
employment policy in the Federal Republic of Germany” (Bruche and Reissert 1985: 
12; author’s own translation). The same applied for the period between 1994 and 2005.
112 Source: http://www.bda-online.de/www/bdaonline.nsfrid/AFB40F0F8796D97EC 12570 
4B00447E01
113 For a rare example, see Die Zeit, 17 March 2005, “Hans Eichels ominOse Milliardenquelle”.
114 See coalition agreement: ‘Gemeinsam fiir Deutschland -  mit Mut und Menschlichkeit’, 
Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 11 November 2005, p. 21.
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Unemployment and employment policies were still financed by various sources, and the 
organisational and structural reforms during this period did not reduce this high degree 
of fiscal interdependencies, but rather increased it.
Due to its difficult financial situation and the deficit coverage through the federal state 
budget, the BA was more often the beneficiary when it came to financial shifts between 
insurance carriers (see Trampusch 2003). But as already noted (in 5.2.3.4), financial 
burdens were also shifted from the pension to the unemployment insurance in 1998 
through improved conditions for taking up partial retirement, which was mainly 
financed by the BA. But within the sector of unemployment provision, financial 
responsibilities were also highly fragmented: replacement benefits in unemployment 
were financed by three different bodies (unemployment insurance benefit by the BA, 
unemployment assistance by the federal state, and social assistance by the 
municipalities) which created incentives for each o f these bodies to shift beneficiaries 
from one benefit programme to the other. This problem was to be tackled by the ‘Fourth 
Law for Modem Services in the Labour Market’ implemented in January 2005: 
unemployment assistance and social assistance were integrated into a new benefit type, 
the ‘Unemployment Benefit II’ (see 7.2.4.2). The financing body was now the BA, 
whose expenses were then compensated by the federal government. Unemployment 
Benefit II was administered by consortia (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) o f local offices o f the 
BA and the municipalities, or in some cases exclusively by the municipalities or the 
employment agencies.115 But, by the beginning of 2005, it became clear that the goal of 
clarifying responsibilities between the financing bodies had not been achieved, as the 
municipalities took advantage o f the new regulations and declared many more former 
social assistance beneficiaries as ‘generally employable’ than had been expected. This 
meant that their benefits had to be financed by the federal government, and not the 
municipalities. This resulted in a conflict between federal government and communal 
social assistance providers about the correct classification o f the recipients. 116 
Furthermore, the different financing sources of unemployment benefits and the new 
Unemployment Benefit II had been maintained.
115 At the beginning o f 2005, 345 consortia existed besides 69 exclusive communal administrators and 30 
cases of separate management of the tasks between municipalities and employment agencies.
116 Random inspections discovered that homeless people, prisoners as well as a coma patient had been 
declared ‘employable’ (that is, aged between 15 and 65, and able to work at least three hours per day) by 
the communal bodies (see Article SZ, 12 February 2005).
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“The goal o f the Hartz Commission to abolish the ‘financial switching yard effect’ is 
unfortunately not achieved in this way. The two regulatory circles are neither 
organisationally, nor financially or with respect to their clientele separate from each other.
Every year around 700.000 unemployed people switch over from the SGB III area to the 
Unemployment Benefit II. As a result the separate provision systems, which were actually 
supposed to be abolished, have been reintroduced for an ever bigger group o f people” 
(Engelen-Kefer 2005: 3; author’s own translation).
The fiscal interdependencies have therefore not been reduced, but instead intensified. 
This has reduced the degree of fiscal commitment, as instead of clearly earmarking 
revenues for the unemployment insurance purposes, the revenue base o f the BA has 
been made more unstable as well as dependent on the behaviour of other actors such as 
the federal government and the municipalities. Overall, the volatility of the BA 
revenues has increased, which as a result decreased the degree of fiscal commitment 
from high in 1991 to medium-high in 2005.
7.2.4 Spending Structure
As has been the case in the pension and health insurance schemes, the German 
unemployment insurance scheme did not focus exclusively on the financial 
safeguarding o f income risks, but also pursued redistributive goals. Some characteristics 
of the benefit regulations in 1990 therefore violated the principle o f a strict reciprocity 
between contribution payments and benefit entitlements (see Romer and Borell 2002): 
benefits were increased due to social criteria such as age or the number of dependent 
children, and certain provisions were only granted to certain occupational groups or 
were predominantly used by them.117 Furthermore, the employment agencies provided 
consultation and placement services available to everyone, yet these services were only 
financed by the insured employees. Most active labour market instruments were granted 
either universally to everyone registered as unemployed, or depending on social criteria. 
In 1992, such active measures amounted to a spending share o f over 50 percent which 
shows that this was a factor considerably reducing the degree of reciprocity (see van 
Suntum and Schlotboller 2002). As the financial situation o f the BA deteriorated during 
the 1990s, the board of directors and administrative assembly o f the BA made repeated 
calls for a regular subsidy to cover those insurance-external provisions -  and to avoid 
cutbacks for active measures in order to finance wage-replacement benefit entitlements
117 Examples are the so-called short-time working benefits or the winter-break benefit paid to employees 
of the building industry.
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(see Reissert 1994). But as the attempts to acquire additional revenues remained 
unsuccessful, the increasing financial difficulties o f the BA made considerable reforms 
of the benefit and service provision of the insurance scheme necessary.
7.2.4.1 Eligibility
Traditionally, the social partners had made extensive use o f the active employment 
promotion programmes to accommodate workers who fell victim to industrial 
adaptation processes -  particularly through early retirement regulations partly financed 
by unemployment insurance. These regulations which allowed the early and relatively 
comfortably exit from the labour market were extended at the beginning o f the 1990s.118 
Despite increasing financial difficulties o f the BA from 1992 onwards, this practice 
continued in order to ease pressure on the labour market all throughout the 1990s (see 
Trampusch 2002). Due to changes in the pension legislation which connected early 
retirement with benefit reductions from 1995 onwards, other measures such as part-time 
models for older workers co-financed by the BA ( ‘Altersteilzeit *) gained in importance. 
These changes had financial benefits for the pension insurance, while the bill for the 
status-maintaining benefit provision to older unemployed people was picked up by the 
BA.
But the cost pressures did eventually result in some eligibility restrictions: In 1997, the 
Employment Promotion Act shortened the duration o f extended eligibility for 
unemployment benefit due to former contribution duration and age of the unemployed. 
More far-reaching plans of the government to abolish any right to unemployment 
assistance for claimants without prior receipt o f unemployment benefit and to limit the 
maximum duration generally had been blocked by the Social Democratic opposition in 
the Bundesrat (see Clasen 1997b: 73). However, the majority o f unemployment 
insurance reforms in the first legislative period of the Schroder government focused on 
strengthening the insurance principle. With the 1998 Employment Promotion Reform 
Act it was introduced that unemployment benefit eligibility could now only be gained 
through contribution times and no longer through ‘equated times’. In 2000, the Red- 
Green government introduced exactly what it had formerly blocked in the Bundesrat: 
the eligibility for unemployment assistance without former eligibility for unemployment 
benefit was abolished.
118 In 1991, the age limit for the receipt o f the Old-age Transition Pay (Altlg) was reduced from 57 to 55 
years and its duration of eligibility accordingly extended from 3 to 5 years.
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With the Hartz legislation came a further strong tightening o f eligibility rules: with 
effect from February 2005, only those who had paid twelve months compulsory 
contributions for unemployment insurance were still generally eligible for 
unemployment benefit. Special regulations of a reduced insurance duration of 6 months, 
for example for people formerly in military service, were abolished. Furthermore, the 
necessary minimum insurance time of 12 months for general benefit eligibility had to be 
fulfilled in the time frame of two (formerly: three) years and the possibility to extend 
the time frame was abolished. In addition, the Hartz legislation also increased the 
pressure on jobseekers to take up jobs. In particular for long-term unemployed, 
definitions of ‘suitable work’ were tightened. The requirement to take up jobs 
irrespective o f a jobseeker’s occupational status before becoming unemployed was 
again a radical break from Germany’s status and occupation oriented unemployment 
benefit regime. Overall, the tightening o f eligibility regulations mainly affected those 
insured with shorter insurance times, while the comfortable exit regulations for older 
insured members from the labour market were further extended. It seems that the 
financial relief for the pension insurance that was connected to these measures, as well 
as the purpose the benefits for older unemployed workers served for the social partners 
in wage bargains, played an essential role in this respect.
7,2.4,2 Reciprocity
Not only the eligibility, but also the generosity o f benefits has been tackled since 1991. 
While cutbacks were initially focused on very specific benefits, the 1996 Unemployment 
Assistance Reform Act implemented widespread cuts: for the first time since 1982, both 
insurance and assistance benefits were generally reduced (by on average 3 percentage 
points), and the maximum payment of primary unemployment assistance was limited to 
one year. It was also made sure that beneficiaries, who were eligible for an old-age 
pension, took this pension up as soon as possible as they would otherwise lose their 
eligibility for benefits. In doing so, they were then financed by the pension insurance 
funds and no longer by the BA.
The 1996 reform brought savings of around €10 bn, equivalent to the amount already 
saved through the 1993 reforms. In both cases, measures followed the new approach of 
‘Fordern und Fordern’ and cuts in benefits were accompanied by a tightening of work 
requirements and a compromise on employment standards (Bieback 1997b; Rabe and 
Schmid 1999; Trampusch 2000; Zohlnhofer 2001; Aust et al. 2002). In 1997, the annual
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adaptation of the assessment base for the wage replacement benefits o f the BA was 
abolished (iEnt-Dynamisierung,) .u9 This negatively affected the degree o f external 
reciprocity between the respective value of contributions and future benefits. In 
contrast, the degree of internal reciprocity was strengthened in 1998 with the 
Employment Promotion Reform Act, as the assessment period for the calculation of 
benefits was extended from 6 to 12 months.
The ‘Fourth Law for Modem Service Provision in the Labour Market’, implemented in 
January 2005, constituted the most far-reaching reform of unemployment provision 
since its introduction after WWII. Unemployment assistance and social assistance were 
merged into a new benefit type, the ‘Unemployment Benefit IP, which provided flat- 
rate benefits on the level o f social assistance. Employable claimants received 
Unemployment Benefit II, non-employable claimants received social assistance. In 
contrast to former reforms, which focused on tightening eligibility regulations or 
strengthening the insurance principle, these changes represented a case of strong 
commitment-breaking as all unemployed, regardless of whether they paid in for 40 
years or for 5, received only up to 12 months of benefits. The extended durability o f up 
to 18 months was only granted to unemployed people aged 55 and older. “The cuts in 
unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed show that the system of status 
orientation, arguably the backbone of the German welfare system, has been relinquished 
for a large share o f the dependent population” (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005: 15).
While these benefit cutbacks have broken fiscal commitment on a large scale, it is a 
different question whether they had a beneficial financial impact for the BA. It is 
important to keep in mind the financing bodies of the different benefits reformed with 
the Hartz legislation: the abolished unemployment assistance scheme had been financed 
by the federal government via taxes, but nevertheless applied the same equivalence 
principle between former wages and benefits as the unemployment benefit (just on a 
generally lower level). The abolition of this status protection and the provision o f a flat- 
rate benefit regardless of former wages was therefore a logical consequence of its way 
of financing, which was not contribution but tax-based (see Kemmerling and Bruttel 
2005). But as the unemployment assistance had in any case been financed by the federal 
state, this did not mean that more funds of the BA could now be focused on the
119 While this was initially reversed under the Schrdder government with the 2001 Old Age Assets 
Supplementation Act, cost pressures forced the Red-Green government to re-introduce this regulation with 
the Hartz legislation in 2003.
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insurance aspect of unemployment benefits rather than on redistribution. The insurance- 
external provisions which were financed or co-financed by contribution revenues 
remained (that is, placement and advice services as well as active measures). The 
abolition of unemployment assistance therefore served merely the fiscal interests of the 
federal budget, not the one of the BA.
Another indicator for the degree of redistribution in the unemployment scheme is the 
degree of spending for non-contribution-based active measures. Since 1991, the share of 
spending for active measures compared to passive, contribution-related spending 
declined (see Graph 7-4) -  which seems to indicate that redistribution has been reduced.
Graph 7-4 Unemployment Insurance Spending for Active and Passive Measures,
1991-2004
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Source: Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2006: 118
But due to the financing of active and passive measures from the same revenue pool, 
increasing unemployment and therefore necessary spending for passive measures 
inevitably leads to a reduction of the funds available for active measures (see Bruche 
and Reissert 1985). This means that the reduction of spending for active measures was 
not a consequence of a reduction of redistributive elements, but merely a consequence 
of the interlinked financing of both passive and active measures. This accordingly 
means that the degree of fiscal commitment has not increased on this dimension, but is 
instead lower than in 1990 due to the strong reduction of the contribution-benefit link 
(see Appendix II-4.3).
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7.3 Common Patterns and Differences in the French and 
German Unempioyment Reforms
In 1990, the French and German unemployment insurance schemes differed 
considerably with regard to their respective commitment scores: while the German BA 
had one o f the lowest commitment scores of all analysed schemes, the French UNEDIC 
had one o f the highest. This chapter has analysed how these differences have impacted 
on successive reform developments, which have resulted in the fiscal commitment 
inherent in the German scheme being strongly reduced, while commitment in the 
French scheme has been maintained.
(I) To what extent did the differences in the overall commitment scores between the 
schemes, but also the differences on the individual dimensions matter for future reforms 
in times o f  fiscal pressures? The results of the analysis o f the French and German 
reform developments in the unemployment insurance sector strongly support the 
argument that a high degree o f fiscal commitment in social insurance schemes makes 
successive retrenchment measures in those schemes less likely. This connection 
between high commitment scores and a high degree o f commitment-maintenance could 
be observed for the aggregate scores, but also independently for each individual 
dimension.
In the case of the French UNEDIC, the high degree o f administrative independence 
represented an effective shield against attempts by the government to expand its 
authority. At the beginning o f the 1990s, the government had gained indirect influence 
on the regulatory and managerial decisions of UNEDIC in return for financial assistance 
and the approval o f the agreements between the social partners. But the defeat o f the 
government in the battle with the social partners during the reforms in 2000, in which 
the former openly attempted to impose its own demands on the planned measures, 
meant that UNEDIC in the end retained its high degree o f administrative independence. 
As already observed in both the pension and health insurance sectors, it was mainly the 
employer representatives who were the driving force behind the battle for more 
autonomy. In contrast, the German social partners could not, despite their common 
resistance against reforms of the BA, avoid the drastic reduction of their administrative 
competencies in the wake o f the statistics scandal in 2002. This was also the case as the 
government successfully managed to shift the blame for the failures exclusively to the 
social partners, although it had already been in the possession o f considerable
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administrative and supervisory powers prior to the scandal and had therefore been 
jointly responsible. The social partners, unable to avoid the blame and successively the 
restriction o f their competencies, were however compensated with increased self­
administration powers at the local level. Comparable to the health and first-pillar 
pension schemes in France, the initial low degree o f administrative independence had 
therefore represented a gateway for further governmental involvement.
In the French unemployment insurance scheme, the high degree o f formal budgetary 
independence in 1990 also successfully prevented reductions of this independence 
despite several attempts of the government to do so. Following the improvement of the 
financial situation in the mid-1990s, UNEDIC regained its financial autonomy by 
avoiding the need for further state subsidies and instead guaranteeing payments into the 
state budget. The absence of sufficient internal deficit-coping mechanisms meant 
however that fiscal constraints as well as the danger o f a future financial dependence 
from state subsidies remained high. In contrast to the French scheme, the restriction of 
administrative independency for the German BA went hand in hand with a substantial 
reduction o f budgetary autonomy. The imposition o f the budget by the Ministry of 
Labour and finally the organisational reform in 2004 stripped the social partners to a 
large extent o f what remained of their independent budgetary powers on the top level of 
the institution. The BA is therefore the most straightforward example o f how a social 
insurance with an administration still labeled as ‘self-administration’, and with a main 
financing source o f contributions, is in the end fully subject to state control.
The financial dependence of the organisation on subsidies by the state represented ‘a 
latent gateway for hierarchical intervention’ (Heinelt 1994: 199), which raised the 
interest o f the government in increasing its budgetary powers in order to gain control 
over this spending element (see Trampusch 2002). This confirms the observations in the 
previous two chapters that the revenue structure of insurance schemes is a determining 
factor in the extent to which governments have attempted to reduce budgetary autonomy 
of the social partners in those schemes. The fact that the BA had since 1991 been 
dependent on deficit-covering subsidies by the German government created both the 
intention as well as the justification for the repeated demolition of the self­
administration authorities of the social partners. In contrast, the only short-term 
dependence of UNEDIC on state subsidies and the successive recovery of revenue
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independence limited both the intentions o f the French government to gain control of  
the scheme as well as the justification to do so.
The reform developments in the unemployment insurance schemes also confirm 
observations in the health and pension reform chapters that the extent to which the 
social partners maintain administrative and budgetary competencies plays an important 
role for developments on the spending side o f insurance schemes and the particular 
design o f benefit reforms. If the social partners have strong administrative and 
budgetary authority, they are more likely to maintain the existing fiscal commitment 
towards ‘standard’ insured, i.e. such insured which have gained entitlements via 
contribution payments. This has been the case in the French scheme, in which the high 
degree o f administrative independence o f the unemployment scheme has gone hand in 
hand with a tightening of benefit eligibility and a strengthening of internal reciprocity. 
Spending commitments have only been broken for those insured with only short 
contribution records, while commitment has been maintained for those with long 
employment records. Those with fewer entitlements lost eligibility for unemployment 
benefits and were shifted into the state-financed and often means-tested solidarity 
schemes. Parallel, the proportionality between the duration o f contribution times and the 
duration o f unemployment benefits was further tightened which protected the interests 
of the long-term insured at the expense of those insured with fewer contribution records.
Despite a similarly high degree of support for status-protecting benefit provision in the 
dominating middle classes in France and Germany (see Mandin and Palier 2002), the 
developments in the German unemployment insurance show instead a move away from 
the strict application of the insurance principle o f reciprocity between contribution 
payments and the generosity o f benefits. Overall, the benefit reforms have reduced the 
degree of contribution-based eligibility as well as reciprocity from medium high to low. 
This confirms the argument that with the loss of corporatist control over the schemes, 
the social partners also lose both the interest and ability to defend the occupational and 
status-maintaining elements of the benefit structure.
(2) What have been the predominant modes o f  change and what were the implications 
o f reforms for the degrees offiscal commitment on the different dimensions? In France, 
commitment has been widely maintained via the tightening o f eligibility to those who 
contributed to the schemes over a long period of time, and a tightening o f the degree of
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internal reciprocity. Commitment-breaking on the spending dimension has mainly 
focused on the short-term insured. In contrast, the strong reduction of fiscal 
commitment in the German unemployment scheme has taken both the form of increased 
controlling of commitment via the expansion of direct managerial authorities o f the 
state, and the restraining of existing spending commitments via the reduction of 
budgetary autonomy for the social partners and an imposition o f tighter spending 
constraints. But in the German case we can also observe a more far-reaching direct 
breaking of commitment on the spending dimension, affecting not only the short-term 
insured but also those insured for a long period of time.
(3) What role did the social partners and their relationship with the state play in the 
reforms? The analysis of the developments in France and Germany challenges the 
assumptions formulated in Hypothesis 1 that we should observe a stronger focus on 
reducing administrative independence in the French insurance reforms, as the 
consensual bargaining of reforms with the social partner is not possible. While 
administrative independence was indeed much more reduced in the French first-pillar 
pension and health insurance schemes than in the German schemes, the opposite is true 
for the unemployment sector. It therefore seems that sectoral elements play a stronger 
role in determining the path o f reform developments than national factors, such as the 
different tradition o f corporatist relations.
During the conflict about the UNEDIC reform in 2000, the French employers 
successfully managed to unite with a majority o f union representatives, which gave the 
government no real possibilities to intervene. This had been different in the pension and 
health sectors, where the alliance between the social partners had not been stable. While 
the employers left the common self-administration, the unions remained which gave the 
government the possibility to further increase its powers in these schemes. In contrast, 
the final defeat of the government and the re-establishment o f (nearly) full 
administrative and budgetary autonomy meant that the employers remained in the 
administration o f UNEDIC. As in France, the German employers were also striving 
towards a clear assignment o f authorities. In 2004, they renewed their demand o f a 
further retreat o f the state from the self-administration in this insurance sector: if  the 
government would grant the BA managerial and budgetary independence, the BA 
would in turn forgo the automatic deficit coverage of the federal government said Peter 
Clever, member o f the executive board of the BDA and alternating chairman o f the
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Federal Employment Agency (see Stuttgarter Zeitung, 11 May 2004). As the newly 
introduced ‘displacement fee’ was anyway more costly than the amount o f deficit 
coverage, this made financial sense. But the already low degree of administrative and 
budgetary independence of the BA made it impossible to fend off the increasing 
centralisation of decisionmaking powers with the government. As a consequence of the 
fact that the government now defined all relevant administrative and budgetary 
parameters, the German social partners increasingly lost interest in maintaining their 
central role in the top-level self-administration o f the BA, and focused increasingly on 
their authorities on the local level.
(4) Is there evidence that the French governments focused more strongly on cost 
containment than the German ones? Similar to the earlier two cases o f pensions and 
health, there is strong evidence that a generally more powerful position of the finance 
ministry in the budgetary allocation process and generally in policymaking does not 
seem to play a decisive role for social insurance reforms. In France, the high degree of 
budgetary autonomy o f the UNEDIC considerably restricted finance minister influence 
in the first instance. But also with regard to benefit reforms, the government repeatedly 
attempted to interfere in reform plans agreed between the social partners (for example, 
in the 2000 reforms as well as during the introduction o f PARE) -  not to impose further 
financial restrictions, but instead to avoid those as they would have also meant a 
restriction of its own influence. In Germany, where cost containment pressures should 
have generally been lower according to Hypothesis 2, we could instead observe a strong 
governmental interference in the administrative and budgetary decisionmaking o f the 
BA in order to enforce budgetary discipline. Once again, the high financial stake o f the 
government due to the automatic deficit regulation seemed to have created the strong 
interest in cost containment rather than a generally stronger position of the finance 
minister.
Conclusions:
The results of the chapter confirm the observation that the financing structure o f  
insurance schemes is an essential element in determining the policy positions o f all 
involved actors. There is strong evidence that the high financing stake o f the German 
government in the BA was the determining factor in it pushing through much more 
encompassing institutional and programmatic reforms with much more wide-reaching 
commitment-reducing effects than it has been the case in the other two insurance
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sectors. But as in the other two insurance sectors, these interventions were mainly self- 
interested and often aggravated the financial problems of the BA. The interlinked 
financing system between tax and contribution-financed provisions has enabled the 
hidden re-channelling of funds into the state budget. These observations challenge fiscal 
institutionalist arguments that retrenchment advocates in government (mainly the 
finance minister) should have an interest in reducing deficits per se. Besides this, the 
results o f the analysis provide further support to the argument that the political positions 
of the social partners are not predominantly defined by the specific national interaction 
patterns between employer representations, unions and the government, but instead are 
strongly shaped by their specific position in the individual insurance schemes.
The analysis of reform developments in the unemployment sector furthermore 
strengthens the hypothesis that partisanship arguments are no longer a decisive factor in 
determining the extent and shape of reforms. In Germany, the Red-Green government 
introduced several measures it had previously opposed, and also in France no change of 
the governmental strategy with regard to unemployment policies has been visible.
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8 Conclusions: The Politics of Regaining Control over 
the Social Budget
8.1 The Effect of Sectoral Differences in Fiscal Commitment
The second part o f this thesis has examined to what extent institutional commitment- 
devices in the French and German social budgets have influenced the extent and shape 
o f cost-containment measures in times of fiscal austerity. In order to answer this 
question, the previous three chapters have analysed the reform processes which took 
place between 1990 and 2005 in the main social insurance schemes in both countries. 
The analysis has applied a sectoral perspective, which derived from the observation that 
although both France and Germany are usually considered as having welfare states with 
a high degree o f institutional and policy stickiness, the degree o f fiscal commitments in 
the individual insurance schemes differed in fact considerably. The comparison o f fiscal 
commitment scores in 1990 and 2005 furthermore showed that while overall fiscal 
commitment in both countries has been reduced, this varied systematically with regard 
to previous degrees of commitment in the individual schemes. This observation 
challenges common understandings that despite similar degrees of financial pressures, 
we should expect nationally different developments as the two countries differ with 
regard to their corporatist traditions and the strength o f cost containment pressures 
resulting from their budgetary allocation processes. The results regarding the patterns of 
commitment reductions indicated that other institutional elements and policies (which 
differed not only between the countries, but also between sectors within one country) 
did matter.
The sectoral analyses have addressed the open questions resulting from these 
observations. Firstly, they have investigated how the observed reductions in fiscal 
commitment took place: how did political change due to financial pressures work in the 
generally highly institutionally and programmatically committed environment, and what 
were the different modes of change? Were commitments broken outright, or were other 
modes of change predominant? The second aspect analysed were the conditions and 
driving forces for change: What role did the national factors mentioned above play in 
the reform developments in the insurance schemes? Does the absence o f obvious cross­
national differences mean that these factors did not play a role, or is it rather the case 
that we have to differentiate their effect with regard to the circumstances in the 
individual insurance sectors? The first part o f this chapter brings together the results of
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the sectoral analyses and will try to shed light on these questions. In the second part, it 
then tests whether the conclusions derived from the analysis o f the corporatist- 
continental French and German cases can equally be applied to the United Kingdom, a 
case situated on the other extreme of the fiscal commitment-scale.
8.1.1 Reducing Fiscal Commitment by Avoiding It
As illustrated in Graph 4-3, we can observe the systematic reform-blocking effect of 
high degrees o f fiscal commitment in both France and Germany: policy sectors with an 
initially high degree of fiscal commitment see a small degree o f institutional and 
programmatic change. This confirms ‘new politics’ theories o f institutional lock-in and 
the ‘stickiness’ o f social spending. But as outlined before, the reduction of fiscal 
commitment does not necessarily imply the straightforward breaking o f commitment 
(see Chapter 3.2). In fact, the reduction o f fiscal commitment has in both countries often 
taken more indirect forms.
The French unions defended their role in the management o f the social insurance 
programmes via the mobilisation o f public support and also the employer 
representatives increasingly resisted attempts by the government to increase its control 
powers over the social budget. French governments therefore resorted in many cases to 
a strategy o f avoiding and restraining commitments instead of breaking them. Major 
examples were the implementation of the new national budgetary framework, as well as 
the changes in the revenue structure of the health as well as pension insurance schemes. 
The replacement o f contribution with tax revenues increased the influence o f the 
government without directly attacking the administrative powers of the social partners. 
Also on the spending dimension, the government rather restrained and avoided the 
development of new commitments instead of directly breaking existing ones. 
Particularly in the pension, but also in the unemployment sector we could observe the 
maintaining of commitments via the shifting of short-term insured into tax-financed 
solidarity schemes.
In Germany, the straightforward breaking of commitments was also often avoided due 
to fears of electoral backlash or strong resistance by the social partners. Commitment 
was in many instances maintained by making additional revenues'available without 
contribution increases or the provision of additional federal funds. Reforms in this 
context have been the expansion of compulsory insurance, increases o f assessment
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ceilings and also the increasing burdening o f wage replacement benefits with social 
charges. On the spending dimension, moderate commitment-breaking has taken place in 
all three insurance sectors, but far more significant was the tightening of eligibility rules 
and the reciprocity between benefits and contribution payments. This has not only 
maintained spending commitment for the insured, but also created further barriers for 
future reforms as it strengthened the insurance principle. But fiscal commitment has 
also been reduced in the German welfare state: through stronger influence in 
administrative decisionmaking processes, the government has gained control powers 
over existing spending commitments. Furthermore, those commitments were also 
increasingly restrained via a strong reduction of budgetary authorities or the 
implementation o f budgetary mechanisms enforcing budgetary constraints.
Overall, the reduction of budgetary autonomy, the increase o f budgetary constraints and 
the gaining of influence via changes to the revenue structure o f schemes have been the 
predominant form of change in both countries. Although the more visible dimensions of 
administrative independence and spending structure have remained comparatively less 
affected, these more ‘hidden forms of policy retrenchment’ (Hacker 2004) had 
considerable reducing effects on the degree of existing policy commitments.
8.1.2 Finance Minister Strength and Cost Containment in the 
Welfare State
Based on the dominant assumption in the fiscal institutionalism literature that in 
budgetary allocation processes the finance minister has an interest in restraining 
spending, Hypothesis 3 predicted differing degrees of commitment-breaking measures 
in France and Germany (see 2.2.2): as the position of the French finance minister in the 
allocation process was considerably stronger than its German counterpart, we should 
observe stronger pressures for cost containment in the French welfare state which 
should result in more breaking of fiscal commitments.
No evidence was found to support this argument. Instead, the observations challenge its 
underlying assumptions. It is unrealistic to assume that the utility function of the so- 
called ‘spending ministers’ is so different from that of the finance minister in times o f  
fiscal pressures. The French and German case studies have shown that instead o f  
striving for a further expansion of their portfolios, the responsible ministers were
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usually the ffontrunners in trying to contain social spending during the observed 15 
years. One reason has been that due to the pressures associated with the Maastricht 
criteria, the reduction of deficits in the social budget has no longer been solely an issue 
for the finance minister, but has become a general matter of concern for the government. 
But even more importantly, the ‘spending ministers’ have an intrinsic interest to ensure 
the continuing liquidity and sustainability o f the social schemes in their policy sector in 
order to maintain the autonomy o f their political domain.
Another major observation in the analysis o f the two cases has also been that the 
budgetary authorities of the government are often very much restricted: due to the 
budgetary separation of social insurance accounts from the general state budget, the 
central state allocation process often does not have any impact on the budgets o f the 
insurance schemes or does only affect the tax-financed part o f the budgets. It therefore 
seems that the specific budgetary authorities o f the government in the individual 
insurance schemes matter for financial decisions in those schemes, rather than the 
general position of the finance minister in the allocation process.
8.1,2.1 Self-Interested Intervention by the State
Does a tighter grip of the government on a specific insurance budget really lead to 
stronger pressures for cost containment and successively the reduction o f fiscal 
commitment? The observed interactions between governmental budgetary authorities 
and fiscal policies in the three social insurance sectors suggest the opposite: a stronger 
government influence over budgetary decisions actually increased fiscal imbalances. 
The existence of formally self-administered social insurance budgets offers an 
opportunity to shift expenditure from the central budget into the insurance budgets. In 
other words, the central or federal state makes use of the social insurance budgets for its 
own fiscal purposes. As the sectoral analyses have shown, this has not only been the 
case in the fairly well-know example of the financing of German unification, but is 
rather a permanent feature of social budgetmaking. Although deficits in social insurance 
budgets count towards general government debt, the public perception that the 
government is not directly responsible for these debts seems to be an important 
incentive for such fiscal manoeuvres. The institutionalised commitment in most 
insurance sectors is too weak to protect the insurance schemes from this kind o f  
interference.
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In the case o f France, the lack of symmetry between financial responsibilities and the 
possibilities to take budgetary decisions in both the main health and pension insurance 
schemes had important consequences for the way the state dealt with fiscal commitment 
since 1990. The combination of formal administrative autonomy and budgetary control 
by the state enabled the government to use the social security scheme for its particular 
social policy or economic purposes. While the social security code stated that the 
government had to consider recommendations by the social partners managing the 
schemes regarding measures which would contribute to the balancing o f the schemes’ 
budget, the state’s ability to control the main budget parameters often made it follow 
different goals than the balancing of the schemes’ finances. One major example has 
been the insufficient compensation of the social insurance schemes for contribution 
exemptions via FOREC (see 5.1.2.1). This reduction o f revenues for the social 
insurance schemes represented a considerable weakening o f fiscal commitment, as it 
reduced the resources of the system without providing adequate compensation. 
Important in this respect has been the introduction of financing funds, which had wider 
implications for the power distribution between the government and the social partners 
as the government gained more influence due to a higher share of tax revenues. 
Furthermore, the insecurity o f the fund’s resources strongly decreased the degree of 
fiscal commitment within the social insurance schemes.
Another major example of how separate insurance budgets were instrumentalised by 
governments who wanted to avoid increased spending from their budgets was the 
financing of the social costs of unification in Germany mainly via the social insurance 
schemes. But as the resulting contribution increases became a problem due to their 
negative labour-market effects, new revenue sources needed to be found -  but again 
outside the governmental budget. The solution was to increase the available resources 
within the insurance schemes, which for them often meant an increased risk o f financial 
volatility and therefore of future governmental intervention. In the pension insurance 
scheme GRV, this happened via the gradual reduction o f the reserve requirements. In 
the health sector, fiscal rules were relaxed in order to acquire additional revenues for the 
system without raising contribution rates or burdening the federal budget: instead, the 
illegal credit-financing o f the insurance schemes was tolerated by the government over 
the years, which resulted in an accumulation o f debts. Balanced budgets were clearly 
not on top of the agenda of the government, as it accepted a greater financial risk for the
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schemes if this served the purpose o f avoiding either governmental subsidies or difficult 
reform processes.
In the German unemployment insurance sector, the same motivations led the 
government to play a two-sided game regarding structural and policy-related reforms of  
the BA. On the one hand, it had an interest in reducing transfers from the state budget to 
the BA budget. On the other hand, the persistent deficits provided a good justification 
for a continuing reduction of self-administration powers on the top level o f the 
organisation and a restriction o f budgetary autonomy. The introduction o f the 
‘displacement fee’ in 2005 (see 7.2.3) showed the ambiguity o f the fiscal policy in the 
unemployment sector: the amount re-channelled into the state budget via this fee was 
higher than the calculated deficit for the budgetary year. The effect o f this re-channeling 
of funds meant that the deficit occurred in the accounts of the BA and not in the federal, 
budget, which was in the interest of the finance minister. But also prior to the 
introduction o f the rejection fee, the government had repeatedly shifted programmes 
originally financed directly by the federal budget into the financial responsibility o f the 
BA.
The government therefore often did not take actions which would have enhanced the 
fiscal performance o f the insurance schemes, despite the fact that the possibilities for 
state intervention existed. If -  as a consequence of non-intervention or, in the fiscal 
sense, ‘negative intervention’ by the government -  the financial problems became more 
severe, this offered the government not only the justification to implement benefit 
reforms, but also to conduct institutional reforms restraining the self-administration 
powers o f the social partners. In this sense, a worsening o f the fiscal situation in the 
social budget can also be in the interest o f a government.
As the sectoral analyses reveal, the federal government also used deficits in social 
insurance sectors as justification for tax increases. While those additional tax revenues 
were promised to be earmarked for social insurance financing, they did in several cases 
not exclusively flow into the social insurance budgets but instead also partly into the 
state budget (examples are the additional pension subsidy via a VAT increase, the 
introduction of the Eco-Tax or an increase of the tobacco tax for the purpose of  
financing the GKV subsidy in Germany) or were successively re-channelled to other 
schemes or into deficit-covering funds (examples are the CSG and CRDS in France).
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Other examples of the government making use of shared fiscal authority for its own 
purpose have been successful and unsuccessful attempts to shift the responsibility for 
the deficit coverage of some special schemes to other insurance schemes in order to 
avoid tax subsidies. In France, the deficit coverage o f the subsidy-heavy military 
pensions scheme as well as the agricultural scheme BAPSA were shifted into the 
Regime General. In Germany, examples have been the attempt to integrate the miners 
insurance into the GRV, and after this failure the successive creation o f an equalisation 
process between those (see 5.2.3.3). The expansion o f the risk equalisation process in 
the GKV and the abolition o f different equalisation processes for East and West 
multiplied transfers between the health insurance carriers, which avoided necessary 
subsidy payments from the general state. Furthermore, the existence o f different budgets 
in Germany allowed for more hidden cuts through changes in cross-subsidisations 
between funds (see Clasen 1997b). In the period between 1991 and 2005, there have 
been repeated changes regarding mutual contribution payments by the insurance carriers 
for their beneficiaries. In this way funds were transferred cross-sectorally from 
insurance schemes with less financial difficulties to those with severe budgetary 
problems. This often avoided looming contribution increases or higher federal subsidies 
for the schemes in deficit. But while these financial transfers served the purpose to 
sustain commitments in the benefiting schemes, they represented a case o f commitment- 
breaking in the contributing schemes as revenues which were earmarked for these 
schemes were channeled away to other schemes and even other insurance sectors. While 
the government avoided further payments from its own budget, the increase of transfers 
and financial interdependencies therefore reduced the degree of fiscal commitment in 
the insurance schemes.
8.1.2.2 Explaining Sectoral Variance: Financial Interdependence and Cost 
Containment
The higher the financial stake of the government in the individual schemes, the higher 
its motivation for self-interested fiscal intervention. This explains why certain sectors 
and insurance schemes have been more affected by fiscal manoeuvres which had 
negative consequences for their financial situation. In contrast to the assumption that 
governmental budget authority should lead to strong pressures to contain spending, 
there is strong evidence supporting the conclusion that instead the revenue and 
budgetary autonomy of insurance schemes creates more effective pressures for cost 
containment.
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In the case o f the main French pension and health insurance funds, the status o f the 
administrative institutions as ‘etablissements publique’ left the final responsibility for 
deficits with the government. This resulted in continuing efforts by the government to 
enforce more strict budgetary disciplines on the schemes, but as they were neither able 
to determine their own revenues nor to reduce benefit rates, this remained often without 
major effects. But instead of making use of its considerable intervention powers (such 
as the possibility to change benefit regulations or to enforce strict budgetary discipline) 
in order to effectively tackle the reasons for the increasing deficits, most reforms by the 
government -  such as the introduction of CADES and the successive prolongation of its 
duration and mission (see 6.1.2.2) -  aimed at avoiding the deficit-coverage 
responsibilities o f the government. In contrast, the final responsibility for fiscal deficits 
in the French unemployment insurance scheme rested with the scheme itself. In order to 
solve the financial difficulties, extensive cost containment measures had to be 
implemented which also avoided a looming administrative and budgetary take-over by 
the central government in exchange for financial help. In contrast to the other schemes, 
this was possible as UNEDIC also had the decisionmaking powers to decide and 
implement the necessary cost containment measures.
Similarly, the greater financial stake due to the regulation of automatic deficit coverage 
explains why the German government was keen to interfere in budgetary decisions of 
the unemployment insurance. But since 1990, the state’s financing share increased also 
in the GRV. An attempt to abolish the budgetary independence o f the pension insurance 
funds with the planned organisational reform decided in 2004 failed due to resistance of 
social partners as well as the Bundesrat. If, in contrast, the budgetary autonomy of 
insurance schemes has been high, the government has attempted to force the self- 
administration to push through unpopular spending cuts by itself, as has been the case in 
the Statutory Health Insurance.
8.1,2.3 Budgetary Control without Administrative Responsibility 
While there have been repeated (successful as well as unsuccessful) attempts by the 
governments to increase their budgetary as well as administrative powers in the 
insurance schemes since 1990, the analysis of both cases also shows that not only the 
social partners, but also the governments had a vivid interest in maintaining the -  in 
administrative and budgetary decisionmaking restricted -  independence o f the schemes.
270
This is the case as the formal independence o f the schemes offers governments the 
possibility to disguise responsibilities for deficits, as well as to shift the blame for 
unpopular political decisions to the social partners. This also explains why there is no 
systematic lock-in effect of budgetary commitment on the ‘budgetary independence’ 
and ‘revenue structure’ dimensions.
French and German policymakers have rarely attacked the formal administrative 
authority o f the social partners (see also Clasen and Clegg 2003). In France, this has 
been the case despite heavy conflicts not only with the unions, who regularly paralysed 
economic and public life through strike actions, but also with the employer 
representatives. The latter even resigned from the self-administration bodies in the first- 
pillar pension and health insurance schemes (ASSEDIC) in 2001 after financial disputes 
with the government could not be resolved. This withdrawal could have been an 
opportunity for the government to reorganise the administrative structures particularly 
of the health insurance funds, as those were anyway less and less financed by 
contributions. The shift towards tax financing meant an erosion o f the legitimacy of the 
social partners to run those schemes. But the government had an interest in keeping the 
unions involved, as their presence served as an instrument o f giving unpopular decisions 
and compromises greater legitimacy. As a Juppe aide stated, referring to the 1993 
reform of the unemployment insurance scheme: ‘The unions did more to raise 
contributions and lower unemployment payments than the state would have dared to do 
itse lf” (Financial Times, 5 September 1995). As outlined below, the interest in 
maintaining the independence o f the system from state interference has repeatedly 
forced the unions to agree to spending cuts and compromises with the employers, which 
they would probably not have agreed to if their administrative influence would not have 
been at stake. But it seems that the government also had an interest in having the 
employers on board in the social security administration: it accepted a number o f  
conditions by MEDEF for their return into the self-administration o f the health 
insurance funds. Overall, their position in the self-administration has (due to the 
reintroduction o f parity in 1995, as well as their stronger representation in new health 
insurance bodies from 2004 onwards) been repeatedly strengthened.
In Germany, the formal status of self-administration has also remained intact. One 
reason was that it helped to disguise financial difficulties o f the schemes and to blame 
social insurance institutions for apparent fiscal mismanagement. One example o f how
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formally independent social insurance funds offered the possibility for political 
decisionmakers to hide behind their pretence o f a lack o f intervention power was the 
reaction o f the German government to the scandal about falsified statistics in the 
Federal Employment Office at the beginning o f 2002. Although having the authority to 
intervene in the BA’s decisions and, due to the supervisory role, also responsibility for 
its actions, the government effectively shifted the public blame for the malfunction to 
the self-administration committees of the BA. The public perception o f an apparent 
failure o f the self-administration offered the government the possibility to restrain the 
autonomy of the BA even further in both administrative as well as budgetary terms. In 
addition, it used the massive institutional overhaul as an opportunity for a wide-reaching 
reform of the benefit system (see 7.2.1).
The formally independent social insurance administrations in Germany did not only 
offer opportunities to shift blame, but also to shift decisionmaking processes regarding 
unpopular spending cuts into these institutions. “In the context o f heavy distributional 
conflicts, governments are the more stable and less threatened by legitimatory deficits 
the more distributional conflicts are solved autonomous and below the federal level. 
[...] Therefore they have hardly an interest to fulfill the legal intervention obligations 
efficiently” (Alber 1992: 169). This could be observed in the German health insurance 
sectors with the establishment of new institutions of corporatist decisionmaking which 
shifted allocatory bargains away from the direct responsibility o f the government. This 
was not possible in France to the same extent due to the absence o f a developed, 
centralised system of corporatist decisionmaking in its health sector.
8,1,2.4 Formal vs, Effective Commitment
These findings show that an analytical differentiation between ‘formal’ commitment 
and ‘effective’ commitment is necessary: while the former can be high (for example, 
due to a high degree of formal administrative autonomy), effective commitment -  which 
means the possibility to avoid interference which reduces the insurance character and 
the degree o f spending commitment in the schemes -  can be low (for example, due to a
170very low degree of budgetary autonomy combined with strong budgetary constraints). 
The division and sharing o f financial responsibilities can therefore be a deliberate 
strategy to decrease effective commitment in the insurance schemes, while the degree of 
formal commitment is maintained.
1201 am grateful to Waltraud Schelkle for highlighting this point.
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The existence o f formally autonomous social insurance budgets does not only seem to 
make the finance minister a victim of the Common Pool Resource Problem, but it also 
creates a principal-agent problematic: the particular budgetary situation o f most social 
insurance schemes not only created incentives for the government to misuse the social 
insurance funds for its own financial purposes, but this was also the case with the social 
partners. There have been repeated accusations in Germany that unions and employers 
used the BA funds to finance training and employment measures which they offered 
themselves, and that they avoided real competition between providers. The former 
budgetary spokesman of the Green party described the self-administration by the social 
partners as ‘collective self-service’ [kollektive Selbstbedienung] (see Metzger 2003). In 
France, cases have also come to light which have shown the wasteful behaviour o f some 
social insurance administrators in dealing with administrative resources (see e.g. 
Sunday Times, 19 Nov 1995). This illustrates the effects o f the fateful combination of 
budgetary self-administration with automatic deficit coverage and administrative 
independence: in terms of cost containment, it creates wrong incentives for both the 
governments as well as for the social partners.
8.1.3 Influence of the Social Partners and its Effect on Social 
Insurance Reform
On the basis o f theoretical arguments from the ‘old’ politics school, Hypothesis 2 
predicted that due to the different traditions o f corporatist interactions between the 
social partners and the state, we should see more commitment-breaking in France on the 
administrative and budgetary commitment dimensions than in Germany. But the 
detailed analysis of the reform processes in the three insurance sectors has shown that it 
is not the national traditions of corporatist relationship, but instead the responsibilities 
of the social partners with regard to administration and regulation in the different 
schemes which are the decisive factors. In other words, the dynamics observed are not 
the result of exogenous factors, but rather the result of the social partners’ relative 
position in the individual insurance schemes.
& 1.3.1 Blame A voidance and the Effects o f  Selective Occupational Solidarity 
According to the assumption that policymakers want to avoid public blame for 
unpopular retrenchment decisions, fewer reductions in sectors with a high degree of 
spending reciprocity and a high degree of administrative control by the state should be 
expected. While a strong connection of benefit provisions with contribution-based
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entitlements should increase both the legal transaction costs as well as political costs of  
retrenchment, the direct responsibility o f the government for the schemes and 
accordingly also for the unpopular changes should increase the incentive for 
policymakers to avoid such measures. While we can indeed observe fewer commitment- 
reductions in schemes with a high degree o f commitment on the spending dimension, 
those schemes also have a high degree o f administrative independence which does not 
confirm the above assumptions. Instead, the most effective protection o f spending 
commitments results instead from a high degree of occupational solidarity in the 
insurance schemes, which derives from a high degree of administrative independence by 
the social partners and a strong contribution-benefit link. In such schemes, financial 
pressures result in a tightening o f existing spending commitments rather than their 
breaking.
As early as the beginning of the 1990s, scholars have been speaking o f a transformation 
of the German welfare state into a ‘protection state’ [Sicherungsstaat], in which “social 
policy serves the protection o f the governmental institutional set-up instead of the 
promotion o f social security” (Nullmeier and Rub 1994: 2; see also Clasen 1994). Also 
Offe (1990: 196) argued that the effectiveness of the social insurance system was 
increasingly measured not according to how it ensured social protection and 
participation for the whole population, but instead according to how it pooled the big 
majority of the working population to an interest group relatively immune against 
internal rivalry and exit. The developments in the following 15 years support these 
observations and show the effect of the strong degree o f occupation-based solidarity in 
the German welfare state: between 1990 and 2005, benefit reforms in the insurance 
sector with the highest degree of spending reciprocity -  pensions -  have focused on 
tightening the existing fiscal commitments instead on cutting back commitment across 
the bank. This implied a strengthening of the contribution-benefit link particularly for 
those who had contributed to the schemes for a long time, while redistributive elements 
as well as the benefits for only short-term insured were tackled. But while the degree of 
internal reciprocity was strengthened, the overall pension level was strongly reduced 
mainly through hidden cuts, such as changes to pension adaptation which will only take 
effect over time.
In the unemployment insurance scheme, eligibility criteria for benefits were also 
tightened and the underlying contribution period for their calculation was extended.
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While as part of the Hartz legislation the duration o f the benefits was reduced, 
reciprocity elements and the overall level of benefits remained the same. The main cuts 
were instead focused on unemployment assistance beneficiaries. The fact that this 
benefit was exclusively financed via taxes out o f the federal state budget and was 
therefore not part of the contribution-financed solidarity system, strongly contributed to 
the targeting of those ‘insurance alien’ elements (Clasen 1997b: 78). Those observations 
confirm Dohler’s (1994: 160) interpretation o f the ‘financial contraction movement’ of 
social insurance institutions as part o f their survival strategy and intention to avoid 
further dismantlement. While the achieved level o f provisions and distribution for the 
broad tier o f standard insurance cases is protected, retrenchment measures are focused 
foremost on redistributive elements. Only if those options o f cutting back on insurance- 
external provisions are exhausted, the benefit levels o f those who gained eligibility 
solely based on contribution payments are also reduced.
The same observations can be made in the French case: in the unemployment scheme, 
in which eligibility was strongly related to former contribution benefits and benefits 
were highly eamings-dependent, the social partners focused strongly on defending these 
‘earned rights’, while they showed little reluctance o f cutting back benefits for 
unemployed with only minor contribution records. Also the unions, usually portraying 
themselves as guardians o f social justice, practiced very selective ‘occupational 
solidarity’ (Clasen and Clegg 2003: 363): they heavily defended special rights o f their 
clientele, while they were willing to agree harsh benefit cuts for outsiders of the system. 
In the pension sector, benefit reforms also followed this logic o f selective occupational 
solidarity in defending entitlements: cutbacks were most severe in the general first-pillar 
pension scheme o f the Regime General. In contrast, the often very fragmented specialist 
schemes in the public sector resisted cutbacks considerably longer and experienced less 
retrenchment due to changes of adaptation regulations.
The only exception from the observed strengthening o f the insurance principle is the 
public health insurance in France, whose eligibility criteria have been relaxed in order to 
cover the whole population. Parallel, its financing structure has been transformed in 
detaching revenues to a large degree from contributions. These factors have strongly 
weakened the insurance principle, which in turn reduced the interest o f the social 
partners to defend the scheme and its benefit structure. This, besides the conflict with 
the government over the financing of the 35-hour week, contributed to the employer
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representatives withdrawing from the social insurance boards in 2001. Ernest-Antoine
Seilliere, President of MEDEF, clearly stated the position o f the employers in terms o f
responsibility for the insurance schemes: “Pas question de s’occuper de la gestion de
l’assurance-maladie. Nous, les entrepreneurs, ne sommes pas legitimes” (Les Echos, 19 
1 *) 1May 2004). The return of the employers into the administration in 2004 remained 
partial, and they continued to pursue their plans to shift larger parts o f the health 
insurance into the private sector. This again confirms that the governance structure of  
the schemes has an important impact on the future design o f its policies and vice versa: 
with the loss o f the ‘insurance logic’ in the French health insurance, the employers also 
lost the interest in participating in the administration o f the scheme.
8,1.3,2 Trading Retrenchment against Administrative and Budgetary Authority
As Bonoli (2000: 125) observes in the case o f French pension reform in 1993, “the 
government can trade retrenchment in the level o f provision with concessions on the 
management side of social insurance”. The analysis o f reform developments between 
1990 and 2005 provides strong evidence that such deals have indeed taken place in a 
number o f cases in both France and Germany. One example are developments in the 
French unemployment insurance scheme: in the mid-1990s, Juppe repeatedly aimed at 
increasing financial control over the UNEDIC scheme by including decisions regarding 
revenues and spending in the general government budget process. In order to retain their 
budgetary autonomy, the social partners were forced to push through drastic spending 
reductions by themselves. In June 2000, MEDEF and the trade unions achieved a last- 
minute deal agreeing on a reform of the unemployment benefit system. Employment 
minister Martine Aubry had already asked UNEDIC to sign an agreement giving greater 
powers to the government, but the new agreement which solved the financial crisis o f  
the scheme once more saved their institutional and budgetary independence -  however, 
at the cost of further benefit cuts (see 7.1.4.1).
In other cases, union leaders have struck deals with the government about benefit cuts in 
schemes in which the administrative independence was more limited, but nevertheless 
there was much influence to lose for the unions. Some private sector unions were 
willing to compromise and signed in the last decade a series o f agreements with the 
government regarding spending cuts, which in turn secured them a future role in their
121 “It is no question whether we will participate in the administration o f the health insurance funds. We, 
the employers, are not legitimate” (author’s own translation).
276
administration and a limitation of further restrictions o f their competencies. This 
however resulted in repeated conflicts between union leadership and their members. The 
plans for a radical healthcare reform presented by Juppe in 1995 faced strong opposition 
by the radical Force Ouvriere, but not from all unions: Nicole Notat, the secretary 
general o f the CFDT, argued in favour o f a more compromising line by the unions in 
order not to risk the whole balance of the schemes. This earned her (also physical) 
attacks by her own unions members. In December 2002, grassroot members of the three 
main trade union federations stood up against their leadership in rejecting a deal those 
had agreed with the government on reforming the pension systems o f Electricite de 
France and Gaz de France (see Financial Times, 12 June 2003). In May 2003, the 
moderate CFDT unions and the French labour minister agreed a deal over public 
pension reform (which raised the contribution period from 27.5 to 40 years by 2008). 
The CFDT leadership came under fire for causing a split in the union movement, as 
radical wings o f the union opposed the decision o f their own leadership and 
independently organised strikes against the agreement. These examples show that the 
interests o f the union elites in preserving their own position and influence were often 
more decisive for their actions than the actual policy positions o f their members.
In Germany there is similar evidence o f deals between the social partners and the 
government regarding the maintenance of administrative authority: examples have been 
cutbacks in the pension sector with the 2001 pension reform, which were connected 
with an expansion of union powers in the occupational pension sector (see Busemeyer 
2005), or the expansion of administrative powers for the social partners on the lower 
levels of the BA in return for a restriction o f authority on the top level as well as major 
benefit reforms.
8,1.3,3 No Blame without Responsibility: Opposing Goals and Common Interests 
As outlined above, the strategy of both the French and German governments has in 
many cases been to maintain the outer shell o f self-governance in insurance schemes 
while hollowing out the actual authority of the social partners in making self- 
determined decisions. But a consequence o f this strategy o f sharing responsibilities -  
often to the financial disadvantage of the insurance schemes -  has also been that the 
social partners in both countries became increasingly fed-up with this development 
which left responsibility and blame with them, while in parallel, they lost more and 
more competencies to actually determine policy developments. The social partners
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therefore increasingly pressed towards a clarification of administrative and budgetary 
authorities.
What we can observe is that since the mid-1990s there has been a move away from 
interlinked decisionmaking structures between the social partners and the government -  
both towards more direct administrative and budgetary control by the government (such 
as in the health sector in France and the unemployment sector in Germany), as well as 
towards more administrative and budgetary freedom for the social partners (such as in 
the unemployment scheme in France and the health insurance in Germany). On the one 
hand, it has been the government which has granted the self-administration more 
institutional competencies if  this allowed it to delegate difficult and conflictuous 
allocation processes to independent decisionmaking bodies. But in many cases it has 
been the social partners which have pressed for a clarification o f authorities.
Despite the fact that employer and worker representatives were often strongly opposed 
to each other with regard to their policy positions, they found common ground in 
rejecting further state intervention. Paradoxically this has been even more strongly the 
case in France than in Germany -  arguably because o f the even stronger threat o f state 
intervention. As described by Ebbinghaus (2002b: 28), the ‘potential and credible 
threat* o f such intervention is often an important factor for successful social 
concertation. But against the assumptions made in the literature focusing on national 
social pacts, it seems that the collaborative behaviour between the social partners 
depends on the specific situation in certain insurance schemes: while they might find 
common ground in opposing state intervention in insurance schemes, this might not be 
the case in another. Despite the fragility of this united front, the government seems 
often unable to break the common resistance against further state intrusion.
The French and German analyses confirm that conflicts about social policy changes 
increasingly are not fought between the different camps o f political orientation, but 
instead between the government and the administrators o f the social insurance schemes. 
But what they do not confirm is that the social partners in general are acting 
increasingly as ‘office-seekers’ in contrast to ‘policy-seekers’ (see Natali and Rhodes 
2004a: 24). Instead it seems that there are differences to the degree to which the two 
sides of the social partners have an interest in defending their influence regarding the 
insurance schemes: the unions have indeed a great interest as it ensures them political
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influence and employment for many of their representatives. This is particularly strong 
in France, as they -  in contrast to their counterparts in Germany -  lack not only 
sufficient independent resources, but also generally influence regarding the 
determination of broad economic policies. Employers, in contrast, seem to have had less 
interest in maintaining the corporatist governance system per se, but they also had a 
strong interest in avoiding government interference which affected the finances o f the 
insurance funds negatively.
France:
Despite the absence o f corporatist arrangements in the industrial relations in France and 
a highly confrontational approach by the unions regarding welfare reforms (which 
resulted in strikes which paralysed the country for weeks in 1995 and 2003), there was 
increasing co-operation between the unions and employers regarding social insurance 
policies. Historically, the employers started consultations with unions about future 
economic and social reforms from March 1995, initiated by their new head, Jean 
Gandois, who changed the strategy of the ‘patronat,122 from viewing unions merely as 
enemies, but instead pointed to the importance o f seeking the contact to the unions in 
order to enable change. One of his officials commented: “We have everything to lose if  
the unions become weaker still...and so we have to find ways o f keeping their heads 
above water” (Financial Times, 5 September 1995).
Both employers and unions criticised the repeated attempts by the government to gain 
more control over the unemployment insurance, and were also opposed towards the 
restriction of their independence in the pension and health sector. MEDEF repeatedly 
threatened to withdraw from the self-administration, which increased the pressure on 
unions to reach agreements with the employers if  they did not want to endanger the 
system of self-administration as such, and with it their position in it. For the employers, 
this instrument o f exerting pressures put them in a win-win situation: even if the 
agreement had not been approved by government, this would have meant that the 
government would have had to take (temporary) control over the scheme. “If so, it 
would be a partial victory for MEDEF, since, at the very least, the government will have 
to reassess the main union privileges (and abuses) in helping run the social security
122 The change in the employers’ strategy in dealing with the unions is also illustrated by the name change 
of their representative association from CNPF (Conseil National du Patronat Franfais) to MEDEF 
(Mouvement des Entreprises de France) in 1998. The move away from the ‘patronage’ term signalled an 
understanding o f the relationship with other political actors on a more equal level.
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system” (Financial Times, 29 July 2000). These increased pressures finally led to the 
agreement between MEDEF and the majority of unions about the unemployment 
insurance reform in 2000, which was the first time employers defined their relations 
with the unions without government intervention (see Financial Times, 15 June 2000). 
But despite the common resistance towards further state intervention, there were also 
changes on the union side that made this unlikely co-operation between the social 
partners possible: since the reintroduction of parity, the more moderate CFDT became 
the dominating union which proved more willing to reach compromises with both 
government and employers.
Another victory for the employers was achieved in the conflict about the financing of 
early retirement regulations via the supplementary pension schemes: they again 
successfully joined forces with the unions and regained more budgetary independence. 
This was different in both the health and first-pillar pension schemes, where similar 
attempts by the employers to join forces with the unions failed due to the inability to 
agree common policy positions and financing concepts. This led successively to the 
(temporary) exit o f the employers from the administration boards (see 6.1.1).
Germany:
In Germany, scholars have pointed towards a decreasing regulatory ability of the social 
partners due to the increasingly difficult financial situation o f the insurance schemes 
since the early 1990s, which made it more difficult to reach agreements (Schmidt 2000; 
Trampusch 2004). Employers were concerned with the negative effects o f the high non­
wage labour costs, while the unions wanted to avoid a cutting back o f benefits. But also 
in the German case, the social partners -  despite their increasing difficulties in agreeing 
about future reform paths -  supported common positions. As in France, this common 
position of the social partners did not derive from a particular ‘social pact’: the 
‘Bundnis fur Arbeit’ (Alliance for Jobs), an attempt by both Chancellor Kohl and later 
on by Chancellor Schroder to come to a mutual agreement between unions and 
employers regarding economic and social reforms, failed twice (see Lehmbruch 2003). 
Instead, agreements between the social partners often resulted -  as in France -  from 
common opposition to further government involvement in administrative and budgetary 
procedures o f the schemes.
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However, the building of an effective alliance against further government involvement 
was not always achieved: in the deliberative process leading up to the 1999 Pension 
Reform Act, the different positions o f the social partners hindered them in exerting 
influence on the reform process (see Richter 2001: 105). But in other cases the social 
partners managed to agree on common policy positions and successfully defended their 
administrative and budgetary autonomy: in 2004, the planned authorisation requirement 
[Genehmigungsvorbehalt] for the pension insurance budgets was withdrawn again after 
protests from both sides. As in France, employers and unions had very different motives 
for resisting this government initiative: while the unions rejected a further involvement 
of the federal state as they fear a reduction o f self-administration authorities and higher 
pressures for cost reductions, the employers wanted to avoid more federal authority 
explicitly because they feared that this would be an obstacle towards further savings 
(see BDA 2004). Also in the unemployment insurance scheme, both employers and 
unions were striving towards a clear assignment o f authorities -  even if  this meant to 
wave the automatic deficit coverage by the state (see 7.3).
Common Patterns in France and Germany?
In both France and Germany, the social partners found common ground in rejecting 
further government involvement in administrative and budgetary decisionmaking in the 
social insurance institutions. Their common interest in maintaining their independent 
decisionmaking powers has enabled partially far-reaching reforms which have involved 
severe cutbacks o f provisions. In this respect, the sectoral perspective highlighted 
common patterns in both countries: while the social partners demanded the retreat o f the 
state from insurance schemes with a high degree o f fiscal commitment, they seemed to 
be willing to give up involvement in the schemes characterised by only a low degree of 
commitment.
Overall, the French employers were more willing to risk the governance structure of the 
insurance system as a whole when compared with their German counterparts. Their 
‘office-seeking’ attitude was very limited if schemes lost their restricted insurance 
character due to an expansion of eligibility beyond employees, and if they did not see 
possibilities for effective cost containment -  such as in the health sector. But also in 
Germany, employer representatives have raised demands to reduce all three social 
insurance schemes to a sole basic protection (see BDA 1998). So far, however, they 
have remained in the administration of all schemes.
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8.1.4 The Procrastinatory Effect of Party Ideology
The analysis o f the French and German reform processes between 1990 and 2005 
confirms strongly the hypothesis that a partisan-focused theory o f welfare reform 
processes is not able to explain social policy developments in times o f austerity. In both 
countries, commitment-reducing measures were pursued by both conservative and 
socialist/social-democratic governments, and there is no evidence for a diversion from 
once initiated reform paths after the ruling party or parties changed. What is visible 
however is a procrastinatory effect of party politics -  that is, party politics seem to have 
an effect on the timing of reform measures. In both Germany and France, left-wing 
governments gained power in the second half of the 1990s -  also a consequence of their 
campaign strategies which promised to reverse or stop social policy reforms 
implemented by the conservative governments in power at this time. But in both cases, 
the reforms which had been pursued by those conservative governments and which were 
partly reversed or not implemented by the new left-wing governments were after a short 
period reintroduced due to mounting cost pressures -  in most cases under a different 
heading, but often with even more cost-saving consequences.
In Germany, reform packages were passed from 1993 onwards on a regular basis in an 
ongoing attempt to deal with the mounting cost pressures and rising deficits in the social 
budget. By the mid-1990s, in all areas of social policy substantial changes had been 
introduced, but the majority o f those turned out to be insufficient to avoid rising deficits 
in the following years. With the struggle of reform, the formerly mainly consensus- 
oriented pattern of policymaking changed to a highly polarised and conflictual struggle 
between the different parties and their associated stakeholders. The Social Democrats 
under their chairman Oskar Lafontaine opposed reforms undertaken by the Kohl 
government, and used their majority in the Bundesrat to block as many reforms as 
possible. After the election victory of the SPD and a coalition formation with the Green 
party, the direction o f social policy was reversed -  but due to severe fiscal problems, 
this turn was only short-lived. Lafontaine resigned as finance minister at the beginning 
of 1999, and the following reforms were mainly dominated by the aim of fiscal 
consolidation and attempts to reduce the fiscal burden on companies in order to 
stimulate the struggling economy. The Red-Green government was forced to 
reintroduce many measures already decided under the Kohl government and
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continuously saw itself in a struggle with its own followers, but also their traditional 
allies, the unions.
In 1999, the demographic factor -  introduced in 1997 by the conservative-liberal 
government -was abolished by the Schroder government. But due to mounting fiscal 
pressures, a very similar reform was introduced in 2001 when a factor for the 
development o f the pension contribution rate was integrated in the benefit calculation 
formula. In 2004, this was accompanied by a ‘sustainability factor’ -  which was 
basically the formerly abolished ‘demographic factor’. Overall, the combined effect o f  
these reforms on future pension levels was much more drastic than the initial reforms of 
the conservative government (43 instead of 64 percent o f average wages for the 
standard pensioner in 2030). Also the reform of disability pensions had been reversed 
by the Red-Green government, but was again reintroduced with only minor changes 
after a short period o f time. Similar short-term redemptions o f reforms also took place 
in the health insurance. Another example o f how governmental responsibility often led 
to a radical change in policy positions can also be found in the unemployment insurance 
sector. The Kohl government in 1996 failed with its attempt to further restrain the 
independence of the BA self-administration, which as at this point was heavily opposed 
by the Social Democrats; once in power, the Red-Green coalition used the opportunity 
provided by the BA scandal in 2002 to implement exactly these restrictions.
In France we can observe a similar pattern: measures previously attacked by the parties 
in opposition were repeated or expanded once those opposition parties found themselves 
in government. One example is the social insurance tax CSG. Although once opposed 
by the conservatives, the CSG has since its introduction in 1991 been used extensively 
by both camps and its rate was increased multiple times. An example of a delaying 
effect o f party politics can be found in the pension sector: in 1997, the Juppe 
government tried to introduce non-obligatory private savings schemes for private sector 
employees, financially supported by the government. But the left-wing Jospin 
government blocked the implementation of the law after taking over power in 1997. In 
February 2001, the same government introduced so-called ‘Plans Partenariaux 
d ’Epargne Salariale ’ (PPESV). Although not labeled as such, those pension plans were 
employee pension saving schemes financially supported by employers and the state -  
schemes which had been blocked before.
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8.2 The Effects of Low Fiscal Commitment: Social Insurance 
Reforms in the United Kingdom 1990-2005
In order to show that the fiscal commitment framework is also useful to explain 
developments in welfare states with very different institutional characteristics, the 
second part of this chapter contrasts the results of the analysis o f French and German 
social insurance reforms with the developments in the United Kingdom between 1990 
and 2005. The main question evaluated is whether the conclusions derived from the 
study o f the two high-commitment countries France and German can equally be applied 
to the case of the UK, whose social insurance programmes are situated on the other 
extreme of the commitment-scale with very low scores on all four dimensions. The 
following sections present a brief outline o f the characteristics o f the UK social 
insurance schemes in the three observed sectors, and then contrast the reform 
developments in those schemes between 1990 and 2005 with the results o f the French 
and German case studies.
8.2.1 Fiscal Commitment in the UK Social Insurance Sectors in 1990
The UK welfare state is a popular case for comparative studies, as it is often considered 
as the only case o f a ‘liberal welfare regime’ in Western Europe besides Ireland 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999). Characteristic for liberal regimes is the predominant tax 
financing of welfare provisions, which are usually directly administered by the state 
without involvement of the social partners and whose spending structure is mainly 
based on means-testing and marginal benefit levels. But while these general attributes 
are useful for a very broad classification of the British welfare state within the range of 
regime types, a more diverse picture appears when taking a closer look at individual 
policy areas. While it is true that the British welfare state provides more income-related, 
needs-based provisions than social-democratic or continental welfare states, here 
contribution-based social insurance schemes also play an important role. “More than £6 
in every £100 of national income goes through the National Insurance system, making it 
as important within the public finances as financing the National Health Service” (Hill 
2003: 1). Social insurance plays an important role firstly in the pension sector, where 
contribution-based benefits include the basic state pension and compulsory second-tier 
pension provisions. Contribution-based provision also plays a role in the unemployment 
protection sector, with eligibility for unemployment benefits (since 1997 ‘Jobseekers 
Allowance’) based on a contribution record. In the health sector, social insurance 
elements are also prevalent: although health provision in the UK is not insurance-based,
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but delivered on a citizenship-basis by the National Health Service (NHS), there exist 
contribution-based statutory sick pay and disability allowances.
In administrative terms, the British welfare state has only a very low degree o f fiscal 
commitment as all social programs are directly administered by the state or its agencies 
without any involvement of the social partners. The influence o f both employer and 
employee representatives on social policymaking and implementation has traditionally 
never been strong in the UK (see Edwards 1998; Crouch 1999). Some commentators 
have even argued that ‘corporatism is incompatible with British society’ (Bimbaum 
1988). One explanatory factor is the fairly late and weak union movement in Britain, 
which -  contrary to both the German and French unions - did not always actively seek 
involvements in welfare state matters but instead separated labour relation issues from 
social policy issues (see Ashford 1986; Marier 2002). Furthermore, the union movement 
was strongly fragmented which further weakened its influence also in social policy 
matters. “True to its status as a social insurance system without social partner 
participation, the British system became one o f weak universal (as opposed to 
occupational) citizenship. It was, however, a citizenship model rather than a residual 
one, because all except the wealthiest expected to make some use of it” (Crouch 1999: 
448).
The only area where employers had an active role in administering welfare provisions 
were occupational pensions, which since 1975 could be chosen as a replacement for the 
public second-tier pension SERPS. This also gave the unions some limited influence, 
though this was mainly restricted to the occupational schemes in the public sector 
(Ebbinghaus 2000b: 12; see also Bonoli 2000). But who are the state actors involved in 
regulating and administering the social insurance schemes? Besides the Department of 
Health -  which is responsible for the NHS -  all old-age and unemployment related 
benefit provisions were task of the Department o f Social Security (DSS), now 
Department of Work and Pension's (DWP). But another very important actor in shaping 
social policies was traditionally the Treasury, the powerful ministry combining 
monetary and economic policy areas (see Thain and Wright 1992; Deakin and Perry 
2000).
In contrast to the German and French insurance schemes, the British schemes did not 
have budgetary autonomy and their accounts were directly integrated in the general
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government budget. The government exerted full budgetary control over both the 
revenues assigned to the schemes as well as the spending parameters. Spending 
constraints were also high due to the budgetary allocation process: the position of the 
Treasury in the budgetary process has been extremely strong, also according to von 
Hagen’s index (1992: 69), which represented an important counterpoint towards 
expansionist tendencies regarding the social budgets (Ashford 1986; Marier 2002). The 
Treasury was generally involved in all policy-areas and often served as a veto point 
particularly in social policy reforms (see Hall 1986): no proposal involving additional 
spending was discussed in cabinet unless accompanied by a Treasury paper outlining 
the financial consequences (Glennerster 2003: 183), and the Treasury promoted the 
strict control o f the funding of new schemes (Deakin and Perry 2000: 21). But despite 
those strong pressures to contain spending, the extent to which spending could be pre­
determined was restricted: in the sectors in which contribution-based benefits were paid 
(that is, pensions, unemployment and sickness benefits), spending was demand-led and 
therefore no pre-defined spending limits could be set. The situation was different for the 
British National Health Service (NHS) which received a certain pre-defined amount 
from which it had to provide ‘comprehensive’ health care for the population.
Although in Britain a large share of social insurance provisions was financed by 
contributions paid by the employers and their employees, these contribution revenues 
were -  in contrast to France and Germany -  not earmarked for the specific programmes, 
but all contributed to a National Insurance Fund. Although formally separate, the fund 
was de facto part o f the governmental budget (see Bonoli 2000). Differences between 
social spending and revenues in the fund were compensated with tax funds, which 
shows that the distinction between the revenue sources was not distinct. This means that 
while contribution-financing did indeed play a role, the resulting degree of fiscal 
commitment was only low. Moreover, the degree o f fiscal commitment resulting from 
the spending structure of the schemes has been lower than in the other two studied 
cases: while eligibility was based on contribution records, the link between the amount 
of contributions paid and benefits received was often only very weak. While some 
schemes (second-pillar pensions and sickness pay) provided income-related benefits, 
others (unemployment and first-pillar pensions) only paid out flat-rate benefits despite 
the charging of eamings-related contributions.
286
8.2.2 Dealing with Fiscal Austerity: Reform Developments in the UK
Different Premises, Different Reform Predictions?
Similar to France and Germany, cost pressures grew strongly at the beginning o f the 
1990s in the UK: high unemployment coincided with increasing pressures on the NHS 
due to rising costs but increasing problems of service delivery, while pension spending 
was predicted to increase strongly as a consequence of population ageing. The 
containment of social security spending therefore became an area of major concern for 
the government, particularly as it accounted for a large share of overall government 
spending: Deakin and Parry (2000: 108) cite treasury and government officials 
confirming that spending allocations with the social security department had top priority, 
as even marginal errors in estimating expenditure could turn out larger than the entire 
funds o f other departments.
Based on the hypotheses formulated for the French and German reform developments in 
Chapter 2, what should we expect to be the reform developments in the British welfare 
state? As outlined above, fiscal commitment has generally been only low in all three 
social insurance sectors which should make it generally easier to push through cost 
containment measures. Strong pressures to do so should furthermore derive from the 
strong position of the Treasury in the policymaking processes. Due to the direct 
administration o f the schemes by the state, neither the unions nor the employer 
representatives had a vested interest in the maintenance o f the insurance schemes which 
also excludes them as likely barriers to reforms. The only exception would be the 
occupational pension schemes, on which the employers (represented by the 
Confederation o f British Industries, CBI) but also the unions (organised in the Trade 
Unions Congress, TUC) exerted direct influence. Furthermore, these schemes did play a 
role in wage bargains and employee-employer relations (Schmahl 1991), which should 
create resistance by the social partners against reforms which would reduce their role in 
those schemes (as had been the case in 1986; see Bonoli 2000). But in all other social 
programs we should see less resistance for change and it should be easier to push 
through necessary changes facing cost pressures. But on the other hand, the direct 
accountability o f the government for the schemes and therefore also for unpopular 
reform measures should -  according to blame avoidance arguments -  limit incentives 
for reforms.
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Increasing Budgetary Constraints: Changes to the Allocation Process 
At the beginning o f the 1990s, benefit expenditure grew particularly strong due to 
increased expenditure for unemployment, disability and pension benefits. The 1992 
governmental discussion paper “The Growth o f Social Security” predicted that benefit 
expenditure would rise by 26 percent between 1992/93 and 1999/2000 if the rate of 
unemployment remained unchanged. As parallel state revenues declined due to the 
recession during the mid-1990s, the Treasury exerted strong pressures to tackle these 
hard-to-control spending items.
One element of reforms aiming to increase spending constraints was a change in the
budgetary allocation process with the introduction of the so-called ‘EDX expenditure
control system’ in 1991. The new allocation system required new spending proposals to
be admitted only on the basis of cuts elsewhere once the overall total spending ceiling 
1had been set. It therefore reduced the need for case-by-case Treasury approvals of 
departmental spending, which was supposed to increase spending constraints (Parry et 
al. 1997: 396). But expenditure for social benefits continued to grow, and increased 
from 10.2 percent of the GDP in 1990/91 to 13.1 percent in 1995/96. But due to the 
beneficial economic development which also led to the decline of unemployment, this 
trend had already started to reverse when the Labour government came into office in 
1997.
Despite the signs o f a relaxation of spending pressures, the new government stressed its 
intention to follow the course of strict cost containment and froze the spending limits set 
by the former government for the coming two years. Furthermore, it attempted to 
increase budgetary control over social spending by the central government even further 
(Brewer et al. 2002: 507). In 1997, the new Chancellor Gordon Brown replaced the 
annual bidding rounds in the budgetary allocation process with a ‘Comprehensive 
Spending Review’ (CSR) which established spending requirements and budgets over a 
three-year period. This was supposed to give departments more control over their 
spending, as they were able to carry over unspent funds to the next period (see 
Glennerster 2003: 186). But in turn, departments were now required to agree Public 
Service Agreements with the Treasury, which set out the policy objectives as well as 
performance measurement indicators for the next three years (Carmel and Papadopoulos
123 In 1991 the total government expenditure had been oriented around a single aggregate -  the ‘control 
total’; only unemployment-related cyclical elements o f social security expenditure were excluded (along 
with debt interests).
288
2003; James 2004). In line with these measures, so-called ‘cash planning’ was 
introduced, which assigned the task of strict cost containment directly to the 
departments: if spending rose faster than predicted, managers would have to reduce the 
scale of the services that they were able to provide. The Treasury’s position in overall 
policymaking and in supervising its implementation had therefore been again 
strengthened, which also strengthened pressures for cost containment.
Development o f Social Spending
Despite the increased spending constraints, social expenditure in the UK increased 
overall during the observed period -  both if measured in real terms and as a percentage 
of GDP (from 17.9% in 1980 via 23.7% in 1993 to 21.8% in 2001). But parallel, the 
composition of the overall social security budget changed considerably during this 
period.
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As Graph 8-1 shows, the share of contributory benefits did decline considerably 
between the budget years 1970/71 and 1997/98, while both income-related and non­
contributory, non-income related benefits increased. Although this trend was stopped 
thereafter, this does not mean that the new government put increased emphasis on 
contributory insurance-spending: Frank Field, appointed Minister for Welfare Reform
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after the Labour election victory in 1997, had initially argued for a move towards social 
insurance, but this was something “a cost-conscious Treasury saw as unattractive” 
(Brewer et al. 2002: 513). Field did therefore not find sufficient support for his ideas, 
and after his departure from government in 1998 his successors followed the same path 
o f increasing income-based, means-tested provisions compared to contribution-based 
ones (see Hill 2003: 11). Some of these benefit increases came in the form of tax credits 
-  which meant that they did make an impact on the revenue- instead of the spending- 
side o f the social budget. Furthermore it is very important to stress that the increase of 
contributory benefits was exclusively due to an increase in contribution-based pension 
spending. Both spending for contribution-based unemployment benefits as well as 
sickness, invalidity and incapacity benefits declined strongly during this period.
In order to assess the full impact o f those changes regarding the degree o f fiscal 
commitment in the British welfare state it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
developments in the three social policy sectors.
Pensions
From the very beginning, financial considerations played a dominating role in the 
British pension system: before WWII, plans for an insurance-based pension scheme 
were rejected by the Treasury as too inexpensive and financially risky (see Heclo 1974). 
Only after WWII, Lord Beveridge managed to convince the Treasury that his plans for a 
contributory flat-rate pension were financially viable (Heclo 1974: 256; Nesbitt 1995: 4; 
cf. Marier 2002: 276). The result was the introduction of a Basic State Pension, financed 
from compulsory contributions by employers, employees and self-employed. This 
scheme was accompanied by private, occupational pension schemes. In 1975, a public 
second-tier scheme was introduced, the State Earning-Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS).
The degree of fiscal commitment emanating from the administrative and budgetary 
structures of the two pension schemes in 1990 has been extremely low. The Pension 
Service, the agency administering both the Basic State Pensions as well as SERPS, was 
under direct control by the Department of Social Security (DSS) and its budget was 
included in the departmental budget. Although spending in the two schemes was based 
on entitlements, the government disposed o f full budgetary control as it defined all 
relevant revenue and spending parameters. Also with regard to the revenue structure
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fiscal commitment was low, as pension contributions flowed unearmarked into the 
common National Insurance Fund, which was furthermore subsidised by tax funds.
Fiscal commitment on the spending structure varied between the two schemes: in the 
basic scheme, contributions had to be paid or credited for around nine-tenths of the 
claimant’s working life in order to receive a full pension. If the contribution record was 
incomplete, the pension was reduced accordingly. While this constituted a degree o f  
reciprocity between contribution payments and benefit entitlements, there was no direct 
connection between the amount of contributions (which were eamings-related) and the 
overall generosity o f benefits (which were flat-rate). Furthermore, the degree o f  
‘external reciprocity’ was extremely low with pension levels (in 1993 around 22 percent 
of average male earnings) just above those of means-tested provisions (Bonoli 2000: 
59). But the overall pension level was usually higher due to the additional second-pillar 
provision (which amounted to around 25 percent o f average earnings). With regard to 
SERPS, also the degree of internal reciprocity was stronger with the eamings-related 
benefit based on an employee’s best twenty years of earnings.
Pension spending accounted in 1990/91 for 44 percent o f all social benefit expenditure 
in the UK, and was also the spending item which was rising fastest.124 Despite the fact 
that the generally very low level o f the basic scheme was one reason for high level of 
pensioner’ poverty, the Conservative government therefore started to scale back the 
public schemes, particularly SERPS, from 1985 onwards (see Bonoli 2000: 63).125 
Parallel, it promoted a shift to occupational and private saving schemes. In order to 
achieve further savings in the public schemes, the Major government decided at the 
beginning o f the 1990s to equalise the pension age for men and women in the public 
schemes to 65. But while it was predicted that the equalisation of pension ages would 
reduce public expenditure by £10 bn per year by 2030, this did not solve the acute 
spending problems at the time (Deakin and Parry 2000: 125). The plan o f the Major 
government to therefore completely privatise the contributory schemes failed however 
and in 1997 Labour became the governing party.
124 Data Source: DWP, Benefit Expenditure Great Britain, 1991/92-2006/07.
195 The 1986 Pension Act halved the benefit levels under SERPS, by (i) basing entitlements oh whole 
employment career earnings, rather than the best 20 years; (ii) gradually reducing SERPS payments from 
25% o f average earnings to 20 percent (by 2009); (iii) reducing the survivor’s pension from 100 to 50 
percent (see Taylor-Gooby and Daguerre 2002).
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Labour revealed its own pension proposals in 1998, shifting the focus on the voluntary 
take-up of stakeholder pensions and on securing the flat-rate pension (see Evans and 
Cemy 2003). But due to its aim to avoid an increase o f public pension spending, it in 
the end continued the strategy of its predecessors of shifting the old-age risk into the 
private sector. Furthermore, the existing public pension schemes increasingly became 
safety nets for low-income earners, while the eamings-related elements were further 
reduced: in April 2002, SERPS was replaced by a State Second Pension (S2P) which 
was funded by employees and employers (see Glennerster 2003: 141). While 
contributions were still eamings-related, the benefits o f the new S2P would eventually 
be flat-rate, which strongly reduced the degree o f contribution-benefit reciprocity. The 
following year a ‘Pension Credit’ was introduced which subsumed the old Minimum 
Income Guarantee for pensioners and guaranteed a minimum pension for those on low 
incomes, which was a further element of redistribution in the insurance scheme and 
further weakened the degree of internal reciprocity. While means-tested provision for 
people on low income was extended, the central union demand o f expanding the basic 
pension scheme so that it would provide a sufficient base for all its insured were not 
fulfilled (see Ebbinghaus 2002b: 22). The aim of tackling old age poverty was instead 
pursued by increasingly targeting the public funds on the needy, while undermining the 
insurance principle o f reciprocity between contribution payments and benefits.
The reforms in the British pension sector seem to confirm the hypotheses that a low 
degree of fiscal commitment -  particularly on the dimensions ‘administrative 
independence’ and ‘spending structure’ -  facilitates the implementation o f cost- 
containment measures. Despite the direct administrative control o f the schemes, the 
government did not seem to avoid reforms of the schemes due to fears of electoral 
backlashes. Contrary to partisan theories, there have also been no major differences in 
the reform strategies o f the Conservative and Labour governments, as for both the goal 
to contain public pension spending was prioritised.
As pension levels were already low, the most viable solution was to shift the remaining 
commitments in the private sector: all reforms which reduced replacement levels and 
contribution-based elements in the schemes were accompanied by a shift of future 
pension provisions in the private sector. While this enabled the government to stress 
that overall replacement levels would also not fall in the future which reduced resistance 
to the reforms, the continuing shift of fiscal commitments in the private sector meant
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that the government drastically reduced its responsibility for these commitments in the 
future. “At present some 60 percent of retirement income comes from the public purse 
and 40 percent from occupational and private pensions and private savings. The 
objective is, by 2050, to have reversed this ratio” (Taylor-Gooby and Daguerre 2002: 6; 
see also DSS 1998; Hill 2003). The very limited public reaction to the major changes in 
the pension sector confirms the expectations that due to the lack of a vested interest in 
the maintenance of the public schemes, the social partners were not overly concerned as 
long as the occupational schemes remained unaffected.
Health
The provision of health services in the UK is organisationally very different from those 
in France in Germany: The National Health Service (NHS), which provides and 
finances health services in Britain, was founded in 1948 on the principle that the entire 
population o f the UK should have free access to comprehensive healthcare, which 
resulted in a model o f tax-financed, national state provision instead o f the introduction 
of statutory public health insurances. As the NHS is not an insurance scheme, it is 
therefore not subject o f the following section (for an overview over fiscal reforms in the 
NHS see e.g. Klein 1995; Giaimo and Manow 1999; LeGrand 1999; Glennerster 2003). 
Instead, the focus is on the only insurance elements in the health sector, which are the 
provision of sickness pay and invalidity benefits.
After WWII, no scheme providing earnings replacement benefits in the case of inability 
to work due to illness was initially introduced and workers only received means-tested 
assistance in the case of illness. An ‘Invalidity Benefit’ (IVB) was introduced in 1971, 
providing an age-related income to those who fell ill or became disabled while being 
employed. Eligibility was connected to a sufficient record of national insurance 
contributions, while those without sufficient contributions had to rely on the ‘Non- 
Contributory Invalidity Pension’ introduced four years later. Facing increasing 
expenditure for the Invalidity Benefits, the Conservative government reduced spending 
during the 1980s by linking the adaptation of benefits to prices rather than earnings. 
Successively, benefits became flat-rate and finally the financing o f Statutory Sickness 
Pay (SSP) during the first 28 weeks of illness was shifted entirely to the employers (see 
Burchardt 1999). In 1990, the degree of fiscal commitment inherent in the insurance 
scheme was therefore very low: directly administered by the state and financed via a
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combination o f non-earmarked contributions and taxes, the flat-rate provision of 
benefits did also not create much commitment on the spending dimension.
During the 1990s, the contribution-based sickness benefits were further reduced. In 
1995, the IVB was replaced with the Incapacity Benefit (IB) whose eligibility criteria 
were even tighter than before. Insurance benefits were now only provided for sick low- 
income earners not eligible for SSP, and for long-term disabled. Furthermore, the 
benefits were now taxable which channelled benefit spending back into the state budget. 
This further reduced the spending commitments o f the government considerably. Due to 
these changes, contribution-based earning replacement benefits as a proportion of total 
disabled benefits shrank considerably during the 1990s, while means-tested benefits 
grew (see Burchardt 1999: 8). But despite the reductions of benefits, incapacity benefits 
were still very much the target of cost containment reforms as they still accounted for a 
considerable share of social benefit expenditure (nearly 10 percent in 1994/95).126
In 1999, further reforms were implemented but without affecting the insurance status of 
the benefits. The government introduced new contribution conditions which made it 
again harder to claim the benefits. Furthermore, the ability to work was to be more 
strictly controlled, and beneficiaries who received an additional private pension or 
insurance income were subject to a means-test for receiving benefits. Although these 
reforms led to a further reduction of spending for disability benefits in real terms, 
savings have remained modest as take-up rates of the disability benefits remained fairly 
high. As a consequence, the Labour government announced a further reform in January 
2006 to be implemented in 2008. Incapacity Benefit and Income Support will be 
replaced with the new ‘Employment and Support Allowance’ (ESA). If claimants are 
judged to be able to work this will further reduce their benefits, while those cuts will be 
accompanied by increased measures helping disabled back into work. With these future 
reforms, the insurance-component of the benefit will again further reduced, and the 
receipt increasingly linked to conditions for taking up employment and measures 
restoring the employment capacity.
Similar to the pension sector, the wide-reaching cost containment reforms in the area of 
disability and sickness benefit provision have been facilitated by a low degree o f fiscal 
commitment on all four dimensions. Direct budgetary control by the government over
126 Data Source: DWP, Benefit Expenditure Tables Great Britain, 1991/92-2006/07.
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the contribution-financed benefits has not only provided the means, but also incentives 
for the Treasury to tackle the increasing spending in this social policy sector. The non­
involvement o f the social partners or any other representatives o f contribution payers in 
the administration of the schemes has limited barriers and public resistance against the 
reforms. With regard to the structure of benefit provision, the low degree of reciprocity 
between contribution payments and benefit entitlements has led to a further 
development towards a flat-rate benefit provision as well an increasing tightening o f  
eligibility criteria. But in contrast to France or Germany, this restriction of eligibility 
has not been based on the duration of previous contribution payments, but instead on 
income-based criteria (that is, means-tested provision). While in the two corporatist 
countries the insurance character o f benefit provision has been strengthened via these 
measures, it has been further weakened in the British case.
Unemployment
As the other social insurance schemes, the British unemployment insurance was 
administered by the state without any involvement o f the social partners. Wage 
replacement benefits were provided by the Benefits Agency, which was institutionally 
completely separate from the Employment Service responsible for active labour market 
policy.127 Both agencies were subject to direct control by the Department o f Social 
Security (DSS). Unemployment benefit was financed from the pool o f national 
insurance contributions, which meant that funds were not earmarked despite the fact 
that the contributions created entitlements. Accordingly, there was no budgetary 
separation of the general budget and the funds for the unemployment insurance, which 
made spending subject to the annual budget bargains of the government. Fiscal 
commitment on the administrative, budgetary and revenue dimension was therefore 
very low at the beginning of the 1990s.
Fiscal commitment deriving from the contribution-benefit link was also limited: 
although general eligibility was based on the previous contribution record, 
unemployment benefits were flat-rate and their duration was restricted to one year, 
regardless of the duration of previous contribution payments. Replacement rates were
127 In contrast to the provision of passive benefits, the social partners have been involved in active labour 
market policies although this decreased prior to 1990. For an overview over social partner participation in 
the employment administration see Trampusch 2000.
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also low -  if  compared to an average blue collar salary, they amounted to 25 percent by 
the mid-1990s (Clasen 2000: 90).
In the first half o f the 1990s, the Conservative government increased pressures to take 
up work, and eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits were further restricted. The 
new benefit regime involved performance targets for the Employment Service regarding 
the number of people removed from the benefit system (see Finn 2003: 113). Essential 
element of the new ‘activating’ policies introduced thereafter was the replacement of 
benefit entitlements with a ‘contract’ between the unemployed and the state -  the latter 
providing financial assistance and training, while the former agreed to actively 
participate in active measures (see Clasen 2000: 91; Evans and Cemy 2003). These 
forms of contracts were implemented in 1996, when unemployed were re-defined as 
‘jobseekers’ and eligibility for the new ‘Jobseekers’ Allowance’ (replacing 
Unemployment Benefit and Income Support) required entering into an agreement 
specifying job search efforts and minimum wage requirements. But the Jobseekers’ 
Allowance also involved a further cut in passive benefits: while unemployed had 
previously been eligible to up to one year unemployment benefits, the ‘Contribution- 
Based Jobseeker's Allowance’ had a maximum duration o f six months. After this 
expired, unemployed received the ‘Income-based Jobseekers’ Allowance’ with 
unrestricted durability as long as the claimants fulfilled the qualifying conditions. The 
reductions o f contribution-based spending for unemployment benefits were 
considerable -  within two years (between 1995/96 and 1997/98), contribution-based 
spending had been reduced by two thirds from £1.44 bn to just £0.58 bn. Although 
unemployment did indeed decline during this period, this strong reduction was mainly 
due to the new benefit regulations.
Labour pursued these new activating policies further and did so also institutionally: with 
the creation o f the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) in 1997, the Employment 
Service and Benefits Agency were replaced by ‘Jobcentre Plus’ Executive Agencies, 
integrating job search support and benefit payments (see Finn 2003). But the Labour 
policies differed from the previous policies in one major point (see Clasen 2000: 203): 
instead of trying to activate unemployed via threats o f benefit cuts, the policies 
increasingly focused on improving the employability o f the jobseekers. For this
128 One important element o f this strategy was the introduction o f the ‘New Deal’ program, initially 
mainly aimed at young unemployed and long-term unemployed but later expanded to broader groups of
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purpose, expenditure for active employment measures was increased which could -  
despite the pledge to follow a path of containing public expenditure -  be justified due to 
overall declining spending for unemployment due to improvements on the labour 
market. In the following years there were no major changes to the regulations of 
unemployment benefits. Reform efforts have focused on other areas such as disability 
benefits instead, which -  particularly in the eyes o f the cost-conscious Treasury -  
represented a more pressing issue (see Deakin and Parry 2000: 124).
The reform developments in the unemployment sector show again that contribution- 
financing of social provisions alone does not constitute an effective barrier against 
retrenchment in times of fiscal austerity. Instead, the direct administrative and 
budgetary control by the government has enabled it implement wide-reaching benefit 
reforms which -  together with the positive development on the labour market -  have 
resulted in considerable reductions in spending. The strong connection of benefit 
entitlements with active efforts of recipients to seek reemployment represents a strong 
weakening o f the insurance character of the provision as the receipt of benefits is 
connected with conditions completely unrelated to the contribution record o f the 
claimant.
8.2.3 Contradiction or Confirmation?
The developments in the three British social insurance sectors between 1990 and 2005 
confirm the findings o f this study, that the degree o f fiscal commitment inherent in 
insurance schemes in 1990 had a systematic effect on successive reforms. The 
considerable degree o f cost containment measures implemented in all three social policy 
sectors shows that the low degree of fiscal commitment in any o f the contribution- 
financed policy programmes has given the British government considerable control over 
its social budget. The Treasury tightened its grip over the social budget even further in 
the successive years, and this played an important role in the development of social 
spending. While the overall amount of social spending did not decrease, but increase in 
real terms between 1990 and 2005, the degree to which this spending was pre­
committed for specific social purposes has declined drastically.
unemployed, which involved an individual plan for every jobseeker how to improve its chances of  
employment.
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Contribution-related expenditure has been cut back strongly, while in parallel the 
development o f new contribution-based entitlements has (particularly in the pension 
sector) been avoided due to new legislation. The connection of benefit receipt with 
behavioural conditions has been another trend away from the insurance principle, and 
has been prominently introduced in the unemployment benefit sector as well as with 
regard to sickness and disability benefits. These developments together have lead to a 
steady dilution of the contributory principle, as the insurance o f social risks is 
increasingly shifted into the private sector, while the public insurance schemes have 
become increasingly based on participation records instead o f contribution records (Hill 
2003: 28). This means that the government has further increased its possibilities to shift 
spending more easily according to its policy preferences, and its control over the social 
budget has become even greater than already the case at the beginning o f the 1990s.
In contrast to Germany and France, existing spending commitments have often been 
directly broken instead o f merely being avoided or attempted to be hidden. This 
confirms Hacker’s observation that such ‘hidden politics of social policy retrenchment’ 
are mainly necessary if authoritative change is not possible (see Hacker 2004). In the 
UK however, the government disposed of sufficient authority to considerably transform 
the social insurance programmes. It therefore seems that, contrary to blame avoidance 
arguments, the direct accountability o f the government for the schemes and therefore 
also for unpopular reform measures did not limit incentives for reforms. Instead, the 
much stronger financial control over the social budget and concerns about rising social 
expenditure were dominant.
This means that the UK case strengthens the arguments o f the fiscal institutionalism 
literature (e.g. de Haan and Sturm 1994; von Hagen and Harden 1996; Perotti et al. 
1998; Strauch and von Hagen 1999; 2001) that a stronger positions o f the finance 
minister should be conducive to effective cost containment and hinder expansionary 
fiscal policies. The central role o f the Treasury in the policymaking process has resulted 
in a targeting of policy areas involving the greatest financial risk for the government due 
to the increase of contribution-based entitlements. The British finance minister, 
compared to his French and German counterparts, had much more interest in cutting 
back social expenditure, as it had a direct impact on his budget. This confirms the 
finding that the higher the financial stake o f the government in the individual schemes, 
the higher its motivation for such self-interested intervention. The absence o f
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autonomous insurance budgets did not provide opportunities to shift expenditure and 
responsibilities for future spending commitments into the social budgets, which led to 
more direct attacks on social insurance spending. The direct budgetary control by the 
government o f the insurance schemes did therefore not only create the incentives to 
contain costs, but also the means to do so.
A major factor enabling such a radical transformation of the insurance schemes seems 
to also have been the non-representation of the social partners in the schemes’ 
administration. Due to the lack of an institutionalised role for the unions in the 
administration and regulation of social policy they lacked organisational capacities to 
organise protest against the reforms (see Bonoli 2001; Crouch 2001; Hassel 2003). But 
both sides o f the social partners also had only a limited interest to defend the schemes, 
as their provisions were irrelevant for wage bargains and therefore for their economic 
interests. The only area in which they had a vested interest was the occupational pension 
schemes, which they were keen to defend against a further personalisation of funded 
pension schemes. This confirms the findings for France and Germany that the 
employer’s interest in defending their competencies and generally the maintenance of 
the schemes is limited if  schemes loose their corporatist character in both administrative 
and budgetary terms. The limited incentives for the organised stakeholders to protest 
against the government’s reform plans also explained the low degree o f general public 
resistance and attention to many of the reforms announcements (see Crouch 1999: 448).
Britain is furthermore another case which confirms the hypothesis that party ideologies 
do not (any longer) play a dominating role in shaping policies in times o f cost 
containment: both the Conservative and Labour governments followed an equal path of 
cost-containment, shifting the insurance of social risks increasingly into the private 
sector while focusing funds on the needy, though combined with a strengthening of 
behavioural conditions for benefit receipt. This process o f risk privatisation has been 
much stronger than in Germany or France, and means a considerable reduction of public 
commitment to insure social risks. While this is conducive to effective cost 
containment, it has negative effects on degree of social protection as only a minimum 
safety need is provided and the securing of status-maintaining income is left to 
individual households.
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Overall, the contrasting of the results from the analysis o f reform processes in France, 
Germany and the UK confirms that a change in the analytical focus from a macro to a 
micro level enables a much more differentiated comparison o f social policy 
developments across different types of welfare states. The fiscal commitment 
framework is therefore not only applicable for corporatist-continental welfare states, but 
can equally be applied to analyse degrees of fiscal commitment and reform 
developments in countries associated with very different welfare state families.
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9 Summary and Implications
This thesis has addressed a major debate in welfare state research, which is centred 
around one basic question: what are the factors that determine whether some countries 
retrench their welfare states in times of financial difficulties, whereas others maintain or 
even expand the level o f social provision and spending even in times of severe fiscal 
pressure on their social budgets?
To evaluate this question, the thesis has contrasted a number of prominent theories 
which all stress very different variables as explanatory factors for the variation in social 
spending developments and the extent and form of structural reforms in modem welfare 
states. While the ‘new politics’ approach focuses on institutional structures as decisive 
elements which determine the lock-in and stickiness o f welfare provision, the recently 
revived ‘old’ theories highlight the importance o f corporatist political interaction 
patterns or the political orientation o f the ruling party as important factors for the 
development o f welfare states in times o f fiscal austerity. Alternatively, the fiscal 
institutionalism literature stresses elements o f the budgetary allocation process as 
explanatory variables for the degree to which spending is maintained despite financial 
difficulties or instead restrained. The thesis has assessed the validity o f these different 
theories for the explanation o f cost containment reforms in two countries whose welfare 
states are both generally characterised by institutional factors which should lock-in 
spending to a large degree. On the contrary, the two countries differ with regard to the 
political variables on the national level (corporatist relationships and the strength of 
retrenchment advocates in fiscal policymaking) which should alternatively lead to 
different reform developments.
The results of this thesis challenge the view that any o f these theories alone can explain 
reform developments in contemporary welfare states in times o f fiscal pressure. It 
presents theoretical and empirical evidence that policymakers are in fact strongly pre­
committed in determining their social budgets, but that there is also considerable within- 
country variance with regard to the degree o f fiscal commitment in individual social 
policy programmes which challenges the relevance o f theories which rely on 
explanatory factors on the political macro-level. The study furthermore shows that while 
the political context in which reforms take place does play an important role for the 
scope and shape of cost containment reforms, the policy positions and reform strategies
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o f actors are considerably influenced by the institutional regulations in individual 
insurance schemes. These results strengthens arguments for a closer combination of 
both ‘new’ and ‘old’ arguments in welfare state research, as well as for a more 
differentiated, scheme-specific perspective in analysing path-dependent reform 
processes and institutional lock-in.
9.1.1 Summary of Findings
The general focus o f this thesis has been to investigate various explanations for the 
divergent development of mature welfare states which experience both increasing 
financial pressures for and strong barriers against reform. While it is widely accepted in 
the literature that existing institutions and policies generally limit the scope for 
successive reforms, this study has provided a detailed specification o f the institutional 
elements that create fiscal commitment in the social budget. On basis of this 
specification, it has been shown that social insurance programmes administered by the 
social partners in formally independent organisations -  the main characteristic o f the so- 
called corporatist-continental welfare states -  do not necessarily imply a high degree of 
effective fiscal commitment. Instead, the analysis o f fiscal commitment prevalent in the 
main social insurance schemes in France and Germany has shown that the degrees to 
which institutional and programmatic features o f these schemes created barriers for 
change in 1990 varied widely between the different programmes and insurance sectors.
These differences had a systematic effect on the degree to which the governments in 
both countries regained influence over the determination o f spending in these schemes 
and therefore over their social budgets: the higher the degree o f fiscal commitment in an 
insurance scheme prior to the intensification of fiscal pressures from 1990 onwards has 
been, the lower the degree of commitment-reduction in the following years has been. 
While these results confirm institutional lock-in arguments o f the ‘new politics’ 
literature, it has also been shown that it is necessary to take the policy positions and 
strategies of the actors involved in the administration and regulations of the schemes 
into account for the explanation of divergent reform developments in the insurance 
schemes.
The intention of all involved actors to avoid blame for unpopular retrenchment 
measures explains why existing spending commitments have seldom been broken. 
Instead, the tightening o f commitments as well as more indirect, less visible forms of
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commitment-reductions have been the dominant forms o f policy change. The blame- 
avoidance logic o f the government also explains why commitment on the revenue and 
budgetary authority dimensions has been more extensively reduced than on the other 
two dimensions, as changes to the financing structure and budgetary competencies are 
less visible and create less resistance than changes in administrative competencies or the 
benefit structure.
The study furthermore shows that while the policy positions o f both the social partners 
as administrators o f the schemes as well as o f the retrenchment advocates in 
government matter for policy developments, those are not nationally uniform but 
strongly shaped by the respective institutional regulations in the individual insurance 
schemes. Instead o f the general position of the finance minister in the budgetary 
allocation process, it is the specific financing and budgeting regulations in the 
individual insurance schemes which matter for the extent to which these schemes are 
subject to cost containment pressures. The results also challenge assumptions of the 
fiscal institutionalism literature that a stronger position o f the finance minister in 
budgetary decisionmaking leads to stricter cost containment. Instead, the study has 
shown that the formal separation of insurance budgets, combined with intervention 
powers by the finance minister, leads to the central or federal state making use o f the 
social insurance budgets for its own fiscal purposes. The higher the financial stake of 
the government in the individual schemes, the higher its motivation for such self- 
interested intervention. The division and sharing o f financial responsibilities has 
therefore been a deliberate strategy to decrease effective commitment in the insurance 
schemes, while the degree of formal independence has been widely maintained.
The observation that the position of the involved actors varies with regard to the 
regulations in the individual insurance sectors also holds true for the role and policy 
positions o f the corporatist actors in social policy: it is not the national traditions of 
corporatist relationships which matter for the explanation of welfare reforms and the 
likelihood of the social partners agreeing or opposing governmental plans, but instead 
the social partners’ relative position in the individual insurance schemes is the decisive 
factor. Despite the fact that employer and worker representatives were often strongly 
opposed with regard to their policy positions, they found common ground in opposing 
further state intervention. This common interest in maintaining their independent 
decisionmaking powers has enabled partially far-reaching reforms which have involved
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severe cutbacks of provisions. But the employer’s interest in defending their 
competencies and generally the maintenance of the schemes is limited if  schemes loose 
their corporatist character in both administrative and budgetary terms,, as well as in the 
character o f their benefit provision -  this has been more strongly the case in France. The 
analysis o f the reform developments has indeed shown that the most effective protection 
o f spending commitments results instead from a high degree o f occupational solidarity 
in the insurance schemes, which derives from a high degree o f administrative 
independence by the social partners and a strong contribution-benefit link
While the study has shown that the policy positions and reform strategies o f the 
involved actors with regard to specific insurance schemes play an important role for the 
development o f those schemes, there has been no evidence that party politics matters for 
the overall direction o f reforms. Instead, they matter merely for their timing as left-wing 
government rule had a procrastinatory effect on the implementation o f cost-containment 
measures. This confirms that the room to manoeuvre that parties have has, regardless of 
their political orientation, become small.
9.1.2 Implications for Welfare State Research
The findings have some broader implications for welfare state and fiscal policy 
research. First, by specifying the factors which create effective political commitment, 
the study has demonstrated that institutions are not merely general, unspecific 
constraints on actors’ behaviour, but that the various elements of institutional and 
programmatic regulations have very specific effects on the motivations and political 
strategies of decisionmakers. The ordinal measurement of degrees of fiscal commitment 
inherent in the administrative, budgetary, financial and spending structure of social 
programmes enables a general comparison of the degrees to which social spending is 
pre-committed and should therefore be hard to cut back, both between countries as well 
as between different insurance sectors.
The focus on insurance sectors and individual schemes is also a way of overcoming the 
classification problems associated with the distinction of broad welfare state families, 
and the observation that reform developments in the last two decades have often not 
followed a certain ‘regime logic’ (Crouch 2001; Hemerijck and Manow 2001). As the 
analysis o f the characteristics of the insurance schemes in France and Germany has 
shown, the insurance sectors vary considerably in the extent to which they fulfill all
304
characteristics o f a corporatist-continental self-administration structure, and those 
differences have even intensified during the analysed period: while some schemes have 
maintained a high degree of institutional independence, others have become much more 
directly subject to state control. The fact that certain reform developments in countries 
associated to a particular welfare state regime do not follow what could have been 
expected from such a regime type is therefore not a problem of path-dependency theory 
as such, but o f a lack of specific analysis o f individual programmes. Changing the 
focus from a macro to a micro level analysis which takes into account the institutional 
regulations and political context of individual insurance schemes and social policy 
sectors, enables a much more differentiated comparison o f social policy developments 
across different types o f welfare states. This is also confirmed by the application o f this 
analytical approach to the reform developments in the United Kingdom between 1990 
and 2005, a country whose social insurance programmes have very low scores on all 
four dimensions and in which the government has considerable control over its social 
budget. The results show that the scheme-specific application of the fiscal commitment 
framework is also useful to explain developments in welfare states with very different 
institutional characteristics.
Second, the finding that reforms have hardly broken existing spending commitments, 
but have instead avoided the creation of new commitments or have shifted 
commitments in other social programmes or the private sector, supports the notion that 
the analysis of institutional change should go beyond the focus on retrenchment, that is 
on reforms which have an immediate expenditure-reducing impact, and should also 
incorporate structural reforms (see Bonoli and Palier 1998; Visser and Hemerijck 1997; 
Palier 2000; Streeck and Thelen 2005). As Hacker (2005: 42) has pointed out, “shifts in 
the context o f an institution and in the goals that agents pursue through an institution 
can alter an institution’s character and effect fundamentally, even without shifts in 
formal structure”. In particular, the study has highlighted the importance o f changes to 
the governance structure of insurance schemes which did not have an immediate 
financial impact, but have increased fiscal constraints and made future change more 
likely as well as easier to implement (see also Ebbinghaus 2002b). Furthermore, it has 
shown that the non-reform of institutions with great financial difficulties (a process of 
‘policy drift’, that is the prevention of updating institutions to changing circumstances, 
see Hacker 2005) also needs to be taken into account when analysing retrenchment 
processes as this deliberate failure to act reduces the survival changes of the institution
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in the future and reduces commitment. Analysing the development o f welfare states in 
the context o f political and fiscal commitment enables to incorporate all such forms of 
policy developments, and broadens the focus of analysis to not only assess the 
immediate impacts o f reforms but also their medium and long term political, financial 
and social consequences.
In this context, the analysis has also demonstrated the benefits o f applying a ‘social 
budget’ perspective when analysing retrenchment in welfare states. The two dimensions 
‘budgetary independence and constraints’ and ‘revenue structure’ have previously been 
widely ignored in the welfare state reform literature. But as the analysis has shown, they 
play an important role in determining not only the motives o f the involved actors in 
reforming or defending a social policy programme or institution, but also the extent to 
which this is possible, and should therefore be more strongly taken into account.
Third, the findings have implications for ‘old politics’ and fiscal institutionalist theories 
which stress the importance of political macro-level factors for reform, such as 
corporatist interaction patterns or the federal budget allocation process. This study 
demonstrates that these factors do not have a uniform national effect, but a micro- 
perspective o f welfare reforms and their individual context relativises the influence of 
those factors. Distinguishing the policy positions o f the involved actors more 
specifically with regard to individual policy programmes can explain why factors such 
as the behaviour o f the social partners or the finance minister sometimes have an effect 
and reform outcomes and sometimes not. The analysis has shown that neither the social 
partners nor the governmental actors in either o f the two countries had a fixed set o f  
policy preferences per se, but that they instead followed distinct strategies with regard to 
their individual position in the insurance schemes. This confirms observations by 
Pierson (2005) and Hacker (2005) that neither institutional factors, nor the political 
context o f reforms, play an isolated role but have a systematic influence on each other 
as well as on policy outcomes. This should be considered by future research analysing 
the barriers against and drivers for policy change.
Fourth, the study’s results have further implications for the fiscal institutionalism 
literature which stresses the relative strength o f cost containment advocates in the 
governmental budget allocation process as explanatory factor for fiscal policy 
outcomes. In this strand of literature, the fact that in countries with self-administered
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social insurance schemes a very large part of the state budget is beyond the direct 
control o f the finance minister has so far rarely attracted more attention than a single 
footnote (von Hagen 1992; de Haan and Sturm 1994; Strauch and von Hagen 1999; 
Hallerberg 2004). The degree to which the federal or central government has in fact 
control over its social budget should however be more strongly considered in this 
literature, as it has been demonstrated that the extent of budgetary control is an 
important factor for the development o f spending.
While it is assumed in the fiscal institutionalism literature that a stronger position of the 
finance minister in the allocation process leads to stricter cost containment, this effect 
works in the opposite direction if the social insurance budgets are formally separate 
from the government budget. Although deficits in the social schemes also count towards 
overall state debt, the formal separation of the budget creates incentives to shift 
expenditures into the insurance schemes in order to disburden the government budget, 
which as a consequence worsens the overall fiscal situation. This expansionary effect of 
mixed budgetary responsibilities has also been observed in the fiscal federalism 
literature, which analyses the results of and treatments against the perverse incentives 
that exist under certain forms of intergovernmental fiscal institutions (e.g., Ter- 
Minassian 1997; Rodden et al. 2003). This literature stresses that fiscally irresponsible 
behaviour is endogenous to a system with several budgets and only soft budget 
constraints, and that the solution to this problem therefore involves a fundamental 
reform of political and fiscal institutions that alters the incentive structure o f the 
budgetary process (Oates 2005: 360). These observations should also be taken into 
account when analysing fragmented budgetary processes and outcomes in corporatist- 
continental welfare states, as the perverse incentives resulting from the budgetary 
framework are very similar.
9.1.3 Policy Implications
The findings o f this study also have several policy implications. First, the results point 
towards a general transformation of governance structures in corporatist-continental 
welfare states, and connectedly an important shift in the role the social partners have 
traditionally played in the administration of the social insurance institutions. The 
delegation of regulatory and administrative tasks to the social partners has, amongst 
others, served the purpose of shifting distributional conflicts into the self-administration 
sphere (Offe 1981; Fiorina 1982). But with the intensification o f financial pressures and
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the necessity to contain costs since the 1990s, agreements about the amount and form of 
social provisions have become increasingly difficult to achieve. Parallel to this, the 
willingness o f both sides of the social partners to provide the bargaining arena for such 
conflicts has deteriorated, as their role in some schemes has become increasingly formal 
and their de-facto decisionmaking authorities limited. Therefore there has been a move 
away from interlinked decisionmaking structures between the social partners and the 
government -  both towards more direct administrative and budgetary control by the 
government in some schemes, as well as towards more administrative and budgetary 
freedom for the social partners in others.
In this context, the findings also demonstrate that the form o f benefit provision, and 
particularly the degree of contribution-based reciprocity, plays an important role for the 
degree to which the social partners advocate the independence o f insurance schemes and 
the sustainment o f spending commitments. Schemes whose benefit provision has 
become increasingly redistributive and whose membership structure has been detached 
from an occupational status have also seen a stronger reduction o f social partner 
competencies in their administration and regulation. This confirms the notion o f a 
strong connection between governance structure and the design o f benefit provision: 
social insurance reforms which strongly reduce the reciprocal, contribution-related 
character o f benefit provision often make connected reforms of the administrative 
structures and the involved actors necessary (see Clasen and Clegg 2004; Hemerijck and 
Vail 2006). This argument is also valid for the case o f the UK, where the non- 
representation of the social partners in social insurance administration and the lack of an 
occupational character o f benefit provision have resulted in a continuous reduction of 
reciprocity between contribution payments and benefit generosity and a strong growth 
of means-tested and behavioural elements in the eligibility rules. In the cases of France 
and Germany, the analysis of reform developments has shown that in both countries a 
development is underway towards a combination o f schemes which provide universal 
provisions under direct state control, and occupational, self-administered schemes with 
a high degree of contribution-based reciprocity. This means that in the medium term, 
both welfare states will further loose their dominant corporatist characteristics and will 
more develop towards a mix-system of corporatist and universal provision. This again 
shows that the association of a country’s system o f social provision to a particular 
welfare family becomes increasingly difficult and is often not very useful for its 
analysis.
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Second, the findings of this analysis suggest that a further clarification of administrative 
and budgetary responsibilities would be desirable from the perspective of effective cost 
containment. The study has demonstrated the wrong incentives that derive for both 
governments as well as for the social partners from a situation o f mixed financing and 
interlinked budgetary authority. If pledges by politicians to reduce future debt levels -  
also driven by the Maastricht criteria -  and to limit the extent to which fiscal burdens 
are shifted to future generations of tax and contribution payers are credible, further 
reforms o f budgetary frameworks will be necessary in order to replace the ‘soft’ with 
‘hard’ budget constraints (see recent contributions to the fiscal federalism literature, e.g. 
Komai, Maskin and Roland 2003; Oates 2005).
However, effective cost containment does not only involve changes in the budgetary 
framework, but often also makes reforms of the system of benefit provision necessary. 
This can have serious effects on the overall degree of social protection in a country. The 
reform processes currently under way in France and Germany have and will have 
serious implications for the logic of benefit provision in these countries. In some 
schemes (such as the French and German first-pillar pension schemes) the future level 
of benefit provisions will deteriorate considerably in the next decades. But particularly 
in Germany, the retreat o f the state from its commitments to guarantee a sufficient old- 
age income via the public insurance schemes has so far not been connected with a 
parallel shift o f this commitment into the private sector via compulsory membership in 
pension funds as observed in the United Kingdom. Instead, commitment is rather 
merely avoided, which will leave the responsibility for securing old-age income 
increasingly with the individual households -  a process o f ‘risk privatisation’ as 
observed in the United States (see Hacker 2004).
But the observed maintaining of existing commitments via the tightening of eligibility 
rules and reciprocity (such as in the French unemployment insurance scheme and the 
German pension insurance scheme) also has negative implications: the reduction of 
redistributive elements and the exclusion of those with no or insufficient contribution 
records makes social protection coverage more selective and increases the insider- 
outsider problematic already existent in many welfare states relying on insurance 
schemes connected to the employment status o f its citizens (see Offe 1990; Clasen 
1994; Nullmeier and Rub 1994). This shows that the maintenance o f commitment does
309
not necessarily always serve the purpose of providing sufficient social coverage to the 
whole of the population: “Even when pre-commitments are the product o f deliberate 
planning, and serve the goals of their designers, they do not necessarily promote social 
welfare. Any normative appraisal of prior commitment, then, should rest on a realistic 
understanding of democratic politics” (Patashnik 2000: 12-13). As also Esping- 
Andersen (1999) has argued, the maintenance o f existing social welfare frameworks 
often fails to effectively deal with new social risks.
The conflict between the need to adapt policies to changing circumstances and the 
promise to fulfil existing spending promises is therefore a constant struggle and not easy 
to solve if  the financial circumstances require cost containing measures. The study has 
shown that both the French and German governments have gained control over their 
social budgets in the sense of decisionmaking authority in the short as well as long term. 
But the increase of formal authority does not necessarily mean that policymakers gained 
real control in the sense that it would be politically, economically or socially feasible to 
make use of it. In times of fiscal austerity, the dilemma remains that in order to enter 
new commitments, old commitments have to be broken.
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Appendix I: Social Insurance Reforms France 1990-2005
1-1 Changes in the Main French Social Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Administrative Independence
Pension Insurance Health Insurance Unemployment Insurance:
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
Administrative Independence
Institutional 
Fragmentation of 
Insurance Sector
More than 600 
different schemes; 
only 36% o f  public 
pension spending 
by basic scheme for 
salaried employees 
— > Very high
No change 
—> Very high
More than 600 
different 
schemes 
—*■ Very high
No change 
—> Very high
3 main insurance 
schemes + 16 
special schemes 
— ► Medium
No change 
—*• Medium
Single scheme 
—*■ Very low
No change 
— > Very low
Scheme CNAV ARRCO/AGIRC CNAM UNEDIC
Composition of 
Administrative 
Body
Bipartite governing 
board; employee 
representatives in 
majority, with 
chairman elected 
from their ranks 
— *• Very high
Bipartite 
governing board 
with equal 
representation 
o f social 
partners 
— > Very high
Bipartite 
governing board 
with equal 
representation 
o f  social 
partners 
— +  Very high
No change 
—* Very high
Bipartite governing 
board; employee 
representatives in 
majority, with 
chairman elected 
from their ranks 
— ► Very high
Bipartite 
governing board 
with equal 
representation o f  
social partners 
—* Very high
Bipartite 
governing board 
with equal 
representation 
o f  social 
partners 
— ► Very high
No change 
— ► Very high
Selection of 
Administrators
Election o f  board 
members; 
director appointed 
by governing board 
in liaison with 
Ministry o f  Social 
Affairs 
— ► Medium
Appointment o f  
board members 
and directors by 
government 
— ► Very low
Election o f  
board members; 
no government 
intervention in 
selection o f  top 
officials 
—> Very high
No change 
—* Very high
Election o f  board 
members; director 
is appointed by 
governing board in 
liaison with 
Ministry o f  Social 
Affairs 
— * Medium
Appointment o f  
board members 
and directors by 
government 
— ► Very low
Independently 
— ► Very high
No change 
— > Very high
Governmental
Supervision
Wide-reaching a- 
posteriori approval 
o f  major
organisational and 
financial decisions 
— *■ Low
Additional a- 
priori target 
agreements 
— ► Low
Only legality o f
actions
—> Very high
No change 
—*■ Very high
Wide-reaching a- 
posteriori approval 
o f major
organisational and 
financial decisions 
— ► Medium
Additional a- 
priori target 
agreements; 
strong govt, 
influence on 
regional level 
—*■ Low
Very limited 
supervision; ex­
post approval o f  
framework 
agreements 
- * ■  High
No change 
— *  High
SCORE 3 (medium) 2 (low) 5 (very high ) 5 (very high ) 3 (Medium) 2 (Low) M M g h ) 4 (High)
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1-2 Changes in the Main French Social Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
Pension Insurance Health Insurance: CNAM Unemployment Insurance: UNEDIC
CNAV ARRCO/AGIRC
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 I 2005 1990 2005
Budgetary Autonomy
Degree of 
Formal Budget 
Autonomy
Budgetary 
autonomy, but 
approval by 
independent 
supervisory 
institution 
- High
No change 
High
Full budgetary 
autonomy 
— ► Very high
No change 
—* Very high
Budgetary 
autonomy, but 
approval by 
independent 
supervisory 
institution 
- High
No change 
High
Full budgetary 
autonomy 
— > Very high
Budget now 
subject to ex-post 
parliamentary 
approval 
—  ^High
Degree of 
Revenue 
Autonomy
No contribution 
autonomy; rates 
set by ministerial 
decree 
— ► Low
N o contribution 
autonomy; rates 
determined by 
parliament; 
increasing fund 
financing 
—* Very low
Full
contribution 
autonomy 
— * Very high
No change 
—* Very high
No contribution 
autonomy; rates 
set by ministerial 
decree 
—* Low
No contribution 
autonomy; rates 
determined by 
parliament; 
increasing fund 
financing; indirect 
gain o f influence 
via CSG 
—*■ Very low
Contribution 
autonomy, but 
approval by 
relevant ministry 
necessary; 
contribution ceiling 
set by ministerial 
decree 
—* Medium
No change 
—► Medium
Degree of 
Spending 
Autonomy
All parameters 
decided by 
parliament; 
insurance carrier 
only determines 
administrative 
spending 
— ► Low
Government can 
change
indexation via 
decree; admin, 
spending part o f  
COG
agreements 
— * Very low
Autonomous 
decisions within 
framework set 
by government 
-*  High
No change 
High
Main decisions by 
parliament; 
limited discretion 
for insurance 
carrier regarding 
benefits 
—* Medium
Main parameters 
determined by 
parliament; 
admin, spending 
part o f  COG 
agreements; new 
institutions co­
ordinate spending 
decisions 
— + Very low
Autonomous 
decisions by 
insurance carriers, 
but ex-post 
approval o f  
government 
—* High
No change 
— * High
SCORE 2 (Low) 2 (Low) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high ) 3 (Medium) 2 (Low) . . .  * (High) ....JJUishl. ...
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Pension Insurance Health Insurance: CNAM Unemployment Insurance: UNEDIC
CNAV ARRCO/AGIRC
1990 | 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 | 2005
Budgetary Constraints
Budgetary
Allocation
Process
Bilateral bargains 
between spending 
and finance 
minister 
— ► Medium
Annual Social 
Security 
Financing Law 
—> Very low
Bilateral 
bargains 
between social 
partners 
— ♦ Very high
No change 
— ► Very high
Bilateral bargains 
between spending 
minister and 
finance minister 
— ► Medium
Annual Social 
Security 
Financing Law 
— *• Very low
Bilateral bargains 
between the social 
partners, but State 
participation as 
financier o f  
solidarity 
provisions 
High
No change 
- High
Enforced Fiscal 
Targets
No fiscal targets 
or guidelines; 
open-ended 
benefit 
entitlement 
— ► Very high
Target-based 
monitoring in 
framework o f  
COGs 
- High
No fiscal targets 
or guidelines; 
open-ended 
benefit 
entitlement 
—*■ Very high
No change 
—* Very high
Fiscal targets only 
for public 
hospitals (under 
direct state 
control);
enforcement weak 
—+High
Expenditure 
ceilings for all 
four sectors, but 
enforcement weak 
—* Medium
No fiscal targets 
— >  Very high
No change 
—+ Very high
Spending
Monitoring
Weak ex-post 
monitoring 
— *• Medium
Limited 
monitoring 
within COG 
framework 
— *  Low
Only internal 
spending 
monitoring 
—* High
No change 
->  High
Weak ex-post 
monitoring 
— ♦ Medium
Various new 
institutions 
strongly increase 
monitoring, but 
lack o f  
enforcement 
powers 
—* Low
No external 
spending 
monitoring 
—*■ Very high
Tripartite 
Supervisory 
Council, but 
limited powers 
- High
Deficit
Coverage
Not automatic, 
but final 
government 
responsibility 
High
No change 
—* High
No
governmental 
deficit coverage; 
credit financing 
possible 
—> Low
No change 
—* Low
Not automatic, 
but final 
government 
responsibility 
High
No change 
-*  High
No state deficit 
coverage; credit 
financing allowed 
with liability 
guarantee by the 
State 
—> Low
Temporary 
coverage o f  
deficits by 
central State, but 
generally no 
change 
— *■ Medium
SCORE 4 (High) 3 (Medium) 4 (High) 4 (High) 3 (Medium) 2 (Low) 4 (High) 4 (High)
Overall Score 3 (Medium) 2 (Low) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high) 3 (Medium) 2 (Low) 4 (High) 4 (High)
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1-3 Changes in the Main French Social Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Revenue Structure
Pension Insurance Health Insurance: CNAM Unemployment Insurance: 
UNEDICCNAV ARRCO/AGIRC
1990 | 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 1 2005
Revenue-Structure
Share of 
earmarked 
contribution- 
revenues
89.48% 77.94% 81.7% AGIRC: 77% 
ARRCO: 87% 95.2%
Contributions: 
57.3%; CSG: 
33%
93.1% 92.86%
Extent of 
Transfers/Fiscal 
Interdependencies
Demographic+ 
Financial 
Compensation 
Mechanisms for 
Regime General: 
6.60%
Strong increase 
o f fund- 
financing as 
well as 
transfers: 
20.81%
Transfers from 
UNEDIC via 
AGF:
18.3%
Additional internal 
transfer mechanisms 
since 1996; external 
transfers extended as 
ASF replaced by 
AGFF:
Total 23% (AGIRC), 
13% (ARRCO)
Demographic+ 
Financial 
Compensation 
Mechanisms for 
Regime 
General: 1.1%
Transfers 
between health 
insurance 
schemes :
0.5%
Very limited 
compensations 
by employment 
service agency: 
2.6%
Limited
compensation
o f  early
retirement
benefits:
3.65%
SCORE High Medium High __ High Very high Low Very high Very high
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1-4.1 Changes in the French Pension Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Eligibility and Reciprocity
Regime General Public Sector Schemes Supplementary Schemes
Situation 1990 Situation 2005 Situation 1990 Situation 2005 Situation 1990 Situation 2005
Eligibility
Mandatory 
Retirement Age
60 (since 1983); 
Minimum Age: 60
2003 reform: 65 except 
derogation
65 (55 or 60 in 
‘strenuous’ work)
No change 65; Minimum 
Retirement Age: 55
65
Conditions for Full 
Rate Pension
60 and 37.5 years o f  
contributions or 65 
without conditions 
on contribution 
period
1993 reform: contribut. 
period raised progr. to 40 
years in 2003 
2003 reform: period 
increased by 2 quarters 
by year from 2008 to 
reach 41 years in 2012 
and 42 years in 2020
55 or 60 years and 
37.5 years o f  
contributions
2003 reform: 
contribution period 
increase to reach 40 
years in 2008,41 years 
in 2012 and 42 years in 
2020
Full rate if  basic 
pension obtained at full 
rate
Full rate from 60 years 
accorded if  basic pension 
is obtained at full rate; 
otherwise like basic 
scheme from 65 years
Accounting of Non-
Contribution
Times
Full rate regardless 
o f  contribution 
times for: 
employees with 
50% incapacity; 
manual workers 
having raised at 
least 3 children, are 
veterans o f war or 
war victims
Periods o f  sickness, 
maternity, invalidity, 
employment injury 
benefits and 
rehabilitation. 
Unemployment with 
allowances or limited to 
one year without 
allowances; military 
service. Mothers (credit 
o f  2 years insurance per 
child, or for caring for 
severely disabled child. 
Parental leave 3 years.
National Service 
One year parental 
leave (women only)
2004: parental leave 
extended to men
“Credit points” for 
sickness periods -  when 
the customer was 
working and subject to 
the scheme - o f  at least 
3 months in a row 
(concerning executives’ 
scheme) or 60 days in a 
row (concerning non 
executives' scheme); 
also credits for times o f  
unemployment or 
disability
Periods during which 
benefits for sickness, 
maternity, employment 
injury, invalidity, 
unemployment and early 
retirement are drawn; 
certain periods o f war
Minimum 
Contribution Time
None Contributions paid must 
enable the validation o f  
at least one quarter's 
insurance.
15 years No change None None
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Score Eligibility 4 (High) 4 (High) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high) 4 (High) 4 (High)
Reciprocity
Pension Level (at 
full rate)
50% o f average 
wage over 10 best 
years; pension 
increase for children 
raised 
—*■ medium
1993 reform: progressive 
increase to 25 best years 
in 2008
75% o f last monthly 
wage during last 6 
months
No change Lifetime average: total 
number o f  points 
multiplied by value o f  
points; Pension increase 
for children raised
No change
Benefit Inequality 1992:
Minimum pension: 
FF 35.514 p.y. for 
37.5 contribution 
years; reductions for 
incomplete careers 
Means-tested 
minimum: FF 
15.800 for single 
person
Max.: 50% o f  social 
security ceiling
Minimum pension:
€ 6.706.39 p. y., 
regardless o f  validated 
eligibility. Prorated if  
duration o f  insurance 
below requested duration 
depending on year o f  
birth. Means tested 
minimum: € 4.085 per 
year for single person. 
Max: 50% o f  social 
security ceiling 
= €  14,856 per year.
Minimum pension: 
60%;
Maximum Pension: 
up to 80% (for 
certain categories of  
workers)
Minimum pension: 
57.5% (progressively 
reduced until 2013) 
Maximum Pension: up 
to 80%
No minimum pension 
Maximum pension: 
points granted up to 8 
times the social security 
ceiling
No minimum pension 
Maximum: 3 (ARRCO) 
or 8 (AGIRC) times the 
social security ceiling
Reduction for early 
retirement
Prorating effect plus 
10% reduction per 
missing year (max. 5 
years)
2003 reform: prorating 
effect plus progressive 
reduction (after 2004) to 
reach 5% in 2014 per 
missing year (max. 5 
years)
Prorating Prorating and from 
2006 reduction that will 
reach 5% per missing 
year in 2020 (max. 5 
years)
A reduction is made by 
7% per year from 55 to 
59 years o f  age, then a 
5% reduction per year 
from 60 to 62 years o f  
age and a 4% reduction 
per year thereafter.
If 55 pension with 
advance; from 56 no 
advance if basic pension 
at full rate; reductions for 
early pension according to 
age (7% per year from 55 
to 59; 5% from 60 to 62 
and 4% for following).
Indexation Price (applied since 
1986, law in 1993)
N o change Wages Price Wages Price
Charges on 
Benefits
1.4% (health 
contributions)
6.7% 2.7% 6.7% 2.4% (health 
contributions)
6.7% + 1%
Score Reciprocity 4 (High) 4 (High) 5 (Very high) 5 (High) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high)
TOTAL SCORE 4 (High)_______ ___ 4 (High) 5 (Very high) 4 (High) 4 (High) 4 (High)
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1-4.2 Changes in the French Health Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Eligibility and Reciprocity
CNAM
Situation 1990 Situation 2005
Eligibility
Beneficiaries All employees, pensioners, unemployed. Beneficiaries o f  
certain allowances (API, AAH, RMI). Students, priests, 
prisoners
All persons with gainfully employment in France or with a 
permanent regular residence in France.
Sickness Pay Beneficiaries All employees or persons assimilated thereto Employees, craftsmen, tradesmen and manufacturers.
Eligible Dependants Spouse, dependent children; relatives in the ascending, 
descending or collateral lines; partner living with insured 
person
Spouse, dependent children ; relatives in the ascending, 
descending and collateral lines; partner living together 
with or bound by a civil solidarity pact and being 
economically dependent on the insured person. Any 
other person living with the insured for at least 12 
consecutive months and dependent on him or her.
Minimum Contribution Payments: Qualifying period: 1200 hrs worked during the year or 600 
per half year or 200 per quarter or 120 hrs per month
Minimum contributions payment calculated on the basis 
o f n times the minimum wage SMIC: 2.030 times in a year 
or 120 times in 3 months or 60 times in a month. It is also 
possible to apply on the basis o f  the number o f hours 
worked.
Sickness Pay Minimum Contribution Payments: First 6 months: 200 hrs o f employed work in 3 months 
preceding sickness
Subsequently: registered for 12 months, worked 800 hrs 
during 12 months 
Waiting period: 3 days
Contributions on the basis o f  n times the minimum wage 
SMIC or minimum duration o f  activity:
• For the first 6 months: 1.015 SMIC in the 6 preceding 
months or 200 hours worked in the previous 3 months.
• After 6 months and having been registered for a 
minimum o f  12 months since having stopped working: 
2.030 SMIC in the 12 previous months, including the 
1.015 SMIC o f  the first 6 months or 800 hours worked in 
the 12 previous months, 200 o f which in the first 3 
months.
Exemptions from Compulsory Insurance None None
Score Eligibility 2 (Low) 1 (Very low)
319
Reciprocity
Patient’s Co-Payments Medical expenses: 25%
Hospitalisation: 20%
Hospitalisation fee: FF50
Drugs: 30% or 60%; 100% on ease drugs
Share borne by insured person (statutory):
• 30% for doctors' fees,
• 25% for consultations in hospitals,
• 20% for hospital treatment.
35% or 65% for drugs mainly meant for troubles or 
affections without gravity. 100% for ease drugs. 
Hospitalisation fee (forfait hospitalier): €  13 (€ 9 in a 
psychiatric unit) per day
Exemptions or Reductions to Co-Payments Holders o f an invalidity pension or a work injuiy pension 
at a rate > 66.66% are covered 100% together with their 
family members. Persons suffering from certain diseases, 
for those diseases only.
As before, plus:
Persons with resources below a 
certain threshold.
Sickness Pay Benefit Rates 50% o f daily earnings 
66.66% for 3 children
Minimum after 7 months: 1/365* o f  minimum invalidity 
pension
50% o f daily earnings, in a limit o f  1/720th o f  the annual 
ceiling. 66.66% o f  daily earnings with a limit o f  1/540th 
o f the annual ceiling from 31st day for beneficiaries with 3 
children. 51.49% from 7th month o f  drawing benefits 
without interruption. Maximum l/700th o f  annual ceiling. 
For persons with 3 dependant children: 68.66%.
Maximum 1/525th o f  annual ceiling.
Score Reciprocity 2 (Low) 1 (Very low)
TOTAL SCORE 2 (Low) 1 (Very low)
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1-4.3 Changes in the French Unemployment Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Eligibility and Reciprocity
UNEDIC
Situation 1990 | Situation 2005
Eligibility
Minimum Contribution Time At least 3 months insurance in last 12 months 1993 reform: at least 4 months insurance in last 8 months. 
2000 reform: 4 months in last 18 months 
2002 reform: increase o f  minimum contribution time: At 
least 6 months (182 days) insurance during the last 22 
months preceding the unemployment.
Work Availability Conditions ‘to be looking for work’ 2001 reform: necessity o f  signing personalised job search 
contract
Other Eligibility Criteria to be under the age o f  60. However, if at this age the 
person concerned has not paid insurance contributions for 
long enough to justify receipt o f the old-age pension at the 
full rate o f  50%, the indemnity is maintained until the 
period is achieved, and at the latest up to the age o f  65.
1997: ARPE (58 years + 160 quarters o f  pension 
contributions, or 170 quarters; 65% o f  reference salaiy) 
AC A: 160 quarters pensions (like general unemployment 
benefit, no degression)
Score Eligibility 5 (Very high ) 5 (Very high)
Reciprocity
Replacement Rate 40.4% (Allocation Base) and 30.3% (Allocation de base 
exceptionelle; since 1984 for unemployed who do not 
have three months o f  contribution records)
1993: 40.4% o f  reckonable daily wages + €9.26 per day or 
57.4% o f  the reference daily wage (most favourable 
option applied).
For minimum insurance period between 4 and 6 months: 
the amount o f  benefit is calculated at the full rate less 25% 
(general rate).
Reference Salary Reference period: earning on which contributions have 
been paid for in the last 12 months; 75% reference ceiling
No change
Duration Minimum 3 months, up to 60 months for older employees 1993 reform: general entitlement expires after 30 months 
(minimum: 4 months; certain exceptional groups still 60 
months max.)
For those with 6 months o f  employment in the previous
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12, the duration o f  benefit entitlement was reduced from 
15 months (aged -5 0 )  or 21 months (aged 50+) to 7 
months (unemployed o f  all ages).
2003 reform: reduced for all groups from 30 to 23 months 
(minimum: 7 months; max. for older unemployed 42 
months)
Benefit Development over Time Stable 1993 reform: benefits decrease with time (between 8 and 
17%)
1997: reduction rate o f  benefits slowed down (from 4 to 
six months intervals) and minimum benefit increased; 
2001: degressivity abandoned
Qualifying Waiting Period None 1993 reform: 7 days; 20 days in case o f  compensation 
payment
1994: 8 days; up to 75 days in case o f  compensation 
payments (payment divided by amount o f salary 
reference)
2001: reduced to 7 days
Charges on Benefits Benefits are subject to taxation after deduction o f  10% and 
then o f 20%.
Since 1997: GSG o f  6.2% and CRDS o f 0.5%.
Universally available placement activities/active 
employment policies
Provision and financing separate. No change.
Score Reciprocity 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high )
TOTAL SCORE 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high)
Sources: OECD 2005a; MISSOC various years; various others
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1-5 Welfare Reforms France 1985-2005
Pension Insurance
Year Reform Effect
1987 Change o f Indexation:
Change o f  the indexation o f  pensions from wage increase to price increase
Overall replacement rate will decrease over 
time
—* “Commitment-Breaking”: Minor 
adjustment
1993 Reform o f Pensions fo r  Employees in the Private Sector (Balladur Government)
Tightening o f  eligibility criteria; changes o f  calculation formula and indexation
Level o f  pension is calculated in reference to the wages o f the best 25 years (formerly: best 10 years)
To receive a full pension, employees need to have contributed during 40 years, instead o f 37.5 years before the 
reform. The measure is progressively carried out and the process will be achieved in 2004.
The indexation o f  pensions is no longer based on primary wages but on prices’ evolution. This proposition was 
adopted in 1993 for 5 years, but has been extended indefinitely by the Jospin Government.
It is now possible for the government to fix the amount o f indexation by decree; under previous legislation this 
decision had to go through parliament.
Extension o f  reference salary period reduces 
benefits, particularly for high salaries. 
Retirement will be delays in order to qualify 
for full pension.
—> “Commitment-Breaking”: Major changes 
as well as minor adjustments
Government control over indexation 
regulation
—* “Control over Spending”:
1993 Introduction o f Reserve Fund (Fonds de solidarite vieillesse: FSV)
Creation o f  a “Fonds de solidarite vieillesse” (FSV) in July 1993.
Goals are to eliminate the debts o f  the ‘S6curit6 sociale’ (110 bn) and to finance the contributions for the 
‘regimes vieillesse’, the means-tested pensions for people who did not contribute enough.
FSV is financed by 1.3% o f increase in the rate o f  CSG (Contribution sociale generalisee),  as well as by duties 
on alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks.
The state contributes FF104 bn through the CSG which corresponds to the debts accumulated by the Regime 
G6n6ral; the FSV reimburses these debts over a period o f 15 years.
Increase o f  revenues for the elimination o f  
debts o f  the ‘Security sociale’
— ► “Commitment-Sustaining ”
Separates the expenses linked to social 
insurance and the ones linked to social 
assistance:
—* “Commitment-Tightening”
Insured with insufficient contributions and/or 
redistributive pensions are transferred to a 
tax-fmanced system 
— ► Commitment-Shifting
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1994 Loi Madelin:
Creation o f a voluntary complementary pension based on savings for the self-employed
Strengthening o f third-pillar pensions
1995 Failure of Public Pension Reform I:
Reform plans to adapt the pension calculation in the public sector to the one in the private sector; withdrawn 
after heavy protests from unions and strikes.
—* Attempt of “Commitment Breaking: Major 
change”
1996 Financial Equalisation Process between A GIRC and ARRCO:
Financial transfer mechanism introduced between supplementary pension schemes in order to partially 
compensate the consequences which derive from the social security contribution ceiling.
Revenues for loss-making AGIRC increased 
through creation of fiscal interdependency 
—» 'Commitment-Sustaining'
1997 Failure of Retirement Savings Funds:
As decided on 20 February 1997, the retirement savings funds (plans d'^pargne retraite) are optional membership 
plans that all private sector employees can join. In practice, they take the form o f  contracts to which employers 
subscribe on behalf o f their staff. Insurance agencies known as retirement savings funds (fonds d'^pargne- 
retraite) will be set up especially to provide this service.
The funds can be established following a collective agreement (at company, industry or workplace level). 
However, if  no agreement has been made within a six-month period from the beginning o f negotiations, 
subscription to the plan may also result from a unilateral decision by the employer. Besides, one year after the 
law has come into force, employees who have no access to a savings plan through their employer will be able to 
ask for membership o f  an existing scheme.
Implementation blocked by Jospin Government in 1998; this decision was taken in light o f trade union 
opposition on the grounds that the law challenged the pay-as-you-go funding o f the basic scheme and gave no 
role to the social partners.
Attempt to partly transfer the msurance o f  
social risks to the private sector 
—»Attempt of “Commitment-Shifting”
1998 Creation of Pension Reserve Fund (Fonds de Reserve pour les Retraites, FRR):
Creation o f a pension buffer fund within the first-pillar general scheme from 2001 with the goal to accumulate 
reserves for financing future PAYG pensions until 2020.
Increase o f revenues to preserve the system 
financed by repartition 
—► “Commitment-Sustaining"
Increase o f tax-financing o f pension system
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Receives a number o f different allocations, which can be divided into four broad categories: a portion o f  the 2% 
social tax on income from estates and investments; surpluses from the French National Old Age Fund (CNAV); 
proceeds from the sale o f  certain state-owned assets; miscellaneous endowments and allocations.
—*■ “Commitment-Controlling"
2 0 0 0 Failure of Public Pension Reform II:
In March 2000, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced that savings in the FRR should be raised to €152.5 bn. 
He also announced a further pension reform which would guarantee public sector employees’ pensions and take 
in account subsidies in the calculation o f pensions, but would extend the length o f contribution to 40 years. 
After heavy strike action by trade unions, the reform plans were withdrawn.
Attempt to restore fiscal balance o f public 
pension scheme and to delay pension entry 
—* Attempt of “Commitment-Breaking: 
Major Change"
2001 New Employees9 Savings Scheme: 'Fabius Lawf
The main provisions o f the new law introduced in February 2001 aim to increase the scope and duration o f the 
existing employee savings schemes.
First, employees o f  small and medium-sized businesses will now be covered by a new "inter-company savings 
scheme" (Plan d'Spargne interentreprises, PEI).
Second, the creation o f a "voluntary partnership employee savings scheme "(Plan partenarial d'£pargne salarial 
volontaire, PPESV) extends the lock-in period for employee savings from five to 10 years and turns a short-term 
savings mechanism into a medium- or long-term scheme.
First step to transfer insurance o f social risks 
to private sector:
—*■ “Commitment-Avoiding"
2001 Reform of Supplementary Pension Scheme:
On 10 February 2001, the social partners reach an agreement on reforming France's supplementary pensions 
schemes
It sets out four principles to be followed by parliament in overhauling the basic pension system. First, 
"stabilisation o f  contribution levels for the next 10 years without pre-empting the use o f additional connected 
deductions". Second, "prioritisation o f variable contribution periods". Third, fostering "freedom o f choice" in 
terms o f retirement age "from 60 onwards." Fourth, allowing retirement before 60, with the people concerned 
receiving their basic pension (under circumstances and conditions yet to be defined)
This extends the current provisions regarding supplementary pension schemes until the end o f 2002, while the 
general supplementary scheme, ARRCO, and the management and professional staff supplementary scheme, 
AGIRC, are to be merged before the end o f 2002.
An Association for the Management o f Funds Financing AGIRC and ARRCO (Association pour la Gestion du
Goals for pension reforms:
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining"
—*■ “Commitment-Tightening"
Change in Financing and Management o f  
ASF gives control now to supplementary 
pension administrators 
—*> “Control over Implementation "
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Fonds de Financement de l'AGIRC et 1'ARRCO, AGFF) is to be set up to replace the ASF.
2003 Major Reform of Public Pension System: Fillon Law
Reform passed on the 24 July 2003 aligns the more generous public system with that o f private-sector workers, 
increases the standard retirement age from 60 to 65 years, extends the contribution period, modestly raises 
contribution rates, introduces financial disincentives to early retirement, and allows partial benefits for part-time 
workers without adequate contribution histories.
In the public scheme, the length o f contributions will move progressively from 150 quarters to 160 quarters (40 
years) from 2004 to 2008. From 2008 to 2020, it will be extended in both public and private schemes parallel: 
164 quarters in 2012 and 167 quarters in 2020, which would keep the ratio o f  working time to retirement time 
unchanged compared to the level o f 2003.
The value o f pensions in the public scheme will also be indexed on prices (instead o f  wages); a complementary 
scheme will be created in 2005 for public servants who receive wage premiums, which will be limited to 20% of  
wages.
No defined level o f security (i.e., certain wage replacement rate through pensions).
Decreasing pension level:
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking: major changes 
as well as minor adjustments "
Reduction o f future entitlements through 
raising o f retirement age:
—► “Commitment-Avoiding"
2003 New Agreement on Supplementary Pension Scheme:
In November 2003, five-year agreement on the ARRCO and AGIRC supplementary pensions schemes: 
maintains provisions enabling retirement with a supplementary pension from the age o f 60, transcribes a number 
o f provisions contained in a recent pension reform law, and takes action to balance the budget.
From 2004, the AGFF surpluses recorded at the end o f each financial year will be redistributed between the 
AGIRC and the ARRCO on a pro rata basis according to the benefits paid out.
The new agreement transcribes provisions o f the Fillon reform law into the supplementary schemes:
Employees who started working very young will also be able to retire before 60 without a reduction o f pension 
entitlement. This provision will be funded by the AGFF.
The deal sets out the options for buying supplementary pension contribution 'points' to cover periods when the 
person insured was in education.
The wage used as the basis for calculation (i.e. for the purchase o f one retirement 'poinf) will henceforth be tied 
to the average wage, rather than to prices. This decision aims to raise the cost o f buying a point.
The value o f the point used in calculating supplementary benefits from 1 April 2004 to 1 April 2008 will be 
linked to the consumer prices index.
To cover the funding o f AGIRC, which has been in deficit for a year, and bring the distribution o f contributions 
progressively into line with that o f ARRCO general scheme (i.e. 60% from the employer and 40% from the
Increase o f contribution and change o f  
indexation raises revenues and reduces 
spending
—► “Commitment-Sustaining"
Change o f point calculation aiming at raising 
the costs o f  buying a point 
—*■ “Commitment-Avoiding"
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employee), the employee’s contribution to AGIRC will be raised by 0.16 percentage points on 1 January 2006 
and the employer’s will be increased by 0.08 points.
2003 Reform o f Employees ’ Savings Scheme:
The Fillon law also lays the foundations o f  a genuine 'third pillar' o f pension funding, based on employees' own 
savings. Until now, there have been only a few such pension funds targeted at special categories o f employees 
and self-employed people, and some company supplementary schemes. The new law set up two retirement 
savings schemes, building on those established by the February 2001 'Fabius law' on employee’s savings 
schemes.
Contrary to initial plans to introduce a 'pension savings plan' (plan d’epargne pour la retraite, PER), which would 
have been collective and thus would have opened the way for pension funds, there will now be an individual 
'personalpension savings plan' (plan d ’epargne individuelpour la retraite, PEIR) which is an insurance contract 
enabling people to accumulate entitlement to a life-long annuity. The PEIR must be based on an agreement with 
an insurance company through a not-for-profit personal savings fund-holding association.
A new 'voluntary partnership employee pension savings scheme' (plan partenarial d’epargne salariale volontaire 
pour la retraite, PPESVR) is to replace the 'voluntary partnership employee savings scheme' (Plan partenarial 
d'epargne salarial volontaire, PPESV) set up under the Fabius law. The period during which funds are locked in 
to the scheme - formerly 10 years under the PPESV - has been extended up to the retirement age o f the person 
concerned.
Further step to transfer insurance o f  social 
risks to private sector:
— ► "Commitment-Avoiding”
Health Insurance
Year Reform Effect
1990 Plan Durieux:
Increase o f  tax on adverts o f pharmaceutical products o f  5% with retroactive effect starting from 1990.
Series o f  economics is announced which have to be negotiated with the professions. They aim at global budgets 
for hospitals from 1991 and the pharmaceutical laboratories which have to reduce their costs by 2.5% in 1991.
— ► "Commitment-Sustaining: Increasing 
Revenues  ”
-*  "Control over Spending”
1991 Introduction o f Medical Care Agreements (Convention Medicate):
From 1991, the social partners elaborate a Medical Care Agreement which is intended to control the evolution o f
Increase o f  budgetary control 
—> "Commitment-Restraining”
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expenditure. It sets a provisional target for the evolution o f health care spending, practitioners’ remuneration and 
additional expenses.
1991 Plan Bianco:
Increase o f Revenues:
Increase o f 0.9% o f contributions for health insurance of employees from 1 July 1991: Increase o f contribution 
rate for health insurance o f employees from 5.9% to 6.8% o f the salary.
The payment o f  social contributions for companies with 50 to 399 employees is advanced from 15 to 5 o f every 
month; extra revenue o f  FF300 m.
Increase o f hospital charge o f FF33 to FF50 per day from 1 July 1991.
Reductions o f Spending:
It is demanded from pharmaceutical laboratories achieve a further 100 million franc o f their business volume with 
the medicaments reimbursed through the S6curit6 sociale, in proposing an autoreduction o f their business volume 
on the special reimbursements by 2.5%.
Abolition o f the surcharge for pharmacies.
Drugs based on garlic ingredients or magnesium are not longer reimbursed.
Revision o f the list o f x-ray activities.
In total, the economies are estimated at 9 bn 
for the years 1991 and 1992 
—> “Commitment-Breaking: minor 
adjustments”
Increase in contribution payments and 
patients co-payments:
“Commitment-Sustaining"
1993 Hospital Reform Act (Plan Veil):
- . Health spending and volume in ambulatory care are controlled under the National Quantified Objectives.
Start o f a ‘policy o f rationalisation’ in hospital management: introduction of ‘medical references’ which specify 
the use o f medical procedures and examinations (Reference Medicale Opposables, RMO): non-compliance can 
result in financial penalties (but penalties opposed by Conseil d’Etat; not applied).
Increase o f the hospital charge from FF50 to FF55.
Increase o f ‘ticket moderateurs’ [i.e., the percentage o f the bill not covered by the public insurance]: from 20% to 
30% for the cost o f hospitalisation and medical salaries, from 25% to 30% for medical services and dentist 
services, from 35% to 40% for other medical services, from 60% to 65% for medication for the treatment o f  non- 
severe illnesses.
Introduction o f spending targets:
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining”
Failed introduction o f  Medical References 
—* Attempt of “Commitment-Controlling”
Insurance o f  social risks in private sector: 
—* "Commitment-Shifting”
Increase o f patients co-payments 
—► “Commitment-Breaking: Minor 
Adjustments”
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1996 Implementation of Juppe Plan: Law on Social Security Funding 1996
Regions as new level o f health policy implementation and control: creation o f regional agencies that agree 
objectives with the public and private hospitals and that monitor the efficiency and performance o f the hospitals 
New Unions Regionales des Caisses d ‘Assurance Maladie (URCAM), in charge o f co-ordinating and harmonising 
the different social insurance funds’ various health care policies.
Central Level:
o  Councils supervising the finances o f the S6curit6 Sociale 
o  National Health Congress, setting health priorities 
o  National Agency for Accreditation and Evaluation in Health (ANAES)
Medical Care Agreements: the state can replace the social partners when the latter are not able to reach an 
agreement
Annual growth o f health expenditure is limited: projected target (ceiling) for health insurance spending for the 
following year, known as the national ceiling for health insurance expenditure (ONDAM).
Hospital budget options on a region-by-region basis: for the first time, the budget was not to be uniformly 
increased.
Management and Objectives Agreement is concluded between national funds and government for three-year 
period.
Introduction o f spending limits, annual 
voting o f social budget and possibility to 
replace social partners in medical agreements 
increases state control:
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining"
Creation o f Regional Agencies increases 
direct implementation control; increase o f  
state control in administration also through 
changes in managing boards and elections 
—*■ “Commitment-Control”
1996 Failure of Health Reform Attempt:
Plans to create a compulsory unified health insurance scheme (Assurance maladie universelle, AMU), which 
would have had harmonised the range o f  benefits in kind delivered by the 19 regimes, did not realise.
Attempt to introduce stronger control over 
spending and revenues as well as over 
implementation through centralisation 
—* Attempt of “Commitment-Control”
1997 Medical Agreements between Health Insurance Funds and Doctors ’ Unions:
On 28 February, after months o f  negotiation, the social security health insurance funds and the two doctors' 
unions (MG-France and the Union coll£giale des chirugiens et des sp^cialistes fran?ais) conclude two separate 
medical agreements.
They provide for an increase in expenditure (prescriptions and fees) in 1997 o f 1.5% for general practitioners and 
of 1.1% for specialists. As for expenditure covered by social security, general practitioners must abide by an 
increase o f 2.4% for fees and 1.3% for prescriptions, whereas the ceilings placed on specialists are 1.3% and 0.5% 
respectively.
In the event o f their exceeding these percentages, doctors will be forced to reimburse part o f their fees and certain
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sums linked to prescriptions to the social security fund.
1998 Measures Aubry:
Freezing o f tariffs for dentists, masseurs, biologists and orthopaedists.
Reduction o f x-ray tariffs and o f  prices for the fabrication o f health apparatuses.
Reduction o f prices for certain drugs and penalties for production o f products that are more expensive.
Cost-cutting measures through price caps 
with expected savings o f FF2.7 bn 
‘‘Commitment-Restraining”
1998 Law on Social Security Funding for 1998:
Fixation o f the expenditure in crease in the health sector at +2.6% for 1999, with a tolerance barrier o f +10% in 
which no sanctions will be applied, and o f -10%, in which case the tariffs for certain services can be upgraded 
through a ‘fonds de quality’.
Pharmacists get the possibility to replace a prescribed drug with a generic equivalent.
Introduction o f fiscal incentives for cost-
saving behaviour
—*■ ‘‘Commitment-Control”
1999 Universal Sickness Cover (Couverture Maladie Universelle, CMU):
Inaugurated in January 2000, the CMU makes health care available to low-income groups free o f charge.
Costs estimated: €1.37 bn a year; direct funding from the general government budget and introduction o f a new 
tax (1.75% paid by private insurance companies and mutual insurance funds on supplementary health insurance 
contracts)
Introduction o f new tax for financing o f  
health-care for low-income groups; tax- 
increase WITHIN insurance system increases 
State influence
—*■ ‘‘Commitment-Controlling”
2000 Law on Social Security Funding for 2000:
Method o f setting the ONDAM changed: the rate o f  growth no longer applies to estimated expenditure, but to 
(provisional) actual expenditure.
Health management reform: the whole hospital sector was to be the responsibility o f the state (including private 
for-profit hospitals), but in return the government delegated to CNAMTS the dual responsibility o f regulating the 
fees charged by all self-employed health care professionals and negotiating with them expenditure ceilings. Only 
applied in 2000 and subsequently abandoned.
Further attempt to gain control over spending 
in ambulatory sector
—► Attempt of “Commitment-Restriction ”
2001 Law on Social Security Funding for 2001:
Alignment o f benefits for self-employed people with those o f the general health insurance scheme.
Reduction o f spending for self-employed 
schemes
—*■ ‘‘Commitment-Breaking: Minor
330
Extension for five years o f experiments with provider networks (allowing specific payments for coordination o f  
care and delegation o f  the management o f these experiments to regional level).
Private Hospitals: bill sets mechanisms for initiating the transition towards a differential pricing o f services 
Sickness cash benefits: doctors will have to provide the health insurance medical staff with the reasons o f each 
sickness leave they authorise.
Drugs: to keep medical goods’ expenditure under control, the health insurance medical staff may call in patients 
whose medical consumption is particularly high and suggest a more suitable health care plan to the patient and 
his/her practitioner.
Adjustment"
Attempts to break up common fee 
arrangements and to contain spending
Stronger implementation control 
—► "Commitment-Control”
2002 Act reforming the agreement system between the health insurance funds and 
the health care professions:
The new agreement system will comprise three levels: the first will set up common rules for all professionals; the 
second will contain specific items for each profession; the third will allow the health insurance fimds to conclude 
contracts with individual professionals willing to engage in projects (networks, health promotion, etc.).
Further attempt to control expenditure via 
spending caps
2003 Law on Social Security Funding for 2003:
The 'coded letter' system, which has enabled the sickness insurance fund to vaiy consultation fees according to 
spending increases, and to which doctors’ trade unions have been very hostile, has been scrapped.
Hospitals will now have a five-year investment budget o f €6 bn. Of this, €300 m has been earmarked for 2003. 
Key initiatives in the law deal with the prescription o f drugs. Fixed reimbursement levels are to be introduced for 
drugs where a generic alternative exists. Sickness insurance coverage for over 800 'poor-performance drugs' is to 
be phased out over the next three years.
Further attempts o f cost-control via spending 
regulations and expenditure caps 
—* “Commitment-Restrictions”
2003 Plan Hopital 2007:
Implementation o f payment per case for hospitals: .
The public hospital sector will move from a capped budget system towards pricing based on activity (Tarification 
a Vactivite or T2A). The rates o f payment are built upon the existing costbased information system (PMSI) used 
to assess the activity levels in individual hospitals.
For the public system, over 60% o f the budget will be paid for on this basis, the rest will take the form o f grants 
related to a number o f identified “public services” such as training (university hospitals) or emergency wards. In 
contrast to current arrangements (fee-for-service arrangements accompanied by a total cost ceiling, the private 
sector will only be paid on the basis o f this prospective payment system on the basis o f activity.
New financing method for hospitals increases 
abilities for cost control within the system:
—* "Commitment-Controlling "
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2004 Loi Relative a V'Assurance Maladie:
A series o f 13 initiatives is introduced with the law (passed on the 13* August 2004) which should lead to budgetary 
balance in 2007:
Starting in 2005, taxpayers will be required to pay a fixed sum o f EUR 1 per consultation or medical treatment. 
All sickness insurance beneficiaries will be eligible for standard user fees only if  they have a regular general 
practitioner (GP).
Stiffer financial penalties for fraud and abuse.
Insured parties on sick leave will be more strictly monitored. Daily benefits will be suspended where insured 
parties fail to submit to the monitoring process.
On governance o f the system, three national umbrella organisations to cover basic sickness insurance funds, 
supplementary insurance and healthcare professionals respectively are set up:
The National Union o f Sickness Insurance Funds {Union nationale des caisses d'assurance maladie, UNCAM) is 
to have authority in negotiating 'consultation and treatment refund rate' agreements with health professionals.
The National Union o f Supplementary Sickness Insurance Bodies {Union nationale des organismes d'assurance 
maladie complementaires) acts as an umbrella group for mutual insurance entities, provident institutions and 
private insurers, and will provide opinions on decisions made by UNCAM.
The National Association o f Healthcare Professionals {Union nationale des professionnels de sante) will make 
recommendations on decisions proposed by UNCAM.
National sickness insurance funds will be required to submit an 'estimated budget proposal' in the first half o f  
every year. A Sickness Insurance Spending Increase Watchdog (Comite d ’alerte sur I’evolution des depenses 
d ’assurance maladie) will be responsible for developing remedial measures when spending overruns estimates by 
1% or more.
National sickness insurance funds will be required to submit an 'estimated budget proposal' in the first half o f  
every year. A Sickness Insurance Spending Increase Watchdog (Comity d’alerte sur Involution des depenses 
d’assurance maladie) will be responsible for developing remedial measures when spending overruns estimates by 
1% or more.
The organisation of sickness insurance has also been overhauled: the powers of the National Sickness Insurance 
Fund (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie, CNAM), which administers the system, have been widened.
Measures are designed to restore budgetary 
balance by 2007. This is to be achieved by 
making €10 bn in savings and generating €5 
bn in new revenue.
Revenue-Increases 
—* ''Commitment-Sustaining’’
Increase o f patients co-payments 
—> „ Commitment-Breaking: Minor 
Adjustment"
Centralization o f fee agreements and stronger
control over spending
—*• "Commitment-Controlling”
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Unemployment Insurance
Year Reform Effect
1990 Intersectoral Agreement:
December 1991: increase o f  contribution rate 
introduction o f deferred payments
Revenue-Increase:
—* “Commitment-Sustaining ”
Reduction o f  expenditure through delay o f  
benefit provision
—*• “Commitment-Breaking: Minor 
Adjustment”
1992 Creation o f Allocation Unique Degressive (AUD):
Major reform o f unemployment benefit system through intersectoral agreement:
All unemployment insurance benefits are replaced by the Allocation Unique Degressive (AUD).
The new unemployment insurance benefit is payable only for a limited period o f  time, depending on contribution 
record. The amount o f  the benefit decreased with time and entitlements expires after 30 months. Afterwards, 
unemployed people must rely on tax-financed means-tested benefits.
New way o f  benefit calculations reinforces 
contributory dimension o f  benefit system 
—* “Commitment-Tightening”
Insured with short contribution record are 
shifted into tax-financed solidarity system 
—> “Commitment-Shifting”
1993 Intersectoral Settlement:
Sharp increase o f  contribution rate.
Expansion o f  deferment o f  payments and non-increase o f  allocations.
Creation o f  a specific qualifying period.
Reduction o f  age limit for access to benefits from the pension insurance.
UNEDIC is forced to take out a credit facing a deficit o f €5 bn.
Additionally: financial agreement between the state and the social partners, which agreed the provision of FF30 
bn annually, o f  which 85% stem from additional revenue sources: the increase o f  contribution rate as well as the 
subsidy o f  the state (for the next 10 years) amounting to a third o f the deficit o f  the unemployment insurance 
system UNEDIC, this also including the amortisation rates for the debts.
Establishment o f  a tripartite supervisory council, the "Conseil d'Orientation et de Surveillance" (COS), which is 
responsible for the auditing o f  UNEDIC's accounts as well as for co-ordination and control measures.
Reduction o f  age limit for access to pension 
benefits enables unemployment insurance to 
get rid o f  older unemployed 
— ► “Commitment-Shifting”
Increase o f  state participation in financing o f  
insurance benefits through subsidy; revenue 
increases through higher contribution rate 
—> “Commitment-Sustaining”
Stricter spending monitoring 
— * “Commitment-Controlling”
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1994 Convention: Participation in Active Measures
On the 8 June 1994, the social partners agree a convention, pressured by the state, that the usage o f a share o f the 
UNEDIC fund could be used for reintegration measures for unemployed, if these were receiving benefits from the 
unemployment insurance for at least 8 months and were further eligible for benefits.
Government channels away resources from
the insurance schemes
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking”
1997 Intersectoral Agreement:
Rise in unemployment benefits and reform o f the management o f contingency funds for those claimants most in 
need (contracting to outside organisations).
Reduction o f  contribution rate due to a reduction o f unemployment rates.
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining”
2000 Intersectoral Agreement:
New agreement reorganises the unemployment insurance system around a "back-to-work assistance plan" 
(PARE), under which unemployed people's eligibility for unemployment benefits is linked to them committing 
themselves to an individualised PARE contract. The National Employment Agency (ANPE) will be responsible 
for developing and implementing this scheme.
State gains spending control through 
implementation o f PARE through ANPE 
—* “Commitment-Controlling”
2001
w
New Means-Tested Allowance (Allocation Equivalent Retraite):
Created in November 2001 for unemployed workers who are 60 years old and have contributed for 40 years to 
retirement scheme
Guarantees a pension income o f €877 per month if  workers have contributed for 40 years to the retirement 
scheme. It merges with the existing ‘allocation sp6cifique d'attente’ and the ‘Allocation spScifique de solidarity’ in 
order to simplify the administration and to save money. The new allowance will affect about 50 000 pensioners.
People with insufficient contributions and 
redistributive pensions are transferred into 
tax-financed system 
—► “Commitment-Shifting”
2002 Increase of Unemployment Contributions I:
Contribution to UNEDIC increases to 5.8% from 1 January 2002 (for 2003 it is planed to lower it to 5.4% again)
Revenue-Increase 
—► “Commitment-Sustaining"
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2003 Increase o f Unemployment Contributions II: Revenue-Increase
— *■ “Commitment-Sustaining ”
Due to the increasing financial needs o f  UNEDIC, it is decided to increase the contribution rate to 6.4% from 1
January 2003.
Financing and Budgeting
Year Reform Effect
1990 Creation o f the CSG (Contribution Sociale Generalisee):
New tax at 1.1% levied on all types o f  personal incomes (wages, capital revenues and welfare benefits) adopted in 
November 1990 for balancing o f  deficits.
The explicit goal behind this tax has been to 
use it for the financing o f non-contributoiy 
benefits
—* “Commitment-Tightening”
1994 Increase o f CSG:
Rate raised from 1.1 percent to 2.4 percent in 1994 under the new center-right government 
1.3 percent increase earmarked for a solidarity fund for old-age provision {fonds de solidarite vieillesse). 
Increment is tax-deductible, transforming the CSG into a highly regressive tax.
Tax-financing o f  non-contributory benefits in 
pension insurance schemes:
—* ‘Commitment-Tightening’
1996 Juppe Plan: Revenue Changes
End o f 1996: widening o f  CSG income basis and increase o f  rate to 3.4%; in turn, reduction o f  6% o f the 
employer-share o f  the contributions for the complementaiy health insurance and provision.
Another social security tax, the social security deficit refund tax {la contribution au remboursement de la dette 
sociale ,  CRDS)  is introduced. In the same way as the CSG, this new tax is levied (by 0.5%) on almost all types o f  
earned income and is earmarked for the refund o f  social security debt; it is an ad hoc measure. At the time o f  its 
introduction, the CRDS was to be imposed on wages, substitute income such as social security benefits, and 
investment income until 2009, and on inheritances until 2008. The government also decided that the imposition 
could be prolonged by five years until 2014.
Increase o f  1.2 point o f  health contributions for pensioners and unemployment beneficiaries in 1996 and 1997 (in 
1997, the increase is limited to 0.2%).
In October 1995, The Commission des 
comptes de la Securite sociale evaluated the 
deficit o f  the Securite sociale for 1996 with 
FF52.3 bn. The Juppe plan is expected to 
reduce this to FF17 bn (in fact it was 51.6 bn) 
and ensure a positive balance o f  11.8 bn in 
1997 (contrary to the predicted deficit o f  47.7 
bn by the Commission; in fact it was 33.3 bn) 
— ► “ Commitment-Sustaining”
Replacement o f  contribution revenue with 
tax revenues
—* “Commitment-Avoiding”
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1996 Constitutional Amendment:
Gives the Parliament the opportunity to vote a social security budget every year (Loi de Financement de la 
Securite Sociale) which allocates a limited amount o f resources for social expenditure.
Parliament has to decide on national financial aims for hospitals, practices, pharmacy and medico-social sector.
Parliament becomes authority to approve the 
social security budget and major areas o f the 
health agenda
—* “Commitment-Restraining ”
1996 Reforms of Governance Structures:
Reintroduction o f principle of parity in social insurance administrations.
Three year Management and Objective Agreements between national funds and government.
Reform also buttressed government 
participation in the management o f social 
security funds
—* “Commitment-Controlling”
1996 Loi Robien:
More generous financial incentives to employers, offering a 50% reduction in social-security contributions the 
first year after an accord and a 40% exemption each year thereafter in exchange for a 10-15% reduction in the 
employees’ annual work-time and a proportional creation of jobs.
State channels away funds from social 
insurance system 
—► “Commitment-Breaking"
1997
V
Social Security Financing Law for 1997:
Increase o f revenues:
Integration o f  the ‘regime militaire’ in the ‘regime g6n6rale’; budgetary relieve for central government budget 
FF1.2 bn.
Increase o f 17.1 % o f the tobacco tax and alcohol tax.
Increase o f the CSG by one point (on the contrary a reduction o f 1.3 points o f the contributions for the employees’ 
health insurance).
Expansion o f the assessment basis for the CSG to the majority o f transfer incomes and nearly all investments.
Reduction o f spending:
Fixation o f development o f rates o f expenditure o f health insurance at 1.7% for 1997.
Limitation o f the savings plan proposed to the CNAMTS on the 10th September. From the originally intended 
savings o f 4.8 bn, only 1.7 bn are saved through reductions o f tariffs for certain services.
The measures o f the law are intended to 
reduce the deficit by 17 bn. The deficit o f the 
Regime G6n6ral has reached 51.6 bn in 1996. 
The projected deficit for 1997 is estimated at 
30 bn (compared to the 47 bn projected by 
the Commission des comptes de la SdcuritS 
sociale); in fact, it turned out to be 33.3 bn; 
for 1998, the deficit is estimated to be 12.8 
bn.
Increase o f revenues through integration o f  
various schemes into Regime Gdndral 
—> “Commitment-Sustaining"
Further replacement o f contribution revenue 
for health insurance with tax revenues 
—*■ “Commitment-Avoiding”
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1998/
2 0 0 0
Aubry Law I  and Aubry Law II (1998 and 2000): 35-Hour-Week
First law required the social partners to negotiate the application o f the 35-hour week in reorganising work within 
firms; the 35-hour-rule began to take effect in the year 2000 for companies employing more than 20 workers and 
will not apply to small firms until 2002.
Second law raises the threshold for reduced social contributions from 1 to 1.8 times the minimum wage and 
established annual limits on work-time and overtime for firms or sectors that reduced work-time.
State channels away funds from social 
insurance system 
—> "Commitment-Breaking”
1998 Social Security Financing Law for 1998:
Increase o f  the CSG by 4.1 points to 7.5% as a substitution o f health insurance contributions, which have been 
lowered by 4.75 points from 5.5% to 0.75% of pay (and from 4.75% for civil servants to 0%).
Increase o f  CSG rate on replacement income increases from 3.4 to 6.2 percent beginning in January 1998. For the 
retired and unemployed, the 2.8 percent additional CSG levy reduced the health insurance contribution from 3.8 to 
1 percent. The government made this new levy deductible from the income tax base again.
Increasing revenue:
Charge o f 1% on inherited property revenues for pension insurance.
Tax o f 2.5% o f total drug sales levied on pharmaceutical companies, and with the creation o f a new tax on 
tobacco products.
Extension o f  RDS (Reimbursement contribution for social security debts) until 2014.
Predicted deficit for 1997: 37 bn in 1997 (de 
facto 33.3 bn), 12 bn in 1998
Aim to reduce the deficit o f the general 
scheme from an expected FF37 bn in 1997 to 
FF12 bn in 1998, with the objective o f  
balancing the social security budget by 1999. 
The shift should provide social security 
additional revenue o f FF4.5 bn.
—* “Commitment-Sustaining”
Nearly complete substitution o f  health 
contributions with tax revenues 
—> "Commitment-Avoiding” 
indirectly:
—* “Commitment-Controlling”
1999 Changes in 35-Hour-Week Funding:
Plans to finance the working time reduction (in the form o f cuts in employers’ social security contributions) partly 
through the UNEDIC fund and the social security budget are abandoned.
UNEDIC's contribution to funding the 35-hour week will be replaced by a new transitional 10% tax on overtime 
work to be levied on companies that have not reduced working time.
FF5.6 bn are to come from social security funds will now be taken from the surplus in the Old Age Solidarity 
Fund (FSV).
Replacement o f  contribution-revenues 
through tax revenues 
—> “Commitment-Avoiding” 
indirectly:
—* “Commitment-Controlling”
Reallocation o f funds adversely affecting the 
insurance fund 
—* “Commitment-Breaking”
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1999 Social Security Financing Law for 1999:
Creation o f the ‘Fonds de Reserve sur les Retraites’, FRR.
Securing o f Revenues 
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining"
2000 Social Security Financing Law for 2000:
Creation o f the Fund to Finance the Reform of Employers' Contributions (FOREC), which is expected to refund 
around 110 bn to social security funds lost through reductions in social charges.
Funded by a fraction o f the tax on tobacco, a fraction o f the duty on the consumption o f alcohol, by a new 
contribution based on the profits o f businesses with a turnover o f more than FRF 50 million, by the tax on 
polluting activities and by a contribution from the state.
Replacement o f contribution-revenue by tax 
revenue:
—*■ “Commitment-Avoiding” 
indirect:
—> "Control over Spending and Revenues ”
2001 Social Security Financing Law for 2001:
Revenues:
Cut in social security contributions for low-wage earners, by means o f a progressive reduction, over two years, in 
the CSG - currently standing at 7.5% o f  gross pay - and in the "social security debt reimbursement contribution" 
(CRDS) - currently equivalent to 0.5% o f gross pay. The reduction will apply to whose income falls below 1.4 
times the statutory national minimum wage. Furthermore, retired, unemployed and disabled people who do not 
pay income tax will be exempt from the CRDS.
Expenditure Reductions:
2.2% increase in pensions.
Increase o f provisions 
—* “Commitment-Sustaining”
2002 Social Security Financing Law for 2002:
Enhancement o f the Universal Health Insurance (Couverture Maladie Universelle, CMU) scheme through 
elimination o f the spending ceiling for dentistry and the extension o f the 'direct settlement' system for former 
benefit recipients whose income now exceeds the statutory ceiling.
2.2% increase in pensions from 1 January 2002.
Direct settlement for CMU recipients 
increases State control over spending and 
reduces independence o f  insurance funds in 
bargaining fees
—> “Commitment-Controlling"
2003 Social Security Financing Law for 2003:
Increase o f revenues:
The funding-related provisions in the 2003 
law are designed to reduce the sickness 
insurance fund deficit from over €8 bn to
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Considerable increase o f tobacco tax (11% increase on price o f cigarettes)
Reduction o f expenses:
Fixation o f health-expenditure increase at +5.3%.
Law focuses primarily on sickness insurance, with particular emphasis on encouraging doctors to prescribe 
'generic' drugs.
Budgetary Allocation:
Possibility for parliament to amend the Social Security Financing Law each autumn, should the economic and 
fiscal realities differ significantly from the original forecasts.
under €7 bn as well as to clarify the funding 
arrangements between the state and the social 
security funds.
Increase o f Revenues 
—► “Commitment-Sustaining ”
Mid-Term Amendment:
—> “ Commitment-Controlling’’
2004 Abolition of FOREC:
Abolition o f  FOREC increases revenue for ACOSS by €16 bn.
It is estimated that the partial compensation for spending covered by ACOSS and normally met by the Social 
Security Debt Redemption Fund or the Old-age Solidarity Fund generates another €20 bn or more in new direct 
revenue. This does not take into account the approximately €2 bn in contribution exemptions not offset by the 
state.
ACOSS surplus for 2004 is approximately 
€3.5 bn
Increase o f revenues
—> “Commitment-Sustaining”
2004 Social Security Financing Law for 2004:
The law mainly focuses on clarifying financing modalities o f  the ‘s6curit£ sociale’ and aims at stabilising the deficit o f  
the health insurance under €11 bn:
Modernisation o f hospitals (additional investment o f €10 bn euros in the plan "hopital 2007") and making the 
resources o f  hospitals dependent on an evaluation o f their activities.
Modernisation o f the health insurance system with the particular aim to stabilize the deficit, in clarifying the 
financial relationship between the ‘security sociale’ and the state.
Increase o f tobacco taxes.
An increase o f 9.7% o f revenues for the 
social security institutions ; half o f the money 
(€2.6 bn) goes to CADES, which is 
equivalent to the contribution allowances that 
were not covered in the budget in 2000 
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining’’
Sources: MISSOC various years; European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line; Palier 2002; various other sources
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II-l Changes in the Main German Social Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Administrative Independence
Pension Insurance Health Insurance Unemployment Insurance
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
Administrative Independence
Institutional 
Fragmentation o f  
Insurance Sector
Medium high (2+3 in 
GRV), small number 
o f  ind. schemes; civil 
service provision 
—* Medium
Internal fragmentation 
strongly reduced with 
organisational reform 
in 2005 
—*■ Low
Very high (over 1.200 
insurance funds)
—* Very high
Strong reduction o f  
fragmentation to 262 
funds (including 206 
work sickness funds) 
— »  Medium
Very low (single 
scheme)
—*■ Very low
No change 
—> Very low
Insurance Scheme GRV GKV BA
Composition o f 
Administrative Body
Bipartite governing 
board with equal 
representation o f  social 
partners 
—* Very high
No change 
— ► Very high
Bipartite governing 
board with equal 
representation o f social 
partners (with few 
exceptions)
—*■ Very high
Additional full-time, 
professional board o f  
directors 
—*■ Very High
Tripartite admin, 
committee with equal 
representation o f  
employees, employers 
and public bodies 
— ► Medium
Transformed into 
tripartite supervisory 
board with fewer 
executive functions 
— ► Low
Selection o f top 
officials
‘Social elections’ by 
members; assembly o f  
representatives elects 
the supervisory board 
as executive body as 
well as the board o f  
directors (based on 
suggestions by the 
supervisory board)
— *• Very high
No change 
— >  Very high
‘Social elections’ by 
members; assembly of  
representatives elects 
the supervisory board 
as executive body as 
well as the board o f  
directors (based on 
suggestions by the 
supervisory board)
— ► Very high
No change 
—*■ Very high
Representatives 
directly appointed 
(nominations by social 
partners); admin, 
committee elects 
executive board; 
president and vice- 
president appointed by 
labour minister 
— *■ Medium
Executive board now 
also directly appointed 
by labour ministry 
— *• Very low
Policies require govt, 
approval/subject to 
ministerial direction?
Public oversight 
limited to the 
supervision o f  the 
legality o f  actions, but 
approval applies to 
autonomous legal and 
various organisational 
and financial decisions 
- + High
No change 
- *  High
Public oversight 
limited to the 
supervision o f the 
legality o f  actions, but 
approval applies to 
autonomous legal and 
various organisational 
and financial decisions 
- * ■  High
No change 
High
Public oversight 
limited to the 
supervision o f  the 
legality o f  actions, but 
approval applies to 
autonomous legal and 
various organisational 
and financial decisions 
High
Regulations regarding 
legal and professional 
oversight can now be 
replaced by contractual 
agreements between 
the insurance carrier 
and the government 
—*■ Low
Score 5 (Very high ) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high) 4 (Very High) 3 (Medium) 1 (Very low)
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II-2 Changes in the Main German Social Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Budgetary Autonomy and Constraints
Pension Insurance: GRV Health Insurance: GKV Unemployment Insurance: BA
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
Budgetary Autonomy
Degree o f Formal 
Budget Autonomy
Formal budget 
autonomy 
— > Very high
No change 
—* Very high
Formal budget 
autonomy 
— *• Very high
No change 
— ► Very high
Formal budget 
autonomy, but subject 
to approval by federal 
government 
— ♦  Medium
Possibility o f  imposed 
budget in case o f  
deficit 
— »■ Very low
Degree o f Revenue 
Autonomy
Contribution rates and 
subsidies defined by 
law
— ► Very low
Contribution rates and 
subsidies by govt, 
automatised, via decree 
-* Low
Contribution autonomy 
—* Very high
Formal contribution 
autonomy maintained, 
but repeated 
interventions 
— > Low
Contribution rates 
defined by law 
—* Very low
No change 
— » Very low
Degree o f Spending 
Autonomy
Carrier only 
determines 
administrative 
spending 
— ► Low
No change 
— ► Low
Considerable self­
administration powers 
regarding definition o f  
provision catalogue in 
ambulatory sector, but 
govt approval 
— > Medium high
Self-administration 
powers regarding 
definition o f  provision 
catalogue strengthened 
High
2/3 o f  spending based 
on benefit legislation; 
flexibility regarding 
1/3 for active 
policies/placement 
— ► Medium
Loss o f  internal 
spending allocation 
competencies 
—* Low
Score Independence 2 (Low) 3 (Medium) 4 (High) 4 (High) 2 (Low) 1 (Very low)
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Pension Insurance: GRV Health Insurance: GKV Unemployment Insurance: BA
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
Budgetary Constraints
Budgetary Allocation 
Process
Delegation approach; 
weak role o f  finance 
minister 
— »  Very high
No change 
— ► Very high
Delegation approach; 
weak role o f  finance 
minister 
—*■ Very high
Increasingly shift o f  
allocation decisions 
into self-administration 
committees; parallel 
strengthening o f  
competition between 
insurance funds 
— >  Medium
Delegation approach; 
weak role o f  finance 
minister 
— ► Very high
Due to deficit- 
financing stronger role 
o f  finance minister; 
employment agencies 
excluded from budget 
process 
—*■ Low
Enforced Fiscal 
Targets
No
—* Very high
No
—* Very high
No
—* Very high
Introduction o f  budgets 
for all sectors, but 
enforcement weak 
—* Medium
No
— ► Very high
Global budget for 
active measures 
—*■ Low
Spending Monitoring
Approval o f  Ministry 
o f  Social Affairs; no 
approval o f  extra 
spending necessary 
High
No change 
— ► High
Approval o f  Ministry 
o f  Health; no approval 
o f extra spending 
necessary 
High
No.change 
- * •  High
Extra spending needs 
approval o f  Ministry o f  
Labour and Finance; 
internal spending 
monitoring weak 
—* Medium
Stronger internal 
spending monitoring 
— ► Low
Deficit Coverage
‘Federal guarantee’ if  
threat o f  illiquidity; no 
legal specification 
whether in form o f  
subsidies or credits; 
automatic coverage o f  
miners insurance 
High
Merely provision of 
interest-free credits in 
case o f  illiquidity 
—* Medium
No state coverage; no 
credit financing 
allowed 
— *• Very low
Temporary exceptions 
to credit financing; 
introduction o f limited, 
tax-financed deficit 
coverage 
—* Low
Automatic deficit 
coverage by federal 
state
—> Very high
No change 
—♦•Very high
Score Constraints 5 (Very high) 4 (High) 4 (High) 3 (Medium) 4 (High) 2 (Low)
TOTAL SCORE 3 (Medium) 3 (Medium) 4 (High)....................... 3 (Medium) 3 (Medium) 1 (Very low)
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II-3 Changes in the Main German Social Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Revenue Structure
Pension Insurance: GRV Health Insurance: GKV Unemployment Insurance: BA
1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
Revenue-Structure
Share o f earmarked 
revenues 77.8% 72.9% 96.5% 97.1% 88.5% 86.6%
Extent of
Transfers/Fiscal
Interdependencies
Federal Subsidies: 
18.8%
Federal Subsidies: 
26.4%; strong increase 
o f internal subsidies 
(mainly to KnRV)
Only internal 
equalisation process in 
pensioner health 
insurance
Internal risk 
equalisation process 
since 1994
No transfers, but 
tax-financed deficit 
coverage (10.5%)
Permanent dependence 
from federal subsidy 
payments 
(1993: 22%; 2004: 7.7%); 
displacement-fee re­
channels revenues into 
federal budget; increase o f  
payments to other 
insurance carriers
SCORE 4 (High) 3 (Medium) 5 (Very high) 5 (Very high) 4 (High) 3 (Medium)
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II-4.1 Changes in the German Pension Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Eligibility and Reciprocity
GRV
Situation 1990 Situation 2005
Eligibility
Mandatory Retirement Age 65 years (in principle) 65 years
Conditions for Full Rate Pension Reaching o f  65 year age limit and minimum contribution 
time; exceptions:
Men and Women:
63 yrs (or 60 yrs for war invalids and invalidity) 
after 35 yrs o f  insurance
60 yrs, if  180 contr. months, in unemployment for 
a year in last 18 months, at least 8 yrs compulsory 
insurance in last 10 yrs 
Women only:
60 yrs, if  180 contr. months, compulsory insured 
for at least 10 years since age 40
Reaching o f  65 year age limit and minimum contribution 
time;
Increase o f  pension ages for exceptional cases:
old age pension because o f  unemployment or 
after part-time for elder workers, and for long­
term insured only possible for persons having 
completed the age o f  65 
Increase o f  old age pension for women from 60 
to 65 years (2000-2004);
Increase o f  old-age pension for severely 
disabled persons from 60 to 63 years (2001 - 
2003)
Reduction o f  0.3% for each month pension is claimed 
early.
Accounting of Non-Contribution Times Substitute periods  (military service and war-related non­
employment times)
Assessment periods  (periods o f sickness, rehabilitation, or 
certain times o f  unemployment; periods o f pregnancy and 
child-bed; school or higher education times up to limit o f 4 
years; finished university education up to 5 years; pension 
times before age limit o f  55 years
Substitute periods (Ersatzzeiten)
Assessment periods (Anrechnungszeiten) (periods o f  
sickness, rehabilitation, unemployment, studies and 
higher education over 16 years o f  age)
Childraising periods (Berucksichtigungszeiten) 
(child-raising up to the age o f  10 years). Mothers or 
fathers bom in 1921 (West) or 1927 (East) or later are 
credited with the first 12 months (36 months for children 
bom from 1992 onwards) after the month o f  birth as an 
insured period, if they stayed at home to look after the 
child.
Minimum Contribution Time 60 months o f  insurance 60 months o f  insurance.
Score Eligibility 4 (High) 4 (High) ............
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GRV
1990 2005
Reciprocity
Pension Level Individual components:
Personal Income Points (PIP)
Access Factor depending on pension age (AF) 
General component:
Pension Type Factor (PTF)
Monthly Pension = PIP x AF x PTF
Individual components:
Personal Income Points (PIP)
Access Factor depending on pension age (AF) 
General components:
Pension Type Factor (PTF)
Current Pension Value (CPV)
Monthly Pension = PIP x AF x PTF x CPV
Benefit Inequality No statutory minimum or maximum pension. No change
Reductions for early retirement None (different pension access accounted for through 
Access Factor and Pension Type Factor)
In the case o f early retirement (for conditions see above). 
Calculated according to the general pension formula.
Indexation Every 1st o f  July adaptation according to development o f  
gross wages
The pensions are annually adjusted on 1st July according 
to the income development by calculation o f  the pension 
on the basis o f  the valid (latest) pension value. The 
current pension value is adjusted in line with the wage 
development in the previous calendar year, whereby 
changes o f  the pension insurance contribution rate and 
the increasing share o f  old age- provision (not tax-related 
changes for employees, however) are taken into 
consideration. The pension adjustment intended for 2004 
and 2005 will be suspended.
Charges on Benefits Pensions subject to taxation.
Contributions to pensioner health insurance.
Gradual transition to deferred taxation until 2040. 
Contribution to pensioner health insurance and long-term 
care insurance.
Average health insurance contribution rate 7.1%, plus 
1.7% (1.95% without children) long-term care insurance 
contribution.
Score Reciprocity 4 (High) 3 (Medium)
TOTAL SCORE 4 (High) 4 (High)
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II-4.2 Changes in the German Health Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Eligibility and Reciprocity
GKV
Situation 1990 Situation 2005
Eligibility
Beneficiaries • Persons in paid employment and those receiving 
vocational training.
• Pensioners with a sufficient period o f insurance.
• Unemployed, receiving benefits o f  unemployment 
insurance.
• Handicapped persons in sheltered employment.
• Trainees in vocational rehabilitation.
• Students o f  recognised higher education.
• Farmers and helping members o f their family.
• Artists and writers
• Personally insured
No change
Sickness Pay Beneficiaries Employees and assimilated. Incapacity for work certified 
by a doctor from the 3rd  day o f illness.
Employees and assimilated. Incapacity for work certified 
by a doctor from the 4th  day o f  illness.
Eligible Dependants Spouse and children, income not exceeding DM500 (west) 
or DM 300 (east)
Spouse and children, income not exceeding € 345 or € 400 
per month if  employed in insignificant employment, 
provided they are not insured in their own right, or active 
as self-employed.
Age limit for children.
Some other exclusions.
Divorced partners to a marriage can insure themselves 
within 3 months after the divorce has become final 
(previous insurance periods necessary).
Minimum Contribution Payments None None
Sickness Pay Minimum Contribution Payments Neither work period nor qualifying period required. No change
Exemptions from Compulsory Insurance N compulsory insurance for employees with monthly 
earnings exceeding €2432/1118 (West/ East) who were 
privately insured or for persons in insignificant 
employment or for persons in insignificant employment 
(up to €315 per month). Civil servants, magistrates and 
professional soldiers are also exempt.
No compulsory insurance for employees with annual 
earnings exceeding €46,350 or €41,850 for persons who 
were privately insured on 31 December 2002 or for 
persons in insignificant employment (up to €400 per 
month). Civil servants, magistrates, and professional 
soldiers do not pay contributions.
Score Eligibility 2 (Low) 3 (Medium)
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GKV
1990 | 2005
Reciprocity
Patient’s Co-Payments Medical Expenses: no co-payments 
Hospitalisation co-payment: DM10 per calendar 
day during a maximum period o f 14 days 
50% o f dental prostheses and connected 
treatment
Drugs: Fixed amount on fixed price products; 
DM3 on all other prescribed drugs; no 
reimbursement o f  comfort drugs (since 1989)
Practice fee o f  €  10 per quarter 
Co-payments for aids which are part o f  the 
medical treatment 10% and € 10 per prescription. 
Hospitalisation co-payment o f  €  10 per calendar 
day during a maximum period o f  28 days.
50% o f  the costs o f  dental treatment 
Drugs: 10%-participation o f the dispensing price, 
at least € 5 and a maximum ofE 10 and not more 
than the price o f  the product. Fixed amount on 
fixed price products, plus possible different 
between fixed amount and price.
Exemptions or Reductions to Co-Payments No co-payments for children and ‘special cases’ No co-payment for children. Exemption 
o f  participation for expenses above 2% (1% in case o f  
chronic diseases) o f  the gross income. Reduction o f  co­
payment for early-detection measures and bonus models.
Sickness Pay Benefit Rates Sickness benefit (Krankengeld): 80% o f the normal salary 
(wages and income from work during last 3 months, 
insofar as subject to contribution; annual adaptation as for 
pensions) but not exceeding 100% o f the net salary
Normal salary (Regelentgelt): Wages and income from 
work, normally received (during last 3 months), insofar as 
subject to contribution. After one year adjustment as for 
pensions.
Sickness benefit (Krankengeld): 70% o f  the normal salary 
but not exceeding 90% o f the net salary.
Score Reciprocity 2 (Low) 2 (Low)
TOTAL SCORE 2 (Low) 2 (Low)
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II-4.3 Changes in the German Unemployment Insurance Schemes 1990-2005: Eligibility and Reciprocity
BA
Situation 1990 Situation 2005
Eligibility
Beneficiaries Unemployed with sufficient previous contribution 
payments
Expansion o f  age-related benefits (passive as well as 
active)
Minimum Contribution Time Compulsory Insurance for at least 12 months during the 
last 3 years.
Since 2005: Period during which compulsory insurance 
for at least 12 months necessary reduced to two years. 
Unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe): 
unemployed person must have received unemployment 
benefit during the last year, and must be in need.
Work Availability Conditions and other Criteria Available for work; To have personally registered at 
the employment agency as unemployed
Actively looking for work
Score Eligibility 4 (High) 2 (Low)
Reciprocity
Replacement Rate Unemployment Benefit: 68% o f net earnings; without 
children: 63%
Unemployment Assistance: 58% of net earnings; without 
children: 56%
Beneficiaries with children: 67% o f  net earnings (net 
earnings are determined on a flat-rate basis by deducting 
the usual employee's stoppage from the gross salary). 
Beneficiaries without children: 60% o f net earnings. 
Unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe): 
Beneficiaries with children: 57% o f  net earnings (net 
earnings are determined on a flat-rate basis by deducting 
the usual employee's stoppage from the gross salary). 
Beneficiaries without children: 53% o f net earnings.
Reference Salary Average weekly wage for last three months Average weekly wage for the last 52 weeks with a ceiling 
o f benefits o f  €5,150 per month in the old Lander 
and €4,350 in the new Lander.
Duration Proportional to periods o f  employment and age: 
Minimum: 12 months empl. —► 156 days benefits; 
Maximum: 64 months empl., 54 years —► 832 days 
benefits;
Unemployment Assistance: unlimited
The duration o f  benefits (DB) depends on the duration 
o f  compulsory insurance coverage and on the age o f  the 
beneficiary; generally max 12 months 
Unemployment Benefit II: Unlimited
Benefit Development over Time Stable Stable
Qualifying Waiting Period None None
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BA
1990 2005
Reciprocity
Charges on Benefits Benefits are not subject to taxation (but subject to 
progression). The Federal Employment Agency pays 
contributions for retirement and sickness insurance on the 
behalf o f  compensatory unemployment benefit providers.
Additionally contributions to long-term care insurance 
paid by BA on behalf o f  insured.
Universally available placement activities/active 
employment policies
Information and placement services are universally 
available. Active employment measures are not connected 
to contribution records. The share o f  active employment 
measures compared to passive ones 45.3% in 1992.
No change regarding universally available information 
and placement services, and non -contribution related 
granting o f active measures. Share o f  active measures 
compared to passive ones reduced, but generally 
expansion o f  possibilities for taking up active measures.
Score Reciprocity 2 (Low) 2 (Low)
TOTAL SCORE 3 (Medium) 2 (Low)
Sources: MISSOC various years; various others
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II-5 Welfare Reforms Germany 1989-2005
Pension Insurance
Year Reform Effect
1989/
1990
1992 Pension Reform:
Change o f  indexation formula to the change in average net earnings rather than to gross earnings.
Increase o f  retirement age to 65 for both men and women gradually between 2001 and 2010
Early retirement remains possible, but with reductions o f  the pension level
Increase o f  the number o f  years o f  contributions credited for each child from one to three years.
Change o f  Federal Grant provision guidelines: size o f  the grant dependent upon the development o f  average 
gross earnings and the contribution rate.
Lowering o f  the reserve requirements from 12 to 3 months o f  pension spending.
For beneficiaries o f  sick pay as well as unemployment benefits the social benefit carriers (health insurances and 
sick half/half; Federal Employment Agency or Federal State) pay pension insurance contributions on the basis o f  
80% o f the former gross wage (formerly: on the basis o f  the compensatory benefit)
The first 4 (formerly: 5) insurance years are credited with 90% o f the average income o f  all insured.
Change in indexation: major reduction in 
future pension claims 
—* “ Commitment-Breaking”
Increase o f  retirement age:
—> “Commitment-Avoiding"
Change o f  Federal Grant Formula: one-time 
increase in the size o f  the grant followed by 
its stabilisation at the level o f  about 20 per 
cent o f  overall pension spending 
— ► “Commitment-Sustaining ”: Increasing 
Revenues
Lowering o f  Reserve Requirement 
—* "Commitment-Restraining ”: ability o f  
insurance carrier to react independently to 
short-term fisca l difficulties is reduced
Increase o f  pension contributions 
— ► “Commitment-Sustaining”: Shift o f  
Revenues between Insurances
Reduction o f  years credited with 90%
—* “Commitment-Tightening": retrenchment 
o f  non-contributory benefits
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1991 Statutory Pension Insurance and Federal Employment Office Contribution Rate Reform Act 
[Gesetz zurAnderung der Beitragssatze in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und bei der 
Bundesansta.lt fur Arbeit]:
Reduction o f the pension insurance contribution rate from 18.7% to 17.7% from April 1991.
1991 Pension Transition Act [Renteniiberleitungsgesetz (RUEG)]:
Transfer o f entire pension legislation (Social Security Code VI) to the new Lander from January 1992.
Men with long insurance records can now retire with 63 years instead o f  65 years.
The uniform disability benefits are now replaced with the BU (Berufsunfahigkeit: occupational disability) and 
EU (Erwerbsunfahigkeit: general work incapacity) pensions, whose conditions o f eligibility are more generous. 
Generous improvements are also connected with the transition o f the surviving dependants’ pensions.
The alignment o f the pensions is based on the net pension level in the old Lander.
The indexation o f  pensions in the East follows the expected development o f net wages in the year o f die pension 
adaptation, not the actual development o f  the last year as in die West. This regulation is intended to pass the 
strong dynamic in the wage development on to the pensioners as quickly as possible.
Shift o f additional financial burden into 
insurance scheme 
—*■ “Comm itment-Breaking ”
1993 Budget Law:
Reduction o f contribution rate from 17.7% to 17.5%.
1994 Contribution Rate Decree (Beitragssatzverordnung):
Increase o f contribution rate to 19.2%
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining": Revenue- 
Increase
1995 Contribution Rate Decree:
Reduction o f Contribution Rate to 18.6%.
1996 Contribution Rate Decree:
Increase o f contribution rate to 19.2%.
—*■ “Commitment-SustainingRevenue- 
Increase
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1996 Act Reforming the Sixth Book of the Social Insurance Code and other Laws [Gesetz zurAnderung 
des Sechsten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch und anderer Gesetze]:
Restriction o f the possibilities o f exemptions from statutoiy insurance duty because o f membership in the 
insurance scheme o f a professional organisation: necessary is existence o f obligatory membership in 
occupational insurance scheme before January 1995.
Making hitherto exempt employed liable to 
mandatoiy insurance 
—* “Commitment-Sustaining Revenue- 
Increase
1996 Second Social Insurance Code VI Amendment Act [2. SGB VI-AndGJ:
Restrictions o f eligibility for disability pensions: persons with limited abilities which are still able to work full­
time are not eligible for BU or EU pensions.
Change o f the pension indexation in the new Lander: from 1 July 1996, the indexation follows as in the old 
Lander the development o f the net wages o f employees in the New Lander in the previous year. An adaptation o f  
the pensions only takes place once a year on the 1st o f July.
Restriction o f eligibility criteria 
—► “Commitment-Breaking": Minor change
Changing o f  indexation 
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking"
1996 Smooth Transition into Retirement Promotion Act [Gesetz zur Forderung eines gleitenden 
Ubergangs in den Ruhestand]:
Eligibility conditions for the former old-age pension because o f unemployment are also fulfilled through the 
employment in partial retirement for at least 24 months after the age o f  55.
The age limit o f 60 years for the old age pension because of unemployment or after partial retirement is raised 
for insured bom after 1936 in monthly steps.to 63 years. For insured bom after 1949, the age limit is raised to 65 
years. Early retirement because o f unemployment or after partial retirement is still possible (up to 3 years for 
reaching the regular age limit, but not before the age o f  60), but it is connected with permanent pension 
reductions (0.3% per month, up to 10.8%).
Pension after partial employment shifts older 
unemployed into pension insurance 
—► “Commitment-Sustaining": Shifting
Increase o f age limit and benefit reductions 
in case o f early retirement 
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening of 
Reciprocity
1997 Growth and Employment Promotion Act [Wachstums- und Beschdftigungsfbrderungsgesetz 
(WFG)]:
The general insurance exemption for students with more than short-time employment is abolished (from October 
1996). Assessment times because o f education are now only credited up to three (formerly: seven) years.
The level o f  transition benefits is reduced (medical rehabilitation: from 90%/75% to 75%/68% [with or without 
children]; professional rehabilitation: from 80%/70% to 75%/68%; unemployment following professional 
rehabilitation: from 68%/63% to 67%/60%).
The age limit for the old-age pension because o f unemployment or after partial retirement is increased from 63 to
Inclusion o f employed students in mandatory 
insurance
—> “Commitment-Sustaining": Revenue 
Increase
Reduction o f education time crediting
—► “Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening o f
Eligibility
Benefit-Reductions
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65 years in monthly steps from December 2001. Early retirement with 60 remains possible, but with permanent 
reductions o f 0.3% for every month (up to maximum o f 18%).
Also the age limit for the old-age pension for women is increased from 60 to 65 years in monthly steps from 
December 2004, with the same regulations for early retirement. Regulations for the protection o f confidence: 
only to women bom before the 7 May 1941 which were unemployed or give notice before the 7 May 1996. No 
protection o f confidence for women still in employment.
The age limit for the old-age pension for insured with long contribution records is increased from 63 to 65 years 
in monthly steps from December 2001. Early retirement with 63 is possible, the same regulations o f reductions 
apply (up to 72%).
In the calculation o f the contribution rate for the pension insurance now also illiquid assets o f the fluctuation 
reserve are taken into account for the reaching o f the minimum reserve (one monthly expenditure at the end o f  
the year).
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking"
Increase o f retirement ages and benefit 
reductions for early retirement 
—► “Commitment-Sustaining ": Tightening o f 
Reciprocity
Change o f calculation o f  fluctuation reserve 
—► “Commitment-Restraining”
1997 Pension Reform Act 1999 [Rentenreformgesetz 1999]:
Introduction o f  the ‘demographic factor’ in the pension formula: in accounting for the increase in the life 
expectancy, it is intended to produce a gradual decline o f the pension level from 70% o f average net earnings in 
1997 to 64% in 2030.
Increase o f the federal subsidy, financed by an increase o f the VAT by one percentage point in April 1998 
Extension o f the value o f credits for child rearing (from 75% to 100% o f  average wage) and introduction o f  the 
possibility to add credits to other entitlements from this period
Eligibility criteria for disability pensions were tightened: the age-limit is increased from 60 to 63 years in 
monthly steps. Furthermore, persons with limited employment capacity (under 50%) are not eligible anymore for 
this pension.
The old-age pension for insured with long contribution records can now be taken up with 62 (formerly: 63) 
years, but with increased reductions (up to 10.8% instead o f 7.2%). Early retirement is still possible with 60 
years, but with the usual reductions (up to 10.8%).
From 2012 onwards, the old-age pensions because o f  unemployment or after partial retirement, or for women, 
are abolished (for everyone bom after 1952). Unemployed and women then can only receive a pension before the 
age 65 as insured with long contribution records or as heavily disabled.
The former pensions because o f occupational disability or limited employment capacity (BU and EU pensions) 
are abolished for pensions from 2000; instead, insured might receive a pension (as temporary pension up to 3 
years) because o f partial or full reduced employment capacity.
Introduction o f ‘demographic factor’:
—► “Commitment-Breaking"
[reversed in 1998]
Increase o f federal subsidy
—> “Commitment-SustainingIncrease o f
Revenues
Increased pension-reductions for early 
retirement
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening of 
Reciprocity
Abolition o f early retirement options
—*■ "Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening o f
Eligibility
Reform o f disability pensions (tightened 
eligibility, shorter duration)
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking"
[Reversed in 1998]
1997 Contribution Rate Decree [Beitragssatzverordnung 1997 (BSV1997)]: —* “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f 
Revenues
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Increase o f  pension contribution rate to 20.3%.
1998 Financing Act for the Additional Federal Subsidy to the Statutory Pension Insurance [Gesetz zur 
Finanzierung eines zusdtzlichen Bundeszuschusses zur gesetzlichen RentenversicherungJ:
Additional federal subsidy as lump-sum compensation for non-contributory benefits (April- December 1998: 
DM9.6 bn; 1999: DM15.6 bn) to the pension insurance carriers; for the calendar year from 2000 the additional 
federal subsidy changes according to the development o f the VAT rate.
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f 
Revenues
1998 Actfor the Amendment of Social Insurance and the Protection o f Employee Rights [Gesetz zu 
Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der ArbeitnehmerrechteJ:
Reduction o f the pension contribution rate from 20.3% to 19.5% (from 1 April 1999)
Abolition o f  the ,demographic factor’ introduced with the RRG 99.
Reform o f the disability pensions suspended
The contributions for child rearing times are covered by the federal state from June 1999 onwards (lump-sum 
contribution).
The federal state continues to compensate the pension insurance for additional benefits connected with pensions 
in the new Lander as well as provisions related to the professional rehabilitation law -  but from now on, without 
influence on the calculation o f  the additional federal subsidy.
—* “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase of 
Revenues
1998 Contribution Rate Decree:
Contribution Rate for 1998 set at 20.3%.
—> “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f 
Revenues
1999 Budget Recapitalisation Act [Haushaltssanierungsgesetz]:
From January 2000, the pension contribution rate is set at 19.3% (formerly: 19.5%).
Increase o f  the additional federal subsidy is increased by the federal state revenues from the introduction o f the 
Eco-Tax (minus an amount o f €1.3 bn in 2000 as well as €0.9 bn from 2001).
The indexation o f pensions in 2000 and 2001 does not follow the development o f net wages, but only the 
changes o f  prices (inflation).
Replacement o f contribution with tax 
revenues
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining"
Change from wage to price indexation 
—> “Commitment-Breaking"
2000 Diminished Earning Capacity Pensions Reform Act [Gesetz zur Reform der Renten wegen Tightening o f  disability insurance eligibility 
criteria and generosity; increase o f age limit
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verminderter ErwerbsfdhigkeitJ:
A two-tiered diminished earning capacity pension replaces the BU-/EU-pensions (half pension for insured with a 
remaining earning capacity between 3 and 6 hours, a full one if  less than that; no eligibility if remaining capacity 
6 hours or more).
Protection o f confidence: if a person has been eligible to one o f the abolished pensions before the 31.12.2000, 
this eligibility remains valid until the age o f 65; risk o f occupational disability (BU) remains for insured bom 
before the 2 January 1960, but reduction o f level to 0.5 times full pension (formerly: 0.6667).
Restriction o f duration for widow pensions or diminished employment capacity pensions (3 years)
Early receipt o f diminished earning capacity pensions leads to pension reductions (10.8%)
Age limit for old-age pension for severely disabled increases from 60 to 63 years in monthly steps
Due to the maintenance o f labour-market related diminished earning capacity pensions a financial equalisation 
process between Federal Employment Office and Pension Insurance is introduced: the BA compensates the RV 
half o f the expenses for these pensions for the average time period during which the person would have been 
eligible for unemployment benefits.
In contrast to the amount fixed in the HsanG, the increase o f the additional federal subsidy is reduced for the 
years 2001 until 2003.
The indexation o f the increased amount is changed to the development o f gross wages from 2004, and is 
therefore detached from the eco-tax revenues.
—► "Commitment-Breaking”
Restriction o f pension durations for widow 
and diminished employment pensions 
—* "Commitment-Breaking”
Benefit reductions for early retirement
—* “Commitment-Sustaining”: Tightening o f
Reciprocity
Introduction o f  Financial Equalisation 
Process: BA pays compensation to pension 
insurance
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase and 
Shifting o f Revenues
Changes in subsidy calculation: 
‘depoliticising’ expenditure policies 
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining”
2 0 0 0 Contribution Rate Decree:
Reduction o f pension contribution rate from 19.3% to 19.1%.
Lump-sum compensation for child-rearing contribution times by the federal state amount to €11.2 bn in 2001.
Reduction o f contribution-financed 
redistributive provisions 
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining"
2001 Old Age Assets Supplementation Act [Altersvermogenserganzungsgesetz (AvmEG)]:
Pension Indexation from 2001: follows the development o f the gross wage bill per average employee in the 
previous year to the then previous year, multiplied with a factor for the development o f the pension contribution 
rate (RVB) and the retirement provision share (AVA).
New calculation o f net pension level: proportion o f an average pension and (this is new) the under consideration 
o f the AVA calculated annual average net wage.
Reduction o f  pensions for surviving dependants: for marriages after the 31. December 2001, the provision rate 
sinks from 60% to 55%; furthermore, now all sources o f income are taken into account for the calculation o f  
eligibility: the reaching o f an income limit results in reductions o f the pension or even non-eligibility.
The duration o f  the ‘small widowers pension’ is limited to two years (protection o f confidence for current
New pension indexation formula 
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking”
Reduction o f dependants pensions and new 
eligibility criteria 
—*• “Commitment-Breaking”
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beneficiaries or older insured).
Appreciation o f child-rearing or care times for insured with at least 25 contribution times.
Debiting o f  times o f  sickness, pregnancy/motherhood or unemployment for young insured between 17 and 25 
years, even if  this does not interrupt employment with mandatory insurance.
Reduction o f duration o f widowers pension 
(protection o f confidence)
—► “Commitment-Avoiding"
2001 Old Age Assets Act [AltersvermogensgesetzJ:
Introduction o f a private pension pillar, the so-called ‘Riester-Rente’.
All persons insured in the statutory pension insurance can receive state-funded subsidies.
Introduction o f  third pillar 
—> "Commitment-Avoiding"
2001 Act Regulating the Fluctuation Reserve in the Statutory Pension Insurance [Gesetz zur 
Bestimmung der Schwankungsreserve in der Rentenversicherung; from 01.01,2002]:
Reduction o f the minimum reserve requirement from 1.0 monthly expenditures to 0.8. Also reduction o f the 
maximum from 1.5 to 12.
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining"
2 0 0 2 Contribution Rate Maintenance Act [Beitragssicherungsgesetz; zum 01.01.2003]:
Increase o f the pension contribution rate from 19.1% to 19.5%.
Further reduction o f  the fluctuation reserve from 70 to 50% of a monthly expenditure, in order to avoid a further 
increase o f contributions.
Lump-sum payment for the compensation o f child-rearing contribution times from the federal state o f €11.8 bn.
—* “Commitment-Restraining”
—► “ Commitment-SustainingIncrease of 
revenues
2003 Second and Third Social Security Code VI Amendment Acts [Zweites und Drittes Gesetz zur 
Anderung des SGB VI]:
Suspension o f pension adaptation in July 2004.
Pensioners have to pay the contributions for the long-term care insurance themselves; abolition o f payment o f  
half the contributions by the pension insurance carriers.
The contribution rate for the health insurance o f  the pensioners changes three months after the change o f  
contribution rates by the health insurers (from April 2004).
For new pensions, the date o f payment is delayed from the beginning to the end o f the month.
Further reduction o f  the fluctuation reserve from 50 to 20% o f a monthly expenditure.
Suspension o f adaptation 
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking”
Change in care contribution payments 
—► "Commitment-Breaking”
Delay o f pension payments 
—> “Commitment-Breaking”
Reduction o f reserve requirements 
—♦ “Commitment-Restraining”
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2004 Budget Supplement Act [HaushaltsbegleitgesetzJ:
Reduction o f the general federal subsidy to the workers and employees pension insurance by €2 bn.
Reduction o f earmarked revenues 
—► "Commitment-Breaking"
2004 Pension Insurance Sustainability Act [Rentenversicherungs-Nachhaltigkeitsgesetz]:
Supplementation o f the pension indexation formula by a ,sustainability factor’, which reduces pension adaptation 
in case the pensioner-contributor ratio deteriorates.
In the future, the dynamic o f  pension adjustments furthermore follows the gross wage bill liable to social security 
contributions -  i.e., in contrast to before the average wage bill o f employees without civil servants and inclusive 
o f unemployment benefit recipients.
The crediting o f school education times is limited to vocational schools or professional educational measures, 
and is overall limited to three years (this is also the case for the appreciation for the first 36 months with 
mandatory contribution times).
The age limit for the earliest possible start o f the old-age pension because o f unemployment or after partial 
retirement is gradually increased from 60 to 63 years (with protection o f  confidence).
The former ,pension level protection clause’ for the standard net pension level (67%) is abolished; as minimum 
protection goal a net pension level o f 46% (until 2020) and 43% (until 2030) is defined.
The former ‘fluctuation reserve’ is renamed ‘sustainability reserve’; the upper limit is increased from 0.7 to 1.5 
monthly expenditures, the lower limit o f 0.2 is maintained.
Change o f  benefit formula 
—► "Commitment-Breaking"
New adjustment formula 
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking”
Limiting o f  educational credits
—*■ “Commitment-SustainingTightening o f
Eligibility
Increase o f  unemployment or partial 
retirement age limit 
—► "Commitment-Avoiding"
Abolition o f  pension level protection clause 
—► “Commitment-Breaking"
2004 Old Age Income Law [Alterseinkiinftegesetz; from January 2005]:
Exemption o f pension contributions from taxation.
In turn, pensions will be fully taxed from 2040.
2005 Statutory Pension Insurance Organisation Reform Act [Gesetz zur Organisationsreform der 
gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (RVOrgG)]:
The BfA and the VDR merge to .German Pension Insurance Federation’ (DRV Bund).
Reduction o f federal carriers from four to two, as also Miners Insurance, Rail Insurance and Sea Insurance 
merge.
—* “Commitment-Controlling"
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Health insurance
Year Reform Effect
1989/
1990
Healthcare Reform Act [Gesundheitsreformgesetz (GRG)J:
Introduction o f  fixed amounts for pharmaceuticals: for those drugs, the co-payment is abolished; for those not 
included, the co-payment is increased from DM2 to 3; for drugs that compete with fixed amount drugs, the 
patient has to pay the difference; for remedies, the co-payment increases from DM4 to 10% o f the costs; for 
glasses frames, the health insurance only pays an allowance o f  DM20.
Introduction o f  reimbursement o f  costs instead o f  principle o f  allowances in-kind for dental prostheses and 
orthodontics: the health insurance reimburses 50% o f the costs o f  the treatment.
The co-payment for hospital stays is increased from DM5 to 10 per day (max. 14 days).
Introduction o f ,hardship clause’: insured with a household income up to 40% o f a monthly reference are exempt 
from co-payments.
Reduction o f  death benefit; for persons insured after January 1989, death benefit is abolished completely.
Increase o f  co-payments 
—* “Commitment-Breaking "
50% reimbursement o f  costs for dental 
treatment
—* “Commitment-Breaking”
Abolition/Reduction o f death benefit 
—* “Commitment-Breaking ”
1989/
1990
1992 Pension Reform [Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung, R R G 1992]:
The health insurance contribution for beneficiaries o f  replacement benefits o f  the Federal Employment Agency is 
calculated on the basis o f 80% (formerly: 100%) o f the last gross wage.
Reduction o f  revenues for health insurance 
carriers
— *• “Commitment-Breaking ”
1993 Healthcare Structure Act [Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (GSG)]:
Co-payments for all pharmaceuticals (also fixed amount drugs).
The co-payments for hospital stays (formerly DM10 per day) is changed: for the old Lander to DM 11 (1993) and 
DM12 (from 1994), and for the new Lander to DM8 (1993) and DM9 (from 1994).
Exclusion o f orthodontic treatment for adults from the catalogue o f benefits covered.
Predefinition o f  a pharmaceuticals- and remedies-budget for an unlimited period and linking o f  its adjustment to 
the base rate o f  pay.
Foundation o f  an Institute for Pharmaceuticals, whose task is mainly the drafting o f  a ,positive list’ o f  
prescribable drugs.
Budgeting o f  the health insurance expenditure for travel expenses and stationary cures (1993 until 1995). 
Abolition o f  the principle o f  original cost coverage (Selbstkostendeckungsprinzip) in hospital financing and 
introduction o f performance-oriented allowances (case-based lump sums, extra fees) from 1995. For 1993 until 
1995 fixed hospital budgets are introduced; the development o f  expenditure is linked to the base rate o f pay 
Lowering o f  the payments for dental and orthodontic services by 10% in 1993 and introduction o f  a degressive 
point value for all dental services in case o f  exceeding a certain amount o f points. Total pay for panel dentists
Increase o f  co-payments 
— *  “Commitment-Breaking”
Exclusion o f  certain treatments 
— ► “Commitment-Breaking”
Pre-defined budgets 
— ► “Commitment-Restraining"
Competition between health insurance 
carriers
— ► “Commitment-Controlling"
Pensioners formerly voluntary insured are 
now excluded from mandatory insurance 
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase o f  
Revenues
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linked to base rate o f  pay for the years 1993 until 1995. Restriction o f admissions o f panel dentists from 1999. 
Introduction o f a national (separated for old and new Lander) and for all types o f insurance funds comprehensive 
revenue-oriented risk equalisation process (Risikostrukturausgleich, RSA) from 1994/95. Relevant factors for the 
equalisation are the base rate o f  pay, the quota o f co-insured, the age- and the gender structure.
Equal right o f choice o f insurer for workers and employees from 1996/97 (exceptions only remain for special 
systems).
Voluntarily insured are not longer compulsory insured in the health insurance for pensioners when taking up 
their old-age pension from 1993 onwards. All income o f these persons (with exception o f  the pension) is 
therefore subject to the full contribution rate o f the GKV.
1995 3, Social Security Code VReform Act [3. SGB V-AndGJ:
Delay o f the new regulation scheduled in the GSG that the health insurance contributions for pensioners will 
have to be paid from January 1995 according to the individual contribution rate o f the health insurance o f each 
pensioners (and not as formerly according to the GKV-average) until July 1997.
1995 4. Social Security Code V Reform Act [4. SGB V-AndGJ:
The budgeting o f the Healthcare Structure Act (GSG) for the contractual ambulatory sector is broken up: the 
overall salary for ambulatory case is increased beyond the legal limit.
Partial abolition o f budget regulations 
—> “Commitment-Sustaining Increase o f 
Revenues
1996 5. Social Security Code V Reform Act [5, SGB V-AndGJ:
The regulations o f the GSG to compile a list o f recommendations for a ‘positive list’ o f prescribable drugs as 
well as to establish an Institution for Pharmaceuticals are abolished.
—> “Commitment-Sustaining”
1996 Hospital Expenditure Stabilisation Act [Gesetz zur Stabilisierung der KrankenhausausgabenJ:
Expenditure growth for hospitals in 1996 is limited to the linear increase o f salaries according to the wage 
agreement for federal employees BAT, i.e. 0.855% in West, and 1.106% in East.
Changes to budget adaptation; 
‘depoliticizing’ expenditure policies 
—► “Commitment-Restraining”
1997 Contribution Relief Act [Beitragsentlastungsgesetz (BeitrEntlG)J:
Temporary abolition o f contribution autonomy: Contribution increases in 1996 are only permitted if  authorised 
before the 10 May 1996 (exceptions: increases which are a sole consequence of the risk structure equalisation
Temporary abolition o f contribution 
autonomy
—► “Commitment-Restraining"
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process). At 1 January 1997, the contribution rates o f the GKV are mandatory reduced by 0.4%.
Insured bom after 1978 are not eligible for dental prostheses allowances in the future (allowances before: 50% or 
60%).
The co-payments for drugs increase from DM3, 5 and 7 to DM4, 6 and 8. The formerly granted allowance for 
glasses frames is abolished. Sickness pay is with immediate effect reduced from 80% to 70% o f the former net 
wage and to a maximum o f  90% (formerly: 100%) o f the net wage.
Exclusion o f benefits 
—► “Commitment-Breaking”
Increase o f Co-Payments:
—*• “Commitment-Breaking”
1997 i. Healthcare Reorganisation Act [Erstes GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz (L NOG)]:
If an insurance fund increases its contribution rate, insured have an early right o f cancellation.
If an insurance fund increases/reduces its contribution rate, this increases/reduces also the co-payments as well as 
the private share for dental prostheses for the insured o f this fund (per 0.1 contribution points change o f DM1 or 
1% point). This is not the case if  contribution increases are necessary due to changes in the obligations or the risk 
structure equalisation process.
Incentives for cost-efficient behaviour 
—> “Commitment-Controlling”
1997 2. Healthcare Reorganisation Act [Zweites GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz (2. NOG)]:
Further increase'of co-payments for drugs (from formerly DM4, 6 or 8 to DM9, 11 and 13). The co-payments for 
remedies increase from 10% to 15% o f costs. The co-payment for hospital stays increases from DM12 to DM17 
(new LSnder: from DM9 to DM14).
All fixed co-payment amounts are for the first time adjusted every two years according to the development o f  the 
reference parameter.
The statues o f the insurance funds can increase existing co-payments or introduce new ones for areas o f  
additional provisions.
Allowances for dental prostheses (for insured bom before 1979) are reduced from 50%/60% to 45%/55%.
The regional budgets for pharmaceuticals and remedies are abolished from 1998 and replaced by benchmarks for 
each group o f doctors. The benchmarks as well as possible sanctions are to be defined by the contractual 
partners. For performed services the doctors should be ensured fixed payments instead o f the former collective 
pay budgeting (Gesamtvergiitungs-Budgetierung), in case that the total volume o f claimed services by them does 
not exceed a certain limit (Regelleistungsvolumen); in case the limit is exceeded: reduced point value, but 
insurance funds have to prove that the health professional has acted inefficiently.
Increase o f Co-Payments and Reduction o f  
Benefits
—*• “Commitment-Breaking”
[Reversed in 1998]
Abolition o f  budgets and replacement with 
benchmarks, bargained by the contractors 
—> “Commitment-Restraining”: 
automatisation o f expenditure limits
1998 GKV Finances Strenghtening Act [GKV-Finanzstarkungsgesetz (GKVFG')]:
The insurance funds become the legal possibility to avoid contribution rate increases until the end o f 1998 in the
Possibilities o f financing via credit
—* “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase o f
Revenues
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new LSnder by taking up loans (authorised by the supervisoiy authority).
Regarding the formerly for the old and new Lander separate risk structure equalisation process is a temporary 
(until the end o f 2001) legal adjustment introduced, which aims at the equalisation o f financial power (base rate 
o f pay). The resulting equalisation payments in favour o f the contribution payers in the new Lander are in 1999 
limited to DM1.2 bn.
The mid-1997 introduced automaticity between contribution increase and co-payment increase (1. NOG) does 
not affect contribution increases coming into effect before the 31.12.1998.
Equalisation o f base rate o f pay nationwide: 
transfer to East Germany 
—► ‘‘Commitment-Sustaining”: Revenue- 
Shifting
1999 Strengthening of Solidarity in the Statutory Health Insurance Act [GKV 
Solidaritatsstarkungsgesetz (GKV-SolG)]:
The co-payment share o f 20% (for the second and further children 10%) payable to the contracted dentist is 
refunded by the insurance funds.
All insured, also the ones bom after 1978, are again eligible for the medically necessary provision with dental 
prostheses; the provision is again (against the regulations o f the 2. NOG) carried out as allowance in kind 
The fixed co-payment concept o f the 2. NOG is abolished; insured have generally -  as until mid-1997, to finance 
50% o f the costs o f dental treatments themselves.
Reduction o f co-payments for drugs from DM 9, 11 and 13 to DM8, 9 and 10.
Also eliminated: co-payments for psychotherapeutic treatments and for chronically ill after one year.
Abolition o f the possibilities for the insurance funds (granted by the 2. NOG) to vary co-payments and to 
introduce additional provisions; also abolition o f the dynamisation o f the co-payment amounts eveiy two years, 
as well as o f the coupling o f the amount o f co-payments and the development o f the contribution rate.
The possibility for compulsory insured (introduced by the 2. NOG) to choose cost compensation instead o f  
allowances in-kind is abolished again and limited (as with the GSG 1993) to voluntarily insured.
The formerly only temporarily introduced abolition o f the separation between old and new LSnder in the risk 
structure equalisation process becomes open-ended.
Expenditure limiting regulations for 1999:
The increase o f the overall payments for doctors is not to exceed the increase o f contribution-based revenues in 
1998.
Two budgets are available for the provision o f  dental services: the budget for dental prostheses and orthodontic 
care is reduced by 5% compared to 1997; the budget for chirurgical dental treatments is fixed to the overall pay 
volume o f 1997.
The hospital budgets are limited to the growth o f contribution-based revenues.
The pharmaceutical and remedy budgets amount to the budgets of 1996, increased by 7.5%.
Reversal o f many former commitment- 
breaking reforms 
—> “Commitment-Sustaining"
Limitation o f budgets 
—* “Commitment-Restraining”
Fixation o f annual adjustments o f  budgets 
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining”
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2 0 0 0 Budget Recapitalisation Act [Haushaltssanierungsgesetz (HSanG)]:
Between July 2000 and June 2002, the increase o f the sickness pay after each year is not following the 
development o f net wages, but the development o f prices.
Change o f sickness pay adjustment 
—► "Commitment-Breaking”
2 0 0 0 GKV Healthcare Reform 2000 [GKVGesundheitsreform 2000]:
As in the past, the expenditure o f the GKV may only increase by the annual rate o f pay increases in the future. 
Nevertheless, departures can be made from this limit if  medically necessary treatment is at risk.
Hospitals and Health Insurance Funds are to introduce a comprehensive, performance-based and flat-rate price 
system for hospitals by 1 January 2003; more intensive efficiency controls in hospitals in order to check 
compliance with budget regulations.
Flat-rate allowances for financing o f hospital maintenance expenditures now for indefinite time period
The ministry o f  health is empowered to release a ‘positive list’ o f medication allowed to be prescribed (through
decree with consent o f die Bundesrat).
Persons, who after the age o f 55 become compulsory insured, are exempt from insurance, if they were not 
insured in the statutory health insurance during the last 5 years (this is also the case for spouses o f civil servants, 
self-employed or insurance-except employees if  they after the age o f 55 become subject to compulsory 
insurance). Also spouses, who were formerly privately insured, do not become access to the family co-insurance 
during times o f pregnancy or child rearing.
The insurance funds can decide in their statues under which conditions insured can receive bonuses in case they 
agree to join a GP-model.
The in 1996 abolished commitment o f  pharmacies to make use o f cheaper, imported drugs again becomes legal 
duty.
Insurance funds become power to agree contracts with individual or groups o f ambulatory service providers and 
hospitals which offer such integrated treatment.
Limitation o f budget increases 
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining”
Flat-rate price system for hospitals 
—► “Commitment-Controlling”
Exemption o f insured without sufficient 
contribution times strengthens contribution- 
principle
—► “Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening of 
Eligibility
Introduction o f  GP-Model, Bonus-System 
and Integrated Treatment Models: Promotion 
o f Cost-Efficiency 
—*■ “Commitment-Controlling"
2 0 0 0 Legal Approximation in the Statutory Health Insurance Act [Gesetz zur Rechtsangleichung in der 
gesetzlichen KrankenversicherungJ:
Introduction o f the national, complete risk structure equalisation process in 2000.
Basis for the calculation o f the transfers: standardised expenditure for provisions on the one, and contribution- 
based revenues o f the health insurances on the other side; has the effect that the GKV East and GKV West have 
available the same base rate o f pay for the financing o f their individual, risk-weighted expenditure.
Increase o f the volume o f  transfers from 
West to East; Raising o f contribution ceiling 
—► “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase of 
Revenues
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From 2001 onwards, the social security ceiling as well as the contribution assessment ceiling in the new Lander 
is raised to the level o f the old Lander; from this point also the co-payments are raised to the same level.
2001 Old Age Assets Supplementation Act [Altersvermogenserganzungsgesetz (AvmEG)]:
The annual adjustment o f sickness pay is linked to the last pension adjustment rate (formerly: inflation 
adjustment).
—> "Commitment-Breaking"
200 1 Fixed Amounts Adjustment Act [Festbetrags-Anpassungsgesetz (FBA G)J:
The Ministry o f Health is empowered (until the end o f 2003) to enact via decree (with approval o f the Ministry 
of Economics and Technology, and without approval o f the Bundesrat)
o  a one-time general adjustment o f the fixed amounts for pharmaceuticals
o  new definitions o f groups o f pharmaceuticals and regulations o f  their fixed amounts, in case this is 
factually justified.
Reduction o f budgetary autonomy 
—»■ “Commitment-Restraining”
2001 Pharmaceutical Budget Reform Act [Arzneimittelbudget-Ablosungsgesetz (ABAC')]:
Abolition o f  the former regulations regarding the pharmaceutical budget and the legally regulated presetting for 
the lowering o f the overall pay for the ambulatory sector in case o f an excession o f the budget limit.
Instead o f the former budget, now the self-administration is supposed to reach annual pharmaceutical agreements 
on a regional level; the agreement should connect an annual expenditure volume with an agreement about targets 
o f provision and efficiency, connected with appropriate implementation measures and controlling. The self- 
administration on the national level is providing a framework o f targets.
The expenditure volume o f the pharmaceutical agreement can also during the year be amended by the self­
administration, or -  in case o f non-agreement -  be increased by the Ministry o f Health via decree (with approval 
of the Bundesrat).
There are no legal guidelines regarding sanctions for the exceedance o f  the expenditure volume; possibility o f  
bonus regulations if compliance with budget targets.
Self-Administration regains budgetary 
independence; agreement o f targets, state 
intervention in case o f failure; 
‘depoliticizing’ expenditure policies 
—► “Commitment-Restraining”
2001 Health Insurance Suffrage Reform Act [Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Krankenkassenwahlrechte]:
Period o f commitment to one health insurance provider is extended.
Competition-element is reduced again 
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining”
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2 0 0 2 Risk Structure Equalisation Process Reform Act (Gesetz zur Reform des Risikostrukturausgleichs 
in der GKV):
For a transition period from 2002 until maximum the end o f 2006, the equalisation factors o f the existing risk 
structure equalisation process (RSA) between the insurance funds are expanded: independent ride group for 
insured with chronicle illnesses.
Risk pool for expenditures for insured who receive treatment far beyond the average costs.
From 2007 onwards, the contribution-demands o f insurance funds within the RSA are determined on the basis o f  
direct morbidity characteristics o f  the insured.
Increase o f financial interdependencies 
—*■ "Commitment-Sustaining”
2 0 0 2 Pharmaceutical Expenditure Limitation Act (Arzneimittelausgaben-Begrenzungsgesetz, AABG):
In the future, pharmacies are obliged to choose a low-price drug (with the same effect and same ingredients) if  
available (but doctors can actively rule out this option).
The discount on prices for drugs which has to be passed on from the pharmacies to the insurance funds (in 2002 
and 2003) is increased from 5% to 6%.
Instead o f the initially planed 4% price reduction as well as the price moratorium for non-fixed-price drugs 
(planed savings o f €480 m), the Associations o f  the Researching Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) commit 
themselves to provide €200 m for the consolidation o f the GKV finances.
—*■ “Commitment-SustainingIncrease of 
Revenues
2 002 Contribution Rate Maintenance Act (Beitragssatzsicherungsgesetz):
Increase o f social security ceiling.
Reduction o f death benefit for persons insured in January 1989.
Increased pharmacy discount now beyond 2003; above certain price limit, higher discounts apply 
Instead o f an adaptation o f the pay sums according to the development o f the base rate o f pay in the central 
provision sectors (doctors, dentists, hospitals), there is a zero-round in 2003; reduction o f compensated 
maximum prices for dentistry services by 5%, and also here zero-round in wage bargains.
From the 7 November 2002 until 2003, contribution rate increases are only allowed in legally defined 
exceptional cases (in order to counter-balance the increase o f pension contribution rates to 19.5%).
Increase o f contribution ceiling; higher
pharmaceutical discounts
—*■ “Commitment-SustainingIncrease o f
Revenues
Freezing o f health professional wages; 
Temporary Abolition o f Contribution 
Autonomy
—► "Commitment-Restraining"
2 0 0 2 10. Social Security Code VReform Act (10. SGB V-Anderungsgesetz):
Pension recipients, which do not fulfil the necessary pre-insurance times for the health insurance for pensioners 
and which were voluntarily insured (Healthcare Structure Act 1993), become again mandatory insured (due to 
decisions o f the constitutional court) -  i.e., contribution payments on additional income are omitted .
Restriction o f compulsory insurance 
—*• “Commitment-SustainingIncrease o f  
Revenues and Tightening o f Eligibility
365
For recipients o f a pension up to €335 monthly, who have formerly been co-insured without paying 
contributions, the introduction o f  the general mandatory insurance means that they also become mandatory 
insured from April 2002.
2003 Case-Based Lump Sum Act (Fallpauschalengesetz -  FPG):
Specification o f the performance-oriented price system for hospitals introduced with the GKV Healthcare 
Reform 2000. The new price system is based on the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), and is introduced for all 
hospitals that are subject to the DRG price system in 2003. In January 2004, this price system is introduced 
mandatory for all hospitals.
—► “Commitment-Controlling”
2004 Statutory Health Insurance Modernisation Act (GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz, GMG):
Increase o f co-payments: generally 10% o f costs for all provisions (min. €5, max. €10); €10 practice fee for 
ambulatory treatment.
Debt limit: 2% o f  annual gross income for living expenses.
Elimination o f  certain provisions from the benefit catalogue (death benefits, dental prostheses, travel costs, etc.).
From 2006 onwards, insured have to pay an additional exceptional contribution o f 0.5% o f their gross wage 
subject to contributions. For occupational pensions and income from self-employed labour, pensioners pay now 
the full (formerly: half) contribution rate.
as a lump-sum compensation for provisions by the insurance funds for insurance-external benefits the federal 
government pays €1 bn in 2004, €2.5 bn in 2005 and €4.2 bn in 2006; financed by increase o f tobacco tax 
All insured (formerly: only voluntary insured) can choose cost compensation instead o f in-kind provision; 
insurance funds can now also offer cost-sharing in return for contribution reductions.
The regulations regarding a positive-list are abolished.
The number o f Physician-Associations is reduced from 23 to approx. 18 through mergers.
Administrative costs o f the insurance funds are linked to the development of the base rate o f pay until 2007 or 
are frozen, in case they are 10% above the average o f all insurance funds.
Act is intended to disencumber the health 
insurance by €10 bn.
Increase o f co-payments; elimination o f  
certain provisions 
—► “Commitment-Breaking"
Introduction o f  additional contribution; 
increase o f pensioner contribution rate 
—♦ “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f 
Revenues
Tax-compensation for insurance-external 
benefits
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase o f  
Revenues
Automatisation o f  administrative cost 
developments
—► “Commitment-Restraining”
2005 Financing of Dental Prostheses Reform Act (Gesetz zur Anpassung der Finanzierung von 
Zahnersatz):
Cancellation o f the regulations in the GMG regarding dental prostheses: the provision remains part o f the benefit
Shift o f financial burden to employees
Reduction o f  budgetary independence by the 
social partners
—*■ “Commitment-Restraining”
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catalogue o f  the GKV; also the former regulations regarding hardship cases is maintained.
The exceptional contribution o f  0.5% is brought forward to the 1 July 2005 and is increased to 0.9%. Parallel to 
the charging o f  this exceptional contribution, the other contribution rates are reduced by law, without a decision 
by the self-administration or the approval o f  a supervisory authority being necessary.
Unempl’oyment Insurance
Year Reform Effect
1991 Statutory Pension Insurance and Federal Employment Office Contribution Rate Reform Act 
[Gesetz zur Anderung der Beitragssdtze in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und bei der 
Bundesanstalt fu r  Arbeit]:
Increase o f  the unemployment contribution rate from 4.3% to 6.8% in April 1991.
Reduction o f  the contribution rate from 6.8% to 6.3% from Januaiy 1992.
Strong increase o f  contribution rate 
— *  “Commitment-Sustaining": Revenue 
Increase
1991 Employment Promotion Law and Other Social Regulations Reform Act (Gesetz zur Anderung 
arbeitsforderungsrechtlicher und anderer sozialrechtlicher Vorschriften):
From July, the age limit for the receipt o f  the Old-Age Transition Pay (Aliig) is reduced from 57 to 55 years; the 
duration o f  eligibility is accordingly extended from 3 to 5 years.
—* “ Commitment-Sustaining Tightening o f  
Eligibility
1993 Conditions in the Employment Promotion Law Reform Act (Gesetz zur Anderung von 
Fordervoraussetzungen im Arbeitsforderungsgesetz und in anderen Gesetzen):
General tightening o f  the control o f  employment promotion measures and o f  eligibility criteria.
— >  “Commitment-Controlling"
1993 Compensation fo r Old-Age Transition Pay Provisions Act (Gesetz iiber den Ausgleich von 
Aufwendungen fu r das Altersubergangsgeld):
In order to compensate the Federal Employment Agency for Old-Age Transition Payments in 1993 to insured 
over 60 years, the BA receives a lump-sum compensation from the pension insurance carriers o f  DM1.6 bn.
Increase o f  inter-sectoral insurance transfers 
from pension to unemployment insurance 
— ► “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase o f  
Revenues
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1993 Amendment o f the Compensation for Old-Age Transition Pay Provisions Act (Anderung des 
Gesetzes iiber den Ausgleich von Aufwendungen fur das Altersubergangsgeld):
In order to compensate for expenditures by the BA in 1994 for payments o f the Old-Age Transition Pay (Altig) it 
receives a lump sum compensation o f DM2 bn from the pension insurance carriers.
—*• “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f 
Revenues
1993 Budget Law 1993 (Haushaltsgesetz 1993):
Increase o f the contribution rate for the BA from 6.3% to 6.5%.
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f 
Revenues
1993 Implementation of the Federal Consolidation Program Act (Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Foderalen 
Konsolidierungsprogramms (FKPG) bzw. ftSolidarpaktff):
Short-time work benefit (KurzarbeitergeldKug) is only paid if  the beneficiary is available for recruitment, and if 
the employer agrees to the placement o f the employee with another employer.
If Kug is paid longer than 6 months, the BA allowance for the pension insurance contributions o f  the employer is 
omitted.
The formerly semi-annual adaptation o f the wage replacement benefits o f the BA in the new Lander is -  as in the 
old Lander -  changed to an annual rhythm. It is also linked now to the actual development o f the gross wage sum 
for average employees, not anymore the predicted development.
—*• “Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening o f  
Eligibility
Change o f benefit adaptation 
—* “Commitment-Breaking"
1994 First Act Implementing the Savings-, Consolidation- and Growth-Program (Erstes Gesetz zur 
Umsetzung des Spar-, Konsolidierungs- und Wachstumsprogramms, 1. SKWPG):
The Minister can implement the budget on his own authority if  the Council does not accept the budgetary 
stipulations imposed by the Minister. This situation can arise, only if  the BA's budget is in deficit (§216 AFG), 
i.e. it is unable to finance proposed expenditures through its own resources (unemployment benefit contributions) 
and any reserves it may have accumulated).
The contribution rate remains at 6.5%; from 1995 onwards, the federal government can decide temporary 
reductions o f  the contribution rate via decree.
Cutting o f benefits (the first since 1982/83):
Unemployment insurance benefits for unemployed without children are reduced from 63 to 60% and 
unemployment assistance benefits from 56 to 53 per cent o f previous net earnings; transition benefits in case o f  
professional rehabilitation are cut from 80%/70% to 75%/68%.
Major reduction o f  budgetaiy autonomy 
—► “Commitment-Restraining"
Reduction o f  benefit levels; change o f  
calculation formula 
—> “Commitment-Breaking”
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The maximum payment o f primary unemployment assistance is limited to one year.
The calculation period for die amount o f unemployment benefit is extended from 3 to 6 months.
Beneficiaries o f Altig (Old-Age Transition Pay), who are eligible for an old-age pension, have to take up this 
pension as soon as possible; otherwise their Altig eligibility is interrupted.
Requirements for unemployment assistance recipients to improve their employability or to cany out community- 
related work are tightened.
The jobs created within the framework o f the Job Creation Measures (ABM) are no longer paid in line with the 
public sector pay-scale (initially only for the new Lander, but extended nation-wide in 1994)
Mandatory take-up o f available pensions 
—► “Commitment-SustainingShifting o f 
insured into other scheme
1997 Employment and Growth Act (Wachstums- und Beschdftigungsforderungsgesetz, WFG):
The annual adjustment o f the assessment base for the wage replacement benefits o f the BA (as Unemployment 
Benefit, Uhg, Altig) is abolished in 1997.
—* “Commitment-Breaking”
1997 Employment Promotion Reform Act, Article 11 [Arbeitsforderungs-Reformgesetz (AFRG, Artikel 
11)1:
Acceptability criteria (introduced in 1982) were redefined. Recipients o f  unemployment assistance are no longer 
allowed to decline jobs that do not correspond with their formal qualification and their previous occupation. 
Recipients were also obliged to accept a much stronger decline in income than it had been the case before. 
Finally, the ‘acceptable’ time spent for commuting was raised.
Unemployed were obliged to prove their efforts to find new employment.
Various forms o f  wage subsidies for employers who hired a (long-term) unemployed introduced.
Dismissal compensations by the enterprise should reduce the level o f unemployment benefits and assistance,
A new ‘integration treaty’ (as a substitute for a labour contract) between employer and employee was created 
which abolished dismissal rights for long-term unemployed for a period of some months.
The second labour maricet was to be restricted to long-term unemployed (95% o f all measures for this group); 
reduced subsidies to employment agencies.
The duration o f extended eligibility for unemployment benefit due to former contribution duration and age o f the 
unemployed is shortened: eligibility duration over 12 months now only for unemployed aged 45 (formerly: 42), 
and reaching o f maximum duration o f 32 months only for unemployed aged 57 (formerly: 54).
Redefinition o f acceptability criteria: 
elimination o f  equivalence-principle due to 
occupational protection 
—► ‘‘Commitment-breaking”
Extended benefit duration is shortened
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining": Tightening o f
Eligibility
1998 Employment Promotion Reform Act, Article 1 [Arbeitsforderungs-Reformgesetz (AFRG, Artikel
Dl:
Redefinition o f eligibility criteria 
—> “Commitment-Avoiding”
Restriction o f eligibility to ‘real’ contribution
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No new entitlements to unemployment benefit due to further education measures.
Continuing personal notification o f unemployment in order to maintain eligibility.
Unemployment benefit eligibility can only be gained through contribution times (not longer: equated times); the 
assessment period for the calculation o f the amount is extended to 12 months (before: 6 months).
The assessment base for benefits now includes the total salary subject to contributions (i.e., also extra hours). 
Income from minor employment or from self-employment is now credited against the unemployment benefit. 
Blocking times can now much more easily lead to a loss o f eligibility for unemployment benefits.
times
Commitment-Sustaining”: Tightening of 
Reciprocity
Expansion o f assessment base
—»■ “Commitment-Sustaining”: Revenue
Increase
Crediting o f additional income: reduction of
insurance factor
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking”
1999 Second Social Security Code III Reform Act [2. SGB III-AndG]:
Personal notification not longer necessary; acceptable commuting time is reduced again.
3-year protection o f  status quo in calculation o f unemployment benefit and assistance: in case employees accept 
a lower-paid job, the former higher wage is used for the calculation o f unemployment benefit if  this job is lost. 
Shorter unemployment period for eligibility for ABM.
In future entitlement to unemployment benefit remains dormant if a settlement is paid and the relevant period o f  
notice is not kept to. The employer is obliged to reimburse the unemployment benefit for older workers under 
certain conditions.
—*■ Commitment-Breaking: minor change 
[Reversed in 1999!]
1999 Redundancy Payment Reform Act [Entlassungsentschadigungs-Anderungsgesetz (EEAndG)]:
The increased crediting o f redundancy payments against unemployment benefits is abolished.
—> Commitment-Sustaining
1999 Corrections in the Social Insurance and Maintenance of Employee Rights Act [Gesetz zu 
Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der ArbeitnehmerrechteJ:
The costs o f the emergency program against youth unemployment are not covered by the federal government, 
but from the Federal Unemployment Agency (justification: the financing o f the program mainly via funds which 
were otherwise used for the financing o f youth unemployment).
Shifting o f financial burden from state to 
insurance
—*■ “Commitment-Breaking"
2000 Budget Recapitalisation Act [Haushaltssanierungsgesetz]: —* “Commitment-Breaking” 
[Reversed in 2001]
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The annual adjustment o f the wage replacement benefits does not follow any longer the development o f gross 
wages, but the consumer price index (from July 2000 until June 2002).
2 0 0 0 Third Social Security Code III Reform Act [3, SGB III-AndG]:
The eligibility for unemployment assistance without former eligibility for unemployment benefit (e.g., due to 
employment for only 5 months) is abolished.
—► "Commitment-SustainingTightening of 
Eligibility
2001 Old Age Assets Supplementation Act [Altersvermdgensergdnzungsgesetz (AvmEG)]:
The adjustment o f  replacement benefits o f the BA is linked again to the gross wage development in the former 
year.
—► "Commitment-Sustaining”
2 0 0 2 Simplification of the Election of Employee Representatives in the Supervisory Body Act [Gesetz zur 
Vereinfachung der Wahl der Arbeitnehmervertreter in den Aufsichtsrat]:
The Federal Employment Agency gets a board with three directors (recommendation right o f the government), 
which is employed on a contractual basis for 5 years. The tripartite administrative board, which controls the 
board o f directors, is reduced to 21 members and the competences o f the self-administration are reduced.
Increase o f  govemment-influence in self­
administration
—► "Commitment-Controlling ”
2003 First and Second Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market [Erstes und Zweites Gesetz fiir 
moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt (‘Hartz’)]:
Social assistance and unemployment benefits will be for the first time administered together and a new job­
seekers allowance is introduced. The communal carriers will be responsible for essential needs like housing, 
child-care or clothing. The Federal Employment Agency will be responsible for all other benefits, in particular 
all employment-related benefits, all benefits for living-maintenance (unemployment benefits I and II, additional 
needs), and the payment o f all other social security contributions.
Employees are obliged to immediately report their unemployment, otherwise their benefits are reduced; blocking 
times are aggravated.
Unemployment benefit as well as other replacement benefits are not longer adjusted to the general wage 
development (‘ Entdynamisierung').
Unemployed aged 50 or older, which take up employment but have a remaining eligibility for unemployment 
benefit, are eligible for further provisions (wage supplement or additional contribution to the pension insurance).
—* “Commitment-Sustaining Tightening o f  
Eligibility
Benefit Reductions for Short-Term Insured 
and Long-Term Unemployed 
—* “Commitment-Breaking”
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2004 Labour Market Reform Act [Gesetz zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt]:
The maximum duration o f unemployment benefit is reduced to 12 months (for unemployed aged 55 and older to 
18 months).
—► "Commitment-Breaking”
2004 Third Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market [Drittes Gesetz fur moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt (\Hartz *)]:
The Federal Employment Office is renamed Federal Employment Agency (structured in central office, regional 
offices and employment agencies).
Unemployment Benefit and Subsistence Allowance are merged: unemployment benefit is paid in case o f  
unemployment as well as in case o f  professional further education (AlgA/AlgW).
In order to be eligible for unemployment benefit, a general former insurance duration o f 12 months is necessary: 
the special regulations o f 6 months (e.g., military service) is abolished. Furthermore, the insurance time o f 12 
months has to be fulfilled in the time frame o f  two (before: three) years; the possibility to extend the time frame 
is abolished.
—*■ “Commitment-Sustaining”: Tightening o f  
Eligibility
2005 Fourth Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market [Viertes Gesetz fur moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt ('Hartz*)]:
Unemployment assistance and social assistance are merged into a new benefit type, the ‘unemployment benefit 
II’ on the generosity level o f social assistance.
Carrier o f  the provisions is the Federal Employment Agency, whose financial expenses are then compensated by 
the federal government; the BA in turn compensates the government for former unemployment benefit recipients 
transferred into the Unemployment Benefit II (‘rejection fee’).
Funds are channeled away from contribution 
funds into government budget 
—► “Commitment-Breaking”
Financing and Budgeting
Year Reform Effect
1999 Short-Time Employment Reform Act [Gesetz zur Neuregelung der geringfugigen 
Beschaftigungsverhaltnisse]:
The income limit for short-time employment for all social insurance branches is nationwide fixed at 630DM per 
month.
Increase o f circle o f insured
—► “Commitment-Sustaining”: Increase o f
Revenues
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For employees in permanent short-time employment the employers pays a lump-sum contribution amounting to 
12% of the wage to the statutory pension insurance.
Employees in permanent short-time employment have the possibility, to turn down their insurance duty 
exemption; if  doing so, they have to pay the difference between their employers’ lump-sum contribution and the 
currently valid contribution rate o f the pension insurance (April 1999: 19.5%); in this case, they gain full pension 
entitlements.
If employees maintain their exemption, they are eligible to supplements to their pension points due to the lump­
sum payments o f  their employers.
For short-time employees which are co-insured in the statutory health insurance, the employers pays a lump-sum 
contribution o f 10% o f wages; this does not create an independent, new health insurance status and does not 
create additional entitlements to benefits.
1999 Self-Employment Promotion Act [Gesetz zur Fdrderung der SelbstdndigkeitJ:
The criteria regarding the pension insurance duty fo r ,employee-similar’ self-employed are changed: obligatory 
insured are now all persons, which fulfil the criteria o f  this category (do not employ an employee liable to social 
insurance contributions; are permanently and basically only working for one client); the client now is considered 
as employers, which has to fiilfil a duties based on the social security code.
Increase o f circle o f insured
—► “Commitment-Sustaining": Increase o f
Revenues
2002 Constitutional Court Ruling:
Until 2005, public pension income has been tax free. After a ruling o f the constitutional court in March 2002, this 
tax exemption is illegal and therefore will be reduced step-wise in a 35 year transformation period from 2005 on.
2002 Second Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market [Zweites Gesetz fur moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt]:
The income limit for short-time employees is raised from €325 to €300; the working time limit o f under 15 hours 
weekly is no longer applied
Above this limit, the employer contribution for social insurance increases step by step for the complete gross 
wage between €400 and 800. The starting point is at 4%, and increases up to half the current social insurance 
contribution rate (21%).
Reduction o f the contribution revenue for 
pension insurance; government burdens 
insurance with negative fiscal effects o f  
economic measures 
—» “Commitment-Breaking"
Sources: Steffen 2005; MISSOC various years; European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line; various other sources
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Appendix III: Development o f Social Insurance Contribution 
Rates
Social Insurance Contribution Rates Germany, 1991-2005
Year Pension Health (1) (2) Unemployment Long-term
Care
Total (1)
1991 until 31.3. 18.7 12.2(12.8) 4.3 X 35.2 (35.8)
from 1.4. 17.7 12.2(12.8) 6.8 36.7 (37.3)
1992 17.7 12.5 (12.7) 6.3 X 36.5 (36.7)
1993 17.5 13.4(12.5) 6.5 X 37.4 (36.5)
1994 19.2 13.4(13.0) 6.5 X 39.1 (38.7)
1995 18.6 13.2(12.8) 6.5 1.0 39.3 (38.9)
1996 u n t i l  30.6. 19.2 13.4(13.3) 6.5 1.7 40.1 (40.0)
From 1.7. 19.2 13.4(13.3) 6.5 1.7 40.8 (40.7)
1997 20.3 13.3(13.7) 6.5 1.7 41 .8(42.2)
1998 20.3 13.6(14.0) 6.5 1.7 42.1 (42.5)
1999 until 31.3. 20.3 13.5(13.9) 6.5 1.7 42.0 (42.4)
From 1.4. 19.5 13.5(13.9) 6.5 1.7 41.2 (41.6)
2000 19.3 13.5(13.8) 6.5 1.7 41.0(41.3)
2001 19.1 13.5(13.7) 6.5 1.7 40.8 (41.0)
2002 19.1 14.0(14.0) 6.5 1.7 41.3 (41.3)
2003 19.5 14.4(14.2) 6.5 1.7 42.1 (41.9)
2004 19.5 14.3(14.0) 6.5 1.7 42.0 (41.7)
2005 19.5 13.4+0.9* 6.5 42.0 (42.0)
Source: BMGS, VDR
(1) Old/New Lander
(2) Average contribution rate from 1 January
* For the first time, the principle o f equal contribution financing between employers and employees is 
broken, and the legally enforced reduction o f  health contribution rates by 0.9 percentage points is counter­
financed by an additional contribution financed solely by the insured
Contribution Rates Regime General (% o f Gross Wages), 1970-2004
1970 1981 1990 1995 2000 2004
Health Employer (total) 2 4.5 12.6 12.8 12.8 12.8
Employer (< ceiling) 10.25 8.95 - - - -
Employee (total) 1 5.5 5.9 6.8 0.75 0.75
Employee (< ceiling) 2.5 - - - - -
Pension Employer (total) - - - 1.6 1.6 1.6
Employer (< ceiling) 5.75 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
Employee (< ceiling) 3 4.7 7.6 6.5 6.55 6.55
Family Employer (total) - - 7 5.4 5.4 5.4
Employer (< ceiling) 10.5 9 - - - -
Long-term
Care
Employer (total) " “ " “ 0.3
Total < ceiling 35 40.85 41.3 39.7 33.7 33.7
Contributions total 3 10 25.5 25 18.95 19.25
CSG - - - 2.4 7.5 7.5
CRDS - - - - 0.5 0.5
TOTAL < ceiling 35 40.85 41.3 42.1 41.7 42
charges total 3 10 25.5 27.4 26.95 27.25
Source: INSEE
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Appendix IV: Social Security Funds France
Social Security Funds in 2004
TOTAL: 18 Funds with financial relations with the Regime general and ACOSS:
■ €52 bn o f  total revenues
■ €17 bn collected via URSSAF and ACOSS
■ €8 bn direct financing by the Regime General
Health Sector: 7 Funds
■ CMU (€0.25 bn)
■ Modernisation Etablissements de Sante Public et Prive (€0.40 bn)
■ Amelioration Qualite et Coordination des Soins Dispenses en Ville (€0.10 bn)
■ Information Professionnels de Sante (€0.02 bn)
■ Financement Allocation de Remplacement Service aux Medecins (€0.07 bn)
■ Prevention Bioterrorisme (€0.19 bn)
Occupational Accident Sector: 3 Funds
■ Financement Cessation Anticipde d’Activite des Salaries Exposes a l’Amiante (€0.45 bn)
■ Preparation des Prejudices liees a l’Amiante (€0.19 bn)
■ Financement des Anciennes Rentes accidents du travail (€0.06 bn)
Pension Sector: 2 Funds
■ Fonds de Solidarite Vieillesse (FSV) (€10.07 bn)
■ Fonds de Reserve des Retraites (FRR) (€1.66 bn)
Social Assistance Sector: 4 Funds
■ Financement des Depenses d’Allocation Supplem ental Invalidite (€0.25 bn)
■ Financement de l’Allocation Logement £ Caractere Social et de l’Allocation Logement 
Temporaire (€1.69 bn)
■ Financement de l’Aide Personnalisee au Logement (€3.13 bn)
■ Financement de 1’Allocation Personnalis6e d’Autonomie (€0.81 bn)
Family Sector: 1 Fund
■ Developpement des Structure d’Accueil de la Petite Enfance (€0.20 bn)
Reimbursement of Social Debts: 1 Fund
■ CADES (€4.10 bn)
Financing o f Employers Contribution Exemptions: 1 Fund 
■ FOREC (€1.5 bn)
Source: ACOSS; own amendments
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